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Abstract 
Action decisions can be directly driven by the current state of the external 
environment (instructed decisions); or they can be driven by internal mental states 
and goals, independently of the current environment (intentional decisions).  
Neural, behavioural and subjective data suggests that two separate neural systems 
may drive instructed and intentional action respectively. The distinction can be 
generalized beyond action itself to action inhibition, also classifiable as either 
instructed or intentional.  
However, the validity of the instructed/intentional distinction remains controversial. 
This thesis presents three linked sets of experiments that explored the validity and 
generality of the distinction, extending it in two key directions: action inhibition and 
subjective experience. The first group of experiments concerned decision making 
processes related to action and inhibition; the second focused on the period between 
decision making and action execution and the third on the subjective experience of 
intentional actions.  
Decision making processes were addressed by comparing electrophysiological and 
subjective measures prior to, during and after decisions to act or inhibit action. In the 
absence of external imperatives, intentional decisions may capitalize on spontaneous 
neural fluctuations, and show a weaker neural code than their instructed 
counterparts.  
To further explore the relative strength of intentional decisions, the period between 
decision making and action execution was addressed with EEG and behavioural 
methods. No evidence for unstable intentional decisions was found, during decision 
maintenance.  Intentional action decisions may be strong, and persistent. 
Finally, two experiments directly compared the subjective experience of intentional 
and instructed actions. Neuroimaging results revealed possible mechanisms 
associated with the subjective experience of acting intentionally.  
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Together, results support the broad distinction between instructed and intentional 
decisions. In particular, the coding of intentional actions may involve partial 
activations of alternative responses. Importantly, the thesis also demonstrates the 
feasibility of experimental studies addressing the subjective experience of intentional 
behaviour. 
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Chapter 1  General introduction 	  
 
“Desire, wish, will, are states of mind which everyone 
knows, and which no definition can make plainer. We 
desire to feel, to have, to do, all sorts of things which at 
the moment are not felt, had, or done. If with the desire 
there goes a sense that attainment is not possible, we 
simply wish; but if we believe that the end is in our 
power, we will that the desired feeling, having, or doing 
shall be real; and real it presently becomes, either 
immediately upon the willing or after certain 
preliminaries have been fulfilled.  
The only ends which follow immediately upon our 
willing seem to be movements of our own bodies. …” 
(James, 1890) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 	  
In the general introduction, the literature on neural systems for action and action 
inhibition is reviewed, focusing on conceptual and functional distinctions between 
instructed and intentional systems for action. Action inhibition systems can also be 
classified into instructed or intentional. The roles of subjective reports and 
neurophysiological data in studying the distinction between instructed and 
intentional behaviour are considered.   
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1. 1      Definitions and scope 
An action such as moving one’s hand may either be a direct and immediate result of 
an imperative stimulus (e.g., reaching towards a falling object), or may occur for 
reasons that seem unrelated to any single identifiable stimulus at all, but are instead 
strongly related to the internal states of the individual (e.g., reaching towards a book 
that one wants to read).  
Motor behaviour can thus be broadly divided in two main categories, namely 
stimulus driven or instructed; and stimulus independent or intentional. Instructed 
behaviour can be directly related to an imperative stimulus. Conversely, intentional 
behaviour does not obviously relate to any external stimulus but instead to internal 
states (i.e., desires, intentions). The intentional/instructed distinction recalls the 
accepted distinction between respondent and operant behaviour. Skinner (Skinner, 
1938) first noted that the causes of an animal’s behaviour may have come from one 
of two main sources. First, causal factors of behaviour may be found in the 
immediate external environment (e.g., food presented causes an animal to approach a 
person). Alternatively, it may be necessary to consider the internal states of an 
animal to explain behaviour (e.g., an animal approaches a person in order to be 
petted). In the first case, a change in the environment directly causes behaviour. In 
the second case, a change in the animal’s internal states is responsible for the 
observed behaviour.  
These internal states are also ultimately related to the external environment, and 
could thus be seen as representations that mediate between the external world and 
the expression of behaviour. This mediation means that intentional behaviour can be 
remote in time from many of the factors that are relevant to its causation, and thus 
shows ”freedom from immediacy” (Shadlen & Gold, 2004). 
To address mechanism of motor behaviour, an established experimental tradition has 
studied action processes. Mechanisms of intentional action processes have been 
contrasted with those of instructed action, in order to isolate the neural mechanisms 
underlying volition.  
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Intentional behaviour requires impulse control 
Importantly however, voluntary behaviour very often requires self-control. It is clear 
that many times it is necessary not to respond to stimuli that are encountered in the 
external world. In other words, in order to be intentional creatures, individuals need 
to be able to stop being externally-driven creatures. For this reason, actions made, or 
those not made, are the result of a balance between positive and negative motor 
inhibitory components. 
Inhibition of action produces, by definition, no behavioural effect. Thus, perhaps for 
methodological reasons, empirical studies have focussed on intentional action and 
neglected processes of intentional inhibition. Importantly however, observations 
from both healthy and clinical populations stress the importance of understanding the 
mechanisms of intentional inhibition.  
Introspection suggests that restraining our impulses can sometimes be very hard. 
Containing an angry reaction or controlling addictive behaviour is normally effortful. 
Within the neuropsychological data, some puzzling disorders (such as anarchic hand 
syndrome and utilization behaviour) reveal deficiencies in action inhibition 
mechanisms. Therefore, an empirical approach to intentional behaviour should 
address mechanisms of action inhibition as well as mechanism of action execution.   
To approach the study of intentional behaviour, this introduction makes use of three 
conceptual distinctions. First, a conceptual distinction between intentional and 
instructed behaviour is presented. The evidence supporting this conceptual 
distinction relies mainly on the study of action mechanisms. Therefore the 
neuroanatomical properties of action systems and their functional relevance are 
discussed. 
Second, a unifying conceptual framework is considered for the study of behaviour 
(the “what, when, whether” model of action decisions).   
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Third, a parallel is drawn between action and inhibition processes. In particular, it is 
suggested that the distinction between intentional and instructed action systems may 
be mirrored by a distinction between intentional and instructed inhibition systems. 
Consequently, the neuroanatomical properties of inhibition systems and their 
functional relevance are discussed.  
 
1. 2      Voluntary action 
1. 2. 1  Neuroanatomy of action systems 	  
The neuroanatomy of action systems has been extensively studied, and most of the 
relevant information comes from primate studies. The functional correspondence 
between human and primate anatomy has been addressed primarily from human 
neuroimaging studies, but is yet to be fully elucidated.  
If a neuroanatomical structure is related to intentional behaviour, it should show two 
main characteristics. First, it should clearly be related to movement, or inhibition of 
movement. Second and importantly, it should be related to intentions. That is, its 
activity should bear a relationship with some higher-level feature of movement, such 
as target acquisition, goal representation, prospective memory for action, etc. For 
example, the muscles and the motoneurons that excite them are clearly related to 
movement execution, but not to the expression of intentions. Therefore, although 
limb muscles are clearly fundamental for the physical expression of intentions, their 
electrical activity will say little about how intentional control is achieved. Therefore, 
these two aspects are important in the exploration of volitional systems. 
Consequently, the relationships between neural activity and both movement and 
intention are considered in the following description of the motor system.  
The main cortical areas identified as directly involved in action systems are the 
primary motor cortex (M1), the premotor cortex (PMC) and the supplementary 
motor cortices, including the supplementary and presupplementary motor areas 
(SMA and preSMA) and the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) (see figure 1.1). 
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Subcortical components include the thalamus, striatum, Globus Pallidus, Substantia 
Nigra and Subthalamic nucleus (see figure 1.2).  
All motor output ultimately follows the “final common pathway” (Sherrington, 
1906) of α-motoneurons that drive muscle contraction. The cortical neural structures 
close to the “output” end of the motor pathway are relatively easy to identify, and 
comprise the primary motor cortex. Neural structures that lie at the “input” end of 
the motor pathway modulate, drive and organize motor behaviour in a more 
hierarchical way. These structures are involved in other cognitive functions, and are 
not as easy to identify. Therefore, a useful approach is to follow the motor pathway 
in a direction that goes against the flow of information, (i.e. tracking back from the 
muscle to the source of the control signals), to describe the central contributions to 
motor control. What therefore follows is a description of the cortical and subcortical 
areas involved in controlling action and their functional relevance and 
interconnectivity. The subcortical contribution to action control will then be 
reviewed, in relation to action as well as to inhibition of action.  
 
 
Fig 1.1: A. Medial (right hemisphere) and B. lateral surfaces (left hemisphere) showing 
cortical motor primary and supplementary areas. Primary motor cortex (M1); premotor (PM; 
dorsal, PMd and ventral, PMv); (pre)supplementary motor area (preSMA); rostro cingulate 
zone (RCZ; anterior, RCZa and posterior RCZp). RCZ, comprise the cingulate motor areas 
(CMA). (Adapted from Duvernoy, 1991) 
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1. 2. 1. 1  Primary motor cortex 
The main cortical area that send projections to the spinal cord is the primary motor 
cortex (M1) (Fulton & Jacobsen, 1935) (See Fig 1.1). M1 possesses direct 
connections to the spinal cord, premotor areas, parietal cortices, thalamus and 
cerebellum (Guye et al., 2003), and is considered the main source of voluntary 
cortical motor commands to the body. Penfield and Boldrey (Penfield & Boldrey, 
1937) famously mapped the human M1 by direct electrical stimulation in 
intraoperative settings. Their work showed positive motor signs evoked in specific 
muscles, leading to the notion that M1 contains a precise somatotopical map of the 
body (as illustrated by the famous motor homunculus). In line with these findings, 
M1 was first thought to encode only relatively low-level movement features, and its 
activity was thought to be modulated only by the muscles required for the action. 
More recently however, the idea of a strict somatotopy in M1 has been challenged. 
Although the cortical representation of each muscle is partially segregated in M1, 
there is also a significant amount of overlap. This has been shown by single-cell 
recordings in the monkey M1 (Schieber & Hibbard, 1993) and confirmed by human 
neuroimaging studies, (e.g., Beisteiner et al., 2001; Hluštík, Solodkin, Gullapalli, 
Noll, & Small, 2001). The notion of a strict somatotopy has therefore been replaced 
by a notion of a certain degree of mosaicism. In other words, brain areas representing 
specific body areas are not fully segregated but can be found interdigitated. In 
addition, M1 does not only contain the representation of individual muscles. Instead, 
the activity of single M1 neurons has been shown to encode simple movements 
(Kakei, Hoffman, & Strick, 1999). The firing patterns of these “movement” 
encoding neurons did not depend on the specific muscle activity required for the 
movement, but on the final target position, in an extrinsic space. Together, these 
results suggest that M1 may code for some high-level aspects of action, rather than 
simply the specific pattern of muscle activity required.  
Upstream of M1, the premotor areas contribute to drive motor output. They may do 
so either through direct projections to the spinal cord or indirectly, through  
connections to M1 (Dum & Strick, 1991). Two sets of neural structures can be 
identified, and have a functional relevance for the distinction between intentional and 
instructed behaviour. This distinction will be discussed at length in section 1.2.2. 
Briefly, lateral premotor areas have been associated with instructed action, and 
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medial premotor areas with intentional action. The anatomical and functional 
features of these premotor and supplementary motor areas will be discussed in what 
follows. 
 
 
1. 2. 1. 2 Lateral premotor areas: premotor ventral and premotor dorsal 
surfaces 
The lateral premotor areas lie immediately upstream of M1. Consistent with monkey 
neuroanatomy (Dum & Strick, 1991), in humans the lateral surface of each 
hemisphere contains the premotor ventral (PMv) and premotor dorsal (PMd) 
surfaces. Tomassini et al (Tomassini et al., 2007) have studied the functional 
connectivity of the dorsal and ventral PMC through diffusion-weighted imaging 
tractography. Their results show that the connectivity profile of PMd is different 
from that of PMv. The PMd is most strongly connected to superior parietal areas and 
dorsal prefrontal areas, whereas the PMv is mainly connected to inferior parietal 
lobule and ventrolateral and orbital prefrontal areas. The connectivity-based 
distinction is consistent with functionally-derived distinctions (Mayka, Corcos, 
Leurgans, & Vaillancourt, 2006).  
Several monkey studies support a functional distinction between PMd and PMv. It 
has been suggested that the functions of PMv and PMd differ in terms of their 
integrative role in sensorimotor processing (Hoshi & Tanji, 2007). On the basis of 
monkey single-cell electrophysiology, Hoshi and Tanji suggest that the PMv has a 
simple or “direct” integrative function, and sends motor outputs to drive an action 
that directly matches a simple source of information. By contrast, they suggest that 
PMd has a major role in “indirect” sensorimotor processing, retrieving multiple sets 
of motor information from sensory signals, and integrating components of a required 
action to formulate a motor program for the intended action.  
In humans, the functional distinctions between PMd and PMv are less clear. One 
transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) study has yielded results consistent with the 
division of labour suggested by the monkey data (Davare, Andres, Cosnard, 
Thonnard, & Olivier, 2006). Transient virtual lesions (caused by repetitive TMS) of 
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PMv impaired specifically precision grasping functions, whereas repetitive TMS 
over PMd impaired the timing and coordination of different subcomponents of the 
movement. This result is consistent with a relatively more integrative role for PMd, 
and a lower-lever movement control role for PMv. However, both PMv and PMd in 
humans have been related to higher level motor functions, such as action imagery 
and mental hand rotation (Abe & Hanakawa, 2009; Rizzolatti, Fogassi, & Gallese, 
2002). 
In addition to the premotor areas of the lateral surface, three structures within the 
medial surface have been related to motor control. These are the supplementary 
motor area (SMA), located caudal to the anterior commissure; the preSMA, rostral to 
the anterior commissure and the cingulate motor areas (CMA). 
 
1. 2. 1. 3  Medial premotor areas: SMA and preSMA 
The first two medial areas that lie immediately upstream of M1 are the 
supplementary motor areas. The key difference between SMA and preSMA is their 
connectivity patterns (Picard & Strick, 2001). In humans, diffusion weighted 
imaging has shown that SMA and preSMA present clearly different connectivity 
profiles (Johansen-Berg et al., 2004). SMA was found to project to the spinal cord 
and M1, whereas only preSMA, showed connections with the prefrontal cortex and 
the medial parietal cortex. Both SMA and preSMA presented connections with the 
thalamus, but preSMA is connected to more anterior parts. These different properties 
vary along a rostrocaudal gradient, rather than showing a sharp separation between 
the two areas.  
Results from human neuroimaging studies consistently suggest that SMA and 
preSMA also differ in their functional properties. Whereas increases in blood-
oxygen level dependent (BOLD) activity in the SMA depend on aspects of 
movement behaviour e.g. movement force (Dettmers et al., 1995); preSMA 
activations are normally associated with the cognitive aspects  of the tasks (Jenkins, 
Jahanshahi, Jueptner, Passingham, & Brooks, 2000). 
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A final difference between SMA and preSMA is their degree of somatotopical 
organization. In humans, evidence for a coarse somatotopy comes from both direct 
electrical stimulation (Fried et al., 1991) and neuroimaging studies of movement of 
hand and foot (Cauda, Geminiani, D’Agata, Duca, & Katiuscia, 2011).  Interestingly, 
the neuroimaging study by Cauda et al showed that BOLD activity increases in 
ventral M1 (hand area) are accompanied by BOLD activity increases in rostral SMA. 
More dorsal M1 (foot area) BOLD activity levels are in turn accompanied by more 
caudal SMA activity, suggesting a somatotopical coupling between SMA and M1. In 
contrast there are no clear reports of somatotopy or effector-specificity in preSMA.   
In sum, there is considerable evidence suggesting that SMA is related to lower-level 
aspects of movement behaviour such as movement parameters, whilst preSMA 
seems to play a role in diverse higher-level cognitive tasks, such as action planning.  
The precise role of the preSMA is still a matter of debate (Nachev & Husain, 2010; 
R. E. Passingham, Bengtsson, & Lau, 2009). Three different functions have been 
proposed for the preSMA. Some of these seem to be simply different descriptions of 
the same function, so they can be grouped in three broad categories. These are in 
general terms (1) intention representation, (2) action plan maintenance and (3) 
response inhibition. 
First, increased preSMA BOLD activity has been associated with action intention 
representation, in cases of both the representation of our own intentions (H. Lau, 
Rogers, Haggard, & Passingham, 2004), action observation (Cunnington, 
Windischberger, & Moser, 2005) and voluntary action selection (Soon, Brass, 
Heinze, & Haynes, 2008; Zhang, Hughes, & Rowe, 2012). Intriguingly, Fried et al 
(Fried et al., 1991) found that direct electrical stimulation of SMA could induce 
conscious “urges” to move, suggesting a link between the SMA and the generation 
or introspection of intentions.  
Second, preSMA activity in either monkeys and humans has been related to motor 
learning (Hikosaka, Nakamura, Sakai, & Nakahara, 2002), maintenance in memory 
of action plans (Stadler et al., 2011), visuo-motor associations (Sakai et al., 1999), 
action sequence initiation (Kennerley, Sakai, & Rushworth, 2004) and updating of 
motion plans (Shima, Mushiake, Saito, & Tanji, 1996).  
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Third, preSMA has been related to response inhibition (Aron & Poldrack, 2006) and, 
more generally, to conflict resolution (Nachev, Kennard, & Husain, 2008). It has 
therefore been suggested that the diverse functions associated with increased 
preSMA BOLD activity should be parsimoniously interpreted as conflict resolution 
(Nachev, Rees, Parton, Kennard, & Husain, 2005). 
The disagreement in the precise function attributed to the preSMA may depend on 
the specific task demands, as several different functions may be subserved by one 
given area. Whatever function is associated with preSMA, it is clear that it plays an 
important role in volitional control in situations of ambiguity or the need for 
response selection, initiation or control.  
 
1. 2. 1. 4 Cingulate motor areas 
The cingulate motor area (CMA, see figure 1.1) lies anterior to the supplementary 
motor cortices. The CMA lies within the anterior cingulate cortex and projects to 
supplementary motor and premotor cortices as well with M1 and the spinal cord 
(Picard & Strick, 1996). This connectivity profile strongly suggests that the CMA is 
involved in motor control. In humans, CMA can be subdivided in three different 
zones that differ on their cytoarchitectonic properties and function (Vogt, 
Nimchinsky, Vogt, & Hof, 1995). Picard and Strick have distinguished the caudal 
cingulate zone (CCZ, behind the VCA line) from the rostral cingulate zone (RCZ), in 
turn subdivided into its anterior and posterior segments (RZCa and RCZp 
respectively).  
CCZ and RCZ differ in their connectivity patterns. In a recent resting state functional 
connectivity analysis, Habas (Habas, 2010) has shown that CCZ and RCZ share a 
large common connectivity pattern, including connections with limbic and 
sensorimotor regions. However, RCZ showed more widespread connections with 
prefrontal, premotor and parietal cortices, whereas CCZ presented more widespread 
connections with sensorimotor cortex. This connectivity pattern is consistent with 
results from functional studies. The CCZ has been mainly related to movement 
execution (Picard & Strick, 2001); whereas the RCZ has been associated with 
conflict resolution and action selection (Mueller, Brass, Waszak, & Prinz, 2007; 
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Picard & Strick, 2001). Further, it has been suggested that RCZa is involved in 
conflict monitoring, and the posterior portion playing a role in action selection 
(Picard & Strick, 2001). A recent study has extended Picard and Stick’s (Picard & 
Strick, 2001) original meta-analysis and has provided further support for this 
distinction (Beckmann, Johansen-Berg, & Rushworth, 2009).  
Both RCZa and RCZp present some coarse somatotopy and BOLD activity increases 
corresponding to arm or face movement that can be spatially segregrated in both 
anterior and posterior RCZ (Picard & Strick, 1996; Shackman et al., 2011).  
 
1. 2. 1. 5 Prefrontal Cortex  
A final structure clearly involved in motor control is the prefrontal cortex. Although 
it is not strictly considered a motor area, motor and premotor areas are affected by 
inputs from the prefrontal cortex (PFC) (Goldman-Rakic, 2007).  
Areas within the PFC may be taken to occupy the highest levels in the hierarchy of 
motor planning. It is important to point out that rather than being “homuncular” in 
nature, the PFC has mainly an associative function and receives input from limbic, 
sensory and associative cortices. 
PFC function has been associated with most aspects of behavioural guidance, such as 
processing and integration of both directly perceived and memorized information, 
associative learning, reward based behavioural control and decision making, (see 
Tanji & Hoshi, 2001) for a review). Neuronal activity in PFC has been shown to be 
related to coordination of concurrent information, allowing for a temporal 
sequencing of multiple actions and goal and action selection (Averbeck, Chafee, 
Crowe, & Georgopoulos, 2002; Tanji & Hoshi, 2001). Evidence from human 
neuroimaging data is consistent with that from monkey electrophysiology. For 
example, it has been proposed that PFC plays a role in achieving goals by 
maintaining behavioural goals in working memory and representing the actions 
necessary to reach those goals (Miller & Cohen, 2001).  
It has been argued that the PFC allows for response selection by “sculpting the 
response space” (C. Frith, Gallagher, & Maguire, 2004). Several pieces of evidence 
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support this notion. In one fMRI study, Desmond et al (Desmond, Gabrieli, & 
Glover, 1998) tested participants in a word completion task. They found that DLPFC 
showed greater levels of BOLD activity with larger numbers of possible response 
alternatives, or larger response spaces. Further, in one positron emission tomography 
(PET) study participants were tested in a sentence completion task (Nathaniel-James 
& Frith, 2002). The presented sentences varied in their degree of constraint. I.e., 
some of the sentences presented strongly suggested only one possible response 
alternative, whereas others admitted several response alternatives. Together, these 
results suggest that DLPFC is involved in response selection, with increased effort 
necessary for the “pruning” of greater response spaces. 
In addition, Koechlin et al studied the organization of the information processing in 
PFC (Koechlin, Ody, & Kouneiher, 2003). The authors asked participants to make 
responses to external stimuli. Crucially, in separate blocks, the responses required an 
increasing level of complexity in the processing of the necessary response. The 
results show that higher processing complexity was associated with more frontal 
increases in BOLD activity within the PFC. On the bases of these results, the authors 
suggest a hierarchical model for PFC function (Koechlin & Summerfield, 2007).  
 
1. 2. 1. 6  Subcortical structures: Basal ganglia 
The basal ganglia (BG) are located at the base of the frontal lobes and contribute to 
motor control, sending feedback to the cortex and participating in coordination and 
inhibitory functions. They consist of four main subnuclei: striatum, globus pallidus 
(in turn comprised of the internal segment -GPi- and external segment -GPe-), 
subthalamic nucleus (STN), and substantia nigra -including the pars compacta (SNc) 
and pars reticulata (SNr)- (See Fig 2).  
The primary and premotor cortices (M1, SMA, PM) and the somatosensory cortex 
project excitatory outputs onto the striatum. The striatum, in turn, sends inhibitory 
projections to two output nuclei, the internal segment of the globus pallidus (GPi) 
and the substantia nigra pars reticulata (SNr), through two possible parallel 
pathways, known as “direct” and “indirect”. The direct pathway consists of 
monosynaptic connections from the putamen to the GPi/SNr; whereas the indirect 
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pathway consists of polysynaptic connections involving the external segment of the 
globus pallidus (GPe) and the subtalamic nucleus (STN). Inhibitory projections from 
the GPi/SNr then reach the thalamus, which in turn projects its excitatory output 
back into the cortex (Spence, 2009).  
A widely accepted view includes a third possible connection between the cortex and 
the STN, i.e. the hyperdirect pathway (Aron & Poldrack, 2006; Chambers, Garavan, 
& Bellgrove, 2009). This pathway is a monosynaptic excitatory connection from the 
cortex to the STN, bypassing the striatum. The hyperdirect pathway has special 
relevance for action inhibition (see section 1.3).  
 
 
 
Figure 1.2: Box diagram indicating basal ganglia connectivity. Arrow connectors indicate 
excitatory connections. Dot connectors correspond to inhibitory connections. Red, blue and 
green lines correspond to the hyperdirect, direct and indirect pathways respectively. Adapted 
from Chambers et al., (Chambers et al., 2009). Represented subcortical structures include 
subthalamic nucleus (STN); globus  pallidus (GP internal -GPi- and external -GPe- 
segments); subtantia nigra pars reticulata.    
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1. 2. 2   Principles of action control  
Given the neuroanatomical systems that support motor control, in this section a 
general framework for the investigation of intentional action is provided.  
Every action decision includes at least three dimensions, what action to make (what 
component) when to make it (when component) and whether to make the action at all 
(whether component) (Brass & Haggard, 2008). These three dimensions are 
described in the context of the “what, when, whether” (WWW) model for action 
selection (see figure 1.3).  
 
 
Figure 1.3. Decision tree for action and inhibition, in the context of the “what, when, 
whether” (WWW) model for action selection. Black sections correspond to actions and grey 
sections correspond to inhibition of actions. Early whether decisions to act or not and what, 
when and late whether decisions are shown. “Selection whether” and “inhibition whether” 
decisions are two separate processes, with the former involving response selection and the 
latter requiring action inhibition (see text for details). What and when decisions need not be 
sequential in time and the precise order may depend on the task. Each decision can be 
reached by two possible extreme pathways, namely instructed or intentionally. Solid lines 
represent instructed decisions, dotted lines represent intentional decisions. See section 1.3.4 
for example implementations of this decision tree.  
 
 
Supporting a conceptual distinction, different action decisions have been associated 
with different brain structures (see figure 1.4). Hoffstaedter et al (Hoffstaedter, 
Grefkes, Zilles, & Eickhoff, 2012) have used fMRI to identify brain areas 
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differentially involved in the selection of either the what or when components. Their 
results show greatly overlapping, but also partially segregated brain structures 
associated with each decision. The ACC, bilateral IPL and DLPFC are involved in 
the selection of both the what and when components. Hoffstaedter et al also show 
that pre-SMA is specifically associated with the what component; whereas internal 
timing (when component) relies crucially on bilateral anterior putamen and globus 
pallidus and on a well-distributed timing network comprised of bilateral area 44 and 
anterior insula for cognitive time processing and SMA, basal ganglia, and 
cerebellum related to more automated timing of movement execution.  
To formally examine a dissociation between the what and when components of 
action, Krieghoff et al devised a task in which each of these components could be 
manipulated independently (Krieghoff, Brass, Prinz, & Waszak, 2009). In each trial, 
two visual cues could either specify (instructed conditions) or let participants choose 
(intentional conditions) the what and when components. This resulted in four 
possible combinatorial conditions. The authors contrasted BOLD activations 
between intentional and instructed conditions for each component independently, at 
the time of presentation of the visual cue. They found increased BOLD activity in 
RCZ when participants selected when to act. Conversely, the authors found increased 
BOLD activity in the superior frontal gyrus (SFG) in the paramedian frontal cortex, 
when participants decided what action to make.  
To investigate a distinction between what and whether decisions, Kühn et al (Kühn, 
Haggard, & Brass, 2009) did an fMRI experiment in which participants could 
intentionally decide whether to press a key or inhibit the key press. They found that 
the dorsal frontomedian cortex (dFMC) showed increased levels of BOLD activity in 
trials in which participants decided to inhibit a key press. This suggests that dFMC 
activity is related to the implementation of inhibition of action. In addition, increased 
RCZ BOLD activity was associated with decisions to act and to inhibit, as compared 
with the instructed cases. The authors argue that RCZ is involved in the response 
selection process, regardless of the outcome. This study will be further discussed 
below for its implications for the understanding of mechanisms for action inhibition 
(see section 1.3.4.3)  
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Figure 1.4 Medial surface of the brain(right hemisphere) showing the neuroanatomical 
structures associated with intentional what (rostro cingulate zone, RCZ) when 
(supplementary motor area, SMA) and late whether (dorsal fronto median cortex, dFMC) 
decisions.  Adapted from (Duvernoy, 1991) 
 
Importantly, the whether component of action decision can occur at two rather 
different stages of action preparation, suggesting that there are two possible sources 
of non-action: (1) early decisions about whether or not to begin action processing 
(“selection whether”) and (2) late decisions about whether to inhibit a final motor 
output (“inhibition whether”). The former occurs before any action preparation takes 
place and can be explained in terms of action selection processes alone, while the 
latter requires an additional process of intentional inhibition. Late decisions to inhibit 
would have the specific function of blocking motor output, and suppressing an action 
that has already been prepared.  
Regarding early whether decisions, neuroimaging evidence suggests that a decision 
to omit an action shares some brain correlates with decisions to act. In this way, 
decisions to “do nothing” may involve active action selection processes, but not 
necessarily inhibition components. Kühn and Brass (Kühn & Brass, 2009) asked 
participants to make decisions about whether to act or not upon the appearance of a 
“decide” signal. These decide signals were presented in the context of a task with a 
majority of simple reaction trials. Therefore the decide signals required that 
participants stopped their prepotent impulse to act, and subsequently made an early 
whether decision, to select between acting or not. Kühn and Brass measured the 
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BOLD activity associated with these early whether decisions, and found that early 
decisions to act (go) only differed from early decisions not to act (nogo) in their 
activation of areas related to motor execution, strongly suggesting that both go and 
nogo decisions included action selection processes. The task included an additional 
stop signal that required participants to stop their reaction, but did not require a 
subsequent late whether decision. The authors then contrasted the BOLD activity 
associated with trials involving early whether decisions with that of trials involving 
only simple stopping. A conjunction analysis revealed that early whether decisions 
(regardless of the outcome) recruited bilateral insular cortex, right DLPFC and RCZ. 
These areas are typically associated with action selection tasks. These results suggest 
that decisions not to act share the decision processes with decisions to act, and 
nonaction should therefore be considered as an alternative action outcome.  
Two further studies support this idea. First, Kühn et al (Kühn, Bodammer, & Brass, 
2010) have shown that multivariate pattern analysis classification algorithms can 
distinguish the pattern of BOLD activity associated with active decisions not to act 
from that associated with not deciding at all. Predictive areas included SMA, 
precuneus and right inferior frontal gyrus (rIFG). These areas had not been identified 
by a classical univariate analysis comparing trials including decisions not to act with 
those including no decisions at all, indicating that the classification power did not 
depend simply on generalized BOLD activity increases in broad brain regions. 
Second, in a series of experiments, Kühn et al have shown that nonactions can be 
bound to perceptual effects that have been arbitrarily associated with them, showing 
the same kind of action-effect binding demonstrated by Elsner and Hommel (Elsner 
& Hommel, 2001). Elsner and Hommel induced stimulus-response associations (S-
R) by asking participants to freely choose to make one of two actions, and presenting 
tones of different pitches contingent on the action selected. In a subsequent test 
phase, participants were faster and more accurate in making actions in response to 
tones with a S-R consistent with the one learnt during the acquisition phase as 
compared to when the required S-R was inconsistent with the one of the acquisition 
phase. In the same way, Kühn et al (Kühn, Elsner, Prinz, & Brass, 2009) have shown 
that nonactions show a “nonaction-effect” binding. Importantly, this binding is 
dependent on participants forming an intention not to act, as instructed nonactions 
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require no active whether decisions and generate no binding. Further, nonactions 
seem to have specific representations, as “not-moving a right hand” may be 
associated to a different effect than “not-moving my left hand” (Kühn & Brass, 
2010). Interestingly, these specific non-action representations seem to be possible 
even at the stage of an early whether decision. This suggests that action preparation 
may not be a necessary requirement for non-action effect binding.  
In contrast to early whether decisions, that are related to action selection, late 
whether decisions are tightly related to action inhibition and will be discussed in 
section 1.3.4.  
 
1. 2. 2. 1  Experimental operationalizations of intentional and instructed actions 
An established empirical tradition has drawn objective distinctions between 
intentional and instructed action. In this tradition, instructed actions are operationally 
defined as arbitrary but fixed associations of e.g. visual stimuli to simple 
movements. Typically, in instructed actions, both the timing and type of action are 
explicitly specified (the when and whether, figure 1.3). In contrast, intentional 
actions are usually operationalized by leaving one of the dimensions underspecified 
(when: e.g. Libet, Gleason, Wright, & Pearl, 1983, Thaler, Chen, Nixon, Stern, & 
Passingham, 1995; what, e.g.  Lau, Rogers, Ramnani, & Passingham, 2004; Mueller 
et al., 2007, whether, e.g., Kühn, Haggard, et al., 2009). The participants must 
internally decide whether to move, what movement to make, or when to make it, and 
must then generate the movement on the basis of this internal information. As such, 
by definition intentional actions are not fully specified by any single environmental 
event. 
Within this operational framework and supported by evidence from functional, 
neuroanatomical, cytoarchitectonic and ontogenic features of the primate brain, 
Goldberg ( Goldberg, 1985) proposed the existence of two parallel systems for 
action. He suggested that the lateral premotor cortices (PMd and PMv) were 
responsible for instructed or reactive actions, i.e., those that are driven by explicit 
external signals. Goldberg further suggested that medial premotor areas, notably the 
SMA, were responsible for intentional, self-generated or “projectional” action. 
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Whilst a sharp division between lateral and medial aspects is clearly artificial, this 
conceptual framework is a useful guide to approach a description of the 
neuroanatomical systems involved in motor control.  
In the context of the WWW model for action control discussed above, instructed 
actions will be those that fully follow specified instructions, constraining all three 
action dimensions (what, when, whether). In contrast, intentional actions will be 
generated and made, despite some ambiguity in one or several of the dimensions of 
action decisions. For example, a low-pitch tone may signal that a right finger 
movement should be made at the time of the tone. In this case, all three components, 
namely what (right and not left finger), when (at the time of the tone) and whether 
(yes) dimensions are specified by the external auditory instruction. In contrast, a 
low-pitch tone may indicate that a movement should be made with either finger, thus 
leaving the what dimension unspecified.  Similar comparisons can be made for the 
when and whether dimensions. 
 
1. 2. 2. 2 Experimental evidence for a distinction between intentional and 
instructed actions 
Several lines of research provide evidence supporting Goldberg’s hypothesis and 
will be described in this section. In monkeys, robust evidence from lesion studies 
supports a functional distinction between instructed and intentional systems. In 
humans, evidence for a distinction comes from behavioural measures, neuroimaging 
data and electrophysiological (both scalp and intracranial) recordings. This 
converging evidence will be described to provide support for a conceptual distinction 
between instructed and intentional action.  
In a set of pioneering studies, Thaler et al (Thaler et al., 1995) trained monkeys to 
make spontaneous, self paced movements in order to get a food reward. Thaler et al 
showed that removal of the medial premotor cortex in monkeys dramatically reduced 
the rate of such spontaneous movements. In contrast, when monkeys were trained in 
the same task (to make the same movement and obtain the same food reward), but in 
response to external auditory cues, medial premotor cortex lesions virtually did not 
affect the monkeys’ spontaneous movement rate. Therefore, the lesion in the medial 
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premotor cortex did not affect the monkeys’ ability to make the movements per se, 
or even to be driven by the food reward. Instead, these results suggest that the lesion 
impaired the monkeys’ ability to generate arm movements intentionally. Passingham 
et al (Passingham, 1987) replicated and extended this result. They trained monkeys 
to make arm movements in the absence of external visual cues. The monkeys sat in 
the dark and raised their arms to roughly eye-level in order to get a food reward. 
Bilateral removal of the supplementary motor cortex affected the monkeys’ ability to 
make accurate movements driven solely by proprioceptive input. When the lights 
were turned on and monkeys could use visual cues to guide their movements, they 
performed like unoperated animals.  
In addition and importantly, Passingham et al (Passingham, 1985) trained other 
monkeys to perform a visually guided motor task. A blue or red light required 
monkeys to pull or turn a handle respectively. Monkeys with bilateral premotor 
lesions could execute the movements, but were unable to do so in response to the 
visual cues. Again, the lateral premotor lesion did not affect the monkeys’ ability to 
make the movements per se but to pair these movements to arbitrary external cues.  
In humans, behavioural evidence also supports a distinction between instructed and 
intentional action systems. Obhi and Haggard (Obhi & Haggard, 2004) asked 
participants to make self-paced key presses. Occasionally, they interrupted these 
self-paced intentional actions with an instruction that required a switch from an 
intentional action mode to an instructed action mode, but not a change in the 
movement effectors. The authors found a reaction time (RT) cost of this switch that 
they coined ”truncation effect”. This suggests that instructed action systems cannot 
benefit from existent action preparation of intentional action systems. However, this 
result has recently been challenged (Hughes, Schütz-Bosbach, & Waszak, 2011) by 
the results of a similar experiment. Hughes et al found a truncation effect only if the 
switch between intentional and instructed action plans also involved a switch 
between movement effectors, suggesting that instructed actions may indeed benefit 
from processes of preparation of intentional actions, and questioning the strong 
dissociations drawn between the two systems.  
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1. 2. 2. 3 Neuroimaging evidence for a distinction between instructed and 
intentional action 
Several human neuroimaging studies have addressed the neural basis of the 
difference between intentional and instructed actions, and the results have mirrored 
those from monkey lesion studies. The contrast between intentional vs. instructed 
action has been associated most consistently with increased BOLD signal in SMA, 
preSMA and RCZ (Cunnington, Windischberger, Deecke, & Moser, 2002; H. Lau, 
Rogers, Ramnani, et al., 2004; H. Lau, Rogers, & Passingham, 2006a); see 
(Krieghoff, Waszak, Prinz, & Brass, 2011) for a review. In particular, Müller et al. 
(Mueller et al., 2007) have suggested that RCZ is mainly involved in selecting the 
what component; whilst preSMA participates in the selection of the when component 
(see figure 1.4).  
The inverse contrast, of instructed vs. intentional actions has shown less consistent 
patterns of activity. Debaere (Debaere, Wenderoth, Sunaert, Van Hecke, & Swinnen, 
2003) found increased BOLD signal in dorsal premotor cortex, in line with 
Goldberg’s hypothesis; but this result has not been as widely reported as the 
increased BOLD signal in medial and parietal aspects of the brain associated with 
the inverse contrast. Krieghoff et al. (Krieghoff et al., 2011) speculate that this may 
be due to the fact that instructed actions are more automatic and require less 
cognitive effort, and they therefore elicit less of a differential BOLD activity.  
In summary, the functional distinction between intentional and instructed action 
systems is often based on the neuroanatomical distinction between a medial frontal 
system for intentional action, centred on the SMA, and a lateral premotor system for 
instructed action, centred on the premotor cortex. 
Medio-lateral distinctions related to the amount of information to be integrated are 
not restricted to motor areas. In the PFC differences between medial and dorsal 
systems has also been reported. Interestingly, Koechlin et al (Koechlin, Corrado, 
Pietrini, & Grafman, 2000) found that increases in BOLD activity differed in the 
medial and lateral PFC, according to the nature of the task. The medial PFC showed 
increased activation with a task that required responses that could be prepared and 
expected, whereas the lateral PFC showed increased activation with tasks that 
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required responses that were unpredictable, and contingent on the external 
environment.  
In monkeys, the dorsal and ventral parts of the lateral PFC present different 
connectivity patterns. The lateral PFC is part of an orbitoventral network that 
receives multiple sensory inputs, from visual, auditory, somatosensory and olfactory 
and gustatory modalities. In contrast, the dorsal PFC is part of a mediodorsal 
network that receives input from multimodal areas in the temporal cortex (Tanji & 
Hoshi, 2008). This suggests that the dorsal PFC receives signals that have already 
been through a processing stage, whereas the lateral PFC processes relatively “raw” 
inputs, and that a medial/lateral distinction may not be confined to the motor 
structures. 
 
1. 2. 2. 4 Studies of the subjective experience of intentional action 	  
One of the few studies exploring potentially differential effects on subjective 
experience of intentional action studied the phenomenon of intentional binding. In 
intentional binding, participants make actions that are paired to a given effect, such 
as a tone. When participants are asked to retrospectively judge the time of their 
action and the time of the action effects, the actions are judged later, and the effects 
earlier, than when they actually happened. In other words, action and effects are 
bound together in time (Haggard, Clark, & Kalogeras, 2002). When actions are not 
generated by the participants but artificially, by means of a TMS pulse to M1, the 
temporal binding effect is reversed. Wenke et al (Wenke, Waszak, & Haggard, 2009) 
asked whether temporal binding effects would distinguish between intentional and 
instructed actions. Participants did a modified temporal binding task, in which they 
were either instructed or free to choose the what (right/left hand) or when 
(first/second interval) components in each trial. Interestingly, the authors found no 
differences in terms of intentional binding between intentional and instructed 
actions, suggesting that intentional binding does not depend on the action selection 
processes, but rather on motor preparation and effect anticipation.  
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1. 2. 3  Electrophysiology of action 
Scalp electroencephalography (EEG) recordings time-locked to the time of 
movement reveal the readiness potential (RP), a slow negative potential that peaks 
around the time of movement (Kornhuber & Deecke, 1965). The RP has been 
typically related to action preparation and has two main pre-movement segments, the 
early RP and the late RP (Shibasaki & Hallett, 2006). The early RP typically starts at 
around 1.5 s before movement onset. It is maximal in fronto-central electrodes and is 
symmetrically distributed. It shows larger amplitudes and/or earlier onset in 
conditions of increased level of intention, preparation, movement selection, required 
forced and learning. The late RP typically starts at around 500 ms before movement. 
It is characterized by an increase in slope of the RP, and by a lateralization of its 
topography. The amplitude of the late RP is greater at electrodes that are 
contralateral to the movement, as compared to ipsilateral electrodes. It is hence 
referred to as lateralized readiness potential (LRP) and can provide a measure of 
covert action selection. The RP has been related to increased BOLD activity in 
preSMA, bilateral SMA, and ACC (Cunnington et al., 2005; Jahanshahi et al., 1995; 
Jenkins et al., 2000).  
RPs for actions following the intentional selection of the when component show 
larger amplitudes than those for actions made at instructed and unpredictable times, 
it was first taken to be a signature of voluntary action control, e.g. (Jahanshahi et al., 
1995). It is now however increasingly clear this is not the case. In an elegant 
experiment, Baker et al (Baker, Piriyapunyaporn, & Cunnington, 2012) asked 
participants to make two self-paced actions per trial, in order to reproduce a time 
interval. The experimenters emphasized the need to time the second key press as 
accurately as possible, in order to reproduce the time interval. No attention was 
drawn towards the first key press. In this way, the first action started each trial and 
was somewhat incidental to the task, so it did not require much attention from the 
participants’ part. The second action was kinetically equivalent and also self-paced, 
but did require attention and precise action preparation. The authors found larger RP 
amplitudes related to the second action than to the first one, although they were both 
intentional actions. This strongly suggests that the large RP amplitudes found in 
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intentional actions may be related not to intentional processes per se, but rather to 
attentional factors that often accompany intention.  
Evidence from intracranial electrodes in human patients complements the scalp 
electrophysiological data. Recently, Rosenberg-Katz et al (Rosenberg-Katz et al., 
2012) have applied a combination of fMRI and intracortical electrophysiological 
(iEEG) recordings to demonstrate differences at the neural level between instructed 
and intentional actions. The authors showed that the pre-SMA (but not the SMA) 
and DLPFC showed higher levels of BOLD activity during intentional compared to 
instructed action planning. In addition, intentional action planning was associated 
with higher levels of functional correlation between preSMA and DLPFC, and SMA 
and DLPFC Finally, iEEG data showed increased inter-regional gamma-related 
connectivity between electrodes situated in medial and lateral aspects of the 
prefrontal cortex for intentional compared to instructed actions.  
It has been shown that the free selection of the what component may also affect RP 
amplitude (see (Lang, 2003) for a review). Praamstra et al (Praamstra, Stegeman, 
Horstink, Brunia, & Cools, 1995) asked participants to make four types of joystick 
movements. Participants were asked to make either single or sequential movements. 
In turn, both single and sequential movements could either be instructed or 
intentional. That is, participants were either instructed or allowed to freely choose 
which movements they would make. Praamstra et al measured the amplitude of the 
RPs associated with each one of these movement types. They found higher RP 
amplitudes for intentional movements as compared to instructed movements. These 
differences were apparent as early as 1.5 s before the time of movement and were 
generalized topographically, but concentrated on the centro-parietal electrodes. In 
addition, single movements showed greater differences between instructed and 
intentional conditions than did sequential movements. Praamstra et al replicated the 
results when participants were asked to make finger flexions with either hand. These 
results suggest that the intentional selection of the what component enhances RP 
amplitude. The authors suggest that this may be related to greater involvement of the 
SMA in actions where the what component is intentionally chosen, compared to 
instructed.     
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Dirnberger et al (Dirnberger, Fickel, Lindinger, Lang, & Jahanshahi, 1998) noted 
that in experimental paradigms such as the one reported by Praamstra et al 
(Praamstra et al., 1995), intentional actions are characterized by a non-repetitive 
sequence of movements. In contrast, instructed actions are made in the context of a 
repetitive sequence of actions. Consequently, the relatively low RP amplitudes 
associated with instructed actions may have to do with motor habituation effects 
rather than with volitional components. To examine this possibility, Dirnberger et al 
recorded EEG activity while participants were making brisk finger movements in 
order to press one out of four possible buttons. They replicated the finding that RPs 
show larger amplitudes and earlier onsets in conditions of intentional actions as 
compared to instructed action. In comparing RPs from trials following long periods 
of repetitive actions (and consequent motor habituation) with trials that did not 
follow habituation periods, the authors found that RPs were significantly reduced, 
suggesting that habituation factors modulate RP amplitude. Critically, the authors 
found that the LRPs differed strongly between intentional and instructed conditions, 
with intentional actions showing greater LRP amplitudes. These differences 
appeared as early as 1.5 s prior to movement.  
Together, these results suggest that relatively low-level movement features, such as 
movement habituation, or attention allocation may affect RP amplitude. This has led 
to the idea that RPs do not reflect intentional processes. Instead, they may reflect 
other lower-level attention-related processes that are incidentally associated with 
intention. Importantly, these low-level features may be central to the “intentional” 
component of action. For example, intentional actions are intrinsically non-routine, 
and non-habitual. As such, novel intentional actions will demand more attentional 
resources than routine actions. The two processes of intention and attention may be 
difficult to disentangle in the two situations. One fMRI experiment is useful to 
address this potential concern. Lau et al (H. Lau, Rogers, Haggard, et al., 2004) 
asked participants to make self-paced actions. The authors reasoned that paying 
attention to an endogenous cognitive process will increase BOLD activity in the area 
subserving that process. Thus, in separate blocks, participants were asked to pay 
attention to the timing of either their action intentions or of the actions themselves.  
Lau et al found increased SMA activity when participants paid attention to their own 
intentions, as compared to when they attended to their actions. SMA activity has 
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been linked to RPs (see above). This elegant result therefore suggests that attentional 
and intentional processes may be in fact distinguishable, but at the same time 
intrinsically confounded in several of the classical experiments reviewed here.  
 
1. 2. 4   What is the “intentional” component in intentional action? 
Despite the attempts to develop an unambiguous and objective experimental 
approach to action systems, the nature of the difference between intentional and 
instructed actions is still debated. Lau and Passingham (R. E. Passingham et al., 
2009) have argued that intentional actions are clearly distinct from instructed actions, 
and that the neural structures that support them are in turn distinct.  
Two main criticisms to this argument have been raised. First, it has been argued that 
given the complexity and obscure nature of the processes underlying “intentional” 
action, this label is not an appropriate one. Because saying that an action is 
intentional does not describe in any detail the true processes required for it, the term 
adds no explanatory power. Roepstoff and Frith (Roepstorff & Frith, 2004), first 
pointed out that when a participant is asked to make a series of “intentional” actions, 
she is in fact asked to unpack the obscure instruction to “act as if she had free will”. 
Folk knowledge indicates that apparently “free” action should also be apparently 
“random” (Ebert & Wegner, 2011). Therefore, the neural mechanisms identified 
with intentional action defined in such a way may therefore have more to do with the 
conscious and carefully planned simulation of seemingly random behaviour rather 
than with true generation of behaviour in underdetermined conditions (Jahanshahi, 
Dirnberger, Fuller, & Frith, 2000). In line with this view, Nachev and Husain 
(Nachev, 2010; Nachev & Husain, 2010) argue that in cases of intentional action, 
what is in fact covertly taking place is a rich series of integrative processes and 
decisions. Further, they hold that what is particularly unfortunate from an empirical 
point of view is that these covert integrative processes are scientifically intractable 
and not accessible to controlled manipulation.  
A second criticism points out that a stark distinction between intentional and 
instructed action is artificial. Even if the two action systems exist as such, they will 
tightly interact and contribute to drive any given action. There is some  consensus on 
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the fact that intentional and instructed actions are two extremes of a continuum, but 
it is not clear along which dimension this continuum should be defined. Passingham 
et al agree (Passingham, Bengtsson, & Lau, 2010) that actions may gradually vary in 
terms of the relative contributions of “exogenous” (environmental i.e., available as 
simple cues in the perceptual environment) and “endogenous” (internal cues i.e., 
memory, goals, etc). In fact, Thut et al (Thut et al., 2000) have shown that EEG 
activity between intentional and instructed actions differs in the relative duration of 
neural activity in SMA and PM, rather than activating the medial and lateral systems 
completely independently.  
For Nachev and Husain (Nachev & Husain, 2010) “endogenous” cues are ill-defined 
and “intentional” actions should simply be seen as the result of a complex integration 
of many different external stimuli. In particular, according to Nachev and Husain, 
the dimension that would most clearly distinguish the two extremes is the amount of 
information to be integrated. Instructed actions require virtually no stimulus 
integration beyond recognizing the instruction, and can be accomplished in a simple, 
almost reflexive fashion. In contrast, decisions about the “when and what” of 
intentional actions may require the integration of diverse sources of both internal and 
environmental information, such as a complex and changing environment, internal 
models of the world (Berkes, Orbán, Lengyel, & Fiser, 2011), action goals (Tanji & 
Hoshi, 2001), memories of past actions (Hadland, Rushworth, Passingham, 
Jahanshahi, & Rothwell, 2001), or preceding neural activity (Soon et al., 2008). 
Schüür and Haggard (Schüür & Haggard, 2011) echo this criticism, and insist that 
considering intentional actions as the result of a complex integration of several 
external inputs may help escape the tendency for dualistic arguments that associate 
intentional actions to some sort of nonmaterial self.  
In sum, the two main criticisms raised against the classical approach of comparing 
intentional vs. instructed behaviour are (1) that they differ in more than one 
dimension and (2) that the difference is not qualitative but rather quantitative. These 
criticisms have been well taken in this thesis. The working hypothesis does not 
consider the differences between instructed and intentional behaviour as categorical. 
Instead, it acknowledges that the differences exist, and seeks to empirically 
understand their nature and consequences. All that is required is that the intentional 
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and instructed cases considered are located in different positions along a continuum 
of degrees of freedom of selection. By dissecting the components of the differences 
between intentional and instructed behaviour this thesis aims at uncovering some of 
the obscure processes underlying “intentional” behaviour.  
 
1. 2. 5   Neural correlates of intentional action and implications for 
free will  
Libet et al (Libet et al., 1983) famously compared the time of onset of the RP with 
the reported time of awareness of an intention to act. In his study, participants were 
asked to make brisk wrist movements at their own will, and to attend to the time at 
which they had first experienced the will (or “urge”, to use Libet’s own word) to act. 
Participants could report the time of their awareness of the intention to act by 
reporting the position of a clock hand that was rotating on a screen in front of them. 
Libet et al found that the onset of the RP preceded by about 250 ms the reported time 
of intention, suggesting that it is not our conscious intentions that drive neural 
activity, but the inverse. This study has attracted a large amount of attention due to 
its relevance to the question of free will. Libet et al’s result has been widely 
discussed and criticized (Gomes, 2002; Trevena & Miller, 2009), but also replicated 
(Haggard & Eimer, 1999; Sirigu et al., 2004) and extended (Soon et al., 2008). Soon 
et al used multivariate pattern analysis classification algorithms of fMRI data to 
predict whether participants would freely choose to make a movement with their 
right or left fingers. Soon et al found that the volxelwise patterns of BOLD activity 
in the frontopolar cortex and precuneus showed above-chance predictive power up to 
8 s before the time of awareness of decision.  
Both Libet et al’s and Soon et al’s results suggest that unconscious brain activity 
builds up to give rise to conscious intentions to act, displacing the conscious self 
from the position of responsibility for our intentions and actions. Relating these 
findings to the model of “what, when, whether” decisions for action, Libet et al’s 
results provide evidence for an unconscious process in the selection of the when 
component, whereas Soon et al’s results reveal the unconscious determinants of 
what decisions.  
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Libet suggested (Libet, 1999) that between the time of awareness of intention and the 
time of action there is a time window where the conscious self could reclaim 
responsibility for our actions. Libet suggested that we may not have free will, but 
that we can have “free won’t”, and that we have the capacity of consciously 
“vetoing” actions that would be otherwise solely driven by our unconscious brain 
activity. The concept of “free won’t” has consequently been a last bastion of free 
will. By this account, inhibition of action assumes a significant role in our behaviour. 
Of course, modern science does not accommodate such a dualistic position, and the 
decision to inhibit might itself have an unconscious antecedent (Hughes, Velmans, & 
Fockert, 2009), though these whether decisions have hardly been examined.  
 
1. 3       Inhibition of voluntary action 
As it has been suggested above (section 1.1), intentional behaviour emerges as a 
result of action and inhibition processes. Intentional behaviour, understood as 
behaviour that is not purely explained by responses to the environment, would be 
impossible without some self-control process. Often we need to hold- back from 
impulsive angry reactions, addictive behaviour (smoking, excessive eating, 
gambling), or saying or doing things that may not be appropriate in some contexts. 
This section will first present the two types action inhibition, namely instructed and 
intentional. First, the tasks used to study instructed inhibition and the main results 
they have yielded will be reviewed. Then, a potential distinction between instructed 
and intentional inhibition will be suggested on the basis of conceptual, 
neuropsychological and empirical evidence.  
 
1. 3. 1  Empirical studies of action inhibition  
The neuroanatomical substrates of action inhibition have largely been explored by 
means of two main tasks. 
First, the go/nogo task has been widely used to study mechanism associated with 
instructed inhibition (Eimer, 1993; Pfefferbaum, Ford, Weller, & Kopell, 1985) (see 
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figure 1.5 A). In this task, participants are required to make quick movements to 
frequent go stimuli, but to withhold their movements if a nogo stimulus is presented.  
Second, in the Stop Signal Task, (SST, see figure 1.5 B) quick motor actions are 
required in response to go signal. Crucially, on some infrequent trials stop signals 
appear shortly (around 250 ms) after the go signals. The precise timing of the stop 
signal is determined adaptively, based on the online performance of each participant. 
Successful stopping is therefore effortful and requires a sudden inhibitory 
mechanism that stops the action before it is executed.  
Logan et al (Logan, 1994; Verbruggen & Logan, 2008a) have suggested that action 
and inhibition processes compete in a “race”. In their model, action and inhibition 
are triggered by different external signals (go and stop signals, respectively), and 
whichever process first reaches a threshold level of neural activation will determine 
the action outcome. Under these assumptions, a parameter called stop signal reaction 
time (SSRT) can be estimated from a participant’s performance (Logan, 1994). The 
SSRT is a precise quantifier of inhibitory function, with short SSRTs corresponding 
to better (quicker) inhibitory mechanisms.  
The crucial difference between the SST and the go/nogo task is that in the former, 
adapting the SSD ensures that inhibition is often required at the latest possible 
moment before the action was executed. In the go/nogo task instead, inhibitory 
processes may be recruited earlier, and action preparation may not have been 
underway at the time of inhibition.   
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Figure 1.5 Two tasks to study instructed inhibition A. In the go/nogo task, a rapid 
succession of go signals makes acting the prepotent response. A minority of nogo (typically, 
but not always, 25%) signals require participants to stop their prepared actions. B. Stop 
signal task. In the majority of trials participants are required to make a quick key press in 
response to a go signal. In a minority of trials, a stop signal (typically a tone) will appear 
after the go signal. The stop signal delay (SSD) is the time between the onset of the go signal 
and the onset of the stop signal, and is typically varied 
 
1. 3. 2  Neuroanatomy of action inhibition  
The ability to inhibit action in the SST has been related chiefly to two cortical areas, 
the right inferior frontal gyrus (rIFG) and preSMA; and, subcortically, the STN 
within the BG. Although most studies agree that inhibitory function depends on the 
integrity of the three areas and their connections (Rubia et al., 2001), the precise 
division of labour between these three structures remains unclear. On the one hand, 
neuroimaging and direct electrical stimulation results suggest that (Aron, Behrens, 
Smith, Frank, & Poldrack, 2007; Swann et al., 2011) preSMA plays a role in conflict 
detection or resolution, and that the IFG instead is the primary structure 
implementing an active process of action inhibition. These results are supported by 
observations that increases in BOLD activity in IFG are inversely correlated with 
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SSRT (Aron & Poldrack, 2006), and that the extent of damage to rIFG correlates 
positively with SSRT. Duann et al (Duann, Ide, Luo, & Li, 2009), however, contests 
this view. The authors show (through functional connectivity analyses of fMRI data) 
that IFG connects to the STN only indirectly, via preSMA. On this basis, the authors 
suggest that preSMA is the primary inhibitory effector, whereas IFG detects a salient 
and behaviourally relevant signal, driving activity in the SMA which in turn 
implements a true inhibitory function.  
In the BG, inhibitory (stop) processes interact with go processes. Importantly, Aron 
and Poldrack (Aron & Poldrack, 2006) have suggested that IFG excites STN via the 
hyperdirect pathway. The hyperdirect pathway sends excitatory connections from the 
STN to the GPi/SNr, which in turn suppresses the thalamic the output from the BG 
(see figure 1.2) to the cortex, and stops an action before it is executed.  
 
1. 3. 3  Neuropsychology of action inhibition 
Some neurophysiological conditions provide further evidence for the existence and 
importance of intentional inhibition. The anarchic hand syndrome (AHS) (Della Sala 
& Marchetti, 2005) is especially illustrative. AHS typically follows medial frontal 
and/or callosal lesions. Patients with frontal AHS will typically report that their 
affected hand makes compulsive, goal-oriented movements against the patient’s will. 
These movements are clearly made in response to environmental stimuli, such as 
grabbing objects, food, etc. Patients are aware of the movements, and aware that they 
are inappropriate. Nevertheless, they are unable to intentionally inhibit them. Indeed, 
patients often physically restrict unwanted movements with their unaffected hand, as 
the only successful inhibitory strategy.  
In principle, both excessive action drive and failed inhibitory mechanisms could 
explain AHS. Empirical evidence provides evidence for the latter being true. 
Cantagallo et al tested one AHS patient in a simple reaching task. The patient was 
asked to make intentional actions (i.e., pre-established sequential movements) and 
instructed actions (i.e., reaching towards a visual target). The authors found that the 
patient’s affected hand was slow to initiate intentional actions as well as being 
quicker at making instructed actions (i.e., reaching towards a visual target). If the 
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compulsive emerged as a result of excessive action drive, then the affected hand 
should be quicker, rather than slower, to initiate intentional actions. Therefore, these 
results suggest that AHS might emerge as a result of a failure in mechanisms of 
intentional inhibition. 
 
1. 3. 4   Principles of inhibitory control  
1. 3. 4. 1 Conceptual distinction between intentional and instructed inhibition 
Although the source of the differences is controversial, empirical data from diverse 
sources support a distinction between intentional and instructed actions, at least to 
the extent that they represent two extremes of a continuum (see section 1.2.2.3). This 
thesis explores the possibility that the same continuum may also be found in 
inhibition of action, and that an intentional/instructed distinction can be made just as 
clearly for action inhibition as for action execution. 
Experimental studies have addressed motor inhibitory function by means of tasks 
that require instructed inhibition, most notably, the SST and the go/nogo task (see 
section 1.3.1). In both tasks, infrequent external signals require a rapid inhibition of 
prepotent simple actions. The methodological (but important) advantage of these 
tasks is that quick actions are the prepotent response, and inhibition cannot be 
planned in advance. This ensures that inhibition occurs in trials in which no action is 
made.  
Despite the clear methodological advantages of instructed inhibition tasks, few 
examples of inhibitory control in naturalistic situations can be compared to a SST. 
Aron (2010) has suggested that motor inhibition in the SST is reactive, whereas a 
more ecologically valid type of inhibition is proactive. Proactive inhibition is rather 
related to longer term goals and motivations, and it may be targeted at inhibiting a 
particular response tendency. The concept of proactive inhibition can be related to 
intentional inhibition, i.e. the capacity to voluntarily suspend or inhibit an action, 
independently of a clear external signal indicating to do so. Boulingez et al 
(Boulinguez, Ballanger, Granjon, & Benraiss, 2009; Boulinguez, Jaffard, Granjon, & 
Benraiss, 2008) has shown that an experimental paradigm that incorporates warning 
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signals appearing before go signals can elicit proactive inhibition. To prevent early 
responding to warning signals, participants may adopt the strategy of applying a 
generalized suppression of reactivity that is only released by a warning signal. This 
type of inhibition is generalized, does not have a clear onset and does not follow any 
clear external inhibitory cues, so it may therefore be considered as intentional. 
Interestingly, this illustrates the ubiquity of inhibitory control. Even making simple 
actions may rely on inhibitory mechanisms for accurate timing.  
A person may withhold an action either because of an external stop signal, or 
because of an intentional decision to do so. The decision to inhibit, like the decision 
to act, may depend on environmental stimuli (instructed behaviour), or on internal 
reasons and desires (intentional behaviour). For example, the current mental state 
may make a particular action inappropriate or undesirable, even though it might be 
highly appropriate in other situations. It is important to point out that the 
intentional/instructed dimension for inhibition is orthogonal to the 
intentional/instructed dimension for action. That is, one can intentionally inhibit both 
actions that one decided oneself to make, or actions that are tr(Stroop, 1935)iggered 
by environmental signals or objects. On this view, the cognitive control of action has 
a factorial structure. To illustrate this factorial structure, table 1.1 presents daily 
examples and experimental tasks for each of the possible combinations of instructed 
and intentional what and whether decisions.   
Here it is relevant to consider contextual inhibition tasks, which typically require 
inhibition within a relatively complex set of rules. These tasks involve a contextual 
instruction to inhibit, but no overt ‘inhibit’ signal. For example, in Jacoby’s 
exclusion task, participants are asked to complete a stem, e.g., “tab ”, with any word 
apart from a word that was presented just previously. Thus, if the word table is 
presented first, followed by “tab ” the participant must intentionally inhibit the table 
response, in order to achieve a correct response such as taboo (Cothran & Larsen, 
2008). Similarly, the instruction to perform an antisaccade involves inhibiting a 
prepotent prosaccade response (Munoz & Everling, 2004), and the Stroop instruction 
to name the colour of a word involves inhibiting the prepotent response to read it 
(Stroop, 1935), and the spatial location of a stimulus may strongly influence spatially 
organised responses, meaning that these responses must be inhibited when spatial 
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parameters are irrelevant and when stimuli contain incongruent spatial information 
(Forstmann, Brass, Koch, & von Cramon, 2006; Simon, 1969). 
Contextual inhibition therefore involves both an external stimulus, and a context 
which influences the way the stimulus is processed. Often, the context can be treated 
as a rule, for example in a set of task instructions. Thus, in Stroop tasks, the 
instructions specify that a word should not be read, but rather the ink colour should 
be named. Successful performance thus depends both on a preceding process of 
understanding the context, and on perceiving the stimulus. Therefore, under one 
possible view, applying such rules still involves sensory processing of external 
stimuli, but is just more complex. Therefore, contextual inhibition can be considered 
to be closer to instructed than to intentional inhibition. 
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Table 1.1: Factorial organisation of instructed and intentional control of what and whether 
decisions. Each cell corresponds to one of the possible combinations of instructed and 
intentional what and whether decisions. Each cell contains examples of daily and 
experimental situations that capture the processes. Adapted from Filevich et al., 2012 with 
permission from Elsevier Limited 
 
 ACTION (“what” decision) 
INSTRUCTED INTENTIONAL 
IN
H
IB
IT
IO
N
 (“
wh
et
he
r”
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ec
is
io
n)
 
IN
ST
R
U
C
T
E
D
 
Driving towards a green traffic 
light, which suddenly turns to red 
Suddenly cancelling a 
nefarious activity when 
realizing one is being watched  
Stop signal reaction time  
(Logan, Cowan, & Davis, 1984) 
Pausing an action in response 
to external stimulation 
(Matsuhashi & Hallett, 2008) 
IN
T
E
N
T
IO
N
A
L
 
Resisting the temptation to take 
another biscuit from the biscuit 
tin  
Deciding not to send an angry 
email just before clicking the 
“send” button 
Freely choosing whether to 
respond to a stimulus or not 
(Karch et al., 2009; S. Kühn & 
Brass, 2009) 
“Veto” task (Brass & Haggard, 
2007).  
 
 
In the first place, action and inhibition may occur in an automatic way, as in the case 
of responses to sudden simple environmental events such as traffic lights. These 
kinds of situations are well operationalized by classical instructed inhibition tasks, 
such as the go/nogo task, where participants are required to act in response to go 
stimuli but not to nogo stimuli. But inhibition may also occur without any external 
instructions, in order to control or limit a natural tendency to respond to impulses. 
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An example would be to resist from succumbing to potential addiction, where 
actions may be initiated automatically but a second thought will control the impulse. 
Empirical tasks operationalizing this intentional inhibition of instructed action may 
include free decisions about whether to follow a default action plan or not.  
On the other hand, inhibition of intentional action may occur as a quick reaction to 
an unexpected event in the external environment. In daily life, such situations occur 
when an admittedly “wrong” action is suddenly interrupted by an external noise. A 
task that captures this process may instruct participants to act freely but stop their 
actions if they hear an external tone. And finally, intentional inhibition of intentional 
action may take place in everyday life when we “change our minds” about making 
actions that we had freely selected. Tasks that operationalize this process will 
typically allow participants to make when or what decisions, and additionally ask 
them to make a final whether checkpoint decision.  
Intentional inhibition shares some features with instructed inhibition. For example, 
there is in both cases a prepotent or otherwise salient motivation for action. Further, 
the preparatory processes that lead to action are already underway when inhibition 
occurs. However, intentional inhibition has features that are not shared with other 
forms of inhibition. By definition, the process or signal that cancels or inhibits the 
action is not the result of any external signal or instruction, but is crucially generated 
internally by the participant herself. In this respect, intentional inhibition clearly 
differs from classic psychological paradigms where an external stop signal is used to 
trigger inhibition (Logan & Cowan, 1984), or NoGo tasks (Pfefferbaum et al., 1985; 
Eimer, 1993).  
 
 
1. 3. 4. 2 Methodological difficulties in isolating intentional inhibition 
A methodological difficulty in the study of intentional inhibition arises because an 
experimenter needs to assume that something was inhibited. That is, she will hope 
that there was a process which would have lead to action had it not been inhibited. 
But, in the absence of any behaviour, what evidence is there that an action would 
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have occurred? Given the absence of overt behaviour, neuroimaging methods 
provide a particularly useful approach. The following section describes two 
neuroimaging studies that support intentional inhibition as a distinct process. In 
particular, three situations may involve very different neural processes but are 
behaviourally identical (in the sense that neither produces any behavioural output) 
and will therefore be difficult to distinguish, namely instructed inhibition, intentional 
inhibition and intentional early decisions not to act.   
First, although theoretical grounds may suggest a possible distinction between 
intentional and instructed inhibition, empirical data are necessary to provide stronger 
support. Second, as was discussed above (see section 1.2.2) two possible decisions 
may lead to an absence of overt behaviour, namely early whether decisions not to act 
and later whether decisions to inhibit action. To study intentional inhibitory 
processes, these two situations should be clearly distinguished  
 
1. 3. 4. 3 Neuroimaging evidence for a distinction between intentional and 
instructed inhibition 
Only a limited number of experimental studies have addressed a process of 
intentional inhibition. Brass and Haggard (Brass & Haggard, 2007) asked 
participants to intentionally prepare and execute a simple keypress action on some 
trials, but on other trials to prepare the action and then withhold it at the last possible 
moment. Participants freely chose on each trial whether to act or inhibit. Participants 
reported the time of their intention to act, even on trials where no action in fact 
occurred, and this was used for event-related fMRI comparisons between action and 
inhibition conditions. The contrast of inhibition vs. action trials revealed BOLD 
activity in the dorsal fronto median cortex (dFMC). In addition, the analyses 
revealed a significant correlation between each participant’s percentage of inhibited 
trials and inhibition-related activity in dFMC. 
Kühn et al (Kühn, Haggard & Brass, 2009) asked participants to freely decide 
between executing and inhibiting a keypress action. Their task provided a prepotent 
external drive to act, as the action of pressing the key would avoid an unpleasant 
sound. Some trials consisted of external instructions to either perform or inhibit the 
Chapter	  1	  	  	  	  General	  introduction	  	  
49	  	  
keypress. Other trials allowed participants to freely decide what they would do. 
Intentional inhibition was identified by contrasting trials involving a voluntary 
decision to inhibit with trials involving a voluntary decision to proceed with the 
prepared action. This contrast revealed BOLD activity in dFMC, close to the area 
reported by Brass and Haggard (Brass & Haggard, 2007), though slightly more 
ventral. As in Brass and Haggard’s earlier study, the authors found a correlation 
between individuals' probability of inhibition and inhibition-specific BOLD activity. 
Kühn et al. (Kühn, Haggard & Brass, 2009) argued that, given that dFMC appears in 
the contrast between deciding to inhibit and deciding to act, it cannot be related 
exclusively to the decision itself. Instead, the authors show through connectivity 
analyses that the RCZ is responsible for the decision, while the dFMC simply 
expresses the decision outcome “inhibit”.  
The clear anatomical substrate for intentional inhibition helps to differentiate it from 
other forms of inhibition, and inhibition-related processing. First, instructed 
inhibition in SST has been associated with two quite different areas, the right inferior 
frontal gyrus, and the SMA. A recent large meta-analysis of the SST (Swick, Ashley, 
& Turken, 2011), included the contrasts Stop > Go, Stop > baseline and Successful 
stop > Unsuccessful stop.  The resulting activation likelihood estimation (ALE) map 
contained major clusters in the left insula, extending into thalamus and putamen; the 
posterior cingulate (BA 23); right insula, extending to inferior precentral gyri (BA 9) 
and the superior frontal gyrus (medial BA 6, including the pre-SMA), the right 
middle frontal gyrus (BA 9), and the right inferior parietal lobule (BA 40). This 
analysis identifies a network involved in instructed inhibition, focused on a lateral 
and a medial frontal cluster. Importantly, the identified network for external 
inhibition does not overlap with the medial prefrontal areas associated with 
intentional inhibition. In particular, the medial cluster for internal inhibition is 
clearly posterior to the medial cluster for intentional inhibition (Filevich, Kühn, & 
Haggard, 2012a) (see figure 1.6). 
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1. 3. 4. 4 Neuroimaging evidence for a distinction between intentional inhibition 
and intentional nonaction  
To confirm the difference between the BOLD correlates of action selection and those 
of intentional inhibition, a recent study (Filevich et al., 2012a) has shown through 
ALE analyses that the brain areas typically associated with action selection (derived 
from a contrast of intentional action > instructed action or intentional action > rest) 
do not match those associated with intentional inhibition. Intentional action selection 
is typically associated with increased BOLD activity in preSMA and SMA, areas 
different from the more anterior activation of dFMC shown to be associated with 
intentional inhibition (Brass & Haggard, 2007) (see figure 1.6). This analysis 
suggests that the activation associated with early selection of voluntary actions is 
distinct from the activation associated with late intentional inhibition of actions that 
are already prepotent. 
 
 
Figure 1.6 Results of ALE meta-analysis from 21 stop-signal studies (red) (Swick et al., 
2011), 11 response selection studies (blue) and 7 intentional inhibition studies (green). Note 
the clear distinction between the more posterior preSMA coordinates of stop-signal and 
response selection studies and the more anterior dmPFC coordinates of intentional inhibition 
studies. Taken from Filevich et al., 2012 with permission from Elsevier Limited 
 
1. 3. 4. 5 Speculative neurostimulation evidence for a distinction between 
intentional and instructed inhibition 
A rather different source of evidence for a distinction between intentional and 
instructed inhibition comes from the neurosurgical literature. In cases of presurgical 
evaluation in drug-resistant epilepsy, subdural electrode arrays may be placed on the 
cortical surface. Each electrode of the array can be stimulated individually to assess 
the function of the underlying local area of cortex. Similar stimulation techniques 
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can be used intraoperatively. This method has been exploited by Penfield and Welch 
(Penfield & Welch, 1951) to find for the ‘positive’ sensorimotor signs evoked in 
specific muscles, leading to the famous motor homunculus.  
Interestingly, the neurosurgical literature also identifies electrode sites where direct 
electrical stimulation causes slowing or suppression of ongoing movements (Lüders, 
Dinner, Morris, Wyllie, & Comair, 1995). If a patient is asked to perform rapid 
alternating eye, tongue, hand or foot movements, and an electrode is stimulated 
while the movement is ongoing, a negative motor response may be found. These 
sites have been termed ‘negative motor areas’ (NMAs) (Lüders et al.  1995). 
Alternative simple explanations of non specific motor arrest, such as loss of 
consciousness, can be excluded. Since the 1950s, over 20 studies have reported 
NMAs upon direct cortical stimulation. The total frequency of NMAs varies 
dramatically between studies, perhaps reflecting the difficulty of extensive and 
comprehensive sampling given the strict clinical restrictions of this unique setting. 
Clearly, such external stimulation will bypass any decision to inhibit on the patient’s 
part, so it can say little about the natural circumstances under which this suppression 
occurs. On the other hand, stimulation offers a well-controlled method that can 
reveal how the suppressive mechanism functions.  
Previous discussions of NMAs have been largely confined to the neurosurgical 
literature. The general interpretation in that literature suggests that the normal 
function of NMAs is the fine regulation of motor output (Chauvel, Rey, Buser, & 
Bancaud, 1996; Ikeda et al., 2009; Mikuni et al., 2006). An alternative interpretation 
is that NMAs reflect a functional system for inhibition of action. Given the 
widespread neuropsychological consensus that inhibition of action is a crucial aspect 
of both cognitive control of behaviour, this interpretation would make NMA data 
highly relevant to cognitive neuropsychology. A detailed review of the NMA 
literature with a specific emphasis on the possible contribution of NMAs to 
inhibitory processing is beyond the scope of this introduction, but in the following 
section a possible functional inhibitory role for NMAs is discussed.   
Several lines of evidence suggest that NMAs may be functionally relevant for 
inhibition (Filevich, Kühn, & Haggard, 2012b). First, stimulations on many sites that 
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produce positive motor effects do not also produce negative motor responses. In fact, 
highly complex sequences of functional action can be evoked by some instances of 
electrical stimulation (Bancaud et al., 1976), yet these positive motor effects can be 
readily dissociated from negative motor effects. Second, NMAs are sometimes found 
in quite different areas from positive motor areas, and usually anterior to positive 
motor areas (Uematsu et al., 1992). Third, NMA localisation matches the areas 
showing increased BOLD activity associated with response inhibition in stop signal 
tasks (see review articles by (Chikazoe, 2010; Levy & Wagner, 2011; Swick et al., 
2011). Fourth, NMAs are sometimes found at lower intensity than positive motor 
effects (Mikuni et al., 2006). Taken together these findings suggest that negative 
motor responses do not simply arise from disrupting normal physiological activity in 
excitatory areas.  
Finally, in one recent study the roles of preSMA and IFG (Swann et al., 2011) were 
addressed in a rare patient with implanted electrodes over both preSMA and IFG. In 
this case study of a single patient, evidence from connectivity patterns, functional 
properties and direct electrical stimulation suggest that NMAs may play a functional 
role in motor inhibition, and that they may do so by driving a network of several 
frontal cortical areas that provide a balance between excitation and inhibition. 
Interestingly, NMAs have been reported in two distinct clusters: a medial cluster 
focussed on the SMA, and a lateral cluster focussed on the IFG and premotor cortex 
(see figure 1.7). In relation to a possible distinction between intentional and 
instructed inhibition, a speculative account suggests that the medial NMA cluster 
might be involved in processes of intentional inhibition, whilst lateral NMAs may be 
involved in instructed inhibition processes. The available empirical data is based on 
clinical mapping results, where control is applied externally by the experimenter, and 
cannot be said to be truly intentional – even if it involves activation of areas whose 
normal functions include intentional action or intentional inhibition. Therefore more 
research using tasks that require intentional inhibition may be necessary to test this 
hypothesis. 
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Figure 1.7 Approximate location of reported NMAs shown on a transparently rendered glass 
brain. A Sagittal view, B coronal view, C axial view. Coordinates were approximated by 
visual inspection of the original figures. Small circles represent 1-5 NMA sites, medium 
circles represent 6-20 NMA sites, and larger circles represent >20 NMA sites. Different 
colours represent individual studies, but colours may be repeated due to one individual study 
showing more than one NMA cluster. † Indicates studies in which the lateralization on the 
NMAs was not reported, and were therefore inferred (Nii et al.,1996) or depicted on the 
right (Penﬁeld and Rasmussen, 1949). Gray lines intersect at the anterior comissure.  
Adapted from Filevich et al, 2012b. Reproduced with permission of Elsevier Limited. 
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1. 3. 5   Electrophysiology of action inhibition  
One of the advantages of externally triggered inhibition is that the stopping process, 
when it occurs, is precisely localized in time and the electrophysiological signature 
of inhibition may be studied. EEG studies in SST and go/nogo tasks have therefore 
focussed on instructed inhibition and provided evidence for the involvement of a 
complex ERP component that is identified as N2/P3 (Falkenstein, Hoormann, & 
Hohnsbein, 1999; Ramautar, Kok, & Ridderinkhof, 2004).  The N2/P3 complex 
presents greater amplitudes for nogo trials as compared to go trials (Jodo & Kayama, 
1992) and for successful nogo as compared to unsuccessful nogo trials (Kok, 
Ramautar, De Ruiter, Band, & Ridderinkhof, 2004).  
The N2 component peaks at around 200 ms after nogo signal onset and is maximal at 
the frontal electrodes. Donkers et al (Donkers & van Boxtel, 2004) designed a 
“go/GO” task, in which the infrequent GO stimuli did not require action inhibition 
but a stronger action instead. The authors found an N2 component associated with 
GO stimuli, as well as when participants did the classical go/nogo task. Therefore the 
N2 may be related to the detection of conflict or salient and behaviourally stimuli 
rather than with inhibition per se.  
The P3 component peaks at around 300 ms and has a fronto-central distribution. It 
appears to be directly involved in stopping processes and peaks earlier for successful 
stop trials as compared with unsuccessfully stopped ones (Bekker, Kenemans, 
Hoeksma, Talsma, & Verbaten, 2005; Dimoska, Johnstone, & Barry, 2006). To 
address the relevance of P3 for motor inhibition, Smith et al (J. L. Smith, Johnstone, 
& Barry, 2008) compared a classical go/nogo task with an equivalent “count/no-
count” task, in which participants were asked to covertly count the number of 
frequent go trials, but not to include the infrequent nogo trials. In this way, saliency 
and behavioural relevance effects were controlled for. The authors found that the 
differences in the amplitudes of the P3 component were larger between go and nogo 
trials that between count and no-count trials, suggesting that this component is 
indeed related to action inhibition. 
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It has been suggested that action inhibition critically relies on conscious processes 
and can therefore only be triggered by supraliminal stimuli (Dehaene et al., 2003; 
Mayr, 2004). However, Hughes et al (Hughes et al., 2009) showed that unconscious 
go/nogo primes can influence both behavioural performance in a go/nogo task and 
the amplitude of the N2/P3 complex. The authors showed that nogo primes 
significantly reduced the amplitude of the N2/P3 complex, suggesting that some 
priming of inhibitory function occurred following the presentation of subliminal 
stimuli, and thus reducing the inhibitory effort necessary to stop an action. In a 
similar vein, Van Gaal et al (van Gaal, Ridderinkhof, van den Wildenberg, & 
Lamme, 2009) have shown that subliminal primes associated with stop signals in the 
context of a SST can facilitate action inhibition.  
  
Fewer studies have addressed the electrophysiological correlates of intentional 
inhibition. In one recent study, Walsh et al (Walsh, Kühn, Brass, Wenke, & 
Haggard, 2010) tested participants in a Libet task. In addition, participants were 
asked decide to inhibit their actions in some trials at the very last moment. If they 
had inhibited their action, participants were asked to report the time of inhibition. 
Walsh et al time-locked the EEG recordings to the reported time of inhibition, and 
found a frontally-distributed event-related synchronization in the beta band peaking 
at 12 ms before the reported time of inhibition. The authors suggest that this may be 
an electrophysiological signature of intentional inhibition.  
 
1. 4      Outstanding questions in volitional control of 
behaviour 
 
A vast body of literature points to a distinction between intentional and instructed 
action. Convergent evidence from phenomenological accounts, behavioural data and 
neural data supports the validity of an instructed/intentional distinction in action 
processes.  
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However, the nature of this distinction remains unclear and is still hotly debated. The 
scientific value of a theory depends on its ability to provide simple explanations of 
phenomena other than those that it was originally devised to explain. This thesis 
therefore attempts to extend the intentional/instructed distinction in three important 
directions that remain unexplored. 
  
First, if the intentional/instructed distinction is valid for the control of behaviour as a 
whole, it should not be restricted to action only. Given the importance of inhibition 
of action for the control of behaviour, it may be possible to find empirical support 
for a distinction between intentional and instructed inhibition. Because of the 
methodological difficulties associated with studying inhibition of action, this issue 
has remained relatively unexplored up to now. 
Second, if the instructed/intentional distinction is a relevant one for action control, it 
should presumably also have an impact on the experience of action, given that 
people are generally aware of their actions. The operational distinction between 
instructed and intentional action has been scientifically useful because it helped to 
bypass subjectivity, and is based on information processing. Perhaps because of the 
methodological difficulties typically associated with incorporating subjective 
experience in empirical research, this aspect of intentional behaviour has been 
largely neglected. Arguably however, it lies at the core of intentional action. This 
thesis therefore aims at exploring the instructed/intentional distinction with an 
emphasis on the subjective experience associated with it.  
There are clear methodological problems associated with the study of both 
intentional inhibition and the subjective experience associated with intentional 
behaviour. Consequently, this thesis describes several different methodological 
approaches that are suitable to overcome the practical and conceptual difficulties in 
the study of intentional behaviour.  
 
This thesis studied intentional behaviour and what distinguishes it from instructed 
behaviour. It examined the neural processes that range temporally from decision 
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making to the processing of decision consequences. The thesis is organized to 
highlight three crucial aspects of the instructed/intentional distinction that had not 
previously been explored. First, three experiments explored a possible distinction 
between instructed and intentional inhibition of action, and its functional relevance. 
Second, two experiments examined the period between response selection and 
response execution, i.e. the period of decision maintenance. And finally, two 
experiments focussed on the elusive phenomenology of intentional action.  
In particular, and as a first inferential step, chapter 2 explored potential differences in 
the subjective experience associated with intentional and instructed inhibition of 
action. Preparatory processes for action and action inhibition were studied through 
their effects on time perception. Results revealed that whereas instructed action and 
instructed inhibition were associated with clearly different degrees of time 
compression, this was not the case for intentional action and intentional inhibition. In 
the case of intentional behaviour, action and inhibition trials were indistinguishable 
on the basis of their effects on time compression. Intentional conditions led to 
“intermediate” levels of time compression as compared to their instructed 
counterparts.  
Then, to explore the issue of intentional inhibition in more naturalistic settings, the 
experiment described in chapter 3 aimed to induce in participants strong urges to act, 
and therefore strong requirements for action inhibition. In this case the neural 
processing of the sensory consequences of behaviour was compared for instructed 
and intentional inhibition. Results showed that the neural processing of the 
consequences of intentional decisions to inhibit action differ from those of instructed 
decisions to inhibit action. The differences between intentional decisions to act and 
inhibit are smaller that between instructed decision to act and inhibit. Therefore, in 
line with the results from chapter 2, the processing of the consequences of intentional 
decisions represented “intermediate” situations between the extreme instructed 
decisions, perhaps because intentional decisions always admit the “possibility of 
doing otherwise”.  
Because of the special status of intentional inhibition regarding the conscious control 
of impulsive action, chapter 4 investigated the relation between the neural processes 
underlying intentional inhibition and conscious awareness.  Specifically, the 
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experiment investigated whether decisions to inhibit could be influenced by 
unconscious preceding neural activity. Results revealed that, in the absence of strong 
biases for any of the possible response outcomes, intentional decision processes may 
capitalize on the intrinsic fluctuations of neural activity to bias the outcome. This 
may be a potential mechanism whereby intentional decisions to inhibit action can 
select between two equivalent response alternatives.  
 
If voluntary behaviour involves neural structures associated with intentions, one 
intuitive account would hypothesize that intentional decisions are stronger, and more 
difficult to change, than instructed decisions. However, results from experiments in 
chapters 2 and 3 suggested the opposite scenario. Therefore, in a second extension of 
the instructed/intentional distinction, two experiments explored potential differences 
in the period between action preparation and action execution, by addressing the 
strength of intentional decisions. The study presented in Chapter 5 explored the 
flexibility of neural representations of intentional response alternatives. The results 
showed that the internal representation of actions is not flexible, and presents a lag 
relative to sudden changes in the external environment.  
Chapter 6 explored the penetrability of intentional decisions by external task-
irrelevant distracters. The results did not show differences between instructed and 
intentional action in the susceptibility to external distraction, in keeping with other 
findings previously reported in this thesis.  
Two final experiments directly explored the subjective experience associated with 
intentional action. Chapter 7 explored the timing of the emergence of conscious 
intentions to act, in cases of instructed or intentional action. Results did not show 
differences in the timing of conscious awareness of intention for different action 
types. These results stressed the methodological difficulties in addressing the 
subjective experience of intentional action. 
Chapter 8 addressed the subjective feeling of acting intentionally, and attempted to 
identify the neural structures that may underlie it. The results suggest that a 
postcentral area that had not been related to intentional action before may be 
responsible for the emergence of the feeling of acting freely.   
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Together, this thesis provides strong and consistent evidence for a validity of a 
distinction between instructed and intentional action, the distinction is not restricted 
to the single aspect of action generation for which it was originally developed. 
Rather, the work presented here suggests that the distinction can be usefully be 
extended both to the subjective experience of action execution, and also to the 
control of action inhibition.  
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Chapter 2   Intentional action and intentional inhibition: 
effects on time perception  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Making and inhibiting actions are associated with characteristic subjective 
experiences.  Are these experiences comparable for instructed and intentional 
behaviour? Biases in subjective experience of time following intentional or 
instructed action or inhibition were measured in a factorial design in a 
psychophysical experiment.  Biases in time perception were smaller for intentional 
actions than for instructed actions, but were greater for intentional inhibition than 
for instructed inhibition.  Moreover, intentional action and intentional inhibition 
produced similar compressions of subjective time.  These results suggest that 
intentional inhibition is a distinctive cognitive operation with widespread 
experiential effects. 
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2. 1      Introduction 
Intentional and instructed decisions produce virtually identical behavioural outcomes 
from the point of view of an external observer. In cases of action inhibition, 
instructed and intentional processes are associated with no overt behaviour at all. 
Consequently, behavioural measures have limited value, and other approaches are 
necessary to reveal differences between intentional and instructed decisions. 
Typically, neurophysiological measures have been used (see the introduction of this 
thesis).  
As a possible alternative approach this study considered the subjective experience 
associated with intentional and instructed decisions. If intentional decisions involve 
different mechanisms from those of instructed decisions, each process will in turn 
lead to distinct subjective experiences. Therefore, as a first inferential step, to 
explore differences between intentional and instructed decisions in cases of both 
action and inhibition, the subjective experience associated with these processes was 
addressed.  
Subjective time duration is a candidate aspect of subjective experience that has been 
linked to action processes and is readily measurable. Accurate and precise time 
estimation is important to synchronize action with dynamic events in the external 
environment, and to interpret causal relationships based on temporal consistency.  
Experimental research has addressed the relationship between action and time 
perception (see figure 2.1). In a typical action and time perception task, participants 
are asked to make actions and concurrently to estimate the duration of a “test” 
interval that occurs around the time of their action. Perceived durations of the test 
interval may be compared with other “probe” intervals. Using these paradigms, time 
dilation effects or chronostasis have been consistently found after the time of action. 
A vast body of literature shows that making actions leads to biases in time 
perception in the context of these paradigms. Different actions, such as saccades 
(Yarrow, Haggard, Heal, Brown, & Rothwell, 2001), key presses or voice commands 
(Park, Schlag-Rey, & Schlag, 2003) and arm movements (Yarrow & Rothwell, 
2003) can lead to chronostasis. This effect is generally taken to be a compensatory 
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mechanism that can correct for the perceptual “time lost” during action, or for more 
general mechanisms such as movement preparation and attention (Yarrow, Whiteley, 
Rothwell, & Haggard, 2006). 
However, it has recently been shown that time dilation associated with action 
preparation does not only emerge as a compensation for sensory suppression 
(Hagura, Kanai, Orgs, & Haggard, 2012). In a series of elegant experiments, Hagura 
et al have shown that action preparation is associated with dilation of subjective 
time, whilst at the same time leading to enhanced sensory perception. The authors 
asked participants to make reaching movements to targets presented on a screen, and 
to judge the duration of a target interval presented immediately before their 
movement. Interestingly, the authors found that when participants knew the exact 
spatial location of the target, and hence could precisely prepare their actions, the 
time dilation effects were maximized. Time dilation effects were smaller when 
participants were uncertain about the precise location of the reaching target. These 
results suggest that biases in time perception may be tightly linked to the 
advancement of action preparation present at the time of occurrence of the interval to 
be judged.   
The opposite effect of time dilation, namely time compression, has been found in 
periods around the time of action. Morrone et al (Morrone, Ross, & Burr, 2005) 
evaluated the effects of saccadic eye movements on time perception. Three 
participants were asked to estimate the duration of a time interval occurring between 
the appearances of two pairs of horizontal bars presented in the periphery of the 
visual field. Two time intervals were presented in each trial, namely the test interval 
and the probe interval. The test interval had a fixed duration and was presented at 
unpredictable times relative to a saccade onset. The probe interval had a variable 
duration, and was presented well after the saccade. Participants were asked to judge 
whether the test interval had been longer or shorter than the probe interval. The 
results showed that time intervals around the time of saccades were consistently 
perceived as shorter than they had actually been. This chronostasis effect did not 
depend on the size of the saccades or on the peripheral distance of the visual stimuli 
(the horizontal bars) to the saccadic target. The time compression effect was greatest 
over a period of ± 200 ms relative to saccadic onset. 
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Other research has shown that time compression effects are not restricted to saccadic 
movements. The “intentional binding” effect described by Haggard et al (Haggard et 
al., 2002) shows time compression after finger movements (both instructed and 
intentional; see section 1.2.2.2). This effect appears to be related to the conscious 
motor intentions occurring prior to action, and not to processes of intentional action 
selection.  
 
 
 
Figure 2.1 Some of the temporal illusions described in relation to action 
 
In addition to action-related processes, other cognitive processes may influence time 
perception. In the well documented “filled duration illusion” (E. Thomas & Brown, 
1974), an interval during which a series of discrete perceptual events occur is 
typically judged to be longer than another interval of equal length in which no 
perceptual events occur. For example, if during only one of two intervals of equal 
length a series of auditory tones are played, that “filled” interval will be perceived as 
having a longer duration than the “empty” interval during which no other tones were 
presented.  
In a recent large meta-analysis of experimental studies on time perception, Block et 
al compared time estimation biases between conditions of high and low cognitive 
load (R. A. Block, Hancock, & Zakay, 2010). The authors distinguished between 
prospective and retrospective paradigms. In prospective paradigms, participants 
know beforehand that they will be required to judge the duration of an interval. In 
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retrospective paradigms, participants are asked about the duration only after they 
have been exposed to the time interval. The meta-analytic results of Block et al 
reveal that in prospective time estimation paradigms, higher cognitive load 
conditions are associated with stronger time compression effects. This suggests that 
cognitive mechanisms such as attention and working memory may impair time 
perception.   
Given the effects of both action and cognitive processing on time perception, the two 
experiments reported here explored potential effects of action inhibition and 
intentional decisions on time perception. In particular, it was hypothesized that 
inhibited actions can lead to biases in time perception; and that the additional 
decision making processes required in intentional decisions would lead to differential 
biases in subjective time perception. If the additional cognitive process of intentional 
decisions leads to a “filled duration” effect, then intentional decisions will 
presumably be associated with stronger time dilation effects than instructed 
processes.   
To test the hypothesis, a dual paradigm was designed. The paradigm included on the 
one hand, a go/nogo task that could be either instructed or intentional. That is, the 
outcome of the go/nogo task could either be specified in the instructed conditions, or 
depended on the participants’ choice in the intentional conditions. On the other hand, 
the go/nogo task was combined with a temporal judgement task. In a Michotte-type 
paradigm (Michotte, Thines, & Crabbe, 1991; Yantis, 1995), participants were asked 
to estimate the duration of a visual event that was independent of the participant’s 
response. In this way, the effects of the intentional go/nogo task on the time 
perception task could be determined. 
Experiment 1 revealed differences in time perception between instructed and 
intentional decisions. Experiment 2 showed that these differences are in turn 
associated cognitive processing that occurs prior to the execution of a response.  
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2. 2      Experiment 1 
2. 2. 1  Methods 	  
Twenty naïve participants (4 female, mean age 22 years) took part in the study. All 
participants had normal or corrected to normal vision. Procedures were approved by 
the UCL research ethics committee and were in accordance with the principles of the 
Declaration of Helsinki. 
Experimental stimuli were displayed on a CRT monitor with a refresh rate of 60Hz. 
Participants sat 60 cm away from the screen, and rested their right index finger on an 
“action key” connected via serial port to the stimulus computer. Their left index hand 
rested on the arrow keys of a standard keyboard.  
The experimental paradigm consisted of two simultaneous tasks, indicated by two 
visual cues displayed on the screen (see below). First, in a go/nogo task, participants 
were asked to make or inhibit quick key presses. Second, in a temporal judgement 
task, participants were asked to make indirect temporal judgements. Covert cognitive 
processes presumably occurring during the go/nogo task were addressed through 
their effects over performance in the temporal judgement task. Participants were 
asked to favour both speed and accuracy in the go/nogo task, and to favour accuracy 
over speed in the temporal judgement task.  
 
Go/nogo task 
Stimuli were presented over a grey background. Each trial developed as follows. 
Participants initiated each trial by pressing the action button. A small white cue (0.1 
degree of visual angle) was shown revolving around a white central fixation point 
(see figure 2.2), with a radial distance of 1.5 degrees and at a fixed angular speed of 
0.5 revolutions per second. The direction of rotation (clockwise or counter 
clockwise) was fully randomized across trials. Participants were asked to maintain 
fixation on the central cue, and to avoid pursuit of the peripheral cue. Further, they 
were asked to prepare a right key press at the onset of the trial. After a variable 
period of between one and two full revolutions, the peripheral cue disappeared for a 
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fixed period of 700 ms (occlusion period). Simultaneously with the occlusion period 
onset, the central cue changed colour. The central cue could turn green, red or 
yellow. The colour of the central cue, together with the participant’s behaviour, 
determined the trial type. Each trial fell in one of five possible conditions: instructed 
go, instructed nogo, intentional go, intentional nogo and baseline condition. A green 
central cue instructed participants to make a quick key press (instructed go 
condition). A red central cue instructed participants to inhibit their prepared action 
(instructed nogo condition). A yellow central cue allowed participants to decide 
whether to act (intentional go) or inhibit their key press (intentional nogo). 
Participants were asked to roughly balance the number of intentional go and nogo 
trials, but to try to avoid responding in a prespecified fashion. The four experimental 
conditions fell into a factorial design, with the factors of source 
(instructed/intentional) and outcome (go/nogo).  
Further, in a baseline condition, the central cue was coloured blue from the onset of 
the trial. Unlike in the four experimental conditions, in the baseline condition 
participants were asked not to prepare the key press at all, and could concentrate on 
the temporal judgement task. The baseline condition therefore measured participants’ 
subjective time perception in the absence of any action-related processes.  
 
Temporal judgement task 
The temporal judgement task was adapted from previous studies requiring time 
estimation (Parkinson, Springer, & Prinz, 2011). After the 700 ms occlusion period, 
the peripheral cue reappeared and continued its normal revolution for a period of 800 
ms. Crucially, angular offsets were introduced to the angular position of 
reappearance of the peripheral cue, introducing a mismatch between the expected 
and actual positions of reappearance. The maximum angular offset introduced 
corresponded to a temporal offset of ±700 ms of duration of the occlusion period. 
Thus, on reappearance, the peripheral cue could be seen either too far ahead or too 
far behind the “correct” position of reappearance, estimated on the basis of the 
original travelling speed and duration of the occlusion period. Participants were then 
asked to make a two-alternative forced-choice judgement to indicate whether the 
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peripheral cue had travelled too far or not far enough during the occlusion period. 
The temporal offset was adaptively adjusted with a QUEST algorithm (Watson & 
Pelli, 1983). The data were then fitted with a cumulative binomial function, to 
approximate the psychometric function. The point of subjective equality (PSE) was 
then measured as the 50% point of the cumulative function fitted to the psychometric 
function. Normally distributed noise around the PSE were added to the temporal 
offset suggestions produced by the QUEST algorithm to improve the estimation of 
the psychometric functions. To further improve the estimation of the psychometric 
curve, only extreme values of angular offset were presented in the first 80 trials. 
Just-noticeable differences (JNDs) were calculated as half of the difference between 
the 75% and 25% thresholds of the cumulative function fitted to the psychometric 
data for each condition and each participant.  
Leftwards shifts (towards smaller values) of the psychometric curves would indicate 
time compression, as it would imply that participants overall perceived the peripheral 
cue to have travelled shorter distances. Because the peripheral cue speed was 
constant, shorter expected distances would imply occlusion periods perceived as 
shorter. In turn, rightwards shifts (towards larger values) of the psychometric curves 
would be indicative of time dilation, because longer expected travelling distances 
implied that elapsed periods were perceived as longer. 
A simple cognitive framework was used to characterize the cognitive processes that 
took place in each experimental condition (see figure 2.5). In all conditions except 
from baseline, participants would have made a perceptual decision about the colour 
central cue within the duration of the occlusion period (see figure 2.2). Additionally, 
in intentional trials participants were required to make an intentional decision 
whether to execute the action they had prepared. The occlusion period could not be 
synchronized exactly with any single cognitive process. The 700 ms occlusion period 
was expected to encompass both perceptual and intentional processes, plus most 
actions or inhibitions. The exact time of actions (go RT) could be measured, but the 
“nogo RT” could only be inferred from the go RTs. It was assumed that the 
distributions of go and nogo RTs would be similar for each participant. Finally, some 
of the go and nogo RTs were expected to fall within the occlusion period.  
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Figure 2.2. Experimental task for experiment 1. A peripheral cue revolved around a central 
cue at a fixed speed (0.5 revolutions/s). Both cues were white dots displayed over a grey 
background. Each trial included two concurrent tasks, a temporal estimation task (given by 
the peripheral cue) and a go/nogo task (given by the central cue). For the temporal 
estimation task, the peripheral cue rotated for a variable period of between one and two full 
revolutions, until it disappeared for a fixed time of 700 ms (occlusion period). The 
peripheral cue then reappeared and continued revolving for a further 800 ms. The position of 
reappearance of the peripheral cue could either be too far ahead or lagging behind the correct 
reappearance position, given the fixed speed of the peripheral cue and length of the 
occlusion period. Short red lines on the circle indicate the onset and offset of the occlusion 
period. Participants were asked to make an indirect temporal judgement by indicating 
whether they perceived that the cue had travelled too far or not far enough.  For the go/nogo 
task, at the time of disappearance of the peripheral cue, the central cue changed colour, to 
indicate whether participants should make a key press, inhibit their prepared action or 
intentionally decide in the go/nogo task. In the baseline condition, a central cue coloured 
blue from the onset of the trial indicated to participants that they should not prepare their 
action at all, and should concentrate exclusively on the temporal judgement task.  
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The trial type in the intentional conditions depended on the participant’s decision. 
The number of trials of each type could therefore not be fixed. Instead, the 
experiment continued until the participants had done at least 50 trials per condition, 
or until at least one condition had reached 80 trials. Trials were pseudorandomized, 
and were in the following proportions: 20% instructed go, 20% instructed nogo, 40% 
intentional go/nogo and 20% baseline.  
Large differences in luminosity have been shown to modulate the perceived duration 
of stimulus duration (Eagleman, 2008). Therefore, a colorimeter was used to balance 
the luminosity across colour stimuli.  
Before the main experimental session, participants were familiarized with the task in 
a short practice session. Accuracy feedback was given for the temporal judgement 
during the practice session. No feedback was given during the experimental session. 
 
Eye movements monitoring  
Eye movements were recorded to control for their effect on time perception. In 
experiment 1, vertical and horizontal electrooculograms (VEOG and HEOG) were 
obtained using electrocardiography electrodes placed around the eyes of 10 of the 20 
participants. The bipolar analogue EOG signal from each channel was amplified 
(Contact Precision Instruments, London, UK) and collected by a second computer 
with a sampling rate of 100 Hz, using a 12 bit A/D converter (NI-USB 6008, 
National Instruments, Austin, TX). The high and low pass filters were set to 0.3Hz 
and 30 Hz respectively, with a gain of 200 µV. The amplified EOG signal was 
calibrated immediately before the main experiment. Participants were asked to make 
large saccadic eye movements from one side of the screen to another(angular size, 
31º).  These large saccadic eye movements served as a template to determine 
whether significant eye movements had occurred within the occlusion period. 
Because saccades can lead to biases in time estimation, it was important to ensure 
that no differences in relative number of eye movements were present between 
conditions.  
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2. 2. 2  Results 	  
Some participants made judgement errors in trials with extreme angular offsets in at 
least one condition. In these cases (9 participants), not all conditions could be 
associated with a psychometric curve as a function of the angular offset of the 
peripheral cue. The indirect temporal judgement task was not easy for all 
participants, and a high rate of errors in trials with extreme angular offset values was 
not uncommon. Errors in these trials were the main reason of a failure in the 
estimation of a psychometric curve. These data were excluded without further 
analysis, yielding a total of 11 participants. 
 
Go/nogo results 
Participants made few errors in the instructed trials. The mean (± SD) percentage of 
omission errors was 1.53 ± 2.02% in the instructed go condition. The percentages of 
commission errors were 5.18 ± 6.76% in the instructed nogo condition and 0.28 ± 
0.63% in the baseline condition. In the intentional conditions, participants 
successfully produced a balanced outcome between go and nogo, with a mean 
percentage of intentional go trials of 49 ± 7 %. 
A t-test comparing mean reaction times (RTs) between the instructed go and 
intentional go conditions revealed no significant differences (instructed go, 531 ± 24 
ms; intentional go, 548 ± 34 ms; t10=-1.07, p=0309). 
 
Temporal judgement results 
To measure the effect of intentional decisions on time perception, the individual 
points of subjective equality (PSEs) were calculated for each condition. Example 
data from one representative participant is shown in figure 2.3.  
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Figue 2.3 Temporal judgement data from a representative participant. The individual data 
and the fit of the cumulative binomial distribution are shown. Negative shifts of the 
estimated psychometric curve imply time compression.  
 
 
PSEs in the baseline condition were significantly shifted towards negative values (-
200 ± 120 ms, t10 = -5.53, p<0.001), indicating time compression. To evaluate the 
effect of action and inhibition on temporal perception, the mean baseline PSE was 
subtracted from the mean estimated PSEs for each condition. Baseline-corrected 
estimated PSEs are shown in figure 2.4. 
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Figure 2.4 Mean points of subjective equality (PSE) relative to baseline PSE, for each 
condition.  Negative PSE values indicate time compression. Error bars show standard error 
of the mean. * indicates p<0.05, + indicates p<0.1 
 
A 2x2 ANOVA on the baseline-corrected PSEs with the factors of source 
(instructed/intentional) and outcome (go/nogo) revealed no main effect of source 
(F1,10=0.10, p>0.758) or outcome (F1,10=2.76, p=0.127); but a significant interaction 
effect (F1,10=11.18, p=0.007). Follow up t-tests revealed that the temporal 
compression associated with instructed inhibition differed from that associated with 
intentional inhibition (t10=2.24, p=0.048), with stronger temporal compression in the 
instructed inhibition condition. There was a non-significant trend for a difference in 
the opposite direction between the temporal compression associated with instructed 
and intentional action (t10=-1.96, p=0.078).  
In addition, instructed go and intentional nogo conditions were significantly different 
from baseline (t10=-2.5365, p=0.029 and t10=-2.44, p=0.034 respectively, uncorrected 
for multiple comparisons). Intentional go and instructed nogo did not differ 
significantly from baseline (t10=-1.01, p=0.335 and t10=0.346, p=0.736, respectively) 
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Temporal judgement precision 
To address whether the go/nogo task had an effect on precision of time perception, 
JNDs were analyzed in a 2 x 2 ANOVA with the factors of source and outcome. No 
significant effects were found. There was no main effect of source (F1,10=0.78, 
p=0.399), no main effect of outcome (F1,10=0.70, p=0.426) and no interaction effect 
(F1,10=0.22, p=0.648). This suggests that the results cannot be immediately attributed 
to differences in precision of time estimation. 
 
Eye movements 
To control for eye movements, EOG activity was recorded. Eye movements were 
analyzed offline, after the adaptive QUEST algorithm had yielded the estimated 
PSEs for each condition. Therefore, the rejection of single trials on the basis of 
saccades would not be consistent with the adaptive PSE estimation method. A visual 
inspection of the EOG data showed that saccadic eye movements were rare, with 
participants typically producing no more than 20 saccades occurring in the total 
number of trials in the experiment (a minimum of 250). However, the EOG data 
suggested that despite clear instructions to maintain fixation, participants made 
smooth pursuits of the peripheral cue in virtually all trials.  
 
2. 2. 3  Discussion  
 
The results of experiment 1 revealed differences in the degrees of time compression 
associated with intentional and instructed decisions. There were statistically 
significant differences between instructed and intentional nogo decisions, and a trend 
for significance between instructed and intentional go conditions. To the extent that 
biases in time compression are indicative of covert cognitive processes, these results 
suggest that intentional and instructed inhibition conditions do in fact rely on 
different sets of mechanisms, since they have dissociable effects on time perception. 
Whereas instructed inhibition did not differ from baseline in the amount of time 
Chapter	  2	  	  	  	  Intentional	  decisions	  and	  time	  perception	  	  
74	  	  
compression, intentional inhibition did show time compression effects over and 
above baseline.  
However, experiment 1 is not informative about the specific processes leading to 
time compression. Biases in time perception can occur at different points relative to 
action. The time compression effects described by Morrone et al (2005) occur in the 
period around the time of action, whereas intentional binding and saccade-related 
chronostasis are found in the period immediately following action. In experiment 1, 
several processes occurred within the occlusion period, and could therefore be 
responsible for the observed time compression effects. In principle, both pre-action 
processes (i.e., instruction processing and intentional decision making) and post-
action processes (e.g., processes associated with the sensory processing of action 
consequences) could lead to the observed effects.  
 
2. 3      Experiment 2 
2. 3. 1  Introduction 
 
To distinguish the effects of pre-and post-response processing on time perception, 
experiment 2 aimed at generating a situation of minimal overlap between pre-
response processing and occlusion period, by making responses fall just before or 
early within the occlusion period. The assumption was that time perception biases 
are primarily due to cognitive processes occurring simultaneously with the period to 
estimate. Therefore, any time compression effects observed in experiment 2 would 
be primarily due to post-response processing.  
	  
2. 3. 2  Methods 	  
Participants 
Fourteen naïve participants took part in experiment 2 (mean age ± SD 26.5 ± 7 
years). No participant had taken part in experiment 1.  
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Task 
In experiment 2, participants performed the go/nogo task with their left hand. The 
task in experiment 2 was as in experiment 1, but with the critical difference that the 
go/nogo instruction colour change occurred before the occlusion period offset (see 
figures 2.5 and 2.6). In this way, the temporal relation between the to-be-judged 
period and the response itself was better controlled than in experiment 1. In 
experiment 1, time compression occurred in the period during action selection and 
preparation. In contrast, in experiment 2, time compression occurred after action 
selection, and during action preparation and execution. The decision process will 
have therefore occurred before the occlusion period. Together, experiments 1 and 2 
identified the cognitive processes responsible for the time modulation effects. 
The exact time of go/nogo instruction onset relative to the occlusion period onset 
was estimated for each participant in the first experimental block, and kept constant 
throughout the experiment.  
As in experiment 1, only extreme angular displacements were shown in the first 80 
trials. Each participant’s mean go RT was estimated on the basis of these initial 
trials, and used as the temporal difference between go/nogo instruction and occlusion 
onset. It was assumed that participants with mean RTs longer than 600 ms could 
improve throughout the experiment. Because the temporal difference between the 
two task onsets was kept constant throughout the experiment, there would be a risk 
of overestimating the go RTs due to an initial lack of task familiarity. Therefore, 
mean go RTs were not allowed to go above 600 ms. That is, each participant’s go RT 
was used as a temporal difference between the tasks, unless it was longer than 600 
ms, in which case this maximum value was used.  
This method of approximation to the mean go RT was preferred over a strict strategy 
of initiating the occlusion period upon each action for two reasons. First, to avoid 
potentially confounding effects of agency related to temporal contingencies between 
actions and occlusion onset (e.g., intentional binding). Second, and importantly, go 
RTs could be measured but nogo RTs could not. Because nogo RTs were assumed to 
be roughly equivalent to go RTs, some error in the temporal matching between the 
go RTs and the occlusion period made go and nogo conditions more comparable. 
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In this way, the occlusion period would fall after or around the estimated time of 
action. Any go/nogo effects on time perception in experiment 2 would therefore be 
caused by the response itself or by post-response processing, but not by decision 
making or action preparation processes.  
 
 
Figure 2.5 Comparison between experimental tasks for experiments 1 and 2. A,B. The key 
difference between experiment 1 and 2 was the onset asynchrony between the time of 
go/nogo instruction (central cue colour change) and time of occlusion period onset 
(peripheral cue occlusion). In experiment 1, the two events occurred simultaneously. In 
experiment 2, the two events were separated in time, with the instruction appearing at a 
maximum of 600 ms before the occlusion onset (see methods).The mean relative time of the 
actions with respect to the occlusion period was earlier than in experiment 1.  
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Figure 2.6 Expected probability distributions of RTs in both experiments. In experiment 1, 
the majority of the RTs fell late in the occlusion period.   
 
Eye tracking 
In experiment 2, gaze position was monitored with an eye tracker (Cambridge 
Research Systems, UK) in 10 out of the 14 participants. Analysis of gaze position 
was done offline. To determine whether fixation had been broken in each trial, the 
gaze distance to fixation was calculated for duration of the trial. If it exceeded the 
radial distance of the peripheral cue (1.5°), fixation was considered to be broken.  
 
2. 3. 3  Results 	  
A psychometric curve for the expected temporal offset of the peripheral cue could 
not be resolved from the data from 2 participants. These data were excluded without 
further analysis, yielding a total of 12 participants.  
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Go/nogo results 
Fewer errors were made in experiment 2 than in experiment 1, with a rate of 
omission errors of 0.02 ± 0.02%, commission errors 0.01 ± 0.02% in instructed nogo 
condition and no errors in the baseline condition. In the intentional conditions, 
participants successfully produced a balanced outcome, with a mean percentage of 
intentional go trials of 51 ± 6 %. 
Unlike in experiment 1, mean instructed go RTs were significantly shorter than mean 
intentional go RTs in experiment 2 (instructed go 630 ± 30 ms, intentional go 717 ± 
35 ms, t10=-4.18, p=0.002). As expected, experiment 1 and 2 differed in the time of 
key press relative to occlusion onset. Relative RTs in experiment 1 were 531 ± 8 ms 
in the instructed go condition and 548 ± 11 ms in the intentional go condition. In 
turn, in experiment 2 the mean relative RT was 50 ± 78 ms for the instructed go 
condition and 128 ± 104 ms for the intentional go conditions. A distribution of the 
RTs in each experiment pooled for all participants is shown in figure 2.7.  
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Figure 2.7 Distribution of reaction times relative to the occlusion period. Data are pooled 
for all participants for experiment 1 (black) and experiment 2 (grey). Red vertical lines mark 
the onset and offset of the occlusion period. Most key presses occurred late within the 
occlusion offset in experiment 1, and early within the occlusion period in experiment 2.  
 
Temporal judgement results 
As in experiment 1, the effect of intentional decisions on time perception was 
measured as the PSEs estimated for each condition. Example data from one 
representative participant is shown in figure 2.8 
 
Figue 2.8 Temporal judgement data from a representative participant. The individual data 
and the fit of the cumulative binomial distribution are shown. Negative shifts of the 
estimated psychometric curve imply time compression.  
 
The ANOVA for experiment 2 showed no main effect of source (F1,10=1.51, 
p=0.245) or outcome (F1,10<0.01, p>0.99) and no significant interaction (F1,10=0.89, 
p=0.367). No condition showed PSEs significantly different from baseline (all 
p>0.1440). Baseline-corrected mean estimated PSEs for experiments 2 are shown in 
figure 2.9. 
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Figure 2.9 Mean points of subjective equality (PSE) relative to baseline PSE, for each 
condition.  Negative PSE values indicate time compression. Error bars show standard error 
of the mean.  
 
To determine whether the significant interaction in time compression effects was 
specific to experiment 1, the results between experiments 1 and 2 were compared in 
a mixed effects 2 x 2 x 2 ANOVA. The baseline corrected mean PSEs for each 
condition and each experiment were compared with the factors of outcome (go/nogo) 
and source (instructed/intentional) as within-participants factors and experiment  
(1/2) as a between- participants factor.  
Results of the ANOVA revealed no main effect of source (F1,21=0.70, p=0.412) or 
outcome (F1,21=1.40, p=0.249) and no main effect of experiment (F1,21=0.84, 
p=0.369). There was a significant source x outcome interaction effect (F1,21=10.32, 
p=0.004). Importantly, there was a marginally significant three-way source x 
outcome x experiment (F1,21=4.06, p=0.057).   
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Temporal judgement precision 
To address whether the go/nogo task had an effect on precision of time perception, 
JNDs were analyzed in a 2 x 2 ANOVA with the factors of source and outcome. No 
significant effects were found. There was no main effect of source (F1,11=0.56, 
p=0.470), no main effect of outcome (F1,11=1.13, p=0.310) and no interaction effect 
(F1,11<0.01, p=0.994). As in experiment 1, this suggests that the results cannot be 
immediately attributed to differences in precision of time estimation. 
 
Baseline comparison  
The baseline time compression effect was subtracted from the estimated PSEs for 
each experiment. The baseline effect was therefore not compared across experiments 
in the above analysis. A strong mean baseline time compression effect was found in 
experiment 1 (-200 ± 120 ms, p<0.001). In contrast, no significant baseline time 
compression effect was found in experiment 2 (-5 ± 20 ms; t11 = -1.01, p=0.336). To 
compare the baseline levels of time compression between the two experiments, a 
two-sample t-test was done between the estimated baseline PSEs. These values were 
significantly different (t21=- 2.10, p=0.048) 
 
Eye movements  
To control for eye movements, EOG gaze position was recorded with an infrared 
eyetracker. As in experiment 1, eye movements were analyzed offline, after the 
adaptive QUEST algorithm had yielded the estimated PSEs for each condition, and 
the rejection of single trials on the basis of saccades would not be consistent with the 
PSE estimation method. Offline analyses showed that all participants made pursuit 
eye movements, in the great majority of trials (68% ± 35%). Therefore, despite 
explicit instructions to maintain fixation, participants followed the peripheral cue. To 
determine whether participants made more eye movements in any given condition, 
the proportion of broken fixations was calculated as the number of trials showing eye 
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movements for each condition relative to the total number of trials for each 
participant. A one-way ANOVA with the proportion of broken fixation showed no 
differences between any of the five conditions (F4,9=0.86, p=0.39, Greenhouse-
Geiser corrected). Therefore, eye movements are unlikely to explain differences in 
time perception biases between conditions. 
 
2. 4      Discussion  
This study was designed to investigate potential differences between covert cognitive 
processes associated with intentional and instructed decisions by measuring the 
consequences for the experienced passage of time. These differences cannot be 
directly assessed by their overt behavioural manifestations. One common approach 
in the existing literature is to measure them through their neurophysiological 
correlates. An alternative approach explored here is to measure covert processes 
indirectly, through their downstream effects on other aspects of cognition, such as 
through their effects on subjective experience. Here, differences between intentional 
and instructed behaviour were studied through their effects on subjective time 
perception. Time perception is widely used as a measure of cognitive processing, and 
several cognitive aspects of action control have traditionally been studied via time 
perception (Hagura et al., 2012; Wundt, 1909). Situations that led to identical 
behavioural outcomes (i.e., either a keypress or no movement) were compared, to 
reveal differences in their underlying processes. 
Experiment 1 measured the effects of decisions whether to execute a prepared action 
on time perception. Moreover, despite showing virtually identical overt behaviour, 
measures of subjective experience revealed that intentional and instructed decisions 
lead to different magnitudes of time perception biases. Because experiment 1 
confounded the effects of decision making and response execution, experiment 2 was 
aimed at discriminating the effects of these two processes. Results suggested that the 
time compression effects observed in experiment 1 are related to intentional 
processes that take place before, and not after the execution of a response.  
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Experiment 1 
In experiment 1 all experimental conditions (all except baseline) required 
participants to make a perceptual decision about the colour change of the central cue 
during the occlusion period. In contrast, the baseline condition was indicated from 
the trial onset, and well before the occlusion period. Consequently, in this condition 
the subjective judgements of the duration of the occlusion period would not have 
been affected by perceptual judgements of the colour cue, and would provide a 
measure of “pure” biases in subjective time perception, not related to intentional 
decisions, action, or inhibition.  
In addition, go conditions required action preparation and execution. Assuming that 
participants were in fact preparing to act from the onset of all but baseline trials, 
successful nogo trials would have required active action inhibition processes. In this 
way, nogo conditions would entail action preparation and inhibition. Furthermore, 
intentional go and nogo conditions required that participants made an additional 
whether decision, to decide on a trial-by-trial basis whether to make an action or not.  
Instructed action preparation and execution led to strong time compression effects, 
over and above baseline. This observation is well in line with the strong time 
compression effects associated with saccadic movements reported by Morrone et al 
(Morrone et al., 2005).  Intentional action, on the other hand, led to time 
compression effects that were numerically lower than those for instructed action; 
there was a trend for statistical differences between these two conditions.  
Instructed nogo conditions did not differ from baseline levels of time compression. 
This may be interpreted in two non-mutually exclusive ways. First, the processes 
required for instructed nogo trials (namely action preparation and inhibition) may not 
lead to measurable time compression effects. Second, instructed nogo and baseline 
trials may have been effectively equivalent. Participants were asked to prepare to act 
at the time of trial onset in all conditions but baseline. However, action preparation 
was not otherwise encouraged. If participants were not preparing to make an action, 
instructed nogo trials would only differ from baseline in that a perceptual decision 
would have been necessary during the occlusion period in instructed nogo trials.  
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Time compression in intentional conditions is “intermediate” relative to instructed 
extremes 
These results cannot be easily explained by the filled interval illusion (E. Thomas & 
Brown, 1974). The filled interval illusion occurs when a time period to be estimated 
contains a series of perceptual or cognitive events. In these cases, “filled” time 
intervals are typically perceived as longer than “empty” time intervals of the same 
objective duration. Intentional decision making could be an additional cognitive 
process that acts as a “filling”. If this were true, time intervals during which 
intentional decisions took place should be perceived as relatively longer than those 
where no intentional decision is required. This was not the case. Although the pattern 
of time compression in go conditions is compatible with this effect, results from 
intentional conditions are not. Intentional nogo conditions showed larger, and not 
smaller, time compression effects than the instructed nogo conditions. Therefore, 
intentional processes did not lead to a general positive bias in time estimation, as it 
might have been expected from results from filled interval tasks. Instead, intentional 
conditions seem to show “intermediate” effects that lie between the two extremes of 
the instructed conditions.  
No differences between the JNDs were observed across conditions, suggesting that 
the effects cannot be easily explained by differences in perceptual precision.  
There were clear differences in the magnitude of time compression between 
instructed go and nogo conditions. Strikingly, despite clear differences in behaviour 
between intentional go and nogo conditions (the former involves overt action, the 
latter does not), there were no significant differences between the degrees of time 
compression in the two intentional conditions. Therefore what seems to matter for 
time perception is not whether movement actually occurs or not, but whether there is 
action intention and preparation, even if these prepared action plans may be 
subsequently cancelled. The results of this study cannot be explained by simple 
motor effects or the filled interval illusion alone. Although both effects may 
influence time estimation, other cognitive processes in the intentional nogo 
conditions are necessary to explain the observed pattern of results.  
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Experiment 2 
Results from experiment 1 suggest that the time compression effects observed are 
related to intentional decision making processes. Two scenarios are thus possible. 
Time compression effects may be related to decision making and response 
preparation per se (pre-response execution), or they may be related to attributional or 
compensatory processes following response execution (post-response execution). 
Experiment 2 was designed to disambiguate between these two possibilities. In 
experiment 2, the go/nogo cue was given before the onset of the occlusion period. 
Pre-execution processes such as response selection and preparation would occur 
immediately after the go/nogo cue, and therefore mostly before the occlusion period. 
In contrast, post-execution processes would mostly occur during the occlusion 
period. Timing of events was approximate, because whereas go RTs could be clearly 
measured, nogo RTs could only be estimated. It was assumed that cognitive 
processes will show the strongest effects on the temporal estimation of intervals that 
occur simultaneously with the mental process. In this way, if the time compression 
effects observed in experiment 1 were mainly driven by pre-execution processes, 
separating them in time from the occlusion period would reduce the measured biases 
in the indirect temporal judgement.  
Indeed, the results showed no evidence of modulation of time perception when the 
pre-response period was temporally dissociated from the occlusion period. A 
comparison between experiments 1 and 2 revealed marginally significant 
differences, suggesting that the effects observed in experiment 1 may in fact be 
specific to the pre-response period.  Therefore, the temporal compression observed 
here must be related to response preparation and selection, not response execution 
 
Differences in baseline effects of time compression across experiments 1 and 2 
In experiment 1, a strong time compression effect was observed in the baseline 
condition. This effect was greatly reduced in experiment 2. Baseline trials were 
identical across both experiments, so the reasons for this strong difference are not 
easy to understand. However, an analysis of the mean go RTs and error rates shows 
strong differences in go/nogo task performance between the two experiments. Go 
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RTs were quicker in experiment 1, and error rates were higher than in experiment 2. 
This suggests that participants in experiment 1 prioritized speed over accuracy in the 
go/nogo task. In experiment 2 participants may have taken more time to do the task, 
and may have allowed for better accuracy in the time duration judgement task.  
 
 
Mechanisms of time perception 
The neural mechanisms responsible for time perception are still a matter of debate. 
Two basic opposing mechanisms have been proposed (Ivry & Schlerf, 2008). First, 
time perception may rely on specialized mechanisms or neural structures. Under an 
alternative prevailing view, the representation of interval durations may rely on 
certain inherent properties of all neural systems. Thus, time perception is ubiquitous 
and depends on the perceptual modality related to the timing task (Eagleman, 2008). 
Further, it has recently been suggested that subjective duration of a perceptual 
stimulus is related to the amount of neural firing used to encode a stimulus 
(Pariyadath & Eagleman, 2007). Crucially, this implies that the perception of time 
does not only depend on the neural structure related to the specific perceptual 
modality, but also depends on the current state of the neural network.  For example, 
Hagura et al (2012) have shown that the magnitude of action-related biases in time 
estimation depends on the amount of action preparation. The effects reported by 
Hagura et al are related to time dilation, and not the time compression effect 
observed here. However, it remains a speculative possibility that action preparation 
in the context of the go/nogo task also modulated the observed time compression 
effects. 
In humans, BOLD signal increases have been found in parietal, motor and 
supplementary motor areas (inferior parietal lobe -IPL-, dorsal premotor cortex -
PMd- and supplementary motor area -SMA-) in tasks requiring duration judgements 
of intervals in ranges of both second and subsecond scales (e.g., Lewis & Miall, 
2003; Schubotz, Friederici, & Yves von Cramon, 2000). This result is in line with 
data from monkey electrophysiology, showing links between both sensorimotor 
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parietal areas and motor areas in time perception (Janssen & Shadlen, 2005; Leon & 
Shadlen, 2003; Roux, Coulmance, & Riehle, 2003). 
Together, these results suggest that parietal and motor areas, typically related to 
sensorimotor integration and motor preparation, are also involved in mechanisms of 
temporal estimation, providing a tight link between the two functions. In particular, 
if premotor and motor cortices are involved in mechanisms of temporal estimation in 
this task, then their underlying state of motor preparatory activity will have an effect 
on time perception. In the absence of external imperatives, intentional conditions 
may lead to intermediate degrees of motor preparation because no clear and 
unambiguous instruction is provided. The generation of responses will not be clear 
cut, and the two response alternatives (in this case, go and nogo), may both be 
partially activated (Cisek & Kalaska, 2005). In contrast, in the instructed conditions, 
clear external instructions may lead to an efficient suppression of the “incorrect” 
response. Therefore, in light of these findings, a possible explanation for the results 
observed here is that the degree of time compression is related to the strength of 
action preparation processes. 
Conditions with strong motor preparation (such as instructed go) may in turn lead to 
strong biases in temporal estimation. Conditions with low levels of action 
preparation (in this case, instructed nogo) would lead to minimal biases in temporal 
estimation, as are comparable to baseline levels. Crucially, if intentional conditions -
both intentional go and intentional nogo- represent levels of action preparation that 
are intermediate between the instructed go and nogo conditions, then, these 
conditions would show intermediate levels of biases in time compression.  
This speculation is supported by data from monkey electrophysiology. Watanabe et 
al (Watanabe, Igaki, & Funahashi, 2006) trained monkeys in an oculomor delayed 
response (ODR) task. In a canonical ODR condition, analogous to the instructed 
conditions considered here, monkeys were shown one target, to which they had to 
saccade after a 3 s delay. In a self-ODR condition (S-ODR), analogous to the 
intentional conditions discussed here, monkeys were shown four different possible 
targets, and they would have to saccade to either of them after the same 3 s delay. 
Watanabe et al recorded neural activity from neurons in the dorsolateral PFC 
(DLPFC). They found that neural firing in the ODR task was high and sustained 
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during the delay period for the instructed direction only. In contrast, neural firing 
during the delay period in the S-ODR condition was not directional, and was 
generally lower than that in the instructed conditions. Neural firing in S-ODR 
conditions became directional only at the end of the delay period.  
These results suggest that intentional conditions are associated with “weaker” neural 
codes than otherwise behaviourally identical instructed conditions. These partially 
activated neural codes were not only present in motor-related areas; Watanabe et al’s 
results are drawn from neural firing in DLFPC. Given that time perception seems not 
to depend on a specialized structure, but instead be subserved by distributed neural 
networks, it is possible that weaker motor-related neural codes in cases of intentional 
action lead to the “intermediate” levels of time compression.  
The results described by Watanabe et al are related to the neural representation of 
decisions about what action to make. There is of course no direct evidence that the 
same “partial representation” mechanisms occur also for early and/or late decisions 
about whether or not to make an action. It is however plausible that when an 
intentional decision about whether to act or not is required, weaker (or intermediate) 
motor preparation occurs. In other word, the suppression of motor preparatory 
activity, consistent with a nogo response, may not be as efficient as in instructed 
cases.   
 
Limitations of this study 
One important limitation of this experimental task is it cannot guarantee that action 
preparation occurred in every experimental trial (i.e., in non-baseline trials). 
Participants were asked to prepare action at the start of every trial. However, no 
formal comparison between conditions of action preparation vs. no action 
preparation can be made, and the overall balanced numbers of go and nogo trials 
were not optimally designed to encourage action preparation. Therefore, the 
assumption that participants actively inhibited actions that they had already prepared 
to a late stage should be taken with care. This limitation is important when taking 
into account the differences between early selective decisions about whether to act or 
not vs. late inhibitory decisions (see the introduction of this thesis, section 2.2). If 
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action preparation and active inhibition occurred within an instructed nogo trial, then 
the present results do indeed reflect differences at the level of the late inhibitory 
decisions. If participants did not prepare actions, these results should be interpreted 
as related to early selective decisions about whether to act or not, rather than as late 
inhibitory processes. These early decisions are closer to response selection processes, 
whereas inhibitory decisions are closer to response inhibition processes. These 
results cannot be unambiguously related to a given decision stage. Nevertheless, this 
study allows to clearly compare intentional and instructed conditions, regardless of 
the timing of the nogo process.  
Further, the results from experiment 1 suffered from a high exclusion rate (9 out of 
20 participants). Data from individual participants were excluded from further 
analyses when at least one condition could not be fit by the cumulative binomial 
function used to estimate the psychometric curves. This high exclusion rate suggests 
that the task was generally difficult for participants, even at the extreme values of 
angular displacement from the PSE. These results should therefore be taken with 
care, and future manipulations should ensure more reliable behaviour around the 
extreme values of angular or temporal displacement. 
Finally, the present results may be confounded by eye movements. To avoid the 
well-documented effects of eye movements on time perception, participants were 
instructed to maintain fixation. However, EOG and eye tracking data show that 
participants followed the revolution of the peripheral cue in the vast majority of the 
trials. Smooth eye pursuit movements have been shown to lead to time compression 
(Schütz & Morrone, 2010), which may explain the baseline time compression 
effects. However, and critically, no differences in eye movements were found 
between conditions, suggesting that although a systematic time compression effect 
may be due to eye movements, they cannot easily explain the differences between 
conditions.  
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2. 5      Conclusion 
Two experiments showed that measuring the subjective experience associated with 
action and inhibition can reveal differences in covert cognitive processing that leads 
to a given behavioural outcome. In this case, the biases in time perception associated 
with actions and inhibition of action depended on whether the decision to act or 
inhibit had been intentional or instructed. Interestingly, the results suggest that 
intentional decision-making processes necessary for intentional inhibition can be 
dissociated from both instructed inhibition and nonaction. In addition, intentional 
decisions were associated with intermediate levels of time compression that lied 
between the two extremes of instructed actions and nonacions. Intentional decisions 
to act or inhibit may be associated with weaker neural codes than instructed 
decisions. The effects on time experience of intentional inhibition are similar to 
those of intentional action. In turn, both are intermediate between the compression 
associated with instructed action and the compression associated with instructed 
inhibition. Thus experimentally, intentional action and inhibition seem to occupy 
“intermediate” positions irrespective of whether the action occurs or not. This may 
reflect aforementioned effects of levels of action preparation.   
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Chapter 3 Inhibiting the urge to avoid an itch 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A naturalistic paradigm for studying intentional inhibition was developed by giving 
participants the choice to make an action that terminated an itch, or to inhibit the 
action and tolerate the itch.  Event-related potentials evoked by the itchy stimuli 
were then used to compare the consequences of intentional vs. instructed inhibition 
of the itch-terminating action.  The amplitude of the event-related potentials evoked 
by itchy stimuli was similar when participants had intentionally decided to act to 
avoid the itch, or had intentionally decided to inhibit action and tolerate it. In 
contrast, instructed action and instructed inhibition produced quite different itch-
evoked ERPs.  In terms of their consequences for later processing, intentional 
decisions to inhibit appear close to intentional decisions to act, consistent with the 
concept of a finely-balanced process for either enabling or disabling intentional 
action. 
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3. 1      Introduction 
Inhibitory self-control 
The concept of intentional inhibition partly overlaps with the concept of willpower 
developed in behavioural social psychology (Baumeister et al. 2007), in that both 
have the effect of preventing or delaying inappropriate actions. For example, most 
people can recognize the urge to scratch an itch. Not scratching can be extremely 
effortful, and it can make the itchy feeling more intense. Here an experimentally 
controlled version of this situation was developed to create a paradigm that would 
meet these requirements. 
Recent experimental work has given rise to the idea that willpower, or self-control, is 
a general capacity, or limited resource analogous to the body’s physical energy 
(Hagger et al. 2010). The inhibitory mechanisms associated with willpower relate to 
a general state in which inhibition is continuously present, until exhausted. However, 
intentional inhibition might also involve a temporally-specific decisional process, 
analogous to instructed inhibition triggered by a stop signal. For example, it has been 
argued that people may withhold an intentional action at the last possible moment 
(Libet 1985). Therefore in an event-related framework for intentional inhibition, 
inhibition should appear not only as a general, sustained mental process, but also as a 
specific, clearly-timed event. That is, the decision to inhibit may be taken in the 
context of a specific stimulus, and may have specific consequences. Treating 
inhibition as event-related would allow the neural mechanisms to be measured more 
precisely. 
Experimental constraints raise significant methodological problems, notably for 
ecological validity. Most previous experimental studies of intentional action and 
inhibition have not given participants clear reasons for choosing to act or inhibit, and 
thus have low ecological validity (e.g., Libet et al. 1983; Brass and Haggard 2007). 
This was also the case in the experiments described in chapter 2 of this thesis. The 
need for methodological simplicity has meant that reasons, urges, values and 
consequences of actions have been conspicuously missing in these paradigms.  
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Measuring the consequences of inhibition 
One recent experiment suggests that the sensory consequences of action could be 
useful to describe the processes of action that were in fact inhibited. Shocks 
delivered to participants’ fingers were perceived as weaker after action inhibition 
triggered by an external stop signal, as compared to a passive detection task (Walsh 
and Haggard 2010), suggesting that some characteristics of intentional action are 
maintained even if the action itself is inhibited. An experimental framework to study 
intentional inhibition of action requires three components. First, there must be a 
reason to perform an action. Second, the participant must make an intentional 
decision to inhibit that action on some occasions. Third, there should be some way of 
measuring the intentional processes associated with inhibition, rather than merely 
recording whether an action occurred or was inhibited.  
 
Resisting the urge to scratch an itch 
In this ecologically valid task, reasons for actions were provided by delivering on 
each trial itchy and unpleasant stimuli that could be avoided by doing a hand 
movement. In this way, decisions to act or inhibit would have meaningful 
consequences. Intentional decisions about action and inhibition were allowed in 
some trials, whereas clear instructions were provided in other trials. 
Electroencephalography (EEG) was recorded to measure brain activity.  
Specifically, participants were either instructed or had to decide whether to move 
their arm to avoid an unpleasant itchy sensation, or to inhibit the urge to move the 
arm, and withstand the itch. Thus, a strong motivation to act was introduced.  
Event-related potentials (ERP) were compared for situations of instructed vs. 
intentional inhibition. Sensory processing of itchy stimuli produced a strong event-
related potential (Mochizuki et al. 2008). Therefore, ERPs were measured to take 
advantage of the good temporal consistency of these known potentials.  
The main hypotheses were as follows. First, a decision to execute or inhibit action 
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will influence subsequent sensory processing. Second, and most importantly, this 
influence will vary with the source of the decision: intentional decisions would have 
different ‘downstream’ effects on sensory processes from instructed decisions. In 
following with the results described in chapter 2, intentional decisions to execute or 
inhibit action were expected to show intermediate levels of sensory processing of the 
stimuli, lying between the extremes of the sensory processing associated with 
instructed action and inhibition.  
 
3. 2      Experiment 1 
3. 2. 1  Methods 
Participants 
Sixteen naïve paid healthy volunteers (9 females, mean age 25 ± 5 years) 
participated in the experiment. Participants with sensitive skin were excluded from 
taking part in the study. Procedures were approved by the UCL research ethics 
committee and were in accordance with the principles of the Declaration of Helsinki. 
One participant was excluded after participation due to excessive blinking. 
Participants sat at a table and 60 cm away from a computer screen. Both hands rested 
comfortably on the table, so that their right index finger would rest on a force-
sensitive resistor (FSR) (Active Robots Ltd, Somerset, UK), connected to a 
computer. 
 
Electrical Stimuli 
Itchy stimuli were delivered using previously established methods (Mochizuki et al. 
2008) with some adaptations. Briefly, each electrode consisted of four pairs of 
stainless steel wire 0.1 mm in diameter. Each pair formed a cross and was placed 
approximately 2 mm away from the next pair (see figure 3.1). Current for each 
electrode was supplied by a Digitimer medical stimulator (Digitimer Ltd, 
Hertfordshire, England), and flowed through all wires. The reference electrodes 
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(cathodes) were placed 1 cm laterally to each itch electrode. Current was delivered 
through the electrodes in square pulses of 2 ms duration at 50 Hz. A stepwise 
procedure was used to determine the current intensity necessary to elicit an 
unpleasantly itchy sensation in each participant. The current was explicitly set to a 
level that would rather be avoided, but would still be bearable. Participants were 
asked to rest their right hand on a force-sensitive pad. Electrical stimulation would 
flow through the electrodes on their left forearm only as long as the pad was touched 
by the right hand. As soon as the participant withdrew their hand from the pad, 
stimulation would stop and the itchy sensation would cease. Thus, participants could 
stop an unpleasant sensation on their left wrist by actively withdrawing their right 
hand from a resting position. Critically, while participants held their hand in place on 
the pad they actively inhibited the urge to act. 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1 A. The itch electrode used for stimulation and B. Positioning of the electrode on 
the participants’ wrists. Adapted from Mochizuki et al (2008)1 
  
As expected from previous studies (Mochizuki et al. 2009), participants reported a 
strong habituation of the itchy sensation with repeated stimulation. Therefore, two 
separate itch electrodes were placed on the left wrist. Stimulation lasted for 3 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  I thank Ryusuke Kakigi for providing a prototype of the itch electrode.	  
A.	   B.	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seconds altogether and consisted of three 1 s-long shocks, alternating from one 
electrode to the other. The first electrode to be stimulated (proximal or distal to the 
wrist) alternated across trials. 
 
Task and experimental design 
The experiment consisted of 10 blocks of 40 trials each, and lasted 80 to 90 minutes. 
Each trial was organized as follows: (see figure 3.2) a black fixation cross appeared 
over a grey background for a variable duration of between 2 and 3 seconds. Two 
visual stimuli (called V1 and V2) were presented sequentially. These signalled 
respectively the start of each trial, and the instructions for a given trial. V1 was a 
green circle subtending 1.5º at a distance of approximately 60 cm, appearing for 250 
ms to mark the initiation of the trial. Participants were asked to prepare a right hand 
movement as soon as V1 appeared. The fixation cross then appeared again on screen 
for 2 s, until a second circle appeared (V2), again for 250 ms. The luminosity of V1 
and V2 was balanced with an heterochromatic flicker test with an independent set of 
5 participants. This was done to adjust the intensity of the visual stimuli 
independently of their absolute luminance, but depending on participants’ sensitivity 
(Wyszecki and Stiles 1982). V2 was of the same size as V1 and could be of three 
different colours. If V2 was green, participants should remove their right hand as 
soon as they felt the shock on their left, thus terminating the shock.  
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Figure 3.2: Experimental task. A. General timing of go and no go trials. A visual warning 
sign (V1) was presented for 0.250 s. After a 2 s interval an instruction sign (V2) was 
presented, also for 0.250 s. After a second 2 s interval, three consecutive electrical shocks 
were delivered at 50 Hz and for a maximum of 3 s, generating an itchy feeling on the 
participants’ wrist. If the participant moved their hand, they would interrupt the itchy feeling. 
B. In no shock (catch) trials, no shocks were delivered to ensure that participants were 
waiting for the shock to execute their decisions. C. Factorial response mapping for trials in 
A. and B. Green and red V2 corresponded to instructions to move the hand or not, 
respectively. Yellow V2 allowed the participants themselves to choose between the two 
possible action outcomes. Short trials in which V2 was replaced at variable times by a 
surprise shock were presented to encourage and probe motor preparation. Adapted from 
(Filevich & Haggard, 2012), published under Creative Commons Attribution License. 
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The green V2 represented an instructed go condition, in which participants were 
instructed to perform a movement. If V2 was red, participants were asked to endure 
the shock, and were not to move their hands. Hence, the red V2 represented the 
instructed no go condition, in which participants were instructed to avoid doing any 
movement despite presumably having the desire to do so.  
Alternatively, V2 could be yellow, in which case the participants were asked to 
decide whether they would endure the shock (intentional no go) or withdraw their 
hand (intentional go) as soon as they felt the shock, thus avoiding prolongation of the 
itchy sensation. Participants were encouraged to choose to withdraw their hand in 
roughly 50% of the yellow V2 trials. After each block of 40 trials, they received 
feedback if the rate of withdrawal was higher than 70% or lower than 30% of the 
trials. Because participants preferred to withdraw their hands whenever they had the 
choice, this manipulation ensured that the overall number of trials were comparable 
across conditions for the EEG analysis. The block-by-block feedback and relatively 
loose boundaries around 50% were included to prevent participants from developing 
a very strict strategy.  
In this way, the experiment followed a factorial 2x2 experimental design, with the 
factors of source (intentional/instructed) and outcome (go/no go). Critically, there 
was no behavioural difference between the intentional and instructed conditions, so 
any differences found in the recorded neural signal associated with the intentional or 
instructed sources of decision would necessarily reflect differences in the processing 
of intentional vs. instructed decisions. 
Two additional conditions were included for methodological reasons: 15% ‘catch’ 
trials (without a shock) were presented to ensure that participants waited for the first 
shock before executing their intentional decision or the instruction, and did not 
simply predict its onset. All three V2 colours were followed by catch trials with 
equal probability. In addition, to encourage movement preparation, 25% of ‘short’ 
trials were included. In these trials itch stimulation was delivered at either 0.5, 1.0 or 
1.5 s after V1, in contrast with the normal time of 2250 ms. Participants were asked 
to withdraw their hand from the FSR as quickly as possible in these cases. 
The mean intensity at which participants reported to feel an unpleasant but bearable 
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itchy sensation was 0.36 ± 0.14 mA at the beginning of the experiment for both 
electrodes. After each block, intensity was readjusted if the stimulation was 
perceived as too painful or too mild. Intensity never exceeded 0.4 mA, and by the 
end of the experiment the mean intensity at which subjects perceived the itchy 
sensation was 0.38 ± 0.14 mA and 0.38 ± 0.15 mA respectively for each one of the 
stimulators. 
 
Electrophysiological Recordings and signal analysis 
A SynAmps amplifier system and Scan 4.3 software (Neuroscan, El Paso, TX) were 
used to record EEG data. Activity from fourteen scalp electrodes was recorded (F3, 
Fz, F4, FC3, FCz, FC4, C3, Cz, C4, P3, Pz, P4, O1, O2, according to the 10-20 
system). The reference electrode was AFz and the ground electrode was placed on 
the chin. All electrode impedances were kept below 5 KΩ. The left and right 
mastoids were recorded. Horizontal electroculogram (EOG) was recorded from 
bipolar electrodes placed on the outer canthi of each eye, and vertical EOG was 
recorded from bipolar electrodes placed above and below the right eye. EEG signals 
were amplified and digitized at 500 Hz. 
EEG data were analyzed with EEGLAB software (Delorme and Makeig 2004). Data 
were first re-referenced to the linked mastoids. Because long epochs (8.25 s) were 
defined, data were digitally high-pass filtered over 0.5 Hz to remove low frequency 
drifts. In addition, the amplitude of event related potentials (ERPs) were calculated 
as peak amplitude values. A 30Hz low-pass filter was applied to the data (Mochizuki 
et al. 2008). Continuous EEG data was time-locked to the trial start (stimulus V1), 
and baselined to the period of 250 ms to 150 ms prior to the onset of V1. This 
baseline fell long before the time of decision (V2). This early baseline was desirable 
because trials were classified according to the participants’ intentional decisions and 
it was desirable to take a baseline before a decision was made.  To avoid artefacts 
due to eye blinks, trials were discarded if the bipolar recording of EOG exceeded 
±80 µV at any point during the epoch. The mean percentage of rejected trials was 
22%. This value is relatively high, but perhaps unsurprising given the long epochs 
and the unpleasantness of the experience. The components in the evoked response 
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were identified by inspection of the grand average pooling across all conditions. For 
each component identified in the grand average, the time of maximum amplitude of 
the individual average was determined and the values for each participant in that 
time point were computed.  
 
3. 2. 2  Results 
Behavioural results 
Participants rarely moved their hands in catch trials (mean ± SD commission errors 
0.70% ± 0.91%). 
On average, within the intentional trials, participants decided to withdraw their hands 
(intentional go) on 46 ± 5% (mean ± SD) of the trials. The average RT to withdraw 
the hand after receiving an itchy shock was calculated in order to measure the extent 
of preparation of the action to withdraw. RTs were compared across the intentional 
and instructed go conditions (for which the withdrawal movement could be 
anticipated and prepared) and the average of all ‘short’ trials, in which the shocks 
occurred without a prior V2 warning signal, therefore not allowing for movement 
preparation (3.3). 
 
 
Chapter	  3	  	  	  	  Ecologically	  valid	  whether	  decisions	  	  	  
101	  	  
 
Figure 3.3: Behavioural results. Hand withdrawal times for the movement conditions. No 
difference is observed between the two movement conditions, in which the time of shock 
was highly predictable. Longer withdrawal times are observed in ‘short’ trials, suggesting 
that motor preparation had occurred in both intentional and instructed go trials. Error bars 
show confidence intervals. *** represent p<0.001. Adapted	   from	   (Filevich	   &	   Haggard,	  2012),	  published	  under	  Creative	  Commons	  Attribution	  License. 
 
 
A repeated measures ANOVA revealed a main effect of condition (F1,15=19.38, 
p<0.001). RTs were longer for short trials as compared to both intentional go and 
instructed go conditions. Paired comparisons revealed significant differences 
between the intentional go condition and the short trials (t15=-6.22, p<0.001) and 
between the instructed go condition and the short trials (t15=-5.25, p<0.001). No 
significant differences were found between the RTs for the intentional and instructed 
go conditions (t15=-0.54, p=0.59). These results suggest that there was movement 
preparation in the two go conditions that was less efficient in the short trials. It is 
also possible that go trials had shorter RTs due to the timing of the shocks becoming 
more predictable. Our design cannot distinguish between these two possibilities.  
Relatively long RTs were observed (of around 1 s). Such long reaction times may 
partly reflect the peculiar nature of this stimulation. An interesting feature of this itch 
stimulus is the lack of a discrete perceptual onset at the start of the shock-train. Short 
trains do not produce any sensation at all. At the intensities used, sensory perception 
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began only some time after the onset of the stimulation. Because the reaction time is 
measured from the onset of the stimulus, the reaction time is artificially increased by 
delay, which may be attributed to accumulation of signals in perceptual areas. 
These behavioural results did not change after excluding the participant that was 
excluded from the ERP analysis due to excessive blinking. 
 
ERP results 
After blink rejection, an average of 42 ± 16 trials (SD) were recorded for the 
intentional go condition, and 41±17 trials were recorded for the intentional no go 
condition. 42±13 trials were recorded for the instructed go condition, and 49±13 
trials fell into the instructed no go condition. The grand-average ERPs were 
displayed time-locked to V1, to reveal the sequence of sensorimotor events in each 
epoch. Figure 3.4 shows the grand-average trace at C3, Cz and C4 pooled across all 
conditions. There is a stereotyped response to the onset of both V1 and V2. 
Importantly, although V1 and V2 are physically similar, only V2 carried information 
about the subsequent task instructions. Accordingly, the neural processing of V1 
differed strongly from that of V2, with only V2 eliciting a strong positivity peaking 
at around 580 ms after V2 onset. There was a characteristic negativity preceding V2, 
recalling the CNV (Lumsden et al. 1986). This negativity started roughly 800 ms 
before the onset of the first shock is visible in the grand average across conditions. 
Finally, the neural response to the three consecutive shocks was apparent. A marked 
positive-going component occurs in response to each of the three shocks, peaking at 
around 400ms after shock onset.  
The key ERP components evoked by the first two shocks are indicated by shaded 
areas A and B in Figure 3.4. It shows an average of all conditions, including both go 
and no go conditions. Therefore, whilst the first shock was always delivered, and 
acted as a go signal, the second and third shocks were not experienced if participants 
withdrew their hand. In addition, the third shock was hardly perceived, even on no 
go trials, due to habituation. It was therefore not included in the analysis. Peak 
amplitudes for each of these events were analyzed for each condition separately. 
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The analysis focussed on the effects of source of decision (intentional or instructed) 
and decision outcome (go or no go) on the neural activity evoked by the shocks. 
Further, the analyses were restricted to central and parietal electrodes, because the 
main interest was to assess the neural consequences of inhibition over sensory 
processing, rather than the frontal mechanisms that cause inhibition itself (Aron et al. 
2004).  
 
 
Figure 3.4: EEG results (a) Grand average across all the four main experimental conditions 
(intentional and instructed go and no go) for electrodes C3, Cz and C4. Long (8 s) epochs 
were visually inspected to identify two main periods of interest: response to shock 1 (A) and 
response to shock 2 (B). The response to shock 3 was greatly attenuated and was therefore 
not analyzed. EEG trace is plotted negative-up. Adapted from (Filevich & Haggard, 2012), 
published under Creative Commons Attribution License. 
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Pre-shock components 
First, the response to the instruction cue was examined. A time window of 350-550 
ms after V2 was chosen. In accordance to the topographical distribution in the half-
point of the chosen time window, electrodes C3, Cz, C4, P3, Pz and P4 were 
averaged. A 2x2 ANOVA of the peak amplitudes revealed a trend for a main effect of 
outcome (F1,14=3.42,  p=0.08), with a stronger V2 positivity in the no go conditions. 
There was no main effect of source (F1,14=0.39,  p=0.53) or interaction effect (F 
1,14=0.03 p =0.59). 
Then the preparatory activity the V2 instruction and before shock 1 was examined. 
An inspection of the grand average (figure 3.4) shows that there is an RP/CNV 
component before shock 1 (Kornhuber & Deecke, 1965; Walter, Cooper, Aldrige, 
McCallum, & Winter, 1964). Topographic maps showed that this component was 
maximal between C3 and Cz. It was measured as the mean amplitude during the 200 
ms prior to the shock for the average of these two electrodes. A 2x2 ANOVA of the 
RP/CNV amplitude revealed a main effect of outcome (F1,14=5.00, p=0.042). This 
arose because preparatory negativity was significantly stronger for go trials 
compared with no go trials. However, there was no main effect of source (F1,14=2.86, 
p=0.11), and no significant interaction between source and outcome (F1,14=0.57,  
p=0.46).  
 
Evoked responses to the shocks 
The average topography of the response to shocks 1 and 2 was examined (see figure 
3.5 A). As expected from previous results the average topographical maps show that 
the response to the both shocks is focused on the central electrodes. Based on this 
topography, peak amplitudes for the analysis were obtained from the average of 
electrodes C3, Cz and C4.  
Also, the differences between the instructed and intentional conditions for both go 
and nogo trials were examined (see figure 3.5 B). Topographical maps show large 
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differences in the left hemisphere, ipsilateral to the shocks but contralateral to the 
movement. This suggests that this difference is related to motor preparation. The 
most parsimonious interpretation is that go trials show a stronger (more negative) 
RP-like movement preparation component for intentional than for instructed trials. 
This leads to a positivity observed in the electrodes contralateral to movement in the 
instructed – intentional subtraction.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.5: Topographical distribution of the neural responses to the shocks. The 
topographical maps for the response to shock 1 were calculated at 4900 ms, and the response 
to shock 2 were calculated at 5900 ms from V1 onset. (A) Average of all conditions. The 
topography includes an average of four conditions (instructed go, instructed nogo, 
intentional go, intentional nogo). Shock 2 includes instructed nogo and intentional  nogo 
conditions only. (B) Differences between instructed and intentional conditions, for both go 
and nogo trials. Adapted from (Filevich & Haggard, 2012), published under Creative 
Commons Attribution License. 
 
Evoked response to shock 1 
The topography and peak amplitude of the response to shock 1 is shown in figure 3.6 
(highlighted section A in figure 3.4).  
A 2 x 2 ANOVA of the average revealed no main effect of outcome (F1,14=0.06, 
p=0.80) nor main effect of source (F1,14=0.01, p=0.92) but a significant interaction 
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effect (F1,14=19.433 p=0.001), showing a crossover form in figure 3.6 C. Post-hoc t-
tests revealed that the neural response evoked by shock 1 was greater in instructed 
go than in intentional go trials (t14=3.39, p=0.004). Conversely, the response evoked 
by shock 1 in instructed no go trials was weaker than that evoked by the intentional 
no go trials (t14= -2.22, p=0.04).  
 
Figure 3.6: Neural response to shock 1 A. Time window (4750-5100 ms) in which the 
amplitude of the response to shock 1 was measured. The vertical dashed line indicates the 
time of shock onset. B Scalp distribution at 4900 ms. C. Detail of time window of interest, 
showing the averaged trace for electrodes C3, Cz and C4 for each condition. D. Mean of 
maximum amplitude for each subject within the selected time window, for the average of 
electrodes C3, Cz and C4. Error bars show confidence intervals. A significant interaction 
effect emerged (p<0.01). Post-hoc t-tests showed a crossover effect. Shock 1 ERPs were 
stronger for instructed go trials as compared to intentional go trials (p<0.05), whereas ERPs 
to instructed no go trials were weaker than those for intentional no go trials (p<0.05). 
Adapted from (Filevich & Haggard, 2012), published under Creative Commons Attribution 
License. 
 
Evoked response to shock 2 
Because the mean RT to withdraw the left hand was generally shorter than 1 s, shock 
2 was generally not delivered in trials where participants made the withdrawal action 
with their right hand. Hence the analysis of the ERP to shock 2 was confined to no 
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go trials, in which participants did not withdraw their hand, but resisted the full train 
of shocks. The topography and peak amplitudes for the no go conditions are shown 
in figure 3.7 and match that of shock 1 (see also highlighted section B in figure 3.4). 
A paired t-test comparison revealed a significant difference between the two no go 
conditions, with the intentional no go again showing a stronger potential in response 
to itchy shock compared to instructed no go (t14=-2.33, p=0.03).  
To compare the neural response to shocks 1 and 2, a 2x2 ANOVA of the no go 
responses with the factors shock and source of decision was carried out. Results 
showed no main effect of shock (F1,14=1.202, p=0.29), a main effect of decision 
source (F1,14=7.114, p=0.01), with intentional no go trials showing stronger ERP than 
instructed no go trials. There was no interaction effect (F1,14=0.21, p=0.65). 
 
Figure 3.7: Neural response to shock 2. Because shock 2 was only fully delivered in 
inhibition trials, only no go trials are analyzed. A Time window (5750-6100 ms) used to 
measure the amplitude of the response to shock 2. The vertical dashed line indicates the time 
of shock onset. B Scalp distribution at 5900 ms. C Detail of time window of interest, 
showing the averaged trace for electrodes C3, Cz and C4 for each condition. D Mean of 
maximum amplitude for each subject within the selected time window, for the average of 
electrodes C3, Cz and C4. Error bars show confidence intervals. As in shock 1, instructed no 
go trials evoke a weaker response to shock 2 than an intentional no go trials (p<0.05). 
Adapted from (Filevich & Haggard, 2012), published under Creative Commons Attribution 
License. 
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Shock 3 was not analyzed because participants reported at debriefing that they rarely 
felt it. This reflected a strong habituation, and the evoked potentials were 
correspondingly weak.  
 
3. 2. 3  Discussion 	  
The findings revealed that the sensory consequences of intentional decisions are 
processed differently than those of instructed decisions. These differences in 
processing were found at the neurophysiological level. It is therefore possible that 
the same differences are observed at the phenomenological level. Experiment 2 was 
designed to test this hypothesis.  
 
 
3. 3      Experiment 2 
3. 3. 1  Methods 
 
Participants 
Twelve participants (7 females, mean age 22 ± 3 years) performed a modified 
version of the task in Experiment 1. Five participants had taken part in experiment 1, 
whilst the remaining seven were naïve to the task. Experiment 2 consisted of 5 
blocks of 40 trials each.  
Task 
In a follow-up experiment to the ERP results of experiment 1, participants were 
required to use a visual analogue scale to rate the unpleasantness of the itchy feeling 
after each trial (figure 3.8). This had not been done together with the EEG 
experiment 1 because of time restrictions.  
Experimental details were identical to those of experiment 1, apart from two 
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important differences. First, although the intensity of stimulation was kept constant 
for the different conditions, participants were told that the stimulation would vary 
slightly from trial to trial, and they were asked to rate the unpleasantness of the 
stimulation after each trial. The subjective ratings were reported by a mouse click on 
a visual analogue scale displayed on the screen.  
The duration of the stimulation had a clear effect on how strongly the itch sensation 
was felt. Therefore, a second difference from experiment 1 was that in order to make 
the comparison between withdrawal (go) conditions possible, the stimulation was 
always delivered for at least 1s, regardless of whether the participant had withdrawn 
their hand from the FSR.  
 
Data analysis 
The subjective ratings presented large variations over time, regardless of condition. 
The perceived intensity of the shocks greatly depended on uncontrolled factors, such 
as habituation, body temperature and alertness. Therefore, the subjective ratings 
were calculated not in their absolute value but as the deviation from the local 
average, calculated from the four neighbouring trials. 
 
3. 3. 2  Results 	  
Mean go RTs were very high in experiment 2. Mean (± SD) instructed go RT was 
1568 ± 364 ms and mean intentional go RT was 1559 ± 392 ms. These values did not 
differ significantly (t11=0.19, p=0.855).  
Although the same level of stimulation was delivered in every trial, participants were 
told that each shock was of a slightly different intensity. They were asked to give a 
subjective rating of the perceived intensity by means of a VAS. Mean ratings for 
each condition are shown in figure 3.8. A 2x2 ANOVA on the mean reported ratings 
for each condition revealed a main effect of decision outcome (F1,11=6.45, p=0.027),  
a main effect of source of decision (F1,11=5.57, p=0.038) and no significant 
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interaction effect (F1,11=0.009, p=0.928).  
	  
 
Fig 3.8: Subjective ratings of individual trials relative to the local average of the four 
neighbouring trials. Error bars show standard error of the mean. 
 
 
3. 4      Discussion 
A paradigm that generates strong urges to make hand withdrawal movements was 
used to study the inhibitory functions involved in self-control over urges and actions. 
Further, situations of intentional and instructed inhibition were compared within the 
same context. Participants were either instructed, or decided for themselves, whether 
to withdraw their right hand from a response pad, thus terminating a train of 
unpleasantly itchy shocks delivered via a customised electrode to the left forearm. 
This paradigm addressed the consequences of inhibition, following both intentional 
decisions, and external instructions. Specifically, it was investigated how intentional 
inhibition influenced neural processing of subsequent itchy shocks, in comparison to 
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instructed inhibition. In both these conditions, there is no overt behaviour. However 
the source of the decision to inhibit differs between these conditions. Results show 
that the source of inhibitory decisions has an important structuring effect on 
subsequent sensory experience. This study takes the novel approach of addressing 
the consequences of self-control and intentional inhibition of action on 
somatosensory processing.  
 
Ecological validity 
This experiment used aversive stimulation to induce a strong urge to act. Unlike 
previous studies of intentional inhibition, it made the choice between action and 
inhibition motivationally significant. This was combined with the conventional 
comparison between instructed and intentional decisions for action. The motivational 
element of the experiment may seem to conflict with the free selection element: if 
itchy shocks were truly aversive, participants should choose to avoid them. 
Participants’ willingness to accept the experimental instructions perhaps lead them to 
trade shocks for money (Talmi et al. 2009). However, the balance of positive and 
negative affect indubitably plays a major role in shaping everyday action choices 
(Damasio and Dolan 1999). Notwithstanding these general motivations, participants 
made a fresh choice on every intentional trial, whether to act or inhibit on that trial. 
The random intermingling of intentional and instructed trials was designed to 
discourage them from preparing sequences of “free” choices extending over several 
trials. For these reasons, this study may have an ecological validity lacking in 
previous studies of intentional inhibition. 
 
Experiment 1 - Neural processing of the consequences of intentional decisions 
A marked positive-going component occurs in response to each of the three shocks, 
peaking at around 400ms after shock onset. Previous studies using similar stimuli 
(Mochizuki et al. 2009) had reported slower positive components, peaking at around 
900 ms. Only a speculative explanation can be given for this difference. Mochizuki 
et al. associated the long latency of the evoked response with C-fibre activation, 
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because of their slow conduction speed. Indeed, itch sensation has been mainly 
associated with C-fibres (Handwerker, 2010). However, some Aδ-fibres have also 
been associated with itch in monkeys (Schepers et al., 2008) and humans (Ringkamp 
et al., 2011). Thus, it can be speculated that the electrical pulses delivered here may 
also may have stimulated both C-fibres and the faster-conducting Aδ-fibres. 
Activation of Aδ-fibre can lead to both sharp and burning pain. The joint activation 
of different fibre populations may have produced the distinct sharp itchy feeling that 
participants experienced.  
In this paradigm, participants always received the first shock, and received the 
second and third shocks only if they chose to inhibit the action of withdrawing their 
arm. The third shock was perceived very weakly and accordingly produced only a 
small ERP. Previous reports (Mochizuki et al. 2009) suggested that diminishing 
neural activity evoked by itch reflected habituation effects. Decrease in saliency for 
repeated stimuli has been widely reported (Legrain et al. 2011).  
Go and no go trials cannot easily be compared directly, because several different 
factors may contribute to the differences between their neural correlates. Crucially, 
go trials involve motor preparation, whilst no go trials do not. No strong conclusions 
are drawn about differences between go and no go trials. However, comparing 
intentional and instructed sources of action decisions is possible, within both the go 
and nogo condition, because the motor activity is balanced between the two sources 
of decision.  
The neural response for shock 1 produced lower ERP amplitudes when participants 
intentionally decided to withdraw their hands, as opposed to when they were 
instructed to do so. The neural response to shock 2 cannot be evaluated in the case of 
movement conditions, because when the hand has been withdrawn, no further shocks 
are delivered. However, in the case of no go trials, the neural trace of an aversive 
stimulus that could have been avoided, but was not, informed about the mechanisms 
of inhibition. In these trials, the response to the first and second shock can be 
evaluated. The neural response to both the first and second shocks was significantly 
larger when participants underwent the shocks as a result of their own intentional 
decision, rather than as a result of an instructed instruction.  
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Thus, while action trials showed smaller ERPs to itchy stimuli in the intentional go 
trials than in instructed go trials, inhibition trials showed the opposite effect. 
Stronger ERPs were apparent for intentional no go trials as compared with instructed 
no go trials. A speculative account suggests that this interaction effect reflects 
differences in allocation of attention strategies between go and no go trials. In this 
paradigm, participants presumably attended to the shocks when they needed to react 
quickly (i.e., in go conditions). In no go conditions, participants may have preferred 
to “think of something else” and try to completely ignore the shocks. Interestingly, in 
intentional trials, this effect is reversed. I.e., the attention allocation towards the 
aversive stimuli in go trials, and away from aversive stimuli in no go trials would 
have been less efficient in the intentional conditions, according to this view.   It has 
been suggested (Fleming et al. 2009) that intentional decisions for actions are less 
definitive, and easier to change, than instructed actions. Could this explain the 
differences found between the processing of aversive stimuli in intentional and 
instructed no go trials? If Fleming et al are correct that intentional decisions to act or 
inhibit still leave open the counterfactual possibility, it may be speculated that 
unpleasant consequences of intentional decisions might be strongly processed 
because of feelings of regret for the missed opportunity of doing otherwise. 
In other words, instructed trials have clear instruction, and there is a clear correct 
response. This is not the case with intentional trials, in which any course of action 
would be correct. Therefore, in line with results reported by Fleming et al (2009) 
attention allocation in intentional trials may represent an intermediate situation 
between the two extremes: allocation of attention towards an aversive stimulus in 
instructed go trials, and allocation of attention away from an aversive stimulus in 
instructed no go trials.  
An alternative, but closely related interpretation, relates to motor processing. In this 
study we aimed at investigating action inhibition indirectly by addressing the sensory 
processing of its consequences. However, motor and sensory processes were not 
temporally segregated in our task. Moreover, EEG techniques do not allow us to 
unequivocally identify the sources of the modulation of the shock components as 
either clearly sensory, or clearly motor. Thus it remains possible that our results 
reflect movement-related processing. Because we did not investigate the periods 
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before action directly, or EEG components that are classically related to action, the 
hypothesis that our peak ERP amplitude is affected by motor processes remains 
speculative. The influence of motor preparation on the shock component amplitude 
is unclear. Importantly however, this interpretation remains compatible with the 
“intermediate” account of intentional decisions suggested above. 
Intermediate ERP peak amplitudes may therefore reflect intermediate levels of motor 
preparation. In particular, whereas instructed go trials are associated with a high 
levels of motor preparation, intentional go trials seem to present lower levels of 
motor preparation, closer to the no go conditions. In turn, instructed no go trials are 
presumably associated with lower levels of motor preparation because no action 
should occur in no go trials.  Intentional no go trials present higher levels of action 
preparation, closer to go trials.  
Crucially, in line with the results reported by Fleming et al (2009), intentional 
decisions for action may represent situations that are less committed to than 
instructed decisions, and therefore may be easier to change than corresponding 
instructed decisions. If the attention allocation account is correct, our results may 
interestingly extend this interpretation from the purely motor processing addressed 
by Fleming et al. to the sensory processing of decision consequences.  
 
Experiment 2 - subjective experience of the consequences of intentional decisions 
Motivated by the ERP results, experiment 2 aimed at providing the 
phenomenological counterpart of the findings of experiment 1.  
The mean subjective ratings were compared fro the four experimental conditions. 
Statistical analyses revealed a main effect of decision outcome. This effect is trivial, 
and related to the duration of the stimulation received. Go (withdrawal) trials 
involved in average around 1s of electrical stimulation, whereas no go trials involved 
at least 2s of perceivable stimulation. Because the perceived intensity accumulated 
over time, no go trials led to stronger subjective feelings of the itch stimulation.  
Based on the ERP findings from experiment 1, intentional inhibition trials were 
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expected to elicit a higher subjective report of itch, whilst intentional action trials 
would be associated with lower ratings of itch. This interaction effect observed in the 
ERP amplitude was not mirrored by the reported subjective experience. Instead, 
participants rated itchy stimulation to be lower in both intentional conditions, and not 
only in the intentional action condition.  
The results of the two experiments are not easy to reconcile. Taken together, the 
results show that the neural response evoked by shocks 1 and 2 are not the only 
factors contributing to the subjective experience of itch in this paradigm, as reported 
on a VAS. Other possible factors influencing itch perception are folk knowledge 
about the possibility of choosing (present only in the intentional conditions). It is a 
well-known phenomenon that human participants tend to rate favourable outcomes 
as more favourable when they arise as a consequence of their own choice (Mellers, 
2000). In the same way, participants tend to judge aversive stimuli as less aversive 
when they have some control over their intensity and timing (Staub, Tursky, & 
Schwartz, 1971). Participants may have been biased to believe that freedom of 
choice should lead to decreased aversive experiences. In addition, it could be 
speculated that the ratings are very post-perceptual and attributional. They are 
outputs from the inferential narrative brain.  The ERPs on the other hand reflect 
processes of the decisional, sensory brain. 
 
 
 
3. 5      Conclusion 
Inhibition of action can take two rather different forms depending on its time-course. 
First, it can be a rather tonic behavioural control. This form corresponds to the 
everyday  concept of willpower (Baumeister, Schmeichel, & Vohs, 2007; Vohs & 
Schmeichel, 2003). For example, someone who exerts self-control over their eating 
behaviour may need to continuously inhibit the urge to eat. These inhibitory 
processes are continuous and ongoing, rather than discrete and precisely-timed. 
Inhibitory self-control may also appear in a more phasic form, as a last-minute 
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inhibition of specific and discrete action impulses (i.e., veto) (Libet, 1999). The type 
of inhibition required in this task lies somewhere on the continuum between these 
two extremes. Because some trials required inhibition and others required a quick 
action, the task was designed to encourage phasic, discrete inhibition, rather than 
generalized, tonic self-control. The present results therefore address the concept of 
self-control or “willpower” in a novel experimental way, and suggest that self-
control may have different neural bases than instructed inhibition.  
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Chapter 4       Antecedent brain activity predicts intentional 
whether decisions  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Decisions to inhibit are alleged to have a unique relation to conscious thought and 
cognitive control.  This EEG experiment examined the unconscious precursors of an 
intentional decision to inhibit. The results revealed that prior neural activity could 
bias intentional decisions to act or transiently inhibit action.  “Free” decisions to 
inhibit action may be unconsciously caused.  Like other cognitive control processes, 
intentional inhibition takes place against a backdrop of ongoing neural activity 	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4. 1      Introduction  
Previous studies have linked preparatory activity preceding voluntary action to 
decisions about what action to make e.g., (Deiber et al., 1991; C. D. Frith, Friston, 
Liddle, & Frackowiak, 1991; Jueptner, Frith, Brooks, Frackowiak, & Passingham, 
1997), or when to make it (Jahanshahi et al., 1995; Libet, Wright Jr., & Gleason, 
1982). Both these components were shown to have unconscious neural precursors. 
The readiness potential (RP) is an accepted marker of neural preparation for action 
(Dirnberger et al., 1998; Jahanshahi et al., 1995). Libet (Libet et al., 1983) famously 
identified RPs already occurring around 200 ms prior to the conscious decision to 
move (when component). Soon et al., (Soon et al., 2008) found that brain activity 
several seconds before conscious decision could predict which hand people chose to 
act with. However, the decision about whether to act has received less attention. 
Such decisions can be taken at almost any stage during motor preparation, up until a 
point of no return (Logan et al., 1984). Libet controversially suggested that last-
minute decisions to inhibit action may involve a purely conscious form of “free 
won't”. But theoretical grounds suggest that conscious decisions to inhibit must 
depend on unconscious brain processes, just like decisions to act (Velmans, 2002). 
However, neural precursors of voluntary inhibition have not yet been identified 
experimentally. 
In this study, participants had either to make a rapid key press action, or transiently 
inhibit executing the key press, so as to briefly delay their response. In this way, 
action inhibition was operationalized as a transient process, characterized by delayed 
responding, rather than as a complete suppression of all behavioural output. This 
operational definition has the advantage of matching the action and inhibition 
conditions more closely, since both conditions include a motor response – though 
with differing latencies. In everyday life, such impulse control by delaying an 
intentional response may help in accumulating further information about the 
environment prior to responding (Shadlen & Newsome, 1996), or in synchronising a 
joint action (Sebanz, Bekkering, & Knoblich, 2006).  
The neural activity preceding intentional decisions to act was compared to the neural 
activity preceding intentional decisions to briefly inhibit action. In intentional 
conditions, participants were not explicitly instructed whether to act rapidly or to 
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delay in any given trial, but rather chose for themselves. The hypothesis was that, in 
the absence of any external instruction to act rapidly or inhibit, some other factors, 
such as transient fluctuations in participants’ brain states, may be relevant to their 
decision. Therefore, the intentional conditions would provide a situation in which 
putative internal fluctuations could lead to an overt modification of behaviour. The 
rationale was also that external instructions about action would produce a stronger 
drive of neural activity, overriding any intrinsic fluctuations. Consequently, the 
levels of neural activity preceding external instructions to act or briefly inhibit action 
were compared. Several recent studies suggest that the instantaneous state of the 
brain at the time when a new information-processing operation begins can play an 
important role in how information is processed. For example, the probability of 
remembering an item depends on preceding electrical neural activity (Otten, Quayle, 
Akram, Ditewig, & Rugg, 2006), and the probability of detecting a visual stimulus 
depends on the phase of EEG alpha rhythm over posterior brain regions (Busch, 
Dubois, & VanRullen, 2009). By analogy, it was hypothesized that intentional 
decisions to act or inhibit would depend on the progression of preceding activity in 
the brain. 
In this way, this experiment followed a factorial design in which the differences in 
neural activity between intentional decisions to act and intentional decisions to 
inhibit were compared with the differences in neural activity between instructed 
decisions to act and instructed decisions to inhibit. It was therefore assumed that 
sorting trials according to action or inhibition could reveal patterns of preceding 
neural activity that might putatively bias the outcome of intentional decisions. In 
instructed decisions, in contrast, the cause of the decision to act or inhibit is assumed 
to lie in the imperative stimulus, rather than any putative pattern of preceding neural 
activity.  
 EEG activity was therefore measured around the time of an external instruction to 
either act quickly or delay transiently an action, or around the time of a cue that 
invited participants to intentional decide to either act quickly or delay transiently. 
Although ERP methods do not typically provide high spatial resolution, they do 
provide high temporal resolution, (Luck, 2005). This makes ERP methods 
particularly suited for these purposes, as they allowed for an identification of the 
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neural activity preceding an instruction that influenced intentional decisions in 
response to the instruction.  
 
4. 2      Methods 
Fourteen naïve healthy volunteers (9 females, mean 24 years, 12 right-handed) 
participated in this experiment. Procedures were approved by the UCL research 
ethics committee and were in accordance with the principles of the Declaration of 
Helsinki. Written informed consent was obtained from all participants involved in 
the study. 
Before further data analysis, one participant was excluded from EEG analyses due to 
excessive eye blinking, leaving a total of 13 participants. Each participant performed 
8 blocks of 70 trials each, yielding a total of 560 trials.  
Each trial belonged to one of five possible experimental conditions. Trials could 
belong to one of five possible trial types. 4 or these trials types were part of a 
factorial design, namely the instructed rapid, instructed delayed, intentional rapid or 
intentional delay trials. An additional nogo condition was included.  
Each trial began with a variable fixation cross period (500 to 1200 ms, see fig 4.1). A 
warning sign (a grey circle subtending 1.5º, duration 200 ms) appeared first. The 
fixation cross reappeared for 500 ms and was followed by an instruction cue (a 
coloured circle, 1.5º visual angle, 200 ms duration). The instruction cue indicated 
one of four main possible trial types. In the instructed rapid condition (240 trials, 
43%), participants were asked to press a key with their index finger as quickly as 
possible. In the instructed delayed condition (80 trials, 14%), participants had to 
make the same movement but with the “shortest possible delay”. The exact duration 
of the delay was not explicitly specified to the participants, but they were 
encouraged to delay their action for a period of time that was “as short as possible”. 
In the intentional conditions (160 trials, 28%), participants saw a cue that indicated 
that they were free to choose which action outcome to take. Namely, immediately 
upon the appearance of the intentional cue, participants were asked to decide freely 
whether to act rapidly or after the shortest possible delay. In this way, the experiment 
followed a 2x2 factorial design, with the factors source of decision 
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(instructed/intentional) and outcome (rapid/delayed). The percentages of trials were 
constant across all blocks. 
An additional nogo condition was included, in which participants were asked to 
refrain from acting (80 trials, 14%). This condition was intended to make the task 
more demanding and prevent drifts of attention. The neural signals associated with 
these trials were not analyzed. 
 
 
Figure 4.1: A. General timing of the task A variable fixation cross period (500 – 1200 ms) 
was followed by a brief (200 ms) presentation of a warning sign. The fixation cross 
reappeared and 500 ms after the offset of the warning sign, an instruction cue appeared on 
the screen (200 ms). The instruction cued participants to press a key either rapidly, or with a 
short delay, or to intentionally decide between rapid and delayed pressing. B. The task 
followed a factorial design. The instruction cued participants to press a key either rapidly, or 
with a short delay, to intentionally decide between rapid and delayed pressing. In an 
additional nogo condition participants were instructed to refrain from acting at all. This nogo 
condition was included to discourage attentional drifts. Adapted from Filevich et al (in 
Press), published under Creative Commons Attribution License. 
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The rationale behind the experimental design was as follows. Neural networks 
continually exhibit small fluctuations in state, which may have significant effects on 
behaviour (Fox, Snyder, Vincent, & Raichle, 2007). These effects may be 
particularly relevant for behaviour in the absence of other clear, strong external 
signals. Here, the aim was to identify possible effects of such intrinsic fluctuations 
on the intentional choice between action and transient inhibition. It was assumed that 
similar intrinsic fluctuations should exist before instructed choices to act rapidly or 
delay actions. However, the strong signals linked to external instruction should 
override these weak internal signals, so that no differences between activity 
preceding actions and inhibition should remain. Therefore, in a factorial design the 
neural activity prior to decisions to act rapidly was compared to the neural activity of 
decisions to delay action, where this decision was either intentional or instructed. 
Differences in the neural activity preceding intentional action decisions were 
expected, because the preceding neural activity should strongly influence the 
intentional decision between different action outcomes. Further, no differences were 
expected in the preceding activity between rapid and delayed instructed action, since 
the instructional signal should then have a far stronger influence on behavioural 
outcome.  
In experiments involving intentional inhibition, there is a high risk of participants 
deciding in advance not to make an action (Brass & Haggard, 2007). In cases of 
early decisions not to act, no action will be prepared, and consequently no action 
inhibition will be necessary. Therefore, tasks addressing intentional inhibition should 
encourage action preparation. In this case, a high number of rapid instructed trials 
were included to encourage action preparation, to make delaying effortful, and to 
discourage participants from deciding in advance whether to respond rapidly or 
inhibit and delay on intentional trials. Further, only for trials in the instructed rapid 
condition, participants were rewarded (3p) for every key press that was faster than 
their average in the previous block. The experimental design was therefore not 
strictly balanced, but emphasized the need for true action inhibition.  
In intentional trials, participants were asked to balance their choices between rapid 
and delayed responses. The hand used for responding was fixed for each block, and 
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alternated between blocks. The correspondence of colours to instructions rotated 
across participants, and was additionally reversed for each participant for the second 
half of the experiment. Trials within each participant were randomized, but the 
proportion of trial types was valid for each block. 
 
Data analysis 
Trials with RTs below 200 ms were rejected, as potentially anticipatory (1.76 ± 
1.67%). The average commission error rate in nogo trials was 10±0.9%. These trials 
were included merely to engage attention, and to ensure that participants responded 
only after receiving the go signal. Nogo trials were not further analyzed. RTs for 
each condition were analyzed in a 2x2 repeated measures ANOVA, with the factors 
decision source (instructed/intentional) and response speed (rapid/delay). 
To examine whether participants followed any obvious strategy to produce a 
balanced outcome between rapid and delayed intentional trials, the run length was 
evaluated in the response sequences in intentional trials. This experiment consisted 
of 8 blocks, with 20 intentional trials each. For each block, the instructed trials were 
excluded and the length of runs was measured (i.e., sequences of uninterrupted 
repetitions of the same outcome) for each participant. If participants had been 
producing obvious sequences such as ‘AABBAABB’ they would produce a single 
run-length only (in this case, a run-length of 2). 8 independent “blocks” of 20 “trials” 
each were then randomly generated by sampling without replacement (using the 
randsample function for Matlab, the Mathworks, Inc) from a population of 10 quick 
trials and 10 delay trials. A balanced number of simulated quick and delayed trials 
was necessary because in the intentional rapid and delayed conditions were 
identified on the basis of a median split. 
 
 
EEG data acquisition and analysis 
A SynAmps amplifier system and Scan 4.3 software (Neuroscan, El Paso, TX) were 
used to record EEG data. Activity from fourteen scalp electrodes was recorded (F3, 
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Fz, F4, FC3, FCz, FC4, C3, Cz, C4, P3, Pz, P4, O1, O2) and the right and left 
mastoids. The scalp electrodes were placed according to the international 10-20 
system. The reference electrode was AFz and the ground electrode was placed on the 
chin. All electrode impedances were kept below 5 KΩ. Electroculograms (EOG) 
were recorded from bipolar electrodes placed on the left and right external canthi (to 
detect horizontal eye movements), and on the right supra-orbital and infra-orbital 
positions (to detect vertical eye movements). EEG signals were amplified and 
digitized at 500 Hz. 
EEG data were analyzed with EEGLAB software (Delorme and Makeig, 2004). Data 
were first re-referenced to the linked mastoids. Data were digitally band-pass filtered 
between 0.05 Hz and 30 Hz. Continuous EEG data was time-locked to the 
instruction stimulus, and epochs were defined from -850 ms to 700 ms after the 
instruction sign. A baseline period was defined for each epoch from -850 to -700 ms 
(between 0 and 150 ms prior to the onset of the warning signal). The hand required 
for action was alternated and specified at the beginning of each block. Lateral (non-
midline) electrodes were inverted in the right hand blocks, as if all data had been 
collected from the left hand. Because the lateral electrodes from the right hand 
blocks were inverted, electrodes in the left hemisphere are now ipsilateral to action. 
Similarly, electrodes in the right hemisphere are contralateral to action. 
Right-left hand symmetry cannot be assumed in this situation. First, the left 
hemisphere is dominant for action preparation (Bradshaw, 2001). Second, whereas 
RPs associated with right hand movements are normally distributed, this is not the 
case for left hand movements (Dirnberger, Duregger, Lindinger, & Lang, 2011). The 
distribution of the early left-hand movement RP amplitudes shows negative 
skewness values, even in cases of very simple actions, such as key presses with the 
index finger. This suggests that movements with the non dominant hand may require 
more attentional resources and/or special preparatory processes.  
To remove blink artefacts, epochs were rejected if the difference between the two 
vertical EOG channels was larger than 90µV.  
For ERP data analysis, three consecutive 50 ms time windows prior to the instruction 
cue were defined (-150 to -100 ms, -100 to -50 ms and -50 to 0 ms). These 
timepoints were selected based on previous studies on prestimulus ERP activity 
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(Otten et al., 2006). The mean EEG amplitude in the electrode Cz was calculated for 
each participant. As in the case of the RTs, mean window ERP amplitudes were 
analyzed in repeated measures ANOVA. Greenhouse-Geiser (GG) corrections were 
applied when appropriate, but full degrees of freedom are reported.  
The experimental design included a much larger number of trials in the instructed 
rapid condition than in the other three conditions. Consequently, resampling methods 
were applied to control for uneven numbers of trials (Gruber & Otten, 2010). For 
each participant, the number of trials in the instructed delay condition was found. 
The same number of trials was then randomly sampled, with replacement, from the 
trials in the instructed rapid condition. These two populations of trials were then 
combined to get an overall distribution of instructed RTs. A trial was considered as 
“correct” in the instructed rapid condition if its RT was quicker than the median of 
the distribution of instructed RTs. In the same way, a trial was considered as correct 
in the instructed delayed condition if its RT was slower than the median of the 
distribution of instructed RTs. Finally, the mean CNV amplitude measured from 
electrode Cz was obtained for all four main trial types, in each of the 50 ms time 
windows prior to the instruction, and averaged across subjects. This procedure was 
repeated 10,000 times. 
 
4. 3      Results 
Behavioural results 
Following the monetary reward incentive to the instructed rapid trials, participants 
became quicker in each block. The total number of rewarded trials (i.e., those 
instructed rapid trials that were quicker than the average of the previous block) was 
156 ± 10 (mean ± SD), and there was a mean decrease in RT of 55 ms. 
Instructed trials were classified as rapid or delayed a priori, according to the 
instruction given in each trial. Intentional trials lacked a specific instruction, and 
hence were classified as rapid or delayed a posteriori, on the basis of a median split 
of each participant’s intentional response RT distribution (see appendix A for 
individual distributions, and see below for sensitivity analysis). Because the 
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intentional trials were classified as rapid or delayed on the basis of a median split, 
exactly half of the trials were rapid, and half of the trials were delayed. 
To determine the effect of the decision in the intentional conditions, a 2x2 ANOVA 
was performed on the RTs with the factors decision source (instructed/intentional) 
and response outcome (rapid/delay). The mean RTs are shown in figure 4.2. The 
main effect of source of decision (F1,13=7.15, p=0.019) arose because intentional 
responses were slower than instructed responses. This suggests that intentional 
decisions to respond rapidly or to transiently inhibit and delay involved a time-
consuming cognitive process occurring after the cue. The main effect of outcome 
(F1,13=81.43, p<0.001) unsurprisingly showed that participants significantly delayed 
their RTs both in instructed and in intentional conditions. The interaction between 
source of decision and outcome was not significant (F1,13=0.12, p=0.734).  
 
 
 
Figure 4.2: Delay trials have longer RTs than rapid trials, as expected by the task 
instructions. More importantly, intentional trials are slower than instructed trials, suggesting 
a intentional decision process occurring after the visual cue. Instructed rapid and delayed 
trials were classified on the basis of the instruction provided. Intentional rapid and delay 
trials were classified on the basis of a median split (see text for details). The two methods 
produce a similar RT separation. Adapted from Filevich et al (in Press), published under 
Creative Commons Attribution License. 
 
Participants switched hands in each block. Therefore there could have been an effect 
of hand used on the mean RTs. To examine this possibility RTs for blocks in which 
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participants used their dominant vs. nondominant hand were compared. A repeated 
measures three-way ANOVA was conducted, with the factors block subset 
(dominant hand/nondominant hand blocks), source (instructed/ intentional) and 
outcome (rapid/delayed). The results show a main effect of block subset (F1,12=6.40, 
p=0.026), indicating that participants were quicker to make actions with their 
dominant hands, as might be expected. However, there was no three-way interaction 
(F1,12=0.08, p=0.770), indicating that the hand used did not affect the interaction of 
source x outcome that is of interest here.  
Similarly, to rule out low-level effect of the physical stimuli, the correspondence 
between the visual cue colour and the instruction was changed half way through the 
experiment. This could have led to a significant Stoop-like effect (Stroop, 1935) that 
affected mean RTs. To explore this possibility, a repeated measures three-way 
ANOVA was conducted, this time, with the factors block subset (first half/second 
half), source (instructed/ intentional) and outcome (rapid/delayed). Results show a 
main effect of block subset (F1,12=18.38, p=0.01), suggesting that participants had 
learnt the association in the first half of the experiment, and the switch in association 
between colour of the instruction cue and the task generated a Stroop-like effect. 
Importantly however, the three-way interaction was not significant in the case of 
hand used (F1,12=0.47, p=0.505), suggesting that the source x outcome interaction 
was not modulated by Stroop-like effects.  
 
Participants’ strategies 
Participants were asked to produce roughly 50% rapid and 50% delay responses. 
This may have led to stereotyped behaviour, such as chunking or direct alternating 
strategies. If this had been the case, the decision to act rapidly or delay would not 
have been taken just before the instruction, but presumably at the onset of the trial. 
To discourage this strategy, instructed and intentional trials were interleaved. The 
alternation between intentional rapid and delayed trials would therefore require a 
higher effort of maintenance of the preceding history of choices in working memory. 
To formally test that this was not the case, possible specific simple chunking 
strategies (e.g., AABBAABB) were sought, with the standard method of run-length 
analysis (Nickerson & Butler, 2009; Wald & Wolfowitz, 1940).  
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The run length in each participants’ sequence of intentional responses was examined 
(after discarding the interleaved instructed responses), and compared with simulated 
random data (see figure 4.3). 
 
 
Fig 4.3: Distribution of run lengths in the intentional trials for A all participants and B 
simulated random data. A run is an uninterrupted sequence of repeated choices to either 
press rapidly or delay. Each colour represents an individual participant. Participants tended 
to produce less runs of length 1 (less direct alternations) than would be expected from 
random sequences. Adapted from Filevich et al (in Press), published under Creative 
Commons Attribution License. 
 
The simulated data shows the same pattern than the experimental data. To test if this 
was indeed the case, a 2x4 ANOVA was done with the factors data type 
(experimental/simulation) and run length (1 to 4). The results showed show a main 
effect of data type (F1,13 =6.98, p=0.02) and a significant data type x run length 
interaction (F2,26=4.19, p=0.019). Consequently independent paired t-tests for the 
number of runs of length 1,2,3 and 4 were conducted. The results showed that only 
the number of run lengths of 1 differed significantly between the experimental and 
the simulated data (experimental data mean ± SD: 40 ± 6 runs; simulated data: 46 ± 
6 runs; t13=-2.981, p=0.010). Participants showed fewer runs of length 1 than 
expected based on simulation results, indicating that subjects tended to avoid direct 
alternation (ABAB).  
Finally, to statistically test for randomness all blocks of each participant were 
collapsed into a single run of 160 trials, a Wald-Wolfowitz Runs test was performed 
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(Wald & Wolfowitz, 1940) for each subject. The null hypothesis that the sequence 
generated was random was not rejected for any participant (all p>0.135). 
 
 
ERP results 
After artefact rejection, an average of 164 ± 70 trials (69% of original trials) 
remained for the instructed rapid condition, 67 ± 12 (84%) trials for the instructed 
delayed condition, 57 ± 22 (72%) trials for the intentional rapid condition and 69 ± 9 
(86%) trials for the intentional delayed condition. Participants were told that they 
could blink only after having made an action, to prevent the common tendency to 
blink and press the key at the same time. This instruction might have potentially 
introduced the observed in the percentage of rejected trials between action and 
transient inhibition conditions. Because key presses occurred earlier in the rapid 
conditions, this could have been the reason for higher proportion of more blinks 
occurring during the epoch of interest.  
 
Event-related potentials (ERPs) showed a clear negativity before the instruction 
signal (figure 4.4). This corresponds to the classical contingent negative variation 
(CNV), (Tecce, 1972; Walter et al., 1964).  
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Figure 4.4: A. Averaged CNV amplitude in electrode Cz for the four main conditions, time 
locked to the appearance of the instruction cue (time 0 corresponds to the onset of the 
instruction cue). Note the difference in CNV amplitude between two intentional rapid and 
delayed trials (solid lines), but no difference in CNV amplitude between instructed choice 
rapid and delayed trials (dashed lines). Asterisks indicate a significant ANOVA interaction 
(F test, p<0.05, uncorrected). Vertical dashed line at -700 ms indicates onset of warning 
signal and the end of baseline period (-850 to -700 ms). B. mean CNV amplitudes for the 
three time windows considered, in electrode Cz. Asterisks in panel B indicate a significant 
difference in the mean amplitude in the time window (t-test, p < 0.05, two tails, 
uncorrected). Adapted from Filevich et al (in Press), published under Creative Commons 
Attribution License. 
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To examine the topography of this component, scalp maps were produced in the 
three time windows of interest. These maps show that the CNV shows a broad 
distribution, centred on electrode Cz (see figure 4.5). 
 
 
Figure 4.5: Topographical distribution of the CNV component for each of the four main 
conditions, averaged over three time windows selected for analysis. White highlight shows 
electrode Cz, from which the mean time window amplitudes were obtained for statistical 
analyses. Adapted from Filevich et al (in Press), published under Creative Commons 
Attribution License. 
 
To explore differences in the CNV amplitude between conditions, the topography of 
the CNV potential was first explored. A 2x2x3 ANOVA was conducted, with the 
factors source (instructed/intentional), outcome (rapid/delay) and electrode group 
(ipsilateral/midline/contralateral). Segmenting electrodes into regions rather than 
entering them individually as factors into an ANOVA is a more informative 
approach (Luck, 2005). The parietal and occipital electrodes were excluded, given 
the a priori hypothesis of the known topographical distribution of the CNV (Tecce, 
1972; Walter et al., 1964). To simplify the analyses, the single time window of -150 
to 0 ms prior to the instruction cue was considered.  
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Results show a main effect of electrode group (F2,24=8.59, p=0.002), no main effect 
of source (F1,12=0.03, p=0.874) and no main effect of outcome (F1,12=0.95, p=0.348). 
There was a marginally significant source x outcome interaction effect (F1,12 =4.55, 
p=0.054). This effect did not interact with electrode group (F2,24=0.24, p=0.673). 
Therefore the standard approach was taken of using the electrode Cz for the analysis 
of the CNV amplitude.  
 
Next the possibility that there were any differences between conditions over the 
three time windows defined for analysis was explored. A 2x2x3 ANOVA with the 
factors source, outcome and time bin (-150 to -100 ms/-100 to -50 ms/-50 to 0 ms). 
Results show a main effect of time window (F2,24=8.77, p=0.007); no main effect of 
source (F1,12=0.03, p=0.862) and no main effect of outcome (F1,12= 1.16, p=0.302). 
There was a significant interaction effect between source and outcome (F1,12=6.06, 
p=0.030). This interaction was explored by post-hoc testing. In the intentional 
condition, the CNV amplitude measured from Cz was reduced (i.e., less negative) 
when participants chose to transiently inhibit and delay than when they chose to 
respond rapidly. In contrast, the instructed condition showed no difference between 
rapid and delay trials. That is, CNV amplitude just before the decision cue had a 
specific association with subsequent intentional decisions to respond rapidly or to 
delay. Figure 4.6 shows the topographical distribution of these differences. 
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Figure 4.6 Topographical distribution of the difference in brain activity between rapid and 
delayed trials. Depicted values are averaged amplitudes over 50 ms time windows. There are 
stronger differences in intentional than in instructed conditions. White highlight shows 
electrode Cz, from which the mean time window amplitudes were obtained for statistical 
analyses. Adapted from Filevich et al (in Press), published under Creative Commons 
Attribution License. 
 
This two-way interaction in turn shows a marginally significant interaction with time 
window, as shown by the three-way interaction effect in the ANOVA analysis, 
F2,24=3.8, p=0.051). Because of this marginal three-way interaction, the source x 
outcome interaction effect was evaluated in each one of the three time windows (-
150 to -100 ms, -100 to -50 ms and -50 to 0 ms). Results show a source x outcome 
interaction in the -150 to -100 ms (p=0.041) and -100 to -50 ms window (p=0.016), 
but not the -50 to 0 ms window (p=0.110), see tables 4.1 and 4.2. Because post-hoc 
t-tests were examined only to explore significant interactions, corrections for 
multiple comparisons were not used.  
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Table 4.1: Mean (± SD) ERP amplitudes in the three prestimulus intervals considered.  
 Amplitude (µV) ± SD 
Instructed Intentional 
Time interval (ms) Rapid Delayed Rapid Delayed 
-150 to -100  -5.03 ± 3.35 -5.28 ± 3.42 -5.87 ± 3.93  -4.47 ± 4.30  
-100 to -50 -5.53 ± 4.33  -5.82 ± 4.11 -7.01 ± 4.14 -4.80 ± 4.58 
-50 to 0 -6.54 ± 5.16 -7.07 ± 5.03 -7.04 ± 5.47 -6.40 ± 4.89 
 
 
 
Table 4.2: Results of statistical analyses of EEG amplitudes in three 50 ms time bins. 
Interaction term of a 2X2 ANOVA (source of decision x outcome), and results of the follow-
up t-tests. All p values are uncorrected. See text for details. 
 Interaction Intentional  
rapid – delayed 
Instructed 
rapid – delayed 
Time 
interval (ms) 
F1,12 p t12 p t12 p 
-150 to -50 5.18 0.041 -1.79 0.097 0.58 0.56 
-100 to -50 7.75 0.016 -2.57 0.024 0.66 0.515 
-50 to 0 2.96 0.110 -0.80 0.437 1.05 0.313 
 
 
 
Rapid and delayed trials were classified a priori in the instructed conditions, but a 
posteriori in the intentional conditions. It was thus assumed that instructed rapid and 
instructed delayed trials were drawn from separate populations, with different mean 
RTs. However, if participants had completely failed to follow the instruction to 
respond rapidly, or with a delay, then instructed rapid and instructed delay RTs 
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would not have differed. In the CNV, RT and ERP amplitude have been shown to be 
inversely related (Hillyard, 1969). Therefore, this could also have suppressed 
differences between instructed rapid and instructed delayed ERP amplitudes. The 
interaction found between instructed and intentional conditions could then be an 
artifact of using a priori classification criteria for instructed conditions, but a 
posteriori classification criteria for intentional conditions.  
The present results suggest that this is not the case, for several reasons. First, a 
strong main effect of outcome emerged when instructed trials were classified a 
priori according to the instruction signal, suggesting that participants indeed 
attended to the instruction to respond rapidly or to delay, and indeed generated two 
distinct populations of instructed trials with minimal overlap in RT. Crucially, there 
was no significant interaction (p=0.73) between decision outcome and decision 
source. This was also the case when controlling for hand used or possible confusion 
due to Stroop-like effects. These findings suggest that participants were equally able 
to produce distinct rapid and delayed actions in instructed and intentional conditions. 
Thus, the a priori criterion for instructed trials and a posteriori criterion for 
intentional trials were approximately matched. Since treatment of RTs was 
successfully matched across instructed and intentional conditions, differences 
between ERP amplitudes cannot simply be a consequence of differences in RT 
distributions. 
Second, an additional analysis was performed in which instructed trials and delayed 
trials were both classified in the same way, using an a posteriori criterion, based on 
RT. The experimental design deliberately over-emphasised the number of instructed 
rapid trials. To account for possible overestimation of differences due to an a 
posteriori criterion, subsampling methods were used (see methods, section 4.2). 
Results of this subsampling procedure are shown in figure 4.7. If participants had 
ignored the instruction signal, the mean proportion of correct instructed trials should 
have been around 50% in both conditions. Instead, the mean proportion of correct 
trials was 87.1±9% in the rapid condition; and 87.2±8% in the delay condition. This 
suggests that the a priori classification yielded similar populations than the a 
posteriori classification.  
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Figure 4.7: Bootstrapping procedure to resample instructed trials, accounting for differences 
in numbers of each trial type. This procedure allows instructed and intentional reactions to 
be classified based on reaction times. Results are shown for the interval of -150 to 0 ms prior 
to the onset of the visual cue, in electrode Cz A. The instructed rapid and delayed 
subsampled populations cannot be easily distinguished. In contrast, the intentional rapid and 
delayed subsample populations are clearly distinct. B. 95% Confidence intervals for 
instructed and intentional conditions. Note that while they are separate in the intentional 
conditions, they overlap in the instructed conditions.	  Adapted from Filevich et al (in Press), 
published under Creative Commons Attribution License. 
 
 
In the case of intentional conditions, the resampled data form two clearly distinct 
populations. One population of resampled trials presents slower, above-median RTs 
and is therefore classified as delayed/inhibited. Crucially, these results show that 
these trials were associated with lower prestimulus CNV amplitudes. A second 
population presented faster, below-median RTs. These trials were thus classified as 
rapid responses and showed higher prestimulus CNV amplitudes. The 95% 
confidence intervals for the two resampled populations do not overlap, replicating 
the finding of the main analysis. Prestimulus CNV amplitude differs before an 
intentional decision to respond rapidly or with a delay. In the instructed conditions, 
the resampled data do not form two clearly distinct populations and the 95% 
confidence intervals for prestimulus CNV amplitude show clear overlap between 
slower, above-median RTs classified as delayed/inhibited, and faster below-median 
RTs classified as rapid. The same resampling procedure was repeated for all three 
time windows, and is shown in figure 4.8.  
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Figure 4.8 Results of the bootstrapping procedure in each 50 ms time window analyzed. 
Bars show the 95% confidence intervals of the mean ERP amplitude in Cz (as in panel B of 
figure 4.7). The first two time windows (-150 to -100 ms and -100 to -50 ms) show a 
significant source (instructed/free-choice) x outcome (rapid/delayed) interaction effect. Note 
that while the 95% confidence intervals do not overlap in the free-choice conditions, they do 
overlap in the instructed conditions. See table 4.1 for the corresponding results of statistical 
analysis. Adapted from Filevich et al (in Press), published under Creative Commons 
Attribution License. 
 
 
Lastly, the RT distribution for each participant was analyzed. CNV amplitude has 
been shown to be inversely related to RT (Hillyard, 1969). Therefore, the strong 
difference in the CNV amplitudes between the intentional conditions could in 
principle be a simple consequence of a strong separation between quick and delayed 
RTs. If this were the case, then RT distributions in the intentional conditions should 
be more strongly bimodal than instructed conditions. An established coefficient of 
bimodality b appropriate for large trial numbers (S. A. S. Institute, 1999): 
𝑏 = 𝑠! + 1𝑘 + 3  
Chapter	  4	  	  	  	  There	  is	  no	  free	  won’t	  	  	  
138	  	  
 
Where s and k are indexes of skewness and kurtosis respectively. The index of 
bimodality was in fact lower in the intentional than in the instructed condition (the 
instructed conditions showed a higher coefficient of bimodality than intentional 
conditions, mean (± SD) 0.44 ± 0.07 and 0.22 ± 0.05, respectively). These measures 
of bimodality were significantly different (t13=9.7, p < 0.01). The difference 
remained significant when data was subsampled using the same procedures 
described above for the resampling of trials to calculate the CNV amplitudes. This 
provides further evidence against the possibility that CNV amplitude differences in 
the intentional conditions simply reflect stronger RT differences for intentional than 
instructed choices. 
 
4. 4      Discussion 
In this experiment, participants were instructed either to press rapidly or to inhibit 
and delay a key press; or they were free to choose between these two alternatives. 
The results show that the neural activity before the moment of decision to inhibit 
differed from that before a decision to act rapidly. When participants chose to 
respond rapidly on intentional trials, they did so on the basis of stronger preparatory 
activity before the moment of choice. Choosing to transiently inhibit and delay 
responding was associated with lower preparatory activity. This prestimulus 
influence on decision was unique to intentional trials, and was absent or reduced 
when participants were instructed to inhibit/delay. By definition, in the instructed 
condition, participants’ behaviour was dictated by the instruction cue. Therefore the 
prestimulus CNV activity cannot predict instructed behaviour. Consequently, the 
instructed condition was used as a negative control, and differences in the 
prestimulus CNV trace between the two intentional conditions were sought.  
 
Because different criteria were used to classify rapid and delayed trials for instructed 
and intentional trials, additional analyses in which instructed trials were also 
classified according to their RTs. The pattern of results remained the same. 
Therefore, a specific prestimulus CNV amplitude difference between rapid and 
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delayed actions was still present for intentional trials, but not for instructed trials, 
even when the number of trials was balanced across conditions, and classification 
criteria were chosen to distinguish rapid and delayed responses in a similar way for 
intentional and instructed decisions. 
Could these results have occurred because of variations in general arousal level? 
Specifically, a participant who was mind-wandering or not engaged in the task might 
be expected to show low CNV amplitudes and long RTs (Tecce, 1972). Conversely, 
a high preceding level of arousal and engagement would be likely to produce a short 
RT. Thus, on an intentional trial, a prior state of high arousal would be likely to be 
classified as a decision to respond rapidly, even if no specific cognitive process of 
decision actually occurred. Similarly a low preceding level of arousal would be 
likely to be classified as a decision to transiently inhibiting responding. On this view, 
the relations between prior CNV activity and RT that were identified as decisions to 
act or inhibit might in fact be due to general arousal effects, rather than effects of 
prior neural activity on a specific cognitive decision process. However the variation 
in RT in the present data is much larger than that expected due to arousal effects 
alone. For example, Cheyne (Cheyne, Solman, Carriere, & Smilek, 2009) have 
described the “natural” fluctuations in RT in a go/nogo task (Robertson, Manly, 
Andrade, Baddeley, & Yiend, 1997). Their results show, for example, that trials 
preceding commission errors were on average 20 ms quicker than other trials. 
Conversely, trials preceding omission errors were on average 150 ms slower than the 
baseline. In the experiment reported here, the differences between rapid and delayed 
trials were of around 600 ms, much longer than delays explained by occasional 
inattention or “zoning out” episodes. These results suggest that the RT differences 
reflected outcomes of a specific decision process, and that this specific process was 
driven by neural precursor activity. This precursor activity may well have been in 
turn related to arousal, but the effects described here were clearly mediated by a 
specific whether decision process. This decision process occurred either based on 
external instruction, or on participants’ intentional decisions. These results show that 
these intentional whether decisions in fact depended on preceding brain activity, 
before the cue requiring an intentional decision. The current state of the brain 
appears to influence the conscious decision to act or inhibit/delay, rather than vice 
versa. 
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Could participants actually have decided to inhibit/delay before the visual signal to 
choose? Two facts argue strongly against this potential predecision. First, frequent 
and rapid-response trials in the instructed condition were included to discourage such 
early predecision, participants were rewarded according to their RTs on these trials. 
Second, a 2x2 ANOVA revealed a main effect of source of decision, with intentional 
trials being 90 ms slower than instructed trials (p=0.019), consistent with a time-
consuming decision stage occurring after the instruction, and comparable to RT costs 
of instructed choices (Hick, 1952).  
Finally, to discourage stereotyped behaviour in the intentional trials (such as direct 
alternation between action outcomes), instructed and intentional trials were 
interleaved. In this way, a predecided strategy to maintain a stereotyped behaviour 
would have required higher working memory load. To check whether such 
predecision occurred, the distribution of the length of runs was examined (i.e., 
sequences of repeated action outcomes) for each participant. A distribution of runs 
strongly centred around a given number would have indicated a predecided strategy. 
However, no participant showed evidence for a stereotyped behaviour of this kind 
(see appendix A).  
These data suggest that intentional decisions to inhibit/delay were made after the 
visual cue, but were strongly driven by antecedent, unconscious brain activity.  
 
Limitations of this study 
Several limitations should be considered when interpreting the results of this study. 
First, the sample size was relatively low, and inferences should therefore be 
tempered with caution. Nevertheless, the size of this study is comparable with other 
recent studies on prestimulus EEG activity (Britz & Michel, 2010; Busch & 
VanRullen, 2010; Mazaheri, DiQuattro, Bengson, & Geng, 2011).  
In terms of design and data analysis, five important limitations should be taken into 
consideration. First, the factorial design was not perfectly balanced, as it included a 
relatively higher number of instructed quick trials as compared to instructed delayed 
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trials. Participants were rewarded on the basis of these rapid instructed trials only. At 
the end of each block they received a reward proportional to the number of rapid 
instructed trials that were faster than the average on the preceding block. Because 
only instructed rapid trials were rewarded, free and instructed conditions differed in 
terms of motivation. These differences in motivation may have influenced the way in 
which movements have been prepared or delayed. This imbalance in both trial 
numbers and reward was the result of a strategic decision to decrease the risk of 
participants predeciding before the trial whether to act or delay. By using instructed 
trials to ensure a motivation to prepare actions in advance, and rewarding 
participants accordingly, inhibition of an already-prepared action occurring before 
delayed responses could be assumed with more confidence. 
Second, intentional trials were classified as rapid or delayed actions based on their 
reaction times. This approach has the advantage of not relying on subjective report, 
but only on objective behavioural measures. However, these objective measures may 
not provide a perfect classification of the participants’ intentional decisions to 
respond rapidly or to delay their responses. Long RTs may be indicative of action 
inhibition, but may also arise for other reasons than inhibition, such as failures of 
attention, long decision times, etc. However, if this classification approach were 
simply imperfect, this would count against the probability of finding significant 
differences between trial types. 
Arousal is one particular factor that might influence RT by affecting preparation. 
However, a general relation between arousal and RT would be presumably common 
to both instructed and intentional conditions. To explore the particular possibility of 
a role of arousal, resampling analyses were conducted by splitting the instructed data 
into rapid and delayed based on the median RT. In this way, had arousal been the 
only factor influencing the CNV amplitudes, then the instructed conditions would 
have shown two different populations in this resampling analysis. This was not the 
case. Instead, there was a specific relation between preparatory activity and an 
intentional decision to delay, with no such relation in instructed conditions. This 
cannot be explained by a general relation between arousal and RT without additional 
ad hoc assumptions.  
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Related to these considerations, it should be mentioned that the experimental design 
may have hindered the comparison between instructed and intentional trials. Because 
the SOA between the two visual cues (S1 and S2) was kept constant, intentional 
conditions may have been associated with weaker action preparation, as compared to 
the instructed conditions. This possible asymmetry, however, cannot alone explain 
the interaction pattern between intentional and instructed rapid and delayed 
conditions.  
A third limitation of this study comes from the low spatial resolution of ERP (Luck, 
2005). In particular, the differences in CNV amplitude which precede rapid vs. 
delayed intentional responses may have a subcortical source (Nagai et al., 2004) that 
cannot be measured at the scalp. 
Fourth, this analysis may miss out some hemisphere-specific variations in preceding 
neural activity. Participants were asked to switch hands in every block, and then 
collapsed the ERPs obtained for the hemisphere contralateral and ipsilateral to the 
movement, regardless of the hand actually used for movement. However, the 
distribution of RPs in left and right hemisphere is known to differ e.g., (Wittmann, 
von Steinbüchel, & Szelag, 2001). Dirnberger et al [21] have shown that there are 
“atypical” trials in left hand key presstasks (but not in right hand key press tasks) 
with exceptionally early pre-movement activity. These atypical trials lead to RP 
amplitude distributions that violate the assumption of a Gaussian distribution, 
necessary for the parametric statistics used here. Because trials made with the right 
and left hand were collapsed, it is not clear how typical the RP amplitude 
distributions in this study are, and how valid the assumptions of normality are. 
However, the experimental design focussed on differences between intentional and 
instructed conditions, with equal numbers of right and left hand movements in each 
condition. Any bias introduced by hemispheric asymmetry should be equivalent in 
intentional and instructed conditions, and would therefore not influence the 
conclusions drawn here. Nevertheless, further control experiments could check for 
potential right-left asymmetries. 
Also, and importantly, this experimental design cannot conclusively ensure that the 
prestimulus neural activity recorded is indeed unconscious. Stronger neural activity 
could in fact emerge as a result, and not a cause, of conscious intentions to act. 
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Notably however, chapter 7 in this thesis illustrates how problematic such 
distinctions between conscious and unconscious intentions may be. The alternative 
approach of converging behavioural evidence taken above may in this case provide 
stronger arguments that those that derive from directly probing the contents of 
conscious intentions.  
Finally, as is common practice in paradigms involving intentional choices, 
participants were asked to try to balance their choices, and roughly choose to act 
rapidly in 50% of the intentional trials. This requisite for a roughly balanced 
behaviour may have encouraged participants to predecide in advance the sequence of 
intentional decision outcomes they would choose. This possibility was formally 
explored and no evidence was found to support non-random behaviour, but the 
possibility cannot be fully discarded.  
Implications of this study 
Intentional decisions about what action to make have been shown to be affected by 
subliminal primes (Schlaghecken & Eimer, 2004). In the same way, subliminal 
primes have been shown to modulate ERP components typically associated with 
inhibition in a go/nogo task (Hughes et al., 2009). This study did not use subliminal 
primes were not used to alter the preceding neural activity, but instead this study 
capitalized on the intrinsic variation in brain activity. It was assumed that the state of 
brain processing just before the instruction signal might influence a “free” decision 
about what actions when this was not specified in the instruction itself. These results 
strongly suggest that participants “freely decided” to respond quickly or delay their 
responses, depending on the degree of preparation within the cortical motor system 
immediately preceding the instruction to decide. These data can be parsimoniously 
explained by the suggestion that conscious intentional decisions to inhibit action may 
depend on the preceding state of the brain. Interestingly, the classic definition of 
voluntary actions involves contrasting them with instructed, stimulus-driven actions 
(R. E. Passingham et al., 2009). Volition thus amounts to “not externally generated” 
action. These cortical excitability measures would presumably satisfy this definition, 
since they correspond to fluctuations of internal signals. Links between free will and 
other internal neural signals have been proposed, notably the activity of the default 
mode network (I. Goldberg, Ullman, & Malach, 2008). 
Chapter	  4	  	  	  	  There	  is	  no	  free	  won’t	  	  	  
144	  	  
 
Antecedent brain activity was shown to precede subsequent conscious decisions 
about when to act (by about 700 ms -Libet et al., 1983-), or to be predictive of what 
action to perform (by several seconds -Soon et al., 2008-). EEG activity was also 
reported to precede intentional decisions to inhibit (Walsh et al., 2010). However, 
Walsh et al.’s results depend on interpreting subjective reports about time of 
intentional decisions, which remains controversial (Banks & Isham, 2009). 
Moreover, the experimental designs of those studies did not take the steps taken here 
to exclude advance pre-decision about whether to action or not. The task presented 
here was designed to constrain the whether decision to act or delay/inhibit to an 
identifiable point in time. This makes the finding of antecedent neural prediction of 
intentional decisions more striking, and may provide more convincing evidence for a 
form of neural determinism. In particular, these results show that antecedent brain 
activity influences intentional decisions. This was true even when the decision 
process was precisely defined in time, and when data analysis was based on 
objective behavioural criteria, rather than on subjective reports.  
Importantly, these results also illustrate that unconscious brain activity significantly 
influences behaviour in situations where participants intentionally decide how to 
respond, yet there is no strong motivation to choose any one possible response 
alternative over the other. Preceding brain activity may have much less influence on 
behaviour when a clear instruction or strong internal motivation (such as a financial 
incentive) encourages choosing one response alternative over the other. In that case, 
any influence of preceding brain activity will be diluted or overridden to produce the 
“correct” response. On the other hand, cases of decision without clear instruction or 
strong internal motivation are particularly important, because they are the focus of 
debates about “endogenous” decisions, and more generally about “free will”.  
The main argument is as follows: Libet et al, (1983) had suggested that decisions to 
inhibit action have an important role in freedom of will, because, he argued, they do 
not have any obvious unconscious neural precursors. In Libet’s view, this makes 
them crucially different from decisions to act, for which, he claimed, there is a clear 
unconscious precursor. Libet’s dualistic notion of “free won’t” has been criticised on 
theoretical grounds. However, a stronger rejection of “free won’t” could come from 
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actually showing that the decision to act or not is driven by a preceding, presumably 
unconscious neural activity. The present results identify, for the first time, a 
candidate unconscious precursor of the decision to inhibit action. These results count 
as evidence against Libet’s view that the decision to inhibit action may involve a 
form of uncaused conscious causation. 
 
4. 5      Conclusion 
Neuroscience cannot straightforwardly accommodate a concept of “conscious free 
will”, independent of brain activity (Haggard, 2008). However, the belief that 
humans have free will is fundamental to human society (Nichols, 2011). This belief 
has profound top-down effects on cognition (Vohs & Schooler, 2008) and even on 
brain activity itself (Rigoni, Kühn, Sartori, & Brass, 2011). The dualistic view that 
decisions to inhibit reflect a special “conscious veto” or “free won't” mechanism 
(Libet, 1985) is scientifically unwarranted. Instead, conscious decisions to check and 
delay actions may themselves be consequences of specific brain mechanisms linked 
to action preparation and action monitoring (Brass & Haggard, 2007). Recent 
neuroscientific studies have strongly questioned the concept of free will, but have 
had difficulty addressing the alternative concept of free won’t, largely because of the 
absence of behavioural markers of inhibition. These results suggest that an important 
aspect of “free” decisions to inhibit can be explained without recourse to an 
endogenous, ”uncaused” process: the cause of “free decisions” may at least in part, 
be simply the background stochastic fluctuations of cortical excitability. These 
results suggest that free won’t may be no more free than free will. 
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4. 6      Appendix 
 
Figure A1 shows the individual RT distributions. For each participant, top 
histograms show RTs in the instructed conditions. Bottom histograms show RTs in 
the free choice conditions.  
To encourage preparation, the experimental design included a high proportion of 
instructed quick trials (see Methods). The RT distributions reflect this imbalance. A 
bimodal RT distribution is nevertheless evident in most participants for the 
instructed conditions.  
Free choice conditions show more uniform distributions, with smaller values of 
bimodality, see main text. Importantly, this argues against the possibility that the 
observed ERP effects are simply due to differences in RTs. In particular, a more 
uniform distribution in the free choice conditions would have lead to smaller (and 
not larger, as it was the case) ERP differences between quick and delayed conditions.  
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Fig A1: Individual RT distributions for each participant. Time bins represent 50 ms. Note 
that y axis values are different for each participant. Adapted from Filevich et al (in Press), 
published under Creative Commons Attribution License. 
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Chapter 5 Relative processing of task-irrelevant stimuli  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This study investigated whether intentional actions may be easier to modify than 
instructed actions, by measuring susceptibility to external distractors.  ERP 
amplitudes to task-relevant and task-irrelevant stimuli were compared situations of 
instructed or intentional action preparation. Intentional action was associated with 
less efficient suppression of task-irrelevant information than instructed action. 
Intentional action may therefore being more susceptible to distraction. 
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5. 1      Introduction 
One of the working hypotheses of this thesis is that intentional decisions for action 
are weak as compared to instructed decisions for action. This hypothesis contrasts 
with evidence from previous studies comparing readiness potential (RP) or 
lateralized readiness potential (LRP) amplitudes between situations of intentional 
and instructed actions. Typically, these studies have found stronger RP amplitudes 
for intentional actions e.g. (Praamstra et al., 1995), and no differences in LRP 
amplitude between conditions e.g., (Waszak et al., 2005). One possible explanation 
that may reconcile these apparently contradicting results is that the stronger RPs 
observed are related to movement expectancy and anticipation, and consequently 
have a weak functional relevance for movement preparation.  
One previous study investigated potential functional differences between instructed 
and intentional decisions, by measuring their relative flexibility (Fleming, Mars, 
Gladwin, & Haggard, 2009). In an S1-S2 task, Fleming et al asked participants to 
prepare to make a right or left key press following an initial visual cue (S1). Two 
types of S1 cues were possible.  Instructed S1 cues specified the hand with which 
participants had to prepare to make the action. Intentional S1 cues, on the other hand, 
allowed participants to freely choose between right- and left-hand key presses. After 
a 1.5 s delay, a second cue (S2) followed S1. S2 could be either a “stay” or a 
“change” cue. S2 stay cues meant that participants simply had to make the action 
they had prepared following S1. S2 change cues, on the other hand, instructed 
participants to change their action plans. That is, participants were required to make 
a key press with their left hand if they had prepared a right-hand key press and vice 
versa.  
Fleming et al then compared the neural responses to S2 between intentional and 
instructed conditions. They found that ERPs evoked by S2 change cues showed 
greater amplitudes in instructed trials as compared to intentional trials. Thus, the 
authors suggested that changing instructed action plans required more neural effort 
than intentional action plans, and must have therefore a more robust and less flexible 
underlying neural code.  
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Such indirect measures of action preparation can reveal differences between 
intentional and instructed decisions for action. This study explored another way of 
measuring strength of decisions, namely their resistance to external distraction. In 
particular, intentional action preparation may be more susceptible to interference 
from external, task-irrelevant stimuli than instructed action preparation. 
  
P300 as a measure of information processing 
As in Fleming et al (Fleming et al., 2009), numerous studies have measured the 
amplitude of the P300 component, or of one of its subcomponents as a proxy for the 
strength of processing of external stimuli in general, and of task-irrelevant stimuli in 
particular (Bledowski et al., 2004; Gumenyuk et al., 2001; Polich & Ochoa, 2004; 
Richard Clark, McFarlane, Weber, & Battersby, 1996). Both task-relevant and task-
irrelevant stimuli typically elicit a large positive component in the EEG signal, 
termed P300, peaking at around 300-500 ms after stimulus onset. The analysis of 
neural activity following task-relevant and task-irrelevant stimuli provides a means 
to measure the automatic processing of external stimuli. For example, Vallessi and 
Stuss (Vallesi & Stuss, 2010) tested younger and older participants in a modified 
go/nogo task. The authors measured LRP amplitudes in response to nogo stimuli. 
Although these task-irrelevant nogo stimuli did not require a motor response, older 
adults showed significant LRPs developing in nogo trials, consistent with the 
automatic preparation of a response, despite no need form an overt motor action. The 
authors therefore suggested that older adults showed less efficient mechanism of 
suppression of the processing of task-irrelevant stimuli.  
To test the hypothesis of differential strengths of instructed and intentional decisions, 
this study capitalized on the methods available to assess the automatic processing of 
task-irrelevant stimuli. The amplitudes of the neural response to task-relevant and 
task-irrelevant stimuli were compared between situations of instructed and 
intentional action preparation. The experimental design followed closely that of 
Fleming et al (Fleming et al., 2009). Here, their original design was extended to 
include task-irrelevant stimuli instead of the otherwise always relevant stay/change 
S2 cues.  
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The present task required participants to prepare an action following an S1 cue, and 
maintain action preparation until an S2 cue informed whether these action plans 
should be changed or not. Some S2 cues were task-relevant, and had to be followed, 
whereas other S2 cues were irrelevant and had to be ignored. Because quick key 
presses were encouraged, optimal performance in this task required a suppression of 
the perceptual and cognitive processing of task-irrelevant stimuli. The hypothesis 
was as follows: if instructed and intentional action decisions differ in the relative 
strengths of their underlying neural codes, then task-irrelevant stimuli presented in 
the context of strong instructed action preparation will be efficiently suppressed, and 
processed less deeply than task-relevant stimuli. On the contrary, task-irrelevant 
stimuli presented in situations of intentional action preparation will only show 
intermediate levels of perceptual suppression, due to the intermediate levels of action 
preparation. The processing of task-irrelevant stimuli will therefore be similar to that 
of task-relevant stimuli 
 
 
5. 2      Methods 
Participants  
Sixteen naïve participants (nine females, mean age ± SD, 26 ± 8) participated in this 
study. One participant was left-handed. Procedures were approved by the UCL 
research ethics committee and were in accordance with the principles of the 
Declaration of Helsinki. In total, 4 participants were excluded without further 
analysis. 2 participants blinked excessively and the data from 2 participants could 
not be recorded due to technical problems, yielding a total of 12 participants 
included in the analyses. 
 
Experimental task 
Participants sat in a dimly lit and quiet room, 60 cm away from a stimuli display 
screen. The experiment was divided in 6 blocks of 128 trials each. Trial order was 
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randomized for each participant. The experiment lasted approximately 90 min, and 
participants got familiarized with the task during a short practice session before 
starting with the experiment.  
Each trial was structured as follows (see figure 5.1): a white fixation cross appeared 
at the centre of a black screen for a variable duration of between 500 and 1200 ms. 
Two visual stimuli (S1 and S2) were presented for 250 ms each, with a fixation cross 
period of 700 ms between them. Participants were asked to respond with their right 
or left index fingers following S2 by making a key press on a standard computer 
keyboard. Participants had a time limit of 1250 ms to make their response. The inter 
trial interval was 800 ms.  
Three main trial categories were included in the task. These were S1-S2 trials 
(together, 63%), short trials (15%) and baseline trials (22%). The main experimental 
conditions (S1-S2 trials) consisted in turn of 8 possible variations (see figure 5.1). 
These variations were a combination of 3 independent factors, namely source of 
decision (instructed/intentional, indicated by the S1 cue); and relevance (task-
relevant/task-irrelevant) and outcome (swap/stay), both given by the S2 cue.  
S1-S2 and short trials could be either instructed or intentional. In instructed trials, S1 
contained arrows pointing either to the right (>>) or to the left (<<), and participants 
were asked to prepare a key press with their corresponding hand. In intentional trials, 
a double-headed arrow (<>) was presented, and participants were asked to prepare a 
key press with a hand of their choosing. It was emphasized to participants that they 
should commit to a given hand, and try to avoid producing stereotypical sequences 
of responses. For the purposes of data analysis, right and left key presses were 
collapsed into a single condition.  
700 ms after the offset of S1, one of four possible S2 cues was presented. S2 
provided a second instruction that that could change the required key press. S2 cues 
displayed the words “swap” or “stay” written in lower- or upper-case. Upper- or 
lower-case words could correspond to either task-relevant or task-irrelevant stimuli. 
This mapping was counterbalanced across subjects, and reversed once for each 
participant halfway through the experiment. Task-relevant stimuli were to be 
followed, whereas task-irrelevant stimuli were to be ignored. Consequently, S2 
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conveyed one of two possible messages. A task-relevant S2 cue would either instruct 
participants to reverse (swap) or maintain (stay) their action plans. Instead, 
participants had to ignore task-irrelevant S2 cues, and execute their action plans 
prepared following S1. The 2x2 factorial manipulation for S2 (relevance x outcome) 
was crossed over with the two possibilities for S1 (factor of relevance), yielding a 
2x2x2 factorial design. It is important to note, however, that only one (task-relevant 
swap) of the four possible S2 cues effectively required a change in the prepared 
action plan.  
 
Figure 5.1: Main experimental conditions (S1-S2 trials). Visual stimuli S1 and S2 were 
presented with a fixed (700 ms) interval between them. Participants had to prepare a key 
press according to the S1 cue. S1 would either instruct participants to prepare a right (>>) or 
left (<<) key press, or allow them to intentionally decide which action to prepare (<>). 
Participants were asked to maintain action preparation between S1 and S2, and make a 
speeded key press following S2. S2 cues could require participants to continue with their 
action plans (“stay” cues) or to inhibit their prepared action and make a key press with the 
alternative, non-prepared hand (“swap” cues). S2 could either be a task-relevant or task-
irrelevant cue (upper or lowercase, mapping counterbalanced across participants). Task-
relevant S2s had to be followed, whereas task-irrelevant S2s had to be ignored.  
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The experimental stimuli chosen by Fleming et al for S2 were square and diamond-
shaped visual stimuli that had been arbitrarily paired with the stay/swap instructions. 
In contrast, in the present experiment, word stimuli were preferred, for two main 
reasons. First, pilot data suggested that the pairing of four arbitrary stimuli with their 
corresponding instructions was relatively difficult and confusing for participants. 
More importantly, S2 cues were designed to be both easy to distinguish and difficult 
to ignore completely. Task-relevant and task-irrelevant stimuli were therefore 
different in their surface form, making them easy to distinguish without attending to 
their semantic content. At the same time, they were made difficult to ignore 
completely by using word stimuli, that could trigger automatic semantic processing 
(Stroop, 1935).  
To encourage action preparation, the paradigm included short trials (15% of total 
trials). In these trials, the sign ‘XXXX’ appeared shortly after S1 (see figure 5.2 A). 
The short cue latency was randomly sampled from 5 possible latencies, between 200 
and 600 ms. Participants were asked to make a key press promptly following a short 
cue, executing the prepared action in S1. Participants received a monetary reward of 
an amount proportional to the number of trials with an RT shorter than their own 
average in the previous block. Importantly, short trials were indistinguishable from 
S1-S2 trials, until the time at which S2 or the short cue appeared. Consequently, 
rewarding quick key presses in short trials was expected to encourage action 
preparation in both short and S1-S2 trials. Feedback was given when incorrect 
responses were made in instructed trials.  
Finally, to confirm that participants had indeed prepared their actions following S1, 
baseline trials were included in the task (28% of total trials, see figure 5.2 B). In 
these trials S1 showed a question mark and was followed by a right (>>), left (<<), or 
double-headed (<>) arrow at the time of S2. Participants were asked to make a quick 
key press in the direction indicated by S2.  
 
 
Chapter	  5	  	  	  Processing	  of	  task-­‐irrelevant	  stimuli	  	  
162	  	  
 
Figure 5.2 Short and baseline conditions. Two conditions were included to address whether 
participants prepared their actions after S1.  A. Short trials were indistinguishable from the 
S1-S2 trials at the time of S1. However in contrast to an S1-S2 trial, short trials included a 
go signal (‘XXXX’) appearing at a variable interval before the expected time of S2. To 
encourage action preparation following S1, participants were asked to execute the key press 
they had prepared following S1, and were given a monetary reward proportional to the 
number of quick reaction times. B. In baseline trials, a question mark appeared at the time of 
S1, so participants could not prepare their action. S2 then either instructed participants to 
make a key press with their right (>>) or left (<<) hand, or internally decide which hand to 
use (<>). Action preparation was therefore not possible in baseline trials, and served as a 
measure of RTs in the absence of any preceding action preparation.  
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Electrophysiological Recordings and data analysis 
EEG data were recorded with a SynAmps amplifier system and Scan 4.3 software 
(Neuroscan, El Paso, TX) from fourteen Ag/AgCl scalp electrodes (F3, Fz, F4, FC3, 
FCz, FC4, C3, Cz, C4, P3, Pz, P4, O1, O2, according to the 10-20 system). 
Electrodes were referenced to AFz online and the ground electrode was placed on 
the nose. Activity from left and right mastoids was recorded. Vertical and horizontal 
electrooculographic (EOG) activity was recorded from bipolar electrodes positioned 
above and below the right eye and on the outer canthi, respectively. 
Electromyographic activity was recorded from a pair of surface electrodes placed on 
the flexor pollicis brevis and the adductor pollicis muscle of each hand. Impedances 
were kept below 5 KΩ for all electrodes. EEG signals were amplified and digitized 
at 500 Hz; and recorded with an online notch filter between 45 and 55 Hz.  
EEG data were analyzed with EEGLAB software (Delorme and Makeig, 2004). Data 
were first re-referenced to the linked mastoids. Data were digitally band-pass filtered 
between 0.05 and 30 Hz. All trials were collapsed irrespective of the hand used for 
the keypress. Consequently, to prevent the averaging out of lateralized potentials, the 
electrodes ipsilateral and contralateral to the movement were inverted for those trials 
that resulted in a left hand key press. Epochs were time locked to the onset of either 
the visual cues (S1 or S2) or to the time of the key press. Trials time locked to the 
visual stimuli were baselined to the period of 150 ms immediately prior to cue onset. 
Incorrect instructed trials were excluded from the analysis. Incorrect intentional trials 
could not be identified, so were not discarded (but see below). Further, to avoid 
artefacts due to eye blinks, trials were discarded if the bipolar recording of EOG 
exceeded +/- 80 µV at any point during the epoch.  
A grand average was obtained for all 8 S1-S2 conditions. Time windows and 
electrodes of interest were defined on the basis of the peak latencies and 
topographical distributions of the grand average of all conditions together. Means 
across entire time windows were obtained, and entered into statistical analyses.  
Evidence for lateralization of a prepared response during the period between S1 and 
S2 was sought. The standard measure of lateralization, namely LRP amplitude, could 
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not be obtained here. To compute LRPs, the EEG signal should be time locked to the 
time key press. In this task the definition of LRP epochs would pose a problem 
because the strong neural responses to the S2 cues, prior to actions, fell at variable 
times relative to the time of key press, contaminating the signal and hindering the 
LRP estimation. The critical frequency components of LRP do not overlap with 
those of P300 (Demiralp, Ademoglu, Comerchero, & Polich, 2001; Demiralp, 
Ademoglu, Schürmann, Basar-Eroglu, & Basar, 1999). Therefore, the approach 
adopted by Fleming et al was followed, and the motor-related amplitude asymmetry 
(MRAA) was computed as a measure of lateralization of the prepared response. The 
EEG signal was time locked to the time of S2, and epochs were defined between -
1500 and 100 ms around the time of S2. The µ-band (9-13Hz) power was calculated 
for each trial by Morlet wavelet convolution. The average µ-band power for each 
participant and each condition in the C electrode ipsilateral to movement was 
subtracted from the average power in C electrode contralateral to movement. Finally, 
to obtain the MRAA measure, the contra - ipsilateral µ-band power difference was 
normalized for each participant to the average power for the whole epoch and across 
both contra and ipsilateral electrodes (Gladwin, Lindsen, & de Jong, 2006).  
 
 
5. 3      Results 
Participants made few errors across all instructed S1-S2 conditions (7.9 ± 6.76%). 
Incorrect trials could not be objectively identified in intentional conditions, because 
the covert action selection following S1 was not available to an external observer.  
 
Behavioural evidence for action preparation 
This experiment focussed on the modulatory effects of the state of action preparation 
following S1, on the neural processing of S2. Therefore to validly compare 
instructed and intentional trials, it was crucial that comparable levels of directional 
action preparation occurred following S1, in both intentional and instructed trials. 
Because S1-S2 trials were indistinguishable from short trials at the time of S1 (see 
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methods), evidence for action preparation following S1 in short trials constitutes 
indirect evidence for action preparation following S1 in S1-S2 trials. Therefore, to 
verify that action preparation indeed occurred following S1, RTs associated with 
short and baseline trials were compared. Action preparation at the time of S1 was 
impossible in baseline trials, but was encouraged in short trials. To search for 
evidence for action preparation following S1, RTs were compared in a 2x2 ANOVA 
with the factors of condition (short/baseline) and source (instructed/intentional 
choice) (see figure 5.3). Results revealed a significant main effect of source 
(F1,11=16.70, p=0.002), consistent with an increased RT cost of decision (H. Lau, 
Rogers, Ramnani, et al., 2004; van Eimeren et al., 2006). There was also a 
significant main effect of condition (F1,11=5.15, p=0.044), suggesting that there was 
indeed action preparation after S1, in both intentional and instructed trials. Further, 
there was a significant interaction effect (F1,11=12.02, p=0.005). Follow-up t-tests 
revealed that whereas RTs in the instructed conditions did not differ significantly 
(t11=1.68, p=0.120), RTs in intentional choice were in fact significantly different 
(t11=2.71, p=0.020). Quicker RTs were associated with in intentional short trials as 
compared to those in intentional baseline trials. Although the difference in instructed 
trials was not significant, this result importantly confirms that action preparation 
occurred following S1 in the crucial intentional conditions.  
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Figure 5.3 Evidence for action preparation following S1. Mean reaction times for short and 
baseline trials were compared. Action preparation was encouraged in short trials but 
impossible in baseline trials. Accordingly, RTs were quicker in short trials as compared to 
baseline trials, in both instructed and intentional conditions. The differences were stronger 
for intentional conditions. Error bars show standard error of the mean. ** p<0.05 
 
The mean RTs were then compared for the main 8 experimental conditions in a 
2x2x2 ANOVA with the factors of source (instructed/intentional), relevance (task-
relevant/task-irrelevant) and outcome (stay/swap) (see figure 5.4). There was no 
significant main effect of source (F1,11=0.34, p=0.571) but a significant main effect 
of outcome (F1,11=21.49, p<0.001). An expected RT cost for swap trials was 
consistent with the main effect of outcome. If participants were indeed changing 
action plans at the time of S2 in swap trials, this effect should have been present in 
both instructed and intentional trials. There was, however, an additional significant 
interaction effect between source and outcome (F1,11=6.044, p=0.032). 
Because the action plans following S1 were private to participants, successful 
switching of action plans could not be objectively evaluated in intentional trials. 
Therefore, behavioural evidence was sought to ensure that switching effectively 
occurred in intentional trials. More specifically, the source x outcome interaction 
was explored to ensure that swap RT costs were present in intentional swap trials. 
Because there was no significant three-way interaction, the data were collapsed 
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across the two relevance levels. Paired t-tests revealed significant swap RT costs for 
both instructed (t11=-6.14, p<0.001) and intentional trials (t11=-2.24, p=0.046). 
Therefore, although the effect was more pronounced in instructed trials, intentional 
trials also presented a swap RT cost, suggesting true commitment to decisions in 
intentional trials.  
 
Effects of task-irrelevant stimuli 
The main hypothesis in this study was that intentional trials are more susceptible to 
the effect of task-irrelevant stimuli than instructed trials. If this is true, then RTs 
differences between task-irrelevant and task-relevant S2 cues should have been 
smaller for intentional trials as compared to instructed trials. Mean RTs for each 
conditions are shown in figure 5.4 The ANOVA on the mean RTs revealed a 
significant main effect of relevance (F1,11=5.85, p=0.034), indicating that task-
relevant stimuli demanded more cognitive processing. Importantly, however, the 
relevance of the S2 cue did not interact with the source of decision (F1,11=0.14, 
p=0.712). Also, there was a main effect of outcome (F1,11=21.48, p<0.001), 
suggesting that the processing of the swap cue itself led to increased RTs. However, 
there was no significant relevance x outcome interaction (F1,11=3.16, p=0.103) and 
no significant three-way interaction (F1,11=0.11, p=0.748).  The absence of a 
significant interaction effect between outcome and other factors indicated that this 
RT increase was not exclusive to the actual need for action plan switching. Instead, 
increased RTs following swap cues may reflect increased perceptual processing of 
the stimulus, or perhaps automatic transient stopping of prepared action plans 
(Verbruggen & Logan, 2008b).  
In sum, behavioural results suggest that participants were successfully preparing an 
action following S1, in both cases of intentional and instructed trials. As it was 
reported by Fleming et al. (2009), there was no direct behavioural evidence to 
suggest that intentional trials were more susceptible to task-irrelevant stimuli than 
instructed trials.  
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Figure 5.4 Mean RTs for A task-relevant and B task-irrelevant S2 trials. There was a 
significant swap RT cost, present in both instructed and intentional trials. Error bars show 
standard error.  
 
 
EEG results  
As an initial approach to identifying the timing of the ERPs, trials were time locked 
to S1 and examined in their full length. Figure 5.5 shows the grand average ERP for 
all conditions collapsed, measured from electrode Pz. The grand average trace shows 
two clear P300 components, peaking at around 350-400 ms after stimulus onset. 
Topographical distributions of ERPs were consequently obtained at 400 ms after S1 
and S2 onset, respectively. The P300 components have a clear topographical 
distribution centred on electrode Pz. Thus, all subsequent analyses were done on the 
EEG signal recorded from Pz.  
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Figure 5.5 A Grand average ERP in electrode Pz for all 8 S-S2 conditions together, time-
locked to S1. Vertical dotted lines indicate the time of onset of S1 (0 ms) and S2 (950 ms) 
respectively. Insets show an example S1 and S2. B Topographical plots at 400 ms after 
visual signal onset (neural response to S1: 400 ms; neural response to S2: 1350 ms). The 
scalp distributions show that both P300 potentials were clearly centred on Pz.  
  
Neural response to S1 
At the time of S1, trials could only be classified as either instructed or intentional, as 
S2 information had not yet been provided. After blink rejection, an average (± SD) 
of 200 ± 44 trials remained in the instructed conditions, and 215 ± 42 trials remained 
in the intentional conditions. There were significant differences between the numbers 
of trials for instructed and intentional conditions (t11=-3.37, p=0.006). Differences in 
trial numbers may lead to differences in estimated ERP amplitudes (Luck, 2005). 
However, increased numbers of trials will typically lead to increased ERP 
amplitudes. Here, although more trials were classified as intentional, this condition 
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showed smaller ERP amplitudes (see below). Therefore the differences in trial 
numbers would have decreased any potential significant differences the ERP 
amplitude between conditions and cannot directly account for these results.  
The mean S1 P300 amplitudes were compared between instructed and intentional 
conditions (see figure 5.6). On the basis of the grand average of all conditions, the 
mean S1 P300 amplitudes were measured in the time window between 300 and 500 
ms after S1 onset, in electrode Pz. S1 P300 amplitudes were significantly larger for 
instructed conditions as compared to instructed conditions (t11=3.24, p=0.008). 
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Figure 5.6 A. Neural response to S1.At the time of S1 trials can only be classified as 
instructed (<< or >>) or intentional (<>). B. ERPs time locked to S1. C. Topographical 
distribution of the S1 P300 in the time window between 300 and 500 ms after S1 onset. 
P300 potentials are clearly centred around Pz  
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These results agree with those reported by Fleming et al (Fleming et al., 2009), 
where instructed trials also elicited a stronger P300 amplitude, albeit the maximal 
difference was slightly later in their original report, at 520-540 ms. 
 
Neural response to S2 
The EEG signal was time locked at S2 onset, and trials with blink artefacts were 
removed. Because 8 conditions could be defined, there were less trials per condition 
in S2 than in the case of time locking to S1. The data from one additional participant 
had to be discarded because there were less than 10 trials in some conditions, 
yielding a total of 11 participants for the ERP analyses at the time of S2. After blink 
rejection, the mean (± SD) numbers of trials per condition were as indicated in table 
5.1 
 
Table 5.1 Mean numbers of trials (± SD) in each condition, for ERPs time locked to S2 
Condition Number of trials 
Instructed task-relevant swap 49 ± 18 
Instructed task-relevant stay 51 ± 7 
Instructed task-irrelevant swap 50 ± 6 
Instructed task-irrelevant stay 55 ± 8 
Intentional task-relevant swap 54 ± 5 
Intentional task-relevant stay 56 ± 7 
Intentional task-irrelevant swap 55 ± 7 
Intentional task-irrelevant stay 53 ± 4 
 
A three-way ANOVA with the factors of source, condition and outcome was 
performed on the mean numbers of trials per condition. There was a small but 
significant main effect of source (F1,11=6.49, p=0.029). No other significant 
differences were found between the numbers of trials for each condition. The 
intentional conditions included more trials than the instructed conditions. 
Importantly however, as in the case of S1, the S2 P300 amplitudes were larger for 
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instructed trials than for intentional trials (see below). Therefore, differences in trials 
numbers between instructed and intentional conditions cannot directly account for 
the pattern of ERP results obtained.  
S2 was a more complex stimulus than S1, as it contained both semantic information 
(stay/swap instructions) and non-semantic information (uppercase/lowercase, 
indicating the relevance of S2). This may explain the latency and profile differences 
between S1 and S2 P300s. On the basis of the grand average, the time window of 
300-600 ms was considered for the analysis of the S2 P300 amplitude. 
First, to evaluate whether the result reported by Fleming et al was replicated here, 
only task-relevant S2 conditions were analyzed. These conditions were effectively 
identical to the original experimental design in Fleming et al (2009). Mean P300 
amplitudes were compared between swap and stay task-relevant trials for conditions 
corresponding to either source of decision. A priori t-tests revealed a significant 
difference between swap and stay trials in the instructed conditions (t10=	   2.49, 
p=0.032). Conversely, P300 amplitudes for swap and stay trials in the intentional 
conditions did not differ significantly (t10= 1.03, p=0.335). These results are 
therefore in line with what was reported by Fleming et al (2009).  
The main experimental question of whether instructed and intentional conditions 
differ in terms of their relative processing of task-irrelevant stimuli was addressed 
next. The EEG signal was time-locked at the time of S2 onset and the amplitude of 
the S2 P300 was measured for each condition. 8 different conditions were 
considered, resulting from the three-way factorial design. The ERP traces time 
locked to S2 for each condition are shown in figure 5.7, and the topographical scalp 
distributions are shown in figure 5.8. 
A three-way ANOVA on the mean window amplitudes revealed a main effect of 
source (F1,10=31.34, p<0.001), which agrees with what had been reported by Fleming 
et al. There was no main effect of relevance (F1,10=1.80, p=0.209) and no main effect 
of outcome (F1,10=1.12, p=0.314).  These results contrast with those obtained from 
the behavioural data (see above). An analysis of the RTs for the S1-S2 conditions 
had revealed significant main effects of both outcome and relevance. These results, 
and in particular the main effect of outcome, had been taken to suggest that there was 
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some automatic processing of the swap stimuli, both in the instructed and intentional 
conditions. These results, however, were not reflected in the P300 amplitudes.  
There was no significant source x outcome interaction (F1,10=1.98, p=0.190), but a 
significant relevance x outcome interaction (F1,10=5.57, p=0.040). There was no 
significant three-way interaction (F1,10=0.22, p=0.647). 
There was a significant source x relevance interaction (F1,10=5.53, p=0.041). This 
interaction was further explored by collapsing across the two possible outcomes. 
Post hoc t-tests revealed that whereas there was a trend for significant differences 
between the instructed conditions (t10=1.92, p=0.083), the intentional conditions 
were far from reaching significance levels (t10=0.58; p=0.573). 
 
Table 5.2 offers the results of the 2x2x2 ANOVAs performed on either the mean 
RTs or the mean P300 window amplitudes. Behavioural and EEG analyses revealed 
strikingly different results, suggesting that they reflect different underlying 
processes.  
 
Table 5.2 Results of the 2x2x2 ANOVA on the behavioural and electrophysiological data 
time locked at S2.  
 RT P300 mean amplitude 
Effect F1,11 p F1,11 p 
Source 0.341 0.571 31.34 <0.001* 
Relevance 5.85 0.034* 3.80 0.209 
Outcome 21.48 <0.001* 1.12 0.314 
Source x relevance 0.143 0.712 5.53 0.041* 
Relevance x outcome 6.04 0.032* 1.98 0.190 
Source x outcome 3.16 0.103 5.57 0.040* 
Source x relevance x outcome 0.11 0.748 0.22 0.647 
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Figure 5.7 A. Neural responses to S2. B. ERPs to each of the 8 S1-S2 conditions. C. Mean 
ERP amplitudes were obtained from a time window between 300 and 600 ms after S2 onset 
from electrode Pz. 
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Figure 5.8 Topographical distribution of the neural response to S2, in a time window of 300 
to 600 ms after S2 onset. As in the the case of S1 P300, S2 ERPs were centred around Pz.  
 
Evidence for motor preparation following S1 
The analysis of RT data suggests that participants were indeed preparing a 
directional motor response, in both intentional and instructed trials. To seek for 
neurophysiological evidence for response switching following S2 switch cues, the 
motor-related amplitude asymmetry (MRAA) was computed (see methods section). 
Although there was an expected small decrease in µ-band power around the time of 
S2 cue, this decrease was comparable for contra- and ipsilateral electrodes. MRAA 
calculations provided no strong evidence for lateralization of action preparation or 
switching of action plans following task-relevant S2 swap cues (see figure 5.9).  
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Figure 5.9 No evidence for switching of action plans following S2 cues. Relative µ-band 
power showed a slight decrease around the time of action. There was no inversion of the 
polarity of the differences between contra- and ipsilateral C electrodes following an S2 swap 
cue, as expected if participants switched action plans.    
 
Controlling for incorrect intentional trials 
In this paradigm, the intentional decision following S1 was covert, and was 
expressed only through the response following S2. Thus, potential incorrect swap or 
stay intentional trials could not be detected. Because incorrect trials were rejected 
from the instructed conditions but not from the intentional conditions, the analyses 
reported above introduced an asymmetry in the analysis of instructed and intentional 
conditions. To account for this potential confound, the same ERP analysis was done 
for S2, without rejecting the incorrect instructed trials. An analysis of S2 ERP 
amplitudes revealed virtually identical results as the ones reported above.  
As in the previous analysis that did not include the ~8% incorrect instructed trials, 
the ANOVA of the mean ERP amplitudes following S2 revealed a main effect of 
source (F1,11=31.06, p=0.002), no main effect of relevance (F1,11=2.92, p=0.115) and 
no main effect of outcome (F1,11=1.46, p=0.251). The two- and three-way 
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interactions also showed the same effects as in the previous analysis. There was a 
significant source x relevance interaction (F1,11=6.72, p=0.025), no significant source 
x outcome interaction (F1,11=3.46, p=0.090), a significant relevance x outcome 
interaction (F1,11=6.58, p=0.026), and no significant three-way interaction 
(F1,11<0.001, p>0.999). Therefore, including incorrect trials in the analysis of 
instructed trials did not change the results qualitatively.  
 
 
5. 4      Discussion 
Results described in previous chapters of this thesis suggest that intentional decisions 
have weaker neural representations than their instructed equivalents, especially 
during periods of action preparation. One previous experiment had suggested that 
intentional action plans are more flexible than instructed action plans (Fleming et al., 
2009). The study presented here aimed at further probing the period of action 
preparation by extending that result. It addressed the relative susceptibility of 
instructed and intentional action plans to external task-irrelevant stimuli. The relative 
processing of task-irrelevant stimuli was measured for situations of action 
preparation of both instructed and intentional decisions. Results revealed that when 
instructed action preparation is underway, the differences in the processing of task-
relevant and task-irrelevant stimuli is stronger than that in situations in which 
intentional action preparation is underway. These results are consistent with a 
scenario in which the distinction between task-relevant and task-irrelevant stimuli 
was efficiently made when instructed actions plans were underway, but not as 
efficiently when intentional actions are prepared.  
 
Neural responses to S1 
First, the amplitude of the P300 elicited by S1 was compared across conditions. S1 
only specified the source of action (instructed/intentional), so only these two 
conditions could be compared at the time of S1. In agreement with what had been 
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reported before, instructed S1 stimuli elicited stronger P300 amplitudes than 
intentional S1 stimuli (Fleming et al., 2009; Waszak et al., 2005).  
As Fleming et al (2009) have argued, at least two possible explanations can account 
for this result. First, differences in S1 P300 amplitude may be simply related to 
differences in S1 cue frequency. To balance the number of intentional and instructed 
trials, the experimental design necessarily included twice as many instances of the 
intentional S1 cue (<>) than those with either of the instructed S1 cues (<< or >>). 
P300 amplitude increases with increased stimulus novelty, reflecting adaptation of 
the neural response (Goldstein, Spencer, & Donchin, 2002; He, Lian, Spencer, Dien, 
& Donchin, 2001). Therefore, less exposure to either one of the instructed S1 cues 
could have led to an increased S1-P300. However, novelty effects on P300 
amplitudes are normally observed in “oddball” paradigms, where frequency ratios of 
frequent and oddball stimuli are typically around 9:1, much larger than the 2:1 ratio 
of the paradigm used here. An alternative explanation, favoured by Fleming et al is 
that the observed amplitude differences are indeed related to differences between 
instructed and intentional choice processes.  
As an additional alternative explanation, increased P300 amplitudes may reflect 
more bits of information extracted from the S1 cue, as it has been suggested to be the 
case for other visual stimuli (Duncan-Johnson & Donchin, 1982; Gratton et al., 
1990). Because instructed S1 cues specify the correct key press direction, they 
convey more information than intentional S1 cues, which leave the direction 
dimension underspecified. More information conveyed by a cue may translate into 
larger ERP amplitudes, as a result of more neural processing.  
 
Neural responses to S2 
The amplitude of the ERPs elicited by S2 was compared across conditions. Here, all 
8 S1-S2 conditions could be resolved. Three factors were manipulated 
independently. The S1 cue determined the source of decision (instructed/intentional), 
and the S2 cue manipulated both the relevance of the S2 cue (task-relevant/task-
irrelevant) and the action outcome (stay/swap).  
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In a design involving only task-relevant S2 cues, Fleming et al had reported an 
interaction effect between source of decision and S2 instruction outcome, with 
greatest S2-P300 amplitudes in instructed-swap trials, and no differences between 
the stay and swap trials in the intentional conditions. Here, these findings were 
replicated, as revealed by a priori testing. The authors interpreted these results as 
increased neural effort required for the restructuring of instructed action plans as 
compared with intentional action plans.  
In the present study, the main hypothesis was that intentional decisions would show 
increased processing of task-irrelevant stimuli as compared to instructed decisions. 
In order to test this hypothesis, the S2 P300 amplitudes were compared across the 8 
conditions. The critical finding was that the S2 P300 amplitude showed a statistically 
significant interaction between the factors of relevance and source of decision. The 
differences between the task-relevant and task-irrelevant stimuli in the instructed 
condition were stronger than in the intentional conditions. This suggests that in the 
intentional conditions, the distinction between task-relevant and task-irrelevant 
stimuli was made less efficiently than in instructed conditions.  
These results remained significant even after controlling for a potential confound due 
to unidentified incorrect intentional trials.  
 
Processes affecting P300 amplitude  
The amplitude of the P300 component, measured here, has been related to several 
different cognitive processes. Under one influential view, P300 amplitude relates to 
“context updating” (Donchin & Coles, 1988). Within this framework, P300 
amplitudes correlate with the amount of neural “effort” necessary to update action 
plans. Larger P300 amplitudes may be indirect measures of the distance between the 
two neural representations of action plans, because more neural activity is required 
to change from one to the other.  
An additional alternative account should be considered here. As it was argued in the 
case of S1, differences in S2 P300 amplitude could be related to the amount of 
information extracted from a stimulus (Duncan-Johnson & Donchin, 1982; Gratton 
et al., 1990). In this task, the processing of S2 could be done at two different levels. 
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First, S2 stimuli had to be identified as task-relevant or task-irrelevant, on the basis 
of their surface form (i.e., the letter case). Also, only for those trials with task-
relevant stimuli, the semantic content of S2 had to be evaluated to interpret the S2 
instruction and produce the adequate behaviour. The results presented here are also 
consistent with this account. Importantly however, to the extent that there was true 
action preparation in the intentional conditions (as the behavioural data suggests) 
intentional and instructed conditions should not have differed in terms of the amount 
of information extracted from the S2 cue. Therefore, the information extraction 
account alone cannot easily explain the results reported here.  
In this experiment, reaction times and P300 amplitudes showed strikingly different 
sensitivities, suggesting that they reflect different processes. In go/nogo tasks, N2/P3 
complexes have been typically related to response inhibition (see introduction, 
section 1.3.5). However, the two subcomponents are thought to serve different 
functions. The N2 component amplitude is related to nogo signal monitoring (or, 
more generally, conflict monitoring) monitoring. The P3 component amplitude, on 
the other hand, has been related to actual response inhibition (see section 1.3.5, 
Bekker, Kenemans, Hoeksma, Talsma, & Verbaten, 2005; Dimoska, Johnstone, & 
Barry, 2006; Smith, Johnstone, & Barry, 2008). Speculatively, then, one possible 
interpretation of the discrepancies between the RT and ERP data might suggest that 
RT modulations in task-irrelevant swap trials are due to automatic conflict 
monitoring. These increased RTs would therefore correlate with N2 amplitudes, but 
not with the P300 amplitudes, measured here. 
 
 
Evidence for moment preparation and switching of action plans 
In the intentional conditions, participants could freely choose which hand they would 
use to execute their response. The choice following S1 was intentional, and it was 
not revealed to the experimenter apart from through the behavioural outcome. 
Therefore incorrect trials could not be identified. Thus it is in principle possible that 
participants were not preparing action in intentional trials, and simply pressed any 
key they wished following S2. Under this account, P300 amplitude may not have 
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differed between task-relevant and task-irrelevant stimuli because after an intentional 
S1 participants could have simply ignored all subsequent visual cues, effectively 
eliminating any differences between the S2 conditions.  
Perhaps the most convincing evidence against this possibility would come from 
neurophysiological measures of lateralized action preparation and switching 
behaviour following S2 swap cues. Here, the typical measure of lateralization of 
response preparation, namely the LRP, could not be calculated. The processing of 
the visual cue S2 occurred at variable times relative to the time of key press, 
confounding the LRP amplitude with the processing of the S2 cues. Instead, MRAA 
was calculated as a measure of lateralization (de Jong, Gladwin, & Hart, 2006; 
Gladwin et al., 2006). This measure provided no evidence for lateralized action 
preparation in either instructed or intentional conditions. Thus, on the basis of the 
neurophysiological data alone, no conclusions can be drawn about the nature of 
action preparation or successful changing of action plans.  
Still, three pieces of behavioural evidence suggest that action preparation did indeed 
follow the S1 cue in the intentional conditions. First, as in the case of Fleming et al, 
this experiment included “short” trials to encourage action preparation. In these trials 
participants had to execute their prepared action. Mean RTs in short trials served as 
an indirect measure of action preparation following S1 in S1-S2 trials. Results 
revealed significant differences between baseline trials (where no directional action 
preparation could have occurred) and short trials (where action preparation was 
encouraged). This was also (and especially) the case for intentional trials, suggesting 
that participants were not simply ignoring the S1 cues in the intentional conditions.  
Further, behavioural evidence also suggests that participants did indeed follow the 
S2 stay/swap instructions. When RTs were compared across all 8 conditions, a 
significant effect of outcome emerged, and although the factor of outcome 
(stay/swap) did interact with relevance (instructed/intentional), follow up 
comparisons revealed that swap trials showed significantly longer RTs than stay 
trials in both instructed and intentional trials. It must be noted however that although 
task-relevant trials were in general associated with longer RTs, there was no 
evidence for a significant interaction effect between the factors of relevance and 
outcome. Intriguingly, this suggests that the RTs were as least in part modulated by 
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the processing of the S2 swap cues in general, regardless of the actual need to switch 
action plans.  
Importantly, the amplitudes of the P300 elicited by S2 presented a somewhat 
different pattern of results. In the case of S2 P300, there was a significant main effect 
of outcome that did not interact with the S2 cue relevance. These opposing patterns 
of results for RTs and S2 P300 amplitudes suggest that the two measures reflect two 
different processes. Increased RTs may reflect increased or deeper cognitive 
processing of a stimulus whereas the S2 P300 may reflect neural effort required for a 
switch in action plans, as Fleming et al had originally suggested.   
 
 
Limitations of this study 
The most conspicuous limitation of this experimental design is that its factorial 
nature depended heavily on the participants’ behaviour. Instructed S1 cues 
unambiguously signalled which action (right- or left-hand key press) participants had 
to prepare. However, in the intentional conditions the decision about which action to 
select was left to the participants’ choice. Thus, it could not be evaluated solely by 
behavioural measures whether participants were in fact following the instructions 
indicated by the S2 cue.  
A further limitation is related to the choice of word S2 stimuli, and the assignment of 
upper-and lower-case stimuli to the instructed and intentional conditions. The 
purpose of the S2 cues was twofold. S2 were designed to be easy to identify, based 
on their surface form and not their semantic content, and at the same time difficult to 
ignore, due to automatic semantic processing. However, it is possible that implicit 
associations between e.g. uppercase and task-relevant conditions occurred, 
introducing potential confounds in the data. Because these conditions were 
counterbalanced between and within each experimental session, any potential 
systematic differences would have been counterbalanced but would have also 
decreased any potential differences between conditions.  
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Implications of this study 
Automatic processing of external signals has been studied in fields such as 
advertisement research. For example, Treleaven-Hassard et al (Treleaven-Hassard et 
al., 2010) have recently measured P3a latency as a means to measure the effect of 
different advertising techniques on the automatic processing of the advertised 
brands. The authors measured the neural response to visual stimuli to reveal 
differences in the underlying mental states (like/dislike of a product). If it is true that 
intentional decisions are weaker in suppressing the influence of irrelevant stimuli, an 
interesting corollary of this study may be that freely-chosen alternatives are 
potentially relatively easy to influence, and highly susceptible to external suggestion.  
 
5. 5      Conclusion 
The examination of the period of action preparation is crucial in testing the 
hypothesis that instructed and intentional decisions differ in their relative strengths. 
One possible approach to measuring the strength of action preparation is to do it 
indirectly, measuring in turn the relative processing of task-irrelevant stimuli in 
periods of action preparation. The results presented here provide evidence 
compatible with the notion that intentional decisions lead to less efficient 
suppression of task-irrelevant stimuli as compared to instructed decisions, lending 
support to the hypothesis that intentional decisions have weaker neural codes than 
instructed decisions.  
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Chapter 6       Resistance of the internal representation of 
response alternatives 
 
“There may be outward impediments even whilst 
deliberating, as a man deliberates whether he shall 
play at tennis, and at the same time the door of the 
tennis court is fast locked against him. And after a man 
has ceased to deliberate, there may be no outward 
impediments, as when a man resolves not to play at 
tennis because he finds himself ill-disposed, or because 
he will not hazard his money. So the same person, at 
the same time, should be free and not free, not free and 
free” (Bramhall, 1655) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Accounts of intentional action often refer to unchosen response alternatives: “could 
have done otherwise”. Chapter 6 focussed on the internal representation of these 
response alternatives for intentional action. Classically, reaction times increase with 
the number of alternatives.  In this behavioural experiment, when possible responses 
were removed from the stimulus set, reaction times correlated better with the 
original number of possible responses than with the updated number of responses 
after removal.  Internal representations of response alternatives lag behind actual 
alternatives. Effectively unavailable alternatives may still be “internally” 
contemplated. “Could have done otherwise” may be linked to a perseverative 
tendency to maintain in working memory choices, which we are in fact no longer 
free to make. 
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6. 1      Introduction 
Intentional choices may not be deterred by instructed inhibition  
When a person chooses between alternative actions, what determines how widely her 
choices range?  What is the domain over which action selection mechanisms select?  
How is this domain dynamically updated, as new action options appear and 
disappear?  A common example may illustrate this question. After browsing the 
menu, a customer in a busy restaurant asks for the dish of the day, only to be later 
informed that her choice is no longer available. The disappointed customer may then 
have to re-choose from a now reduced set of available dinner alternatives. Further, 
the costumer’s potential disappointment might not have occurred if the chosen dish 
had never been included in the menu. Arguably, the reason why the late external 
restriction on the menu led to disappointment and the early restriction did not is the 
contemplation of the possibility. In the former case, the “dish of the day” response 
alternative had been internally represented in the costumer’s brain. Conversely, in 
the latter case, this option had never been represented, and it therefore does not carry 
any affective value. This everyday example illustrates two processes of interest in 
the scope of this thesis. These are, on the one hand, the internal representation of 
intentional response alternatives, and on the other hand, the interaction between 
intentional selection and instructed (external) restrictions on the intentional space of 
response alternatives. 
 
Intentional decisions rely on internal representations of available alternatives  
Chapters 2 and 3 in this thesis suggested that the neural representations of the 
alternative and unselected outcomes may remain partially activated even after an 
intentional decision for a particular course of action has been made. This may not 
happen to the same extent for instructed decisions, where the external environment 
clearly precludes the alternative course of action, leading to a more robust inhibition 
of any neural representations of “incorrect” response alternatives. In light of this 
interpretation, the study of the internal representations of response alternatives in 
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cases of intentional actions becomes a matter of critical interest in the scope of this 
thesis.  
To further examine this question, this study evaluated the persistence of the internal 
representation of response alternatives in cases of intentional action. The interaction 
between the intentional selection of action and late instructed restrictions on the 
available set of alternatives was investigated. In particular, this study asked whether 
the internal representations of response alternatives could flexibly follow external 
changes in the environment that restrict the effectively available alternatives. 
 
Behavioural manifestations of response set size 
The sizes of the sets of available response alternatives can be evaluated through their 
behavioural effects. Hick (Hick, 1952) examined the relationship between 
participants’ reaction times (RTs) to press a button and the number of potential 
response alternatives. He tested participants in an apparatus that could automatically 
turn on one out of 10 possible lights. He asked participants to press a key if they saw 
the corresponding light turn on. Critically, in each experimental block, the number of 
possible response keys varied. Participants were instructed to rest their fingers on a 
given subset of the maximum ten possible keys. In that way, the sizes of the response 
set varied across blocks, from 1 to 10. The number of potential response alternatives 
constitutes the response set size. Hick reported a monotonically increasing 
relationship of RT with the response set size, which could be optimally fit by a 
binary logarithmic function, now widely known as Hick’s law.  
Hick’s law was drawn from measurements of instructed action RTs. Intentional 
action RTs have also been found to increase with increasing response set sizes, 
although a strict logarithmic relationship has not been tested (e.g., Kühn, Gevers, & 
Brass, 2009; Lau, Rogers, Ramnani, & Passingham, 2004; van Eimeren et al., 2006; 
Zhang, Hughes, & Rowe, 2012).  
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Internal vs. external response sets 
In his experiments, Hick explicitly informed his participants of the external set of 
available responses, so that they knew how many possible responses there were. 
However, and importantly, this external response set cannot influence behaviour per 
se, but only through its internal representation. Therefore, a crucial distinction must 
be made, between external and internal response sets. The former refers to the 
response alternatives that are effectively available in the external environment. The 
latter refers to the internal representations of these response alternatives.  
Hick could safely assume that the internal response set matched the external 
response set in his experiments. Importantly however, the external and internal 
response sets are not necessarily equivalent. For example, a person may internally 
consider response alternatives that are in fact unavailable in the external 
environment. Such would be the case of a completely delusional misalignment 
between the internal and external response sets, in a person considering unrealistic 
action alternatives. A second, more realistic example would be the everyday scenario 
described in the introduction of this chapter. In that case, the internal representation 
of the possible alternatives initially contained one more item (the “dish of the day”) 
than the external response set. Alternatively, internal representations may represent a 
restricted subset of the externally available alternatives, in cases of vast external 
response sets. For instance, in a word completion task (e.g., Jacoby, Toth, & 
Yonelinas, 1993), an efficient strategy may be to select a response from a restricted 
set of words, instead of searching the full lexicon.  
 
Do internal response sets follow changes in external response sets? 
This study aimed at probing the relationship between the external and internal 
response sets. In particular do internal response sets closely follow sudden changes 
in the external response set, or are they instead resistant to change? An experimental 
task was designed based on the restaurant scenario described above. Participants 
were asked to intentionally select a response from an initially available set of 
responses. Once an intentional decision had been made, but before the response was 
executed, the external response set was suddenly reduced. In this way the new and 
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updated external response set did no longer include the initially selected response. 
Using RTs as a proxy for the internal response set size, it could be addressed whether 
the internal response set had been rapidly updated to match the new external 
response set, or whether the internal response set lagged behind the external changes 
(see figure 6.1). Two scenarios are possible. In the first place, the internal 
representation of the response alternatives may represent a perfect and instant match 
with the external response set. The internal response set may show virtually no delay 
between the external change and the internal updating. Alternatively, the internal 
representation of the response alternatives may present some sluggishness in 
updating. Some delay may be observed between the time of changes in the external 
environment and the updating of the internal response set.  
The hypothesis was as follows. If initially selected response alternatives were 
effectively removed from the internal response set once they become unavailable, 
RTs will increase as a function of the final response set size (and not the initial 
response set size). Conversely, if the neural representation of the selected response 
alternative is maintained in the internal response set despite it no longer being 
available in the external response set, then RTs would increase as a function of the 
initial response set size.  
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Figure 6.1 Rationale and hypothesis of the study. An initial external response set was 
presented, containing the response alternatives A1, A2 and A3. Participants were asked to 
intentionally select and hold a response from this initial response set. In the initial 
conditions, the internal response set would reflect the external response set. After a sudden 
change in the external environment, the internal and external response sets would not 
necessarily match. Two scenarios were possible. The internal response set may be flexible 
(A), and can update its contents to respond rapidly to external changes. Alternatively (B), the 
internal response set may be resilient to change, and the internal response set may lag behind 
changes in the external environment. The external response set was directly manipulated; 
whilst the internal response set was measured through its behavioural manifestations (see 
text for details). As expected by Hick’s law, the observed RTs would correspond to the size 
of either the initial (n=3) or the final (n=2) response sets (where n is number of alternative 
actions in the response set).   
 
  
6. 2      Methods 
Participants 
Eighteen naïve participants (11 female, mean age ± SD; 24 ± 5 years) took part in 
the study. All participants had normal or corrected to normal vision. Procedures were 
approved by the UCL research ethics committee and were in accordance with the 
principles of the Declaration of Helsinki. 
Chapter	  6	  	  	  	  	  Resistance	  of	  internal	  representations	  of	  response	  sets	  	  
191	  	  
Task 
Stimuli were displayed on a CRT monitor with a refresh rate of 60 Hz. Participants 
sat 60 cm away from the screen. The experiment consisted of 6 blocks of 100 trials 
and lasted for approximately 50 minutes. Each trial belonged to one of four 
experimental conditions partly determined by the participant’s behaviour (see 
below), no change (34% of the total number of trials), instructed selection (20%), 
and original selection and reselection (together, 46%).  
At the start of each trial, one to four different numbers were displayed on the screen, 
arranged around a central fixation cross with 2º eccentricity (see figure 6.2). All 
stimuli were displayed over a black background. This set of numbers was the initial 
response set. Numbers in the initial response set were randomly sampled without 
repetition from the numbers 1 to 9 excluding the number 5 (see instructed condition 
below). The numbers in the initial response set were displayed in white for either a 
short or a long stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA). Short SOAs were periods of 350 
ms with a random jitter of a maximum of ± 200 ms. Long SOAs were periods of 
1500 ms with random jitters of a maximum of ± 200 ms. Participants were asked to 
covertly select one of the numbers in the initial response set during the SOA, and to 
prepare to move a cursor and click on the number using a large trackball mouse 
(Keytools Ltd, Southampton, UK). During short SOAs participants had relatively 
less time to select a number from the initial response set than in the long SOAs. 
Short and long SOAs were randomly assigned to experimental trials.  
After the SOA, the fixation cross changed colour, from white to red. This was the go 
signal that indicated to participants that they could start moving the cursor to reach 
their selected target number. Crucially, simultaneously with the go signal a subset of 
the numbers in the initial response set disappeared. The remaining numbers changed 
colour and turned to green. The number of disappearing numbers ranged from none 
of them to all of the numbers in the initial response set but one (0 to n-1, where n is 
the initial response set size). Consequently, the number of numbers remaining (the 
final response set) ranged from one to the full initial response set (1 to n). The 
positions and identity of the disappearing numbers were fully randomized.  
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After the go signal, participants could move the cursor to click on the selected 
number. If the number they had originally selected from the initial response set 
during the SOA period was still available in the final response set, they could select 
it. However, if the originally chosen number was no longer present in the final 
response set, participants were asked to inhibit their planned response and reselect a 
different number, from the smaller final response set of available alternatives. 
After clicking on the number of choice, participants were asked to report which 
number they had originally chosen, regardless of which number they had clicked on. 
In this way, trials in which reselection had occurred could be identified on the basis 
of subjective report. If the reported original choice did not match the clicked number, 
and if the original choice had disappeared, it could be assumed that reselection had 
occurred. Otherwise, trials were assumed to be simple selection. The use of numbers 
as targets sought to minimize the working memory load on both target selection and 
recall, minimizing in turn the problems and potential biases associated with 
subjective report. At debriefing, no participant reported difficulties in the report of 
their original choice.  
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Figure 6.2 Experimental task. A. The initial response set of numbers was presented for 
either a short (350 ± 200 ms) or a long (1500 ± 200 ms) SOA. Participants covertly selected 
a number during the SOA. A change of fixation colour indicated the go signal. Participants 
could then move a cursor to click on a number of their choice. At the same time as the go 
signal onset a subset of the presented numbers could disappear, leaving a final response set 
with a size between 1 and the original response set size. Participants could click on their 
originally chosen number if it remained in the final response set. Instead, they would have to 
reselect a number other than their first choice if it had disappeared from the final response 
set. Participants then reported their original number choice.  
 
To evaluate the effects of instructed inhibition on the intentional selection from the 
initially available alternatives, it was crucial that participants did indeed select from 
the initial response set, rather than simply wait for the appearance of the final 
response set. Two strategies were used to ensure that participants attended to the 
initial response set. First, instructed trials were included, which were any trials 
including a “5” as one of the numbers in the initial response set. In this case, 
participants were asked to select the number “5” upon seeing the go signal. No 
numbers were removed from the initial response set in instructed trials, because 
removing the instructed target in some trials could have decreased the general 
validity of the instruction. Second, to prevent participants from simply waiting for 
the final response set, a no change condition was included, in which no numbers 
were removed from the initial response set. Because quick reactions were rewarded, 
the experimental design discouraged the potential strategy of ignoring the initial 
response set completely and waiting for the final response set instead.  
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Further, to encourage action preparation following the initial response set, and 
therefore the need for inhibition of the prepared response, quick movement times 
(measured as time to click on the target) were monetarily rewarded. Participants 
were informed that they would get 0.5 pennies extra for every trial that was quicker 
than their own average in the preceding block. Participants earned on average (± SD) 
£ 2.23 ± 0.03.  
 
The large trackball mouse was preferred over a keyboard or a normal mouse for two 
reasons. First, using a keyboard would have required different effector fingers for 
each response alternative, possibly introducing systematic RT patterns related to 
finger dexterity. Positioning the targets on the screen and asking for cursor 
movements minimized this potential confound. Second, piloting showed that regular 
mouse or joystick movements were too rapid and familiar to participants. The use of 
an unfamiliar cursor that required larger movements amplified differences in RTs 
between conditions.  
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Figure 6.3 Examples of all four experimental conditions. A. Conditions with equal initial 
and final response set sizes. If a number “5” was present in the initial response set, 
participants were instructed to click on it (instructed condition). In the no change condition, 
the number choice was intentional. B. Conditions with non-matching initial and final 
response set sizes. In the original selection and reselection conditions, some numbers 
disappeared from the initial response set. A trial belonged to the original selection or the 
reselection conditions, depending on whether the original intentional choice remained in the 
final response set, or had been removed from it. A trial was sorted as original selection if 
participants reported that their original choice matched their final choice. Instead, a trial was 
reselection if participants reported having chosen a number that had become unavailable, 
indicating that they had reselected a number before clicking on their final choice. ni and nf 
indicate the initial and final response set sizes, respectively. They were not displayed in the 
experiment. 
 
To discourage participants from adopting a predetermined strategy based on either 
the identity or the spatial location of the targets, both parameters varied randomly 
from trial to trial. Randomly sampled numbers were displayed on the vertices of 
either a square or a diamond, and the position of the targets was fully randomized.  
Importantly, the initial and final response set sizes were not correlated. This implied 
that grouping trials on the basis of their initial response set size was fundamentally 
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different from grouping them on the basis of the final response set size. Figure 6.4 
shows the number of trials per experiment for each combination of initial and final 
response set sizes. Blue and red groupings illustrate the differences in classifying 
trials on the basis of either response set. Instructed trials were selected randomly 
from each combination of initial and final response set sizes. Because no numbers 
were removed from the initial response set in instructed trials, trials with no 
differences between initial and final response set size (i.e., the diagonal in figure 6.4) 
were overrepresented in the experiment.  
 
Figure 6.4 Number of trials for each combination of initial and final response set sizes. The 
initial response set size did not inform of the final response set size. Numbers indicate the 
average number of trials of each combination per participant. Blue and red groupings 
illustrate that the effects of each parameter (initial of final response set size) could be 
estimated independently. As an example, the blue group encloses the trials with an initial 
response set of 3. The red group encloses trials with a final response set size of 2. Because 
the initial and final response set sizes were not correlated, the identity of the trials was 
different, and led to independent datasets.  
 
Before starting the experiment, participants had a short practice session of 40 trials. 
The mean movement time during this practice session was recorded to calculate the 
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number of rewarded trials in the first experimental block. The data from the practice 
session were otherwise not further analyzed.  
 
Data analysis 
RTs were calculated as the time at which the mouse position rate of change was 
nonzero, relative to the onset of the go signal. Because of the screen refresh rate 
(60Hz), RTs were obtained with a relatively low temporal precision, of one sample 
every 16.7 ms. Trials with RTs under 100 ms were rejected, as potentially 
anticipatory. In the same way, trials with RTs longer than 1000 ms were rejected. 
Movement times were calculated as the time taken to click within 20 pixels of the 
number target. 
To calculate the relationship between RT and response set size, linear regressions 
were obtained for the data from each individual participant. The slope parameters of 
the linear fits for each participant were then entered into repeated measures 
ANOVAs where appropriate.  
Hick’s law (Hick, 1952) establishes that mean instructed go RTs increase as the 
binary logarithm of the response set size. Consequently, the typical approach to test 
Hick’s law in a given set of responses is to include conditions with 1, 2, 4 and 8 
possible response alternatives. In contrast to typical experiments testing Hick’s law, 
this study involved the disappearance of some response alternatives from a set of 4 
targets. These targets were spatially arranged. In this arrangement, response set sizes 
larger than 4 were problematic, because they would lead to variations in the 
distances between the disappeared and remaining targets, across different initial 
response set sizes. This reselection distance confound would be minimized in a 
setting with a maximum response set size of 3 (triangular arrangement). As a 
compromise, response set sizes of 1 to 4 possible responses were considered here. In 
this experiment mean RTs were fitted with a linear function, and not with a binary 
logarithm, for several reasons. First, there is no direct evidence that Hick’s law is 
applicable to intentional RTs. Second, even if this were the case, the number of 
different response set sizes considered here (1 to 4) fall on the initial part of the 
binary logarithmic curve, so a linear approximation would be valid. Most 
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importantly, the particular shape of the functional relationship between RT and 
response set size was not the primary interest here. Instead, the main aim was to 
establish whether RTs were affected by either initial or final response set sizes, 
regardless the particular form of the relationship. Therefore the approach adopted 
was to calculate linear fits for the RTs as a function of response set sizes.   
 
6. 3      Results 
In this experiment participants were asked to select a response from an initial 
response set of available alternatives, and hold their response for either a short or a 
long SOA. At the time of the go signal, some of the initially available responses 
could disappear, reducing the effective response set, and yielding a smaller final 
response set. Participants were asked to reselect a response if their original response 
choice had disappeared, but to execute their original selection of it remained in the 
final response set.  
One participant failed to understand the instructions, so their data was excluded from 
the analysis. This yielded a total of 17 participants. Participants made few omission 
errors in instructed trials. There was a mean omission rate of 0.94 ± 0.3 %. After 
rejection of omission trials, an average of 114 ± 2 trials were included in the 
instructed condition, 186 ± 5 trials in the no change condition, 126 ± 17 trials in the 
selected condition and 150 ± 18 trials in the reselected condition. The original 
selection and reselection conditions presented the highest variability in the number 
of trials across participants because the exact number of trials that fell in each 
condition depended on each participant’s behaviour. Based on the total number of 
trials and the combination of initial and final response set sizes, the mean expected 
number of reselection trials was 139, which is comparable to the figure obtained.  
Trials with RTs shorter than 100 ms were rejected, as potentially anticipatory. 
Overall, 26 ± 24 % trials were rejected, across all participants and conditions. 
Differences between the proportions of rejected trials were examined. A two-way 
4x2 repeated-measures ANOVA with the factors of condition and SOA revealed 
significant differences between conditions (F3,48=48.16, p<0.001). The highest 
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proportion of rejected trials due to anticipation was in the instructed condition. There 
were no significant differences between the proportion of rejected trials in the critical 
selected and reselected conditions (F1,16=0.98, p=0.338). Average numbers of trials 
are shown in table 6.1 
 
Table 6.1 Final mean (±SD) number of trials per condition after rejecting incorrect and 
anticipatory trials.  
Condition Instructed Original selection Reselection No change 
SOA Short Long Short Long Short Long Short Long 
Mean 
number 
of trials 
(± SD) 
38 ± 16 38 ± 15 58 ± 22 57 ± 20 48 ± 17 47 ± 17 69 ± 22 69 ± 25 
 
 
Conditions with equivalent initial and final response sets  
In conditions in which no numbers disappeared from the initial response set, initial 
and final response sets were equivalent, so the only factors of interest were condition 
(instructed/no change) and SOA (short/long). The RT averaged across all 
participants for each response set size is shown in figure 6.5. 
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Figure 6.5 Reaction times as a function of response set size for A. short stimulus-onset 
asynchrony (SOA) trials and B. long SOA trials. Error bars show standard error of the mean.  
 
To explore the effect of SOA and reselection, the mean RTs across all response set 
sizes were obtained for each condition (figure 6.4). A 2x2 ANOVA with the factors 
of condition (no change/instructed) and SOA revealed a main effect of condition 
(F1,16=27.02, p<0.001), a main effect of SOA (F1,16=22.26, p<0.001) and a 
significant interaction effect (F1,16=11.01, p=0.004). Follow-up t-tests revealed 
significant difference for the short SOA conditions (t16=-2.14, p=0.048) and a 
strongly significant difference for the long SOA conditions (t16=-8.73, p<0.001) 
 
These results suggest that participants prepared their motor response during the 
SOA, and that they achieved higher levels of action preparation in the long SOA 
periods than in the short SOA.  
The effect of increasing response set size on RTs was further analyzed. As expected, 
RTs in the no change conditions trials increase monotonically with increasing 
response set size. This was true for both short and long SOAs (see figure 6.5). Linear 
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fits were obtained for the data from individual participants, and a two-way repeated 
measures ANOVA with the factors of condition (no change/instructed) and SOA 
(short/long) was performed on the estimated slope parameters. 
Results revealed a main effect of condition (F1,16=14.28, p=0.002) but no main effect 
of SOA (F1,16=0.09, p=0.773) or interaction effect (F1,16=0.14, p=0.709). The main 
effect of condition was expected, because intentional response selection should have 
an RT cost in the no change condition relative to the instructed conditions. In the 
latter condition, the response set size should have no effect on RT beyond the visual 
search time.  
 
Conditions with different initial and final response sets  
In the selected and reselected conditions, one or more numbers were removed from 
the response set. Consequently, the initial and final response set sizes differed. To 
address whether the internal representation of the response set was updated to match 
the new external response set, RTs were calculated as a function of each of the two 
possible response sets. RTs as a function of either the initial and final response set 
sizes are shown in figure 6.6. 
Because the initial and final response set sizes were not correlated (see figure 6.4), 
the relationship between mean RT and the size of the initial response set was 
dramatically different from the relationship between the mean RT and the size of the 
final response set. Trials with an initial response set of 4 could have any of the 
possible final response set sizes of 1, 2, 3 or 4. Similarly, trials with an initial 
response set of 3 could have any of the possible final response set sizes of 1, 2 or 3.  
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Figure 6.6 RTs averaged across all participants, as a function of the response set size for 
each response set (initial/final) and SOA (short/long). Panels A and B show the RTs as a 
function of the initial and final response set sizes, respectively. For long SOA trials, RTs 
increase monotonically with the initial response set size. They do not vary with increasing 
final response set sizes. In both conditions (selected and reselected) at least one number 
target disappeared from the initial response set. Therefore, there were no trials with initial 
response set sizes of 1 (which would have led to final response set sizes of 0) or final 
response set sizes of 4 (which would have required initial response set sizes larger than 4). 
Error bars show standard error 
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The initial and final response set sizes were independent (see figure 6.4). Therefore 
the factor of response set was incorporated into the factorial design. To examine the 
effects of reselection on RTs, the mean RTs were first calculated across all response 
set sizes.  
A 2x2x2 ANOVA on the mean RTs of the selected and reselected condition revealed 
a main effect of response set (F1,16=6.33, p=0.023), a main effect of SOA 
(F1,16=39.24, p<0.001) and a main effect of condition (F1,16=14.06, p=0.002). There 
was also a significant response set x SOA interaction (F1,16=9.54, p=0.007). There 
was no response set x condition interaction (F1,16=2.24, p=0.154), no SOA x 
condition interaction (F1,16=2.27, p=0.15) and no three-way interaction (F1,16=3.16, 
p=0.094). 
The main effect of SOA on the mean RTs suggests that long SOAs allowed for 
stronger motor preparation than shorter SOAs, validating the SOA manipulation. In 
addition, the main effect of condition was presumably due to the RT cost of the 
inhibition of the original action plans and the process of number reselection. 
 
To examine the effects of increasing response set size on RTs, the slopes for the 
individual linear fits of the RTs were analyzed in a repeated measures 2x2x2 
ANOVA with the factors of response set (initial/final), SOA (short/long) and 
condition (selected/reselected). The mean slope estimates for the selected and 
reselected conditions are shown in figure 6.7. 
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Figure 6.7 Mean slope of the linear fit to the RTs as a function of response set size, for 
either initial (panel A) or final response set sizes (panel B). For long SOA trials, RTs 
increase as a function of the initial, but not the final, response set size. Error bars show 
standard error. 
 
Results from the three way ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of response 
set (F1,16=5.12, p=0.038), a significant main effect of SOA (F1,16=6.87, p=0.019) and 
a significant response set x SOA interaction (F1,16=6.551, p=0.021). There was no 
main effect of condition (F1,16=3.043, p=0.1), no significant response set x condition 
effect (F1,16=1.61, p=0.224), no significant SOA x condition effect (F1,16=0.305, 
p=0.588) and no three-way interaction effect (F1,16=1.745, p=0.205). 
The main effect of response set indicates that the initial response set size had a 
stronger impact on RTs than the final response set size. To investigate the response 
set x SOA interaction, the slope estimates were collapsed across conditions. Follow-
up t-tests revealed no differences between initial and final response set sizes in the 
short SOA conditions (t16=0.28, p=0.779), but clearly significant differences between 
the initial and final response set sizes in the long SOA conditions (t16=4.04, 
p<0.001).  
 
 
Chapter	  6	  	  	  	  	  Resistance	  of	  internal	  representations	  of	  response	  sets	  	  
205	  	  
RTs as a function of the binary logarithm of the response set size 
The above results were calculated by estimating linear fits of the RTs as a function 
of the different response set sizes (see Methods). As a control, it was explored 
whether the same results would be valid if the RTs were described as a function of 
the binary logarithm of response set size, as established by Hick’s law (Hick, 1952). 
Because a maximum of 4 response set sizes are not enough to produce reliable 
estimates of the parameters of a logarithmic function, the response set size was 
linearized. The same analysis was done, but considering RTs as a function of the 
binary logarithm of the response set size, rather than as a function of the response set 
size itself. This analysis yielded similar results as the ones reported above.  
A 2x2x2 ANOVA on the slopes of the RTs as a function of the binary logarithm of 
the response set size revealed a main effect of response set (F1,16=9.17, p=0.008), a 
marginally significant effect of SOA (F1,16=4.41, p=0.052), and a marginally 
significant effect of condition (F1,16=4.41, p=0.051). There was a trend for a 
significant response set x condition interaction (F1,16=3.99, p=0.06), no response set 
x SOA interaction (F1,16=1.44, p=0.247) and no SOA x condition effect (F1,16=0.16, 
p=0.693). There was no three-way interaction (F1,16= 0.45, p=0.512). 
Finally, RTs were calculated as the first point in time at which the speed of the 
cursor was nonzero. To ensure that the obtained results were not an artefact of the 
way in which the RTs were defined, the same analysis on the slopes of the linear fits 
was performed in two alternative ways. First, RTs were calculated as the time at 
which the cursor had covered 25% of the total distance in each trial. Second, the 
same analysis was performed on movement times, calculated as the time to click on 
the final target. In both cases, the three-way repeated-measures ANOVA yielded a 
significant effect of response set (F1,16=12.8, p=0.003 and F1,16=13.32, p=0.002, 
respectively) 
 
In sum, the main effect of response set size remained after addressing the 
relationship between RTs and response set sizes in a way that followed more strictly 
the formulation of Hick’s law. Importantly, this effect was not highly sensitive to the 
way in which the RTs were calculated.  
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6. 4      Discussion 
This study aimed at answering the general question of whether selected response 
alternatives that are no longer available in the environment nevertheless remain 
represented in the brain. To address this question, participants were asked to 
intentionally select one number from an initial response set of available numbers 
displayed on a screen. Immediately before executing their selected response, some of 
the available numbers could disappear from the initial response set, yielding a final 
and smaller response set. This distinguished an external response set, represented by 
the numbers physically present in the external environment; and an internal response 
set, corresponding to the internal representation of the available alternatives. Using 
RTs as a proxy for the internal response set, this study suggests that the internal 
response sets driving RTs corresponded more closely to the initial than to the final 
external response sets. This suggests that the internal response sets are in fact 
resilient to external change, and “lag behind” sudden changes in the external 
environment.  
 
Conditions with equivalent initial and final response set sizes: instructed and no 
change 
In the no change and instructed conditions, no numbers were removed from the 
initial response set. Consequently, initial and final response sets were 
indistinguishable. Whereas the no change condition required intentional response 
selection, the instructed condition required only visual search to identify the 
instructed target. The no change condition is informative of the relationship between 
the RTs and the response set size. RTs in the no change condition showed a positive 
linear relation with response set size. Conversely, RTs in instructed trials did not 
depend on the response set size (i.e., the estimated slopes of the linear trends did not 
differ significantly from 0). This may seem surprising, as monotonic increases in 
instructed RTs as a function of response set size have been well documented (Hick, 
1952). In this experiment, however, the SOA temporally separated the processes of 
visual search and action initiation. This may explain the null effect of response set 
size on instructed RTs. Importantly, this validates the SOA manipulation, aimed at 
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allowing for selection and motor preparation, and suggests that the results cannot be 
easily explained by visual search processes.  
The effects of SOA (short vs. long) and condition (instructed vs. no change) were 
analyzed. The mean RTs across all response set sizes and the slopes of the linear fits 
for RTs as a function of response set size were obtained. Shorter SOAs were 
associated with longer mean RTs and with steeper dependencies of RTs on response 
set size. This suggests that longer SOAs allowed for movement preparation, reducing 
the mean RT and decreasing the impact of increasing the number of response 
alternatives.  
 
Conditions with unequal initial and final response set sizes: original selection and 
reselection 
In the selection and reselection conditions, some target numbers disappeared from 
the initial response set. Because the initial and final response set sizes were not 
correlated, they were incorporated as independent factors in statistical analyses. 
Therefore, the effects of SOA, condition (selection/reselection) and response set 
(initial/final) on mean RTs and on the slopes were analyzed. 
Selection and reselection trials differed in two critical aspects. Reselection trials, but 
not simple selection trials, required inhibition of the initial response plan and 
reselection of a new target number. In addition, and critically, they required 
participants to abandon their intentionally chosen response alternative.  
In both selected and reselected conditions, trials with longer SOAs showed shorter 
RTs. This effect mirrors what was found in the no change and instructed conditions, 
and once again suggests that response selection and motor preparation took place 
during the SOA. Further, as expected, longer RTs were found in reselection trials 
due to the cost of response inhibition and reselection.  
Crucially, an analysis of the slopes of the linear fits revealed stronger dependencies 
of the RTs with initial response set sizes as compared to final response set sizes. This 
suggests that the initial response set size had a stronger influence on the RTs than the 
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final response set size. This effect was strongest particularly for long SOA 
conditions, as revealed by a significant response set x SOA interaction effect. Longer 
SOAs may allow for stronger and more stable encoding of the initial response set 
size, leading to more resilience of the internal representation of the initial response 
set.  
A comparison of the selected and reselected conditions revealed that reselection 
processes had a statistically significant effect on the mean RTs, collapsed across all 
response set sizes. Interestingly however, reselection did not have a clear effect on 
the RT slopes. RTs increased with the initial response set size in both selected and 
reselected trials. There was a numerical difference between the estimated slopes for 
selection and reselection trials, but the differences were not statistically significant. 
The factor of condition was not associated with any significant interaction effects 
with other factors. Therefore, the persisting influence of the initial response set size 
does not appear to be related to the intentional selection of response alternatives. 
Instead, results suggest that it is the nonspecific encoding of the response set that 
makes it resilient to external change. 
Intriguingly, a marginally significant effect of condition on the RT slopes was found 
when the binary logarithm of the response set size was considered instead of the 
absolute response set size. This analysis was motivated by exploring a strict 
implementation of Hick’s law, which establishes that instructed go RTs vary linearly 
with the binary logarithm of the response set. However, there is no solid empirical 
evidence for such a strict implementation of Hick’s law, so the potential effects of 
intentional selection remain speculative.  
Additional controls showed that the significant effect of response set size is not an 
artefact of the way in which RTs were measured. Two additional controls considered 
complete movement times, or measured RTs as the time at which the distance 
travelled by the cursor was 25% of the final distance. In both cases, a statistically 
significant effect of response set size was found.  
 
In light of the results from chapters 2 and 3 in this thesis, it might be hypothesised 
that instructed decisions would lead to even stronger and more resilient internal 
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representations of the response space. The comparison between intentional and 
instructed action selection could not be done here, because no numbers were 
removed from the initial response set in instructed trials. Speculatively, if the 
instructed target was removed from the initial response set, the numerical differences 
in the slopes between instructed-selected and instructed-reselected trials may become 
statistically significant.  
 
Neural representations of response sets  
The behavioural analyses reported here do not inform about the nature of the internal 
representations of response sets. Data from monkey electrophysiology are especially 
relevant to this issue. 
Cisek and Kalaska (Cisek & Kalaska, 2005) showed monkeys a screen displaying 
two potential targets of a saccade reaching task. Each target fell in the receptive field 
of different neurons. After a given delay, monkeys saw a colour cue specifying 
which of the two initial potential targets they should saccade to. The authors 
recorded electrophysiological activity from single cells in PMd. They found a large 
proportion of the neurons that presented sustained firing rates during the delay period 
if either of the two potential targets fell in their receptive fields. Once the colour cue 
specified which was the correct target, these “potential-response cells” rapidly 
increased their firing rate for the correct target, and decreased the firing rate for the 
incorrect target. This strongly suggests that potential responses are represented 
internally during an action anticipation period.  
Further, Cisek and Kalaska compared the overall firing rates for delay periods with 
one and two potential targets. They found that the overall population neural activity 
for two potential targets was lower than the sum of the neural activity for the two 
targets presented separately. This suggests possible competitive interactions between 
the representations of available responses.  
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Accumulator models for response selection 
In agreement with these results, Purcell et al (Purcell, Schall, Logan, & Palmeri, 
2012) found neural activity correlating with response set sizes. The authors trained 
monkeys to saccade to an instructed target amongst a group of distractors. Neuronal 
populations in both visual areas (frontal eye field -FEF-, superior colliculus -SC- and 
lateral intraparietal area -LIP-) and motor areas showed increasingly lower firing 
rates with increasingly larger response sets (2, 4 or 8 total items). Firing rate in 
neuronal populations is normally taken to be necessary for perceptual accumulator 
models (Gold & Shadlen, 2001; P. L. Smith & Ratcliff, 2004). Broadly these models 
hold that once enough “perceptual evidence” (i.e., neural firing) is accumulated in a 
neuronal ensemble representing a response alternative the corresponding sensory and 
integrative visual areas will project to motor areas to drive the corresponding action.  
The results from Purcell et al (2012) provide a plausible neural explanation for 
Hick’s law. Larger response set sizes will response set a lower baseline firing rate 
from which perceptual evidence needs to be accumulated until it reaches a decision 
threshold. Lower baseline levels will require more accumulation of information to 
reach the decision threshold. In turn, this may translate into longer accumulation 
times, manifest as longer RTs.  
These accumulator models had traditionally been restricted to perceptual decision-
making, where the accumulation of neural evidence comes from the sensory 
information about the external environment. Recently however, Zhang et al (Zhang 
et al., 2012) have adapted the accumulator models to intentional choices in human 
behaviour. The authors asked participants to make either intentional or instructed 
finger tapping movements. Based on the behavioural data, they estimated the 
parameters for the optimal accumulator model on a trial-by-trial basis. Interestingly, 
when the authors correlated these estimates with blood-oxygen level dependent 
(BOLD) signal data from the whole brain, they found significant correlations 
between expected relative neural activity and BOLD signal levels in areas that 
overlap with those that have been typically associated with intentional action 
(namely supplementary motor area, -SMA-, preSMA, anterior cingulate cortex -
ACC- and sensory cortex).  
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These, “intentional” accumulator models, analogous to perceptual models, may 
relate to the present findings. Different neuronal assemblies may gather “intentional” 
information for each target. These assemblies may provide the neural 
implementation of the internal response sets of this study. Speculatively, spiking 
activity in neuronal assemblies that correspond to the alternatives that are no longer 
available may not be fully inhibited immediately after target disappearance. In line 
with the results reported by Purcell et al (2012), initial firing rates of each neural 
assembly may be lower for larger initial response set sizes in this experiment, 
leading to longer intentional RTs. 
 
PFC function in the “sculpting” of the response set 
In two experiments, Fletcher et al (Fletcher, Shallice, & Dolan, 2000) used fMRI to 
examine the role of the PFC during memory encoding. In the first experiment, 
participants were asked to learn word pair associations in two stages. In the first 
stage, they were asked to memorize novel word pairs. The second stage provided the 
experimental manipulation. In the “new pairs” condition, participants were simply 
asked to memorize a second novel response set of word pairs. In the crucial “re-
paired” condition, participants were asked to remember a new list of word pairs that 
contained items from the previously learned word pair list. In this condition, 
participants had to inhibit the word pair associations learnt in the first stage, in order 
to re-pair them according to the new response set. In this way, BOLD signal activity 
associated with the contrast between the re-paired and the new-pairs condition would 
be related to the inhibition of the word pair associations that had been learnt in the 
first stage. 
In the second experiment, participants were asked to memorize either closely related 
word pairs (e.g., “King, Queen”) or distantly related word pairs (“Prince, Skull”). In 
this case, increased BOLD signal activity for the contrast between distantly and 
closely related word pairs would indicate the positive word association process.  
Results revealed increased BOLD signal levels in the left ventrolateral PFC 
(VLPFC) for both contrasts, in cases of facilitation and inhibition of links between 
concepts. On the basis of these results, the authors suggest that the VLPFC plays a 
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role in “sculpting” the response set. In other words, VLPFC may be playing the dual 
role of associating the necessary concepts and semantic terms necessary for the word 
pairing association, and at the same time inhibiting those responses that are no longer 
relevant for the task and would otherwise interfere with task performance.  
Reward-based decision making paradigms have shown that the relative value of 
available responses is represented in the PFC. In one study, Boorman et al 
(Boorman, Behrens, Woolrich, & Rushworth, 2009) measured brain BOLD activity 
while participants performed a simple reward-based decision-making task, where 
they were asked to choose between two response alternatives. The probability of 
reward of each response alternative changed over time and depended on the recent 
trials history. In this way, participants would typically repeatedly choose one 
response alternative until there was enough evidence to favour the alternative 
response. Once this occurred, participants would switch to a new series of repeated 
choices of the second alternative. Interestingly, Boorman et al found that BOLD 
activity in the frontopolar cortex (FPC) correlated with the expected value of the 
counterfactual alternative. Further, immediately before a switch event, there was 
increased functional connectivity between FPC and parietal and premotor regions, 
suggesting that FPC triggered the switch to a new response once enough evidence in 
favour of the alternative response had accumulated.  
Together, these results provide a plausible implementation of the internal 
representations of the response alternatives. Activity in neuronal ensembles in 
premotor and parietal sensorimotor areas may code for the response alternatives. 
Prefrontal function may drive activity in these areas by top-down regulatory 
mechanisms. Intentional decisions may maintain these representations relatively 
more active than instructed decisions.  
 
BOLD correlates of response sets 
In human participants, neuroimaging experiments have aimed to identify areas where 
BOLD signal activity correlates with response set sizes. For example van Eimeren et 
al (van Eimeren et al., 2006) have measured BOLD signal activity while participants 
intentionally chose one out of a response set of 1 to 4 possible responses. They found 
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that ACC, SMA and PMd showed increased BOLD activity when intentional 
selection was required, but the increases did not depend on the number of possible 
alternatives.  
 
Role of internal representation of response alternatives in response selection 
Traditional models of response selection had assumed that the processes of 
perception, response selection, and response execution are temporally segregated 
e.g., (Bhushan & Shadmehr, 1999; Flash & Hogan, 1985). However, more recent 
theoretical (Cisek, 2007) and empirical (Klein-Flügge & Bestmann, 2012) accounts 
suggest that response selection and action preparation occur in parallel. By this 
account, the internal representation of the available alternatives is not an isolated 
process, but is instead intimately linked to response selection. Cisek (2007) has put 
forward the “affordance competition hypothesis”. This hypothesis suggests that overt 
behaviour is the result of the competition between potential responses, and the 
potential action plans required to make them. Klein-Flügge and Bestmann (2012) 
have recently provided evidence supporting the affordance competition hypothesis. 
In a recent TMS study, they asked participants to choose between two targets with 
either their right or left hands. The right and left targets would be associated with 
different reward probabilities, biasing the participants’ choices. The authors showed 
that costicospinal excitability (a measure of motor preparation) showed lateralization 
even before the response selection process had completed, providing evidence 
consistent with parallel rather than serial processing for response selection and 
execution.  
 
Limitations of this study 
Several limitations should be considered here. First, and most importantly, the 
results of this study rely critically on the validity of the assumed link between RT 
and internal set size. It was assumed that go RTs increased monotonically with the 
number of items in the internal representation of the response set size. This 
assumption was based on a generalized version of Hick’s law, and was as such 
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supported by empirical studies on instructed action (Hick, 1952) and intentional 
action (H. Lau, Rogers, Ramnani, et al., 2004; van Eimeren et al., 2006). In addition, 
this assumption was supported by the data from the RTs in baseline and instructed 
trials. However, on the basis of behavioural data alone, it cannot be further validated.  
Second, these results present an important limitation in the context of this thesis. 
They describe the “persistence of the internal representation of non-selected 
alternatives in cases of intentional selection”. However, the experimental design did 
not allow for a direct comparison between intentional and instructed conditions. 
Therefore, it cannot be assumed that this persistence effect is exclusive to intentional 
conditions; nor do these results reveal the specific features of intentional control as 
opposed to other forms of action control.  
A third limitation of the study is related to the reliance on subjective report. Trials 
were identified as selected or reselected on the basis of subjective report, which 
cannot be checked objectively by an external observer. Subjective report should 
always be treated with caution, precisely because there is no objective way to 
confirm its relation to the actual mental processes taking place. However, in this 
task, if participants’ subjective report was not truthful, there would have been no 
differences in mean RTs between the selected and reselected conditions. Instead, 
longer RTs were found for reselected than for selected conditions, arguing for the 
validity of the subjectively-based sorting strategy. In addition, inaccurate subjective 
report would have only reduced any possible significant differences. 
 Finally, this study did not address action inhibition directly, but instead assumed it 
had occurred during trials where participants reported they had reselected a response. 
Under this paradigm, therefore, the processes of action inhibition and response 
reselection are difficult to segregate and separately characterize. 
Interestingly, in a review paper, Mostofsky and Simmonds (Mostofsky & Simmonds, 
2008) have suggested that response inhibition and response selection are not distinct 
processes, but are instead “two sides of the same coin”. Mostofsky and Simmonds 
reviewed results from monkey electrophysiology and behavioural and neuroimaging 
studies on human participants. The authors note that in a typical go/nogo task, a 
nogo response requires an active decision not to move. In other words, a successful 
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nogo trial requires both inhibition of the prepotent go response, and response 
reselection processes. In that way, processes of response inhibition and response 
reselection are not distinguishable in a typical go/nogo task. Importantly, they note 
that the precise neural processes and correlates of response selection and inhibition 
may depend on the specific task demands. The present task may be one in which 
response inhibition and reselection cannot be distinguished.  
 
Implications of this study 
A 17th century philosophical debate, on the definition of freedom of choice, 
resonates with the situation studied here (Hobbes & Bramhall, 1999). In this debate, 
between Thomas Hobbes and John Bramhall, Hobbes held that free choice is that 
made in “…the absence of external impediments” (Hobbes, 1937). Bramhall 
disagreed, arguing that Hobbes’ definition was ambiguous. He imagined a man that 
makes a decision, unaware of external impediments. Bramhall believed that, 
according to Hobbes’ definition, the outcome of the man’s intentional decision 
would determine whether he was free or not, at the time of decision. He had been  
free if he chose the course of action that was possible given the external 
circumstances; and he had not been free otherwise (Bramhall, 1655). This poses a 
problem because freedom of a decision should be linked to the decision itself, at the 
time at which is occurs. Bramhall argues agains Hobbes’ definition from the absurd, 
showing that if the relative freedom of a decision can be retrospectively changed by 
the decision outcome, a person could simultaneously be “free and not free”.  
Four hundred years had now passed since the debate between Hobbes and Bramhall. 
The results presented here offer an answer to their questions. They suggest that if a 
man has decided not to play tennis, and then finds the tennis court closed, his 
freedom will still be hindered. This is because his internal representation of the 
response alternatives may still contain the possibility of playing tennis, even after 
having intentionally decided not to do so and even after being aware that he cannot.  
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Future directions 
Two interesting questions arise from these results that may be explored in future 
studies. First, the important issue of differences between instructed and intentional 
trials could be addressed. Here, the task was designed to emphasize the validity of 
instructed trials. Removing the instructed target from the initial response set would 
have reduced the strength of the instructions. Consequently, no numbers were 
removed from the initial response sets in instructed trials. In a follow-up experiment, 
a minority of instructed trials with disappearing targets could be incorporated into 
the design, to compare internal response set representations across instructed and 
intentional conditions.  
Second, these results suggest that the internal response set size is not immediately 
“re-sculpted” to match changes in the external environment. Presumably however, 
the internal and external response sets will match given sufficient time. The time 
course of the re-sculpting of the internal response set could be addressed in future 
studies.  
 
 
 
6. 5      Conclusion 
Here, the internal representation of response alternatives was investigated. The 
results revealed that once an internal representation has been established, it is 
relatively resistant to change. That is, response alternatives that suddenly become 
unavailable in the external environment may nevertheless still be actively 
represented, and may still affect behaviour. This experiment did not allow for a 
direct comparison between the flexibility of the internal representation of response 
spaces in cases of intentional selection and cases of instructed selection. However, 
these results suggest an interesting flip side of the relative weakness of intentional 
decisions. Weaker intentional decisions are consistent with the persistence of the 
internal representation of the counterfactual alternatives. Neurophysiological data 
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suggest that in cases of active maintenance of multiple response alternatives (in this 
case, selected and non-selected), all representations are scaled down. Therefore, in 
cases in which the alternative representations are not suppressed, the selected 
representation is less salient.  
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Chapter 7  Probing new methods to measure the time of 
conscious intentions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The time of conscious intentions to act has previously been measured by 
retrospective methods, famously implemented by Libet and colleagues. The 
experiment described in this chapter implemented a recently proposed improvement 
to the heavily criticized retrospective methods to measure time of awareness of 
intentions. In particular, it was addressed whether the online method could be used 
to reveal potential differences between the times of “onset of awareness” between 
instructed and intentional actions. These putative differences could in turn be related 
to differential levels of action preparation in the two types of action.  A systematic 
analysis of the method revealed some of the weaknesses that may render it 
unsuitable for detecting subtle differences between conditions 
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7. 1      Introduction 
Methods of mental chronometry provide an important way to measure and then make 
inferences about mental processes underlying behaviour (Posner, 2005). In 
particular, mental chronometry offers a substantial set of tools for investigating the 
relation between the common experience of action, relative to both the physical 
source event itself, and the neural events that encode it.  
 
Mental chronometry methods to measure time of awareness of intention  
Libet et al (Libet et al., 1983) famously used mental chronometry to make 
psychophysiological inferences about the causes of voluntary actions. Libet et al 
found that awareness of an impending action followed, rather than preceded, 
measurable neural activity that signals motor preparation. Therefore they argued that 
conscious thought could not possibly have a causal role in movement initiation, or 
decisions about when to make actions.  
 
Time of awareness of action selection 
Using the same principle of mental chronometry, Haggard and Eimer (Haggard & 
Eimer, 1999) addressed the relationship between neural activity and decisions about 
what action to make. The authors examined whether the time of conscious intentions 
was related to the onset time of the associated RPs. They measured EEG activity in 8 
participants in a Libet task, making self-paced key presses and retrospectively 
reporting the time at which they had become aware of their intentions to make key 
presses. The authors extended the Libet task by including two different conditions. 
In the instructed condition, participants were instructed on which hand to use 
throughout the block. In the intentional condition, participants were asked to freely 
choose the effector hand in every trial. Haggard and Eimer failed to replicate 
previous findings by Praamstra et al (Praamstra et al., 1995) and Dirnberger et al 
(Dirnberger et al., 1998), as they found no differences in the amplitude or onset of 
the RP or LRP between the intentional and instructed conditions. Haggard and Eimer 
then compared the LRP onset times of trials with early vs. late judgements of 
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conscious intentions -W judgements (Libet et al., 1983)-. They found that trials with 
early W judgements were associated with earlier LRP onset times than trials with 
late W judgements On the basis of the observed direct relationship between LRP 
onset and W judgements, the authors suggest that LRP may have a causal role in 
awareness of motor intention.  
In the case of Haggard and Eimer’s study, the assessment of the W-time was 
estimated using the classical retrospective judgement first implemented by Libet et 
al. This method addresses the time of conscious intentions directly, by asking 
participants to recall and report the position of a clock hand at the time they first 
became aware of their motor intentions. Retrospective methods remain a common 
means to determine onset of subjective awareness of intention (e.g., Soon, Brass, 
Heinze, & Haynes, 2008), though their use is controversial, as it will be discussed 
below.  
 
Methodological and conceptual problems with the retrospective method 
The retrospective method has been widely discussed (Gomes, 2002; Joordens, van 
Duijn, & Spalek, 2002; Libet, 1985, 2000). It has been criticized mainly on the basis 
of potential temporal biases in making W judgements. Because the method relies on 
retrospective reconstruction, and because introspection about W-time is unusual and 
difficult, it is in principle possible that subjects do not report bona fide percepts, but 
simply what they think they are expected to feel. If this were the case, W judgements 
would reflect folk knowledge rather than true timing of “conscious intentions”. Even 
If there is a genuine percept of conscious intention, several factors, notably the 
allocation of attention, may bias the judgement of their time of occurrence. The 
retrospective method has been used to argue strongly against a causal role for 
conscious intentions on motor behaviour. The conclusions from these studies rely on 
relatively large effect sizes (250 ms in the case of Libet et al, 1983 and 8 s in the 
case of Soon et al, 2008). As such, they are not challenged by the biases of under 
approximately 100 ms that retrospective methods might introduce (Joordens et al., 
2002). However, in the experiment conducted by Haggard and Eimer, potential 
differences in the time of conscious intentions between instructed and intentional 
actions may be very small, compared to the relatively large retrospective biases. This 
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may be one reason why Haggard and Eimer found no differences in the reported W-
time between instructed and intentional movements.  
 
Online method to measure time of conscious motor intentions  
Matsuhashi and Hallett (Matsuhashi & Hallett, 2008) have recently suggested an 
elegant method to asses conscious intentions that works around the problem of 
potential retrospective biases. The method probes conscious intentions online rather 
than retrospectively. Briefly, in the online method participants are asked to make 
self-paced movements, and to be mindful of their intentions to move. While 
participants engage in this task, tones are played at random times. Participants are 
then asked to ignore any tones that occur at times when they were not about to move, 
and continue with the task. However, if a tone occurred when participants were 
aware of preparing to move, they should inhibit their movement. In this way, 
participants’ otherwise uniform rate of movement is only interrupted by tones 
occurring during periods of intention awareness. Consequently, the timing of the 
externally controlled tones serves a marker of two possible mental states (namely, 
aware vs. not aware of intentions), which can be classified on the basis of the 
behavioural output following each tone.  
Importantly, Matsuhashi and Hallet found that the online method yielded estimates 
of conscious intentions that were about 1 s earlier than the typical values of W-
judgement found in studies using the Libet task. Matsuhashi and Hallet argue that 
this difference may be related to the explicit probing method in the online task. 
Recalling Haggard and Eimer’s result, they found that the LRP preceded the W-
judgement by 0.5 s, which was consistent with a causal role of LRPs in conscious 
intentions. But if an online method that does not suffer from retrospective biases 
brings the timing of conscious intention earlier than the LRP onset, this causal role 
may be questioned. Therefore the issue of timing of conscious intentions remains of 
great interest and would benefit from bias-free approaches.  
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Online method to measure time of awareness in case of intentional response 
selection 
Because the online method does not depend on potentially large retrospective biases, 
it may be suited to explore fine-grained differences in the timing of awareness 
between two closely related conditions. The aim of this study was therefore twofold. 
First, it aimed at exploring the validity and potential uses of the online method to 
determine its sensitivity. Second, it aimed at applying the online method to explore 
whether there are any differences between the timing of conscious intentions in 
conditions of instructed and intentional action. The hypothesis was that participants 
would show earlier times of intention for intentional actions as compared to 
instructed actions.  
Here, participants were instructed to inhibit action when an external tone fell during 
the period of intention awareness. Importantly however, this study was not aimed at 
studying inhibition of action directly. Inhibition was used only as a tool to indirectly 
measure times of onset of conscious experience.  
 
7. 2      Methods 
Participants 
Sixteen naїve healthy volunteers (6 female, 2 left handed; mean age ± SD 24 ± 6 
years) participated in this study. 
 
Task and stimuli 
The experimental design closely followed that described by Matsuhashi and Hallett 
(Matsuhashi & Hallett, 2008). Participants sat with their index fingers each resting 
on a force-sensitive resistor (Active Robots Ltd, Somerset, UK). Analogue signals 
from the sensors were recorded through a data acquisition device (USB 6008, 
National Instruments, Berkshire, UK).   
Participants were asked to make sudden right or left index finger lift movements 
when they felt the urge to do so. They were asked to make movements at an 
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approximate rate of 1 movement every 5 -10 s, and to direct their attention towards 
their motor intentions. It was stressed that they should make a movement as soon as 
they became aware of their intentions to move, and to avoid deliberately introducing 
delays between the time of awareness and the time of action.  
While participants were making movements, 1000 Hz tones were played through 
loudspeakers. The timing of the tones was determined at the beginning of the 
experiment, and was therefore independent of the participants’ behaviour. The 
interval between tones was sampled from a uniform distribution with a minimum of 
2 s and a maximum of 5 s. Participants were asked to ignore any tones that occurred 
at times when they were not aware of their intentions to move. However, if a tone 
occurred when participants were aware of being preparing a movement, they were 
asked to inhibit their action plans, and wait for a minimum “reset period” of 5 s 
before planning the next movement. In an a posteriori analysis, each tone was 
associated with a measure of the temporal difference between that tone and the 
nearest movement within a given time window (see below). In this way, tones that 
occurred before the emergence of conscious motor intentions would be followed by a 
movement shortly after. However, if tones occurred after the onset of conscious 
motor intentions, the prepared movements would be inhibited and the temporal 
difference between the tone leading to inhibition and the subsequent movement 
would be longer, as they would be separated by (at least) the duration of the “reset 
period” of 5s (see figure 7.1A). 
In this way, the task provides a means to estimate the time of conscious intention 
onset in an online fashion, without resort to the retrospective judgements that are so 
problematic in the Libet task (see above). Tones that fall within the period of 
conscious awareness will lead to movements being inhibited (see figure 7.1 B). In 
consequence, a profile of the distribution of tones occurring before the time of 
movement should show a decrease in the tone frequency just before the movement 
(see figure 7.1C), because those tones leading to movement inhibition will have been 
effectively “removed” from the distribution (see figure 7.1 E). Tones occurring 
immediately before the movement will also contribute to the distribution as they will 
fall after the “point of no return” (i.e., so close to the impending movement that it 
cannot be stopped cf. the stop signal reaction time, see figure 7.1D), (de Jong, Coles, 
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Logan, & Gratton, 1990), and action inhibition processes may not be quick enough 
to achieve inhibition.  
 
 
Figure 7.1 Task schematic. A. Timing of events. Participants become aware of their 
intentions (T-time) and given amount of time before they make their actions. The time of 
tone relative to conscious awareness determines whether movements occur or not (B through 
D). B. Tones occurring before conscious awareness of intention are ignored. If the time 
difference between the tone and the subsequent movement is shorter than 5 s (see text), the 
time difference is computed and considered for the distribution. C. Tones occurring after the 
time of awareness of intentions signal that movements should be inhibited. The time 
difference between tones leading to inhibition and the inhibited movement is not detected, 
and generates a gap in the tone distribution. D. Tones that occur after the time of awareness 
but too close to the movement to lead to timely action inhibition (i.e., tones that fall after the 
point of no return) contribute to the tone distribution. E A putative example resulting 
dataset. Histograms show the tone frequency distribution, relative to movement onset. T-
time indicates the time of conscious intention, and is associated with a decrease in the tone 
frequency distribution. P-time indicates the point of no return, and is associated with an 
increase in the tone frequency distribution.  
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In line with Matsuhashi and Hallet’s (2008) terminology, T-time refers to the time of 
awareness of intention; and P-time refers to the point of no return. 
To test whether the time of conscious awareness differs between the instructed and 
intentional conditions, participants were asked to make movements in one of two 
conditions. In the instructed blocks (6 blocks in total, 3 with each hand), the required 
effector finger was indicated at the beginning of each block and kept fixed 
throughout. In the intentional conditions (6 blocks in total), participants were told to 
decide before each movement which finger they would use. They were asked not to 
pre-decide which finger they would use, but instead to decide at the last moment, 
when they were about to make the movement.  
The experiment was divided in 12 blocks, and lasted for approximately 50 min. The 
order of the blocks was randomized across participants. There were no 
individualized trials, but each block was comprised of 35 tones. The exact number of 
movements per block depended on each participants’ behaviour.  
In addition, in order to monitor behaviour, 14 participants were asked to report 
verbally whenever they had inhibited an action. Their verbal reports were recorded 
with the audio editing software Audacity (http://audacity.sourceforge.net).  
 
 
Data analysis 
1. Parametric fit of error function 
Each tone was associated a posteriori with its time of occurrence, relative to the 
nearest movement. Each movement was therefore associated with all tones that fell 
within a time window of -5 s to 2 s. A tone distribution was then calculated, by 
combining all tones time-locked to the nearest movement within the selected time 
window.  
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Following Matsuhashi and Hallett, the time of intention was estimated in two ways; 
namely parametrically, fitting a sigmoid curve, and nonparametrically, by calculating 
a density function on the basis of the data.  
 
In the parametric approach a cumulative normal function (erf) was fitted to the data 
(equation 7.1).  
erf 𝑦 =    2𝜋 𝑒!!!!! 𝑑𝑡                                                                                                                        (7.1) 
To estimate T-time, all tones occurring at any time between -5 s and -0.01 s before 
movement were considered, and the remaining time (-0.01 to 2 s after movement) 
was padded with zeros. An erf function that fits to the expected profile for the 
distributions of tones for the T period (i.e., descending) will follow equation 7.2.  
𝐹 𝑥 =   𝑝! 1− 𝑒𝑟𝑓 𝑥 − 𝑝22𝑝!                                                                                                     (7.2) 
 
Three parameters (p1, p2 and p3) are enough to describe the shape of the error 
function. The effect of varying the value of each of these parameters is illustrated in 
figure 7.2. p1 shifts the curve vertically; p2 shifts the curve horizontally and p3 
determines the slope of the transition. If the time of conscious intention differs 
between conditions, then the position along the x axis of the step in the error 
function should differ. The final estimates for p2 were therefore subjected to 
statistical analyses.  
In turn, parameters p1, p2 and p3 reflect different cognitive processes. p1 increases 
with an increased overall tendency to move. Impulsive, hyperactive participants 
might therefore be expected to produce higher p1 values. p2 represents the onset time 
of conscious intentions to act. In this experiment, p2 is expected to be negative, as 
conscious intentions are expected to precede action in the healthy population. More 
negative values of p2 (values further away from 0) would indicate earlier awareness 
of intention, relative to the time of action. The final parameter p3 indicates the 
consistency of the timing at which conscious motor intentions emerge, relative to 
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movement onset. p3 may also be taken to represent precision with which the 
intention is perceived. If the conscious intention to act emerges at a reliable time 
relative to movement, this will give rise to a very steep fall in the tone histogram. 
Steep falls are associated low p3 values. 
 
Figure 7.2 Effect of varying parameters p1, p2 and p3 on the shape of the error function used 
to describe the experimental data. A. p1 shifts the curve vertically; higher p1 values indicate 
higher overall movement frequency B. p2 shifts the curve horizontally. More negative p2 
values indicate earlier intention onsets C. p3 gives the slope of the transition. Smaller p1 
values indicate more precision and temporal reliability of the onset of conscious intentions 
relative to the time of movement.  
 
2. Nonparametric estimation of density function 
A second possible method to estimate T-time is by following a nonparametric 
approach and estimating a density function from the tone distribution. A classical 
method for estimating the density function is the kernel density estimation (Parzen, 
1962; Rosenblatt, 1956). Here, a discrete distribution may be convolved with a 
kernel function (such as a gaussian kernel), to obtain a smoothed distribution in 
continuous space. The advantage of this method over the parametric fit to the erf 
function is that whereas the latter depends on the selection of the bin size and bin 
centres for the initial event frequency estimation, the density estimation does not. 
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However, density estimation methods are left with one free parameter, namely the 
bandwidth of the gaussian kernel, which will influence the goodness of fit of the 
density function to the underlying data. Smaller bandwidths allow for more precise 
fits to the data, at the expense of increased complexity of the resulting density 
function (see figure 7.3). 
The density function ƒ(x) is calculated at each point in time with equation 7.3,   
𝑓 𝑥 =    1ℎ! 𝐾 𝑥 − 𝑋!ℎ!                                                                                                     (7.3)!!!!  
where x is the time relative to the movement onset, and Xi is the timing of the i-th 
tone. The density function ƒ at each x is given by a weighted sum of all tones. The 
Gaussian kernel K (equation 7.4) determines the contribution of each Xi to the 
amplitude of the density function in x; as a function of the temporal distance between 
X and Xi (equation 7.3); and of a variable bandwidth hi (equation 7.5). From 
equations 7.4 and 7.5 it follows that the greater the temporal difference X-Xi, the 
smaller the amplitude of the kernel. In this way, events that lie temporally far away 
from x will have little impact on the amplitude of ƒ(x).  
𝐾 𝑡 = 12𝜋 𝑒!!!!                                                                                                                     (7.4) 
In addition, each Gaussian kernel is modulated not only on its amplitude but also on 
its bandwidth. The variable bandwidth is obtained by modulating a global initial 
bandwidth h0 with a factor that recursively depends on the density function at each 
Xi.  
ℎ! = ℎ!𝑓!!!!   𝑋!                                                                                                                           (7.5) 
Following the method adopted by Matsuhashi and Hallet, the final density function 
ƒ(x) was obtained in two iterative steps. An initial pilot function ƒp was calculated as 
the overall average of tones across the whole analysis period (-5 s to -0.1 s). The 
density function obtained was used as a pilot function in a second iterative step. This 
process was then repeated to obtain the final density function.  
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From equation 5 it follows that periods with denser tone frequency will be associated 
with a narrower bandwidth for the following iteration in the estimation of the density 
function. Instead, periods with sparser tone distributions will have wider bandwidths, 
allowing for a good compromise between an efficient smoothing and a precise fit. 
Figure 7.3 illustrates the dependency of the estimated density function on the choice 
of initial bandwidth.   
 
Figure 7.3 Effect of varying the parameters used to find the density function to describe a 
tone distribution. Simulated data illustrates the effect of varying the initial bandwidth 
parameter ho. Smaller ho decrease the overall smoothness of the density function, and 
consequently increase the goodness of fit of the density function. 
 
 
T-time was estimated via bootstrapping. 1000 independent subsamples were drawn 
with replacement from the original time distribution. Subsamples were of the same 
size as the original distribution. The entire iterative estimation of the density function 
was then repeated 1000 times, for each subsample. The mean value of the density 
function was then obtained for each x. Upper and lower bounds were estimated by 
calculating the 99% and 1% limits. A baseline period was defined between -4.5 and -
3 s relative to the time of movement. The lower bound of -4.5 s was chosen to avoid 
distortions in the density function due to edge effects. The distribution of tones is 
assumed to be uniform in this early period where action intentions are presumably 
not yet conscious. T-time was defined as the last point at which the 99% bound 
exceeded the baseline. Figure 7.4 illustrates the effect of increasing the number of 
bootstrapping samples.  
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Figure 7.4 Experimental data from two illustrative participants shows the effect of 
increasing the number of iterations used in the bootstrapping. In some cases and despite 
initial plateaus, increasing the number of bootstrap samples can have important effects on 
the final estimated T-time. 
 
 
As in Libet’s original experiment, participants were encouraged to make movements 
as soon as they became aware of their intentions to act. It was emphasized that they 
should pay attention to their intentions, but that they should not introduce deliberate 
delays between the time of conscious intention and the time of movement. If 
participants were following instructions adequately, then the estimated T-time should 
not be excessively early. In the same way, if participants were attending to their 
intentions, a valid estimated T-time will be earlier than the time of movement.  
 
7. 3      Results 
Subjects made movements with an average inter-movement interval of (mean ± SD) 
4.810 ± 1.33 s for the instructed blocks and an inter-tone interval of 4.67 ± 1.25 s for 
the intentional blocks. These values did not differ significantly (t15=0.64, p=0.527). 
Participants reported having inhibited relatively few movements per block of 35 
tones. Roughly 5-8 out of 35 tones were reported to lead to action inhibition.  
Two different methods were used to estimate T-time. First, a parametric method was 
used, and individual T-times were defined as the value of the p2 parameter (see 
equation 7.2), that determines the position of the step of the erf function along the 
time (x) axis. Second, a density function was estimated (see methods).  
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erf fit  
The data of 1 participant were discarded because the T-time estimate could not be 
obtained with the erf method. The data for one representative participant are shown 
in figure 7.5.  
 
 
Figure 7.5  Tone frequency distribution and estimated T-time for one representative 
participant. Solid lines show the fitted erf function Panels A. and B. show histograms for 
the instructed and intentional conditions respectively.   
 
Mean (± SD) estimates of T-time were -1.128 ± 0.724 s and -1.095 ± 0.635 s for the 
instructed and intentional conditions respectively. These values did not differ 
significantly (t14 = -0.26, p = 0.796).  
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Table 7.1 Individual T-time estimates (in seconds) for the instructed and intentional 
conditions, obtained with the parametric (erf) or nonparametric (density estimation) 
methods. 
 erf fit Density estimation 
Participant Instructed Intentional Instructed Intentional 
1 -1018.25 -1110.12 -1247.5 -1257.5 
2 -2000.88 -677.97 -2722.5 -300 
3 -596.15 -347.38 -592.5 -350 
4 -1406.99 -1128.55 -2535 -2012.5 
5 -800.55 -919.28 -320 -527.5 
6 -546.48 -606.33 -1347.5 -677.5 
7 -900.00 -1008.33 -1147.5 -1192.5 
8 -700.32 -1797.70 -2930 -2302.5 
9 -521.50 -577.53 -617.5 -480 
10 -2887.19 -2797.36 -3127.5 -3572.5 
11 0.00 -395.67 -342.5 -332.5 
12 -1814.48 -1606.93 -300 -2607.5 
13 -1636.77 -1498.78 -300 -300 
14 -896.19 -853.22 -1400 -1037.5 
15 -1200.00 -1100.00 -542.5 -300 
 
 
Estimation of density function 
T-time was then estimated by a nonparametric method, estimating a density function 
and bootstrapping the estimated density to obtain a closer fit to the data.  
The density estimation method presents two main advantages over the parametric 
method. First, the results from the parametric method vary with the bin width and 
bin centres chosen to construct the frequency histogram; and present a bias of order h 
for bins of size h. In contrast, the density estimation with symmetrical kernels (such 
as the gaussian kernels used here) does not dependent on the arbitrary bin parameters 
(Sheather, 2004). 
Figure 7.6 shows data from one representative participant. Mean (± SD) estimates of 
T-time were -1.300 ± 1035 s and -1.150 ± 1.022 s for the instructed and intentional 
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conditions respectively. These values did not differ significantly (t14=-0.61, 
p=0.553).  
 
 
Figure 7.6 Tone frequency distribution and estimated T-time for one representative participant. Solid 
lines show the estimated density function Panels A and B show histograms for the instructed and 
intentional conditions respectively.   
 
Comparison of the two methods 
Matsuhashi and Hallet applied both methods (erf fit and density estimation) to 
estimate T-time. They found that the density estimation method yielded slightly 
earlier T-time estimates. The 95% confidence intervals of the difference between the 
two methods was from 8.1% to 0.3% of the average estimated T-time, suggesting 
that the methods produced consistent results in their case.  
In this study, to explore the agreement of the two estimation methods used, the two-
way mixed model intraclass correlation coefficient (ICC) was calculated for each 
condition (McGraw & Wong, 1996). Values of ICC close to 1 indicate good 
agreement, and values close to 0 indicate poor agreement between measures. In both 
cases, ICC suggests strong agreement between measures (instructed: ICC = 0.63; 
intentional: ICC=0.86. As a rule of thumb, ICC higher than 0.6 can be taken as a 
measure of strong agreement, and ICC values higher than 0.8 suggest very strong 
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agreement). Figure 7.7 shows the individual data for each condition, and the linear 
fits to demonstrate correlation. 
 
 
Figure 7.7 Consistency between the two estimation methods. Individual colours represent 
the pair of the estimated T-times for each participant. Open circles correspond to instructed 
conditions, crosses correspond to intentional conditions. Trend lines show linear fit for the 
data of each condition. 
 
 
7. 4      Discussion 
The estimation of the time of conscious intention has traditionally relied on explicit 
measures that depend heavily on retrospective reports. These measures are 
problematic because they may suffer from reconstructive biases (Wegner, 2002). 
Further, retrospective timing judgements may suffer from distortions that are large 
when compared to relatively subtle effects of interest. For example, this study aimed 
at examining presumably small differences in the timing of awareness of intention 
between intentional and instructed actions. Large inaccuracies due to reconstructive 
errors may greatly decrease the sensitivity of a method in detecting differences 
between conditions.  
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A new method has recently been proposed (Matsuhashi & Hallett, 2008) that probes 
conscious intention online and therefore depends only minimally on retrospective 
confabulations. The present study aimed at exploring the advantages of the online 
method, and its potential suitability for detecting subtle differences in the timing of 
intentions across different conditions. This is the first replication and extension of 
the online method devised by Matsuhashi and Hallett (2008). This study also appears 
to be the first sensitivity analysis of a potentially important method.  
 
Replicability of the online method 
Importantly, the T-time estimates obtained here are in agreement with those reported 
by Matsuhashi and Hallett (2008). This shows that the online method is replicable 
and may contribute to reliable measures of the time of conscious intentions.  
However, despite the clear advantages of the online method, a more thorough 
analysis suggests that it may not be sensitive enough to detect small differences 
between closely related conditions.  
 
Numerical discrepancies between retrospective and online tasks  
There was a numerical discrepancy between the T-time estimate in the online task (~ 
-1.5 s prior to movement onset) and the typical W-judgement in a Libet-type task (~ 
-0.2 s prior to movement onset, Libet et al., 1983). Apart from explanations based on 
differences between attention allocation in the two different tasks, Matsuhashi and 
Hallett have suggested an interesting possible account. They note that the online task 
is similar to studies on mind wandering (Smallwood & Schooler, 2006). In their 
studies, Smallwood and Schooler asked participants to do a repetitive task, and 
measured the frequency of mind-wandering events using two possible methods of 
subjective report. First, participants were simply asked to spontaneously inform the 
experimenter if and when they realized that they were mind wandering. Second, the 
experimenter periodically probed participants, and explicitly asked them whether 
they were mind wandering or were focussing on the task. These two methods are 
interestingly close to the retrospective and online methods for the monitoring of 
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conscious motor intentions. Whereas in the retrospective task participants need to 
“wait for the conscious intention to appear”, in the online task participants are 
periodically probed by the auditory tones. Smallwood and Schooler noted that the 
frequency of mind wandering episodes obtained through spontaneous report was 
lower than that obtained through direct probing. The notion is that awareness of 
one’s own mental states (mind-wandering in one case, motor intentions in the other) 
progresses through three states of metacognitive awareness. These are a first stage of 
no awareness, an intermediate stage of awareness only if one is probed, and a third 
stage of clear metacognitive awareness. Whereas the W-judgement is related to the 
transition from the second to the third stages of awareness, T-time estimates in the 
online task may reflect the transition from no awareness to the intermediate stage. 
These interesting differences between the retrospective and online tasks call for 
richer models of conscious intentions. In particular, mental chronometry methods 
treat intentions to act as being states that are either present or absent. However, it 
seems as though this model may be too simple. Instead, intentions may grow in 
accessibility and clarity as the moment of action initiation approaches.  
 
Limitations of the online method 
The online method was evaluated as a possible candidate to detect differences 
between the intentional and instructed actions. The results show that despite the clear 
appeal of its potential to avoid certain biases, the task suffers from a number of 
limitations. These limitations, described below, may make it insensitive to small 
differences in the timing of conscious intentions between two closely related 
conditions.  
 
Difficulties of introspecting about intentions to make simple movements 
First, index finger extensions may have been excessively simple, and may have not 
been effective targets for the introspection of conscious motor intentions. More 
effortful movements requiring more precise force control (Masaki, Takasawa, & 
Yamazaki, 1998), selectiveness (Kitamura, Shibasaki, & Kondo, 1993) or involving 
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sequences rather than simple movements (Kitamura, Shibasaki, Takagi, Nabeshima, 
& Yamaguchi, 1993) have all been shown to elicit larger amplitudes in the late RPs. 
Replacing single index extensions for other, more effortful movements may result in 
enhanced differences in amplitude of RPs and in the timing of conscious intentions 
between intentional and instructed conditions.   
 
Reliance on subjective report 
Second, the online task suffers from the same major caveats as the retrospective task, 
in that it critically relies on subjective report. This is especially problematic because 
the required introspection about conscious intentions is unusual and effortful. 
Retrospective tasks directly measure the time of conscious intention along a 
continuous variable (i.e., position of the clock hand). In contrast, the online task 
measures binary responses (i.e., if the participant is aware of her intentions at the 
time of tone, she will inhibit the movement. If she is not aware of her intentions, she 
will ignore the tone). However, both continuous and binary responses require that 
participants periodically introspect on their conscious motor intentions. 
Lau et al (H. Lau, Rogers, & Passingham, 2006b) asked participants to perform a 
modified Libet task in an fMRI scanner. The authors compared BOLD activity in 
conditions where participants judged the time of movement (M-judgement) or the 
time of an external tone. They found that BOLD activity in the CMA correlated 
negatively with the amount of temporal bias in the M-judgement. Further, the 
authors found in a separate dataset that when participants were asked to attend to the 
time of intention (W-judgement), activity in the SMA was negatively correlated with 
the amount of temporal bias in the W-judgement. The authors argue that these 
correlations reflect the attentional modulation of the BOLD activity of those brain 
structures that support action timing (cingulate motor area, CMA) and intention 
generation (SMA). They therefore argue that introspective methods may be 
problematic for neurophysiological measurements, because the required 
introspective judgement needed modulates the brain activity precisely in those areas 
that are the targets of study. If this argument is true, the method for reporting 
awareness may interfere with the neurophysiological processes that cause awareness.   
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The online task does not offer a solution for this problem. In fact, it may even 
enhance this interference effect, as attention is drawn away from the otherwise 
external “Libet clock” and focused exclusively on the abstract internal 
representations of intentions.  
 
 
 
 
Undersampling problem 
An examination of the data for individual participants suggests that the number of 
tones was not enough to produce a smooth frequency function in continuous space. 
Data from several participants showed abrupt falls from the baseline tone frequency 
(of mean 1) to 0. This suggests that sampling larger numbers of trials might have 
produced smoother distributions. More importantly, data from some participants 
showed isolated tones in the period around -3 s prior to movement. Arguably, these 
tones were too early to fall within the point of no return (de Jong et al., 1990). The 
reason why they were immediately followed by a movement (instead of leading to 
inhibition of movements) may have been simply due to mind-wandering effects. 
Participants may have been distracted from their intentions, and may have not 
responded correctly to the tones. Mind-wandering and attention drifts are common in 
most experimental tasks (Smallwood & Schooler, 2006) and are usually overcome 
by introducing a large number of trials, i.e., by treating them as random noise . 
However, due to the low frequency of inhibited movements in the online task, these 
“incorrect” trials may have an unusually large detrimental effect. These two issues 
may be solved by greatly increasing the duration of the task, or perhaps by making 
the task less monotonous and interleaving intentional and instructed movements. 
Because individual trials cannot be readily identified in the online task, a paradigm 
that includes shorter blocks may help reduce the number of such trials.  
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Time of conscious intention is indirectly measured 
Finally, unlike retrospective methods, the online method depends on the estimation 
of a putative underlying function. As such, the final result of the online method 
depends heavily on the arbitrary choices of the free parameters chosen for the 
estimation of the function. Importantly, neither estimation method aims at 
minimizing residual errors. Instead, the fit of the estimated function to the tone 
distribution is a non-optimal one. The parametric estimation of the erf function relies 
on a precise fit of the time at which the frequency distribution decays. However it 
does not attempt to minimize the large residual fitting errors. These result from 
approximating a constant function to a variable rate of tones. In the same way, the 
density estimation method requires an arbitrarily chosen bandwidth, that has a 
critical effect on the final result (Sheather, 2004) (see figure 7.3). Several methods 
have been suggested to optimize this free parameter and avoid arbitrary choices e.g., 
(Shimazaki & Shinomoto, 2010). However, the desired density function is not a 
precise and optimal estimation of the data. Instead, and critically, it depends on 
approximating a steady baseline to a period of non-steady tone frequency. Thus, by 
definition the density estimation must be non-optimal and optimization algorithms 
are not applicable here. Exactly how non-optimal the fit should be is not clear, and 
not quantifiable.  
 
Dependence on the task parameters 
Importantly, these results highlight the possibility that the measure of subjective 
experience may not be independent from the method used to address it. In particular, 
the frequency of tones may influence the reported time of conscious intentions. The 
time between the emergence of a conscious intention to move and the movement 
itself may be short (under 1 s, as reported by Libet et al). The tones in this task were 
presented with a relatively long inter-tone interval (2-5 s). Therefore, tones were 
unlikely to fall precisely within the narrow time window during which participants 
were aware of their motor intentions. Consequently, to comply with the task 
instructions, participants may have deliberately introduced delays between the time 
of intention and the time of movement, in order to allow tones the possibility to 
interrupt their prepared movements. Because these presumed pauses are not 
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accessible to objective analyses, there is a risk that conscious intention is brought 
backwards in time by an arbitrary amount. The instructions may have been an 
important part of this task. Indeed, other work in this thesis (see chapter 4) confirms 
that participants can transiently inhibit action in this way. If this speculation is true, 
then presumably decreasing the inter-tone interval will lead to shorter T-time 
estimates. In the same way, instruction that stress the need for interruptions of 
prepared movements may lead to longer T-time estimates.  
 
 
 
7. 5      Conclusion 
The online method suggested by Matsuhashi and Hallett (2008) was applied here, 
and their results were replicated. The estimated values for the mean time of thought 
(T-time) in this study were similar to those reported by Matsuhashi and Hallett 
originally.  
However, a closer examination of the online method revealed some methodological 
difficulties that did not easily emerge from Matsushashi and Hallett’s original 
proposal. The online task has been shown to introduce a large set of potential 
inaccuracies, and cannot provide a final answer for the question.  
Therefore, the question of whether awareness of action is earlier for intentional 
actions, than for instructed actions, remains unclear. A definite answer will require 
the development of new paradigms that work around the caveats that must always be 
issued when conducting experiments with the currently available methods.  
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Chapter 8  Brain correlates of the subjective feeling of 
freedom of choice 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A classical experimental design contrasts instructed and intentional actions, based 
on the objective definition of the extent to which actions are constrained by an 
external stimulus. Instead, in the experiment reported here, intentional and 
instructed behaviour in a numerical stem completion task were defined subjectively, 
based purely on participants’ introspective reports of how free their responses felt to 
them. An analysis of the blood-oxygen level-dependent signal increases associated 
with intentional action as defined in the classical, objective way, and as defined in 
this new, subjective way, revealed striking differences. The neural correlates of 
feeling free did not overlap with the neural correlates of objectively being free, in the 
classical conception of being stimulus-independent.   
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8. 1      Introduction  	  
Debates over whether humans have the capacity to make free choices have been 
ongoing for countless years (Libet, 1999; S. Thomas, 1894; Wegner, 2002). In 
contrast, there is wider consensus about the existence of a subjective feeling of acting 
freely (Sarkissian et al., 2010). According to folk psychology, and consensus of 
experience, people generally have the impression that their internal conscious 
decisions drive their behaviour. In other words, people’s decisions and actions are 
not simple reflections of the immediate environment, but rather expressions of an 
“agentic self” (Kane, 2005; Schüür & Haggard, 2011).  
According to one view, these subjective experiences are illusory (Wegner, 2002), 
and the “conscious will” is merely a retrospective inference, rather than a direct 
readout of brain activity associated with action selection or action generation. 
Supporters of this view often draw on behavioural studies that reported illusions of 
will and agency (Wegner & Wheatley, 1999), and on neurophysiological 
measurements (Libet et al., 1983; Soon et al., 2008) showing that neural events 
associated with free decisions precede the reported onset of the awareness of 
intention. These findings suggest that conscious intention cannot be a causal factor 
for free decisions. Interestingly, despite the recent scientific support for ‘free will 
illusionism’, few studies have investigated where in the brain this alleged illusion 
arises. 
On the other hand, several human neuroimaging studies have shown reliable neural 
correlates of free choice. The contrast between free and instructed movement choices 
has been consistently associated with increased BOLD signal in the SMA and 
preSMA, the rostral cingulate zone (RCZ) and the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex 
(DLPFC) (Cunnington, Windischberger, Robinson, & Moser, 2006; Lau, Rogers, 
Haggard, & Passingham, 2004;  Lau, Rogers, & Passingham, 2006), (see Krieghoff, 
Waszak, Prinz, & Brass, 2011) for a review). In particular, Müller et al. (Mueller et 
al., 2007) have suggested that RCZ is mainly involved in selecting the “what” 
component, in  the context of a given task (Desmet, Fias, Hartstra, & Brass, 2011); 
while preSMA is associated with selecting the “when” component of actions.  
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These neuroimaging studies generally used an objective manipulation in the 
experimental design factors, defining instructed and free choice in terms of 
information that either respectively is or is not provided by external cues. This 
definition bypasses the subjective experience of free choice. However, understanding 
the neural basis of the common feeling of acting freely is important. On the one 
hand, understanding the mechanism underlying illusions has long been a productive 
approach in psychological research, and so would be a natural research question for 
free will illusionism. On the other hand, if ‘free choice’ is not an illusion but a 
distinctive psychological form of decision-making, then the neural bases of the 
subjective feeling of free choice may be relevant to understanding how and where 
such choices occur in the brain. 
The scientific tradition reviewed in the introduction (see section 1.2.2.2) 
operationalizes voluntary action based on objective criteria. This operationalization 
is implicitly assumed to capture the subjective feeling of acting intentionally (Schüür 
& Haggard, 2011). However, this important implicit assumption has never been 
appropriately validated. If the assumption is correct, and there is a correspondence 
between objective and subjective accounts of free action, then the neural correlates 
of free and instructed choices defined objectively should match the neural correlates 
of choices that feel more versus less free. An experimental task was therefore 
devised, in which actions were defined as instructed or free either on the basis of an 
objective definition, or on the basis of subjective experience. Then, the brain 
correlates associated with free choices under each of the two possible definitions 
were investigated.  
Here the classic distinction between instructed and intentional choice was used and 
extended to investigate the neural correlates of subjective voluntariness. Importantly, 
it was also considered that external guidance can come in varying degrees; so that 
the instructed/intentional distinction is not a simple dichotomy between two 
exclusive categories, but rather represents two extremes of a continuum (Nachev, 
2010). On this view, generating an action can involve both intentional and instructed 
factors. For example, responses to external stimuli clearly depend on longer-term 
goals that are represented internally. For the purposes of this study, intentional 
choice was considered as a graded measure of how independent an action is from an 
external instruction. When an action is strongly determined by an external 
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instruction, it will be “less free” than when it is not. It may then be asked whether 
people subjectively experience degrees of voluntariness underlying individual action 
decisions, and whether this graded experience originates from graded levels of 
activation in particular brain areas. 
Here, the classic task of random number generation was adapted from previous 
studies of free action choices (Jahanshahi et al., 2000).  This task was chosen 
because it allows both an objective, graded continuum of integration of stimulus 
information, and also a graded continuum of subjective experience of voluntariness 
regarding action choice. Random number generation tasks have been used before in 
relation to voluntary action, but for rather different reasons from the ones here. In 
particular, many intentional selection studies involve asking participants to produce 
balanced numbers of responses, while avoiding obvious patterns such as alternation. 
These tasks have been interpreted as covertly asking participants to generate 
apparently random response sequences (Roepstorff & Frith, 2004).  For example, 
human positron emission tomography (PET) studies during random number 
generation tasks have suggested a critical involvement of the left dorsolateral 
prefrontal cortex (DLPFC), the anterior cingulate cortex, the bilateral superior 
parietal cortex, and the right inferior frontal cortex (Daniels, Witt, Wolff, Jansen, & 
Deuschl, 2003; Jahanshahi et al., 1995). These areas partially overlap with those 
identified with free selection tasks (Jahanshahi et al., 1995). Here, a modified 
random generation task offered a convenient vehicle to allow participants to 
experience and report a graded sense of stimulus-independence or freedom of action.  
Crucially, two separate analyses were performed.  First, the extreme situations of 
intentional and instructed action were compared, as operationalized by the classical 
objective paradigms. Second, situations in which actions subjectively felt more free 
or felt more constrained, based on self-report, were studied. In this way, this study 
aimed to establish the relationship between the neural correlates of intentional 
actions as traditionally defined, and the neural correlates of the subjective experience 
of choosing freely. 
In the crucial condition for studying graded voluntariness, a number sequence was 
presented and participants were asked to complete the sequence with a number that 
would make the sequence “look random”. The method that participants used to 
achieve this presumably varied from person to person, depending on their subjective 
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concept of a random sequence. However, the actual interpretation of “random 
appearance” was not the central interest here: trials were classified based on 
subjective report of how free the choice of action was felt to be. In contrast, the 
focused was on participants’ subjective feeling of voluntariness associated with 
whatever choices they had in fact made, and not on the mechanisms that caused them 
to make those choices. 
 
8. 2      Methods 	  
Participants  
Twenty-three healthy participants took part in the study (5 female; mean age 22±2 
years). All participants gave written informed consent. Procedures were approved by 
the local ethical committee, and were in accordance with the Declaration of Helsinki. 
All participants had normal or corrected-to-normal vision. No participant had a 
history of neurological, major medical, or psychiatric disorder.  
 
Stimuli and procedure 
Each participant made manual actions to choose numbers on a screen using a 
trackball in experimental trials within three different contexts in a random number 
generation task.  
Each trial proceeded as follows (see figure 8.1). A white fixation cross was displayed 
on a black background. The duration of the fixation cross was sampled from a 
pseudologarithmic distribution, and ranged from 2 to 14 s. The fixation cross served 
as a variable period constituting an implicit baseline BOLD measure. Immediately 
after, either a sequence of four numbers (from 1 to 4) or four X’s appeared on the 
screen, above a 2x2 response grid. The position of each number in the grid was 
randomly assigned and changed in every trial. Participants held an MRI-compatible 
trackball on their lap. The mouse cursor was displayed on the screen using a red “+” 
sign, initially positioned on the centre of the response grid. Participants were 
instructed to select a number from the response grid by moving the mouse cursor to 
the chosen number and clicking on it. The choice of number was based in the 
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number stem presented (see below). Once the number was selected, it was displayed 
next to the stem for 0.8 s.  
In two of the contexts the question “How free was your choice?” (“Hoe VRIJ voelde 
je keuze aan?” in Dutch) was displayed above a visual analogue scale (VAS). The 
VAS had 10 subdivisions, and its extremes were labelled “Very free” and “Not free” 
(“HEEL vrij” and “NIET vrij”). The left-right orientation of the VAS labels was 
counterbalanced across participants, but kept constant for each participant 
throughout the practice and experimental sessions, to avoid confusion. Participants 
were asked to indicate how free they felt their choice had been by clicking with the 
cursor on the appropriate position. Participants were reminded that they could use 
the whole range of the VAS. 
The maximum response time for the number selection and the voluntariness rating 
was 5 s. If participants had given no response after this time had elapsed, a message 
appeared and the next trial started. 
First, conditions of intentional choice versus instructed choice were compared in a 
classical context (see below), operationally defined in the same way as the classical 
literature on free/instructed choices. Second, in an objective context, participants 
performed the free and instructed conditions again, but each trial was followed by a 
rating of how free they felt their immediately-preceding action choice had been. 
Finally, in the crucial subjective context, participants chose which of several actions 
to make following presentation of a suggestive stem stimulus, and rated on a 
continuous scale the extent to which their action choice had been free or not free, 
with respect to the information given in the suggestive stimulus.  
The subjective context necessarily involved a subjective rating, whilst the classical 
context did not, making it difficult to compare these conditions directly. The 
objective context was included to get round this problem, by providing a condition 
that was informationally equivalent to the classical context, but also included the 
element of introspective report. In this way, BOLD activity associated with the 
objective context could be contrasted with BOLD activity in the subjective context, 
because both contexts included both an action selection and a judgement event in 
each trial.  
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Figure 8.1: Experimental paradigm. A. General timing of events. Four numbers or four Xs 
were displayed on the screen (in the figure, # represents either a number or an X. The 
symbol # was never actually displayed in the experiment). Participants chose a number by 
clicking on it with a trackball. Participants were then asked to click on a visual analogue 
scale to rate how free their choice had been. B. The classical context was used to identify 
regions of interest associated with the contrast free > instructed in independent data.  In the 
objective context (C) trials were defined as free or instructed a priori. In objective free trials, 
a series of four X’s was displayed and participants were free to choose any number from the 
response grid. In objective instructed trials, participants saw a sequence of four identical 
numbers (“1 1 1 1” in this example) and participants were asked to complete the sequence 
by clicking on the same number that was displayed. Participants then indicated their feeling 
of voluntariness. In the subjective context (D) four numbers were displayed, and participants 
were asked to complete the sequence with the fifth number “in order to keep the sequence 
looking random” (see Methods for details). Trials were then classified a posteriori according 
to a median split of each participant’s subjective reports.  
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Classical context  
The classical context was designed to identify patterns of BOLD signal associated 
with free actions as classically defined (Richard E Passingham, Bengtsson, & Lau, 
2010). In free trials, the presented sequence was always “X X X X”. In these trials, 
participants were free to choose any of the four numbers (1, 2, 3 or 4) displayed on 
screen as their action. In instructed trials, the sequence contained one single number 
repeated four times (e.g., “1 1 1 1”). In these trials, participants were instructed to 
choose the number that was displayed on the screen (i.e., 1). The classical context 
was effectively used as a localizer, to define regions of interest (ROIs). The BOLD 
activity for the Objective and Subjective contexts (see below) was analyzed for ROIs 
identified independently from the data from the classical context.  
 
Objective context 
The main aim of this experiment was to compare the brain correlates of the extreme 
free and instructed conditions with those of a subjective context in which 
participants could themselves report how free their choice had been by means of a 
VAS (see below). In order to make the two contexts comparable, a VAS rating was 
included in the objective context. In this way, any BOLD activity differences 
between the objective and the subjective contexts could not be attributed to the mere 
presence of the VAS.  
 
Subjective context 
The subjective context aimed to provide participants with graded experiences of 
more or less free choice. Unlike in the other two contexts, the numerical stimulus 
presented in each trial contained a pseudorandomized sequence of numbers. 
Participants were instructed to use this sequence as a suggestive guide for their 
response. They were asked to choose a number that would make the stimulus 
sequence “look random”. It was assumed that folk knowledge would guide 
participants in their choices (Nickerson, 2002). Each participant might have felt 
highly constrained by some preceding sequences, and very unconstrained by other 
sequences. It was assumed that participants would report feeling less and more free 
in those trials respectively. A random sequence generation task was used as a means 
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to provide participants with a graded and reportable experience of voluntariness, in 
the sense of freedom from constraint. This could then be used this to investigate the 
brain activity associated with the experience of voluntariness.  
The numerical stimulus therefore served to prompt the next action choice to some 
extent. The extent to which it did so was assumed to influence feelings of subjective 
freedom of choice. Any of a number of rules could relate the numerical stimulus to 
the chosen action. Participants were asked to make the stimulus “look random”, and 
to report their subjective feeling of freedom of choice. The precise form of the 
completion rule used may vary across participants and was irrelevant to the purposes 
here. Instead, the main interest was the extent of constraint provided by the 
numerical stimulus and the self-selected rule. It was assumed that subjective reports 
of freedom of choice indicated this extent. In this way, voluntariness was not directly 
manipulated experimentally. Instead, introspection was taken as a reliable method to 
report the subjective experience. The extent of free choice was thus a dependent 
variable, in contrast to its normal status as an independent variable in the classical 
action selection literature. 
The sequences for the subjective context were generated by a pseudorandomized 
procedure. The measure of “stimulus space” was defined for each sequence as the 
number of different numbers present in the stem (irrespective of position). Thus, “3 3 
3 3”; “2 2 1 2”; “3 1 4 4” and “2 3 4 1” are sequences with stimulus spaces of 1, 2, 3 
and 4 respectively. The total of 160 trials in the subjective context were divided into 
4 blocks of 40 trials. Pilot results suggested that participants’ ratings of subjective 
freedom of choice were related to the size of stimulus space. Therefore, each block 
contained trials with all possible stimulus spaces in equal proportions. The sequences 
examplars for the subjective context were the same for all participants, to allow for 
potential comparisons across participants. Their order of appearance was randomized 
across blocks and trials.  
Additionally in the subjective context, a memory question was displayed every 10 
trials. A four-number sequence was presented and participants were asked if that 
sequence had been presented in the preceding 10 trials, with a maximum response 
time of 5 s. This memory question was aimed at encouraging participants to pay 
attention to the number stimuli presented on every trial.  The responses were not 
analyzed.  
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Each participant performed two consecutive blocks of 40 trials in each of the 
classical and objective contexts. They also performed 4 consecutive blocks of 40 
trials in the subjective context, which formed the key focus of the study.  The order 
of the contexts was randomized across participants.   
Before scanning, participants were trained with at least one practice block for each 
context, always in the same order: classical; objective, subjective. Training 
continued until participants felt comfortable with the task. The experiment in the 
scanner lasted approximately 70 min. 
After scanning, participants completed five personality questionnaires addressing 
feelings of control (Rotter, 1967) belief in free will (the free will and determinism 
scale, (Rakos, Laurene, Skala, & Slane, 2008); the social desirability scale (Crowne 
& Marlowe, 1960); and two self-control questionnaires (Rosenbaum, 1980; 
Tangney, Baumeister, & Boone, 2004). In addition participants completed a semi-
structured questionnaire about the strategies they had adopted in the completion of 
the random number sequences.  
 
fMRI data acquisition  
Participants were positioned head first and supine in the magnet bore. Images were 
collected with a 3T Trio MRI scanner system (Siemens Medical Systems, Erlangen, 
Germany), using an 8-channel radiofrequency head coil. First, 176 high-resolution 
anatomical images were acquired using a T1-weighted 3D MPRAGE sequence [TR 
= 2500 ms, TE = 2.58 ms, image matrix = 256 × 256, FOV = 220 mm, flip angle = 
7°, slice thickness = 0.90 mm, voxel size = 0.9 mm × 0.86 mm × 0.86 mm (resized to 
1 mm × 1 mm ×1 mm)]. Whole brain functional images were collected using a T2*-
weighted EPI sequence, sensitive to BOLD contrast (TR = 2000 ms, TE = 35 ms, 
image matrix = 64 × 64, FOV = 224 mm, flip angle = 80°, slice thickness = 3.0 mm, 
distance factor = 17%, voxel size 3.5 mm × 3.5 mm × 3 mm, 30 axial slices). A 
varying number of images were acquired per run due to the self-paced initiation of 
trials. 
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Data processing and analysis 
Trials with reaction times (RTs) (for either the number choice or the voluntariness 
rating) shorter than 0.2 s or longer than 5 s were discarded from the analysis. 
Instructed trials with incorrect responses were also discarded.  
The fMRI data were analyzed with statistical parametric mapping, using the SPM8 
software (Wellcome Trust Centre for Neuroimaging, University College London, 
London, UK). The first four scans of all EPI series were excluded from the analysis 
to minimize T1 relaxation artefacts. A mean image for all scan volumes was created, 
to which individual volumes were spatially realigned by rigid body transformation. 
The high resolution structural image was coregistered with the mean image of the 
EPI series. The structural image was normalized to the Montreal Neurological 
Institute template. The normalization parameters were then applied to the EPI images 
to ensure an anatomically informed normalization. A commonly applied filter of 8 
mm FWHM (full-width at half maximum) was used. The time series data at each 
voxel were processed using a high-pass filter with a cut-off of 128 s to remove low-
frequency drifts. The subject-level statistical analyses were performed using the 
general linear model. The events were defined as the onset time of the stem and 
response grid. Movement times were also included as parametric regressors to 
account for variance associated with simple motor activations All resulting vectors 
were convolved with the canonical haemodynamic response function (HRF) and its 
temporal derivative to form the main regressors in the design matrix (the regression 
model). Realignment parameters in all 6 dimensions were also entered in the model 
to account for variance associated with head motion. The statistical parameter 
estimates were computed separately for each voxel for all columns in the design 
matrix. Contrast images were constructed from each individual to compare the 
relevant parameter estimates for the regressors containing the canonical HRF. The 
group-level random effects analysis was then performed. The resulting maps were 
thresholded with p<0.001 and cluster-size corrected by means of Monte Carlo 
simulation. Accordingly significant effects were reported when the volume of the 
cluster was greater than the Monte Carlo simulation determined minimum cluster 
size volume (25 voxels), above which the probability of type I error was below 0.05 
(Cox, 1996).  
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8. 3      Results 	  
Behavioural results 
Trials from the classical and objective contexts were classified into “free” and 
“instructed” according to the stimulus presented in each trial: e.g., “1 1 1 1”, “2 2 2 
2” etc. were classified as instructed, and “X X X X” were classified as free. Instead, 
trials from the subjective context were classified into “feels instructed” and “feels 
free” by means of a median split on the distribution of each participants’ subjective 
reports. The median for each participant was calculated on the basis of all the valid 
trials (> 0.2 s and < 5 s of reaction time -RT-) across all four subjective context 
blocks.  
Thus, trials in the classical and objective contexts were classified a priori; whilst 
trials in the subjective context were classified a posteriori, on the basis of the 
participants’ subjective reports. As a validation of the design and analysis, the 
overall distribution was examined (for all participants) of the ratings of voluntariness 
for the objective free and instructed conditions separately. Overall, the proportion of 
free trials (“X X X X” displayed) subjectively classified as instructed was 4.1%, and 
the proportion of instructed trials (e.g. “2 2 2 2” displayed) subjectively classified as 
free was 4.3%. This shows that an a posteriori classification criterion (according to 
the voluntariness ratings) closely matched the a priori classification criterion 
(according to the information presented in the stimulus). The free and instructed 
conditions were therefore comparable across the objective and subjective contexts.  
 
To evaluate whether there were any differences in behaviour across conditions, mean 
RTs were obtained for free and instructed conditions (see figure 8.2). There were no 
differences between the RTs for free and instructed trials in the objective context 
(t22=0.68, p=0.503). However, in the subjective context, instructed trials had longer 
RTs than free trials (t22=4.93, p<0.001). Subjective instructed conditions imposed, by 
definition, more restrictions on the responses available to the participant than the 
subjective free choice condition. These restrictions will have followed from 
whatever rules the participant used to generate the response from the numbers 
presented in the stem sequence.  Applying these rules, and defining the available set 
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of response alternatives, may have been a time-demanding process that led to 
increased RTs in the instructed conditions. 
 
 
Figure 8.2: Mean reaction times across participants for all free and instructed trials in the 
objective and subjective conditions. Subjective instructed conditions were associated with 
longer reaction times than subjective free conditions (p < 0.001, see text). 
 
 
Subjective context – behavioural analysis 
As an initial approach to the behavioural analysis of the chosen numbers, the 
possibility that participants were following an exclusion rule for the stem completion 
task was examined. Crucially, the dependence between voluntariness rating and 
exclusion behavior was examined. This analysis provided insight on the factors that 
made some trials feel more or less voluntary. Exclusion trials were defined as those 
in which the number chosen in response to the stem was not included in the stimulus 
space. In contrast, inclusion trials were those in which the number chosen was 
included in the stimulus space. Trials with no repeated numbers were necessarily 
inclusion trials, because any number choice would be a repetition of a number 
already included in the stem. In other words, the dependent variable was not 
meaningful if all possible responses were already present in the stimulus space.  
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Therefore, this analysis could only be computed for trials where the stimulus space 
included at least one number repetition. Results showed that participants 
predominantly excluded the numbers present in the stimulus space. The exclusion 
ratio was then computed as the proportion of exclusion trials to the total number of 
valid trials. The mean exclusion ratio was 0.63±0.15 (± SD), and was significantly 
different from 0.5, which would have indicated no preference for exclusion 
behaviour (t22 = 4.06, p<0.001). However, the voluntariness ratings were not 
strongly related to a simple factor of exclusion vs. inclusion. The voluntariness 
ratings for exclusion trials and inclusion trials were 4.82±1.54 and 4.08±1.6 
respectively, and they were not significantly different (t22=1.7, p=0.1). 
To further analyze which factors may have influenced participants’ feelings of 
voluntariness, the number of digits in the presented sequence (i.e., the “stimulus 
space”) was correlated with the degree of perceived voluntariness (see figure 8.3).. A 
trend analysis revealed a significant and positive linear relationship F1,22=18.16, 
p<0.001) between feeling of voluntariness and stimulus space size. A stem sequence 
with only one number represented (e.g., “3 3 3 3”) has a stimulus space of 1. These 
sequences with small stimulus spaces were associated with responses having the 
lowest voluntariness ratings.  
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Figure 8.3: Average across participants of feelings of voluntariness as a function of the size 
of the stimulus space. Stimulus space is defined as the number of different digits present in 
the sequence shown. The sequences “3 3 3 3”; “2 2 1 2”; “3 1 4 4” and “2 3 4 1” are 
examples of sequences with stimulus spaces of 1, 2, 3 and 4 respectively.   
 
fMRI results 
Classical context, free vs. instructed 
First, the free and instructed conditions were contrasted.  This contrast served 
effectively as a functional localizer, based on the objective, classical definition of 
free and instructed action. The brain areas identified were used to define regions of 
interest (ROIs) in which BOLD activity for free and instructed trials was analyzed 
for the independently obtained in the objective and subjective contexts.  
The contrast free > instructed in the classical context revealed increased BOLD 
signal in RCZ/SMA, bilateral inferior parietal sulcus (IPL) left dorsolateral 
prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) and left premotor cortex (PMC) (see table 8.1). These 
findings are consistent with existent report of free action > instructed action contrasts 
(Cunnington et al., 2006; Lau et al., 2004;  Lau et al., 2006). 
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Table 8.1: Results of whole brain analysis in the classical context (free > instructed). The 
RCZ/SMA cluster extends to both rostral cingulate zone and supplementary motor area and 
is ambiguously identified by different toolboxes. RCZ, rostral-cingulate zone; SMA, 
supplementary motor area; IPL, inferior parietal lobe; DLPFC, dorsolateral prefrontal 
cortex; PC, precuneus.   
 
Area Peak coordinates (MNI space) Peak z-score Cluster size 
(number of 
voxels) x y z 
Right IPL 35 -63 
 
42 
 
5.42 
 
206 
 
Left IPL -28 
 
-70 
 
46 
 
4.88 
 
217 
 
RCZ/SMA -4 18 
 
49 4.82 
 
286 
 
Left DLPFC -35 49 
 
7 4.70 
 
113 
 
Precuneus 11 
 
-70 
 
53 4.62 
 
85 
 
Left PM -42 
 
4 39 
 
4.20 
 
112 
 
 
 
 
 
ROI analysis in objective and subjective contexts 
The ROIs identified in the free > instructed contrasts in the classical context were 
tested in independent data from the two other contexts; namely subjective and 
objective contexts.  
The difference between free and instructed conditions in the subjective context was 
not equivalent to the difference between free and instructed conditions in the 
objective context, for two main reasons. First, free and instructed conditions in the 
subjective case were defined by a median split of a feeling of voluntariness that 
varied along a continuum.  In contrast, in the objective context, they were defined as 
two categorically different situations. Therefore the subjective experiences of 
voluntariness corresponding to the subjective free and instructed conditions were not 
expected to be categorically different, in contrast to the objective context. In 
addition, added “noise” due to errors in subjective report could reduce the strength of 
the contrast between instructed and intentional conditions in the subjective context, 
relative to the objective context. For these reasons, a factorial analysis was not 
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appropriate. Instead, the percent signal change was compared between free and 
instructed conditions within each context.  
This analysis was done within each of the ROIs identified by the free > instructed 
contrast in the classical context (see Table 8.1). The only difference between the 
classical context, used to identify the ROIs, and the objective context is that the latter 
also included a VAS judgement. Thus, unsurprisingly, all six ROIs analyzed showed 
increased levels of BOLD activity in the free condition as compared to the instructed 
conditions in the objective context.  
Strikingly however, when this analysis was repeated in the subjective context, the 
pattern of BOLD activity did not match the one in the classical context  (see figure 
8.4 and table 8.2). Indeed, in five of the six ROIs identified, the difference in BOLD 
activity between free and instructed conditions was reversed in the subjective context 
compared to the objective context. In two ROIs (right IPL and left PM) this reversed 
pattern was statistically significant. In these areas, the BOLD activity was 
statistically lower for actions that felt free as compared to actions that felt less free, 
but was nevertheless statistically higher for actions that were objectively free, as 
compared to instructed.   
 
 
Chapter	  8	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Introspecting	  voluntariness	  	  
258	  	  
 
 
Figure 8.4 Effect of subjective feeling of free action in brain areas defined by objective 
freedom of action. Results of the ROI analysis for RCZ/SMA, right and left IPL, left DLPFC 
and left PMC. ROIs were defined on the basis of the free > instructed contrast in the 
classical context. Percent signal change from data from two independent datasets were then 
determined in those ROIs. BOLD activations from the objective context correspond to that 
found in the classical context. On the contrary, BOLD signal from the subjective context 
follows an inverse pattern in all but one (the precuneus) of the ROIs identified. Error bars 
show standard error of the mean. RCZ, rostral cingulate zone; SMA, supplementary motor 
area; IPL, inferior parietal lobe; DLPFC, dorsolateral prefrontal cortex; PC, precuneus.   
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Table 8.2: Results of statistical tests for each region of interest, as identified by the free > 
instructed localizer, derived from the independent data in the classical context.  
 
Region of interest 
(peak MNI 
coordinates) 
Pairwise comparisons 
Free - 
instructed in 
objective 
context 
Free - instructed 
in subjective 
context 
t22  p t22 p 
RCZ/SMA (-4 18 49) 7.13 <0.001 -1.33 0.19 
lDLPFC (-35 49 7) 4.54 <0.001 -1.23 0.23 
lIPL (-28 -70 46) 4.83 <0.001 -1.02 0.32 
rIPL(35 -63 42) 3.31 0.003 -2.05 0.05 
lPM(-42 4 39) 3.80 <0.001 -2.07 0.05 
Precuneus (11 -70 53) 1.06 0.302 2.41 0.02 
 
 
Subjective context – whole brain analysis 
BOLD activity associated with voluntary choice as identified by subjective report 
did not match with that identified by a classical contrast between free and instructed 
actions. Specifically, in those areas identified by classical free > instructed choice, 
there was no evidence for stronger activity when participants felt subjectively more 
free compared to when they felt subjectively less free. In this sense, objectively and 
subjectively defined free choice did not overlap. However, no direct inferences about 
interaction effects can be made by the simple combination of two independent t-	  tests 
(Nieuwenhuis, Forstmann, & Wagenmakers, 2011). Therefore, to further examine 
the mechanisms associated with the feeling of voluntariness, and their relationship to 
the objective operationalization of free action, a whole-brain analysis was done for 
the contrast free > instructed (median split) in the subjective context. This analysis 
controlled for effects of stimulus space and RT by including them as regressors in 
the first-level model. Only one area, in the medial postcentral region, showed 
increased BOLD signal for this contrast after whole-brain correction by means of a 
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Monte Carlo simulation (see figure 8.5). BOLD signal showed two peaks of activity 
in this region, in MNI coordinates (x = 4 y = -21 z = 49) and (x = 0, y = -28, z = 53. 
This pattern of BOLD activation did not share any commonalities with the pattern 
found for the contrast free > instructed in the objective context, confirming the 
results from the ROI analysis 
 
 
 
Figure 8.5: Subjective free > subjective instructed in whole brain (blue) and objective free > 
objective istructed (green). Panels A,B,C show coronal, sagittal and axial planes 
respectively. Blue: Postcentral region showing increased BOLD signal for the contrast free > 
instructed in the median split data from the subjective context. BOLD signal peaked at MNI 
coordinates (x = 4 y = -21 z = 49) and (x = 0 y = -28 z = 53). Results from this contrast in 
the subjective context are non-overlapping with those from the same contrast in the classical 
context (green). BOLD activations were corrected for multiple comparisons by means of a 
Monte Carlo simulation (p<0.001, minimum cluster size: 25 voxels). 
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8. 4      Discussion  
Free action has classically been operationalized as action that is underdetermined by 
the external environment, and is therefore not stimulus-bound. It has been contrasted 
with instructed action, in which actions are fully specified by external stimuli. 
Although this objective operationalization does not make explicit reference to the 
subjective experience of acting freely, the objective and subjective freedom of action 
are often implicitly assumed to be related (Richard E Passingham et al., 2010; 
Schüür & Haggard, 2011), see for example (I. Goldberg et al., 2008).  
This study investigated the relation between the classic operational definitions of 
free and instructed action and the subjective feeling of acting freely. Participants 
chose in each trial between one of four alternative actions. BOLD activations were 
measured in classical conditions in which these free and instructed actions were 
defined in the objective, classical way: either the choice of action was left to the 
participant (free trials), or the choice of action was fully specified in each trial 
(instructed trials). Results were in line with previous literature. In particular, they 
confirmed that medial frontal and parietal BOLD activity is associated with free 
actions. Results of the comparison between free and instructed conditions showed 
significantly greater BOLD responses for free compared with instructed in 
RCZ/SMA, left DLPFC, bilateral IPL and left PMC. These results are consistent 
with previous reports (Cunnington et al., 2006; Lau et al., 2004; Lau et al., 2006). 
When participants were additionally asked to rate how free their choices felt, 
subjective reports in this objective context were also consistent with the operational 
definitions of free and instructed choice, and BOLD contrasts replicated previous 
studies. This part of the results is broadly consistent with the classical view of 
voluntary action. Moreover, it confirms, seemingly for the first time, that the neural 
process of internal generation of action produce an experience of free selection 
(Krieghoff et al., 2011). 
Next, this pattern of BOLD activations was compared with those obtained in a 
subjective context where participants selected actions according to the combination 
of a numerical stimulus stem and a completion rule (“look random”). The 
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completion rule aimed at providing each participant with a situation in which they 
could experience an ecologically valid graded sense of voluntariness. 
It was assumed that participants might use completion rules to conform to the 
required “random appearance” of sequences. The precise completion rule (e.g., 
repetition avoidance, (Ginsburg & Karpiuk, 1994) could vary across participants 
according to their conceptions of randomness. 
Although the completion rule was not considered to be critical in the context of this 
experiment, a simple analysis was carried out, to determine the factors affecting 
participants’ number choices, and voluntariness ratings. As an initial approach, 
possible strategies for exclusion/inclusion strategies were sought in each 
participant’s data.  Exclusion trials were defined as those in which the number 
chosen was not included in the presented stem.  Inclusion trials were defined as those 
where the number chosen was already included in the stem. Results revealed that 
participants tended to base their number choice on an exclusion strategy. Crucially 
however, the mean voluntariness ratings did not differ between inclusion and 
exclusion trials, suggesting that participants took into account additional factors, 
independent from the exclusion behavior, to evaluate the degree of voluntariness of 
each choice. In other words, the pattern of BOLD activity revealed by a contrast 
between choices subjectively rated as free vs. instructed cannot be simply explained 
by exclusion-related activity.  
In addition, the mean voluntariness ratings were compared across all possible 
stimulus set sizes, where the stimulus set size was defined at the number of different 
numbers present in the stem. Participants felt less free in responding to sequences 
with low stimulus space values  (e.g. “3 3 3 3”), perhaps because these sequences 
would have strongly precluded choosing the repeated response (e.g., “3”). 
In contrast, sequences with stimulus spaces of 4 (e.g., “3 2 1 4”) were associated 
with the highest voluntariness ratings.  Two possible reasons for this effect may be 
cited.  First, such sequences may have appeared to offer no particular constraint on 
participants’ choice. Second, stems with a stimulus space of 4 involved no number 
repetitions within the stem.  As a result, participants could not use an exclusion rule.  
At the same time, responses to these stimuli were consistently rated as the most free. 
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Therefore, the ability to use an exclusion rule (i.e., simply choose the number that is 
not included in the stem) is unlikely to be the core of feeling free. 
However, the actual rules used for “random” generation are not relevant for the 
analysis reported here, and the requirement to generate random numbers served 
merely to provide a plausible response space within which some responses might 
seem more free than others. This subjective experience was considered, 
independently of the precise completion rule adopted, and independently of the 
objective randomness of the response. Trials associated with higher subjective 
ratings were contrasted with those with lower subjective ratings of voluntariness. 
The neural correlates of the subjective feeling of freedom were quite different from 
the neural correlates of free choice as classically operationalized. The ROI analysis 
revealed that in five of the ROIs identified (ACC, left IPL, right IPL, left DLPFC 
and left PMC), BOLD activity in the objective context was higher for free trials as 
compared with instructed trials. In stark opposition, in the subjective context BOLD 
activity showed was numerically lower for free trials in all of these five ROIs, and 
was significantly lower in two (right IPL and left PMC). Only one area, the 
precuneus, showed the same pattern of BOLD activity in the objective and subjective 
contexts.  In fact, the contrast between free and instructed choices in this ROI did not 
reach statistical significance in either the objective or the subjective context, making 
this result hard to interpret. Increases in precuneus BOLD activity are not typically 
associated with voluntary action. Instead, the precuneus has been linked to self-
referential tasks and experience of agency (Cavanna & Trimble, 2006). Intriguingly 
however, multivariate patterns of activity in this area can predict outcomes of free 
choices (Soon et al., 2008).  
A whole brain fMRI analysis identified a cluster of BOLD activation in a medial 
postcentral area correlating with the reported subjective feelings of free>instructed 
choices. This did not overlap with any of the areas identified by the free > instructed 
contrast in the classical context. Together, these results suggest that the classic 
operationalization of free action and the subjective experience of choosing freely are 
dissociated. Therefore, classifying actions according to the subjective report of how 
free they feel revealed a brain area that had not been reported before in studies of 
volition and free action selection. The increase in BOLD activity in the medial 
postcentral cortex correlated with the subjective feeling of freedom in choosing 
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actions, but was not related to the objective informational definition of free action. 
Therefore, these results may argue that the feeling of acting freely in naturalistic 
situations may be independent of the classical objective distinction between free and 
instructed choice.  
 These results give rise to three main questions. First, why does the subjective 
experience of acting freely dissociate from the classical experimental manipulations 
of free action? Second, what is the functional relevance of the postcentral area found 
to be related to subjective feelings of acting freely? And finally, what is the 
significance of subjective report in the study of volition?  
 
Why are the objective and subjective contexts dissociated? 
To understand why the subjective experience of acting freely does not correspond to 
the objective operationalization of free action, it was examined which stimuli 
selected by participants were reported to be based on free choices, and which stimuli 
made them report feelings of not acting freely. 
These analyses revealed that restricted “stimulus spaces” (i.e., stimulus sequences 
containing only a few digits, such as “1 1 1 1”) were associated with low ratings of 
voluntariness. In contrast, sequences with large stimulus spaces were associated with 
high feelings of voluntariness. Presumably, participants interpreted the completion 
rule of keeping sequences “looking random” as forbidding simply repeating the 
single stimulus number. In contrast, a stimulus space with 4 items, such as the 
stimulus sequence “3 2 1 4” was associated with high feelings of voluntariness.  
This behavioural result interestingly suggests that perceived voluntariness in our task 
is not related to the number of available alternatives but is instead related to how 
strongly the environment precludes otherwise available alternatives.  
 
 
Alternative accounts 
Several alternative explanations for the dissociation between objective and 
subjective context should be considered here. There were differences in the patterns 
of BOLD activity associated with the free > instructed contrast between the objective 
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and subjective contexts. Clearly, the two contexts differed in more than one respect. 
For example, the subjective context required a complex evaluation of the number 
sequence and may have recruited random generation processes (Jahanshahi et al., 
2000). In addition, the experimental design included a memory question about the 
number sequences in the subjective, but the objective context did not.  The 
subjective context involved experiences of free action choice which was clearly 
graded, and could vary along a continuum, while the objective context involved 
experiences which participants unhesitatingly recognized as located at the extreme 
ends of this continuum. Arguably however, the differences in BOLD activity 
identified between objective and subjective contexts cannot be easily explained by 
differences in task demands. The mental processes such as random number 
generation would have occurred in both trials felt as more free and trials felt as less 
free within the subjective context, but would have occurred in none of the trials in 
the objective context. Consequently, the comparison between free and instructed 
trials within each context would have subtracted out any potential BOLD activity 
that was directly related to differential task demands. 
Alternatively, the differences in patterns of BOLD activations may be related to the 
nature of the free/instructed distinction in each context. There is a strong and 
categorical difference between free and instructed trials in the objective context. 
Conversely, the difference between free and instructed trials in the subjective context 
is slight and gradual. This alternative explanation would predict smaller differences 
between free and instructed conditions in the subjective context as compared to the 
objective context, but in the same direction. This was not the case. There was a trend 
in all ROIs identified (except the precuneus) for an inversion of the pattern of BOLD 
activation in the subjective context, as compared with the objective context. This 
trend became significant in two of the six ROIs analyzed, namely the right IPL and 
left PM. More strongly, the free > instructed contrast in the subjective context 
revealed significant increases in BOLD activity in the postcentral area that were not 
significant in the objective context. 
To account for an inversion in patterns of BOLD activity, it would be necessary to 
appeal to an implausible inversion of the meaning of the terms “very free” and “not 
free” on the part of the participants. Therefore, simple differences in the nature of 
free and instructed contexts cannot easily account for the results reported here.  
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Instead, the subjective feeling of acting freely may be associated with increased 
BOLD activity in the postcentral area. However, other more speculative explanations 
cannot be ruled out. For example, activity in the medial postcentral cortex may 
reflect increased difficulty in finding a random-looking sequence, or other 
differences related to task processing such as the amount of information that was 
taken into consideration for the number choice.  
Importantly however, previous data do not strongly support these alternative 
accounts.  Increased task difficulty is typically associated with prefrontal, and not 
mediocentral areas (e.g., Barch et al., 1997).   
 
The role of restricted choice on BOLD activity 
Trials in the subjective context represent an intermediate situation between the two 
objective extremes of free and instructed actions. In other words, even those trials 
subjectively judged as instructed will require a certain degree of choice.  
Two relevant studies have addressed the effect of varying degrees of choice on 
BOLD activity. Forstmann et al (Forstmann et al., 2006) designed a task selection 
experiment, in which participants were either instructed on which task to perform, or 
could choose the task between either two or three task alternatives. They found that 
BOLD activity in RCZ was higher for task choice conditions, but did not vary with 
the scope of choice (i.e., two vs. three possible tasks). This may explain why here 
there were no significant BOLD signal increases in the classical areas related to free 
choice in the subjective context. However, and importantly, limited set of response 
alternatives cannot readily explain the increase in BOLD activity in the medial 
postcentral region.  
In a previous study (van Eimeren et al., 2006) participants were asked to freely select 
one out of a number of available response alternatives, ranging from 1 to 4. This 
design, which did not include a subjective judgement component, allowed the 
authors to compare conditions of no selection (only one available alternative), 
restricted selection (between 2 and 3 available alternatives) and full selection (all 
four available alternatives). If the medial postcentral activation is simply due to a 
limited availability of alternatives, then the present results should also have revealed 
the activations observed in the study by van Eimeren et al (van Eimeren et al., 2006) 
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in the contrast of restricted selection > no selection conditions. Their contrast 
revealed increased BOLD activity in frontal areas (rostral SMA, rostral ACC and 
right DLPFC), premotor areas (bilateral rostro-dorsal premotor cortex) and parietal 
areas (bilateral superior parietal lobule, anterior inferior parietal sulcus, bilateral 
parieto-occipital sulcus and bilateral cerebellum) but not in the medial postcentral 
cortex that are reported here. The results by Van Eimeren (2006) do not support the 
possibility that the BOLD activation in the medial postcentral area is simply related 
to the limited response space of alternatives.  
 
What is the function of the medial postcentral region? 
Could the activation in the medial postcentral area be due to a confound in the task, 
rather than a true correlate of experience of free choice? Here several alternative 
explanations are examined.  
In tasks requiring free selection, human participants typically hold their previous 
responses in working memory. Monitoring the contents of working memory can then 
prevent repetition of behaviour, and can promote generation of seemingly random 
response sequences (Goldman & Rosvold, 1970). Consequently, working memory 
acts as a confound that is hard to separate from free selection. Increased working 
memory load has been associated with increases in BOLD activity in IPL (Rowe, 
Toni, Josephs, Frackowiak, & Passingham, 2000), but not in DLPFC (Hadland et al., 
2001). Given that the objective context led to relatively little cognitive load, it is 
possible that participants were additionally monitoring their previous history of 
choices when selecting a response. This would have meant increased working 
memory function in the objective context. On the other hand, the more cognitively 
demanding subjective context may have precluded working memory effects on free 
trials. This could explain the attenuation of BOLD activity in the ROIs analyzed. 
However, these results revealed not just attenuation, but an inversion of the free-
instructed difference in the subjective compared to the objective context. Working 
memory accounts cannot easily explain this inversion. 
The phenomenology of free action has rarely been addressed experimentally, despite 
a strong theoretical interest in the issue (Nahmias, Morris, & Nadelhoffer, 2004), but 
see (Haggard, Cartledge, Dafydd, & Oakley, 2004). The postcentral area that was 
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found to correlate with the experience of free choice has been related to resting state 
(Mazoyer et al., 2001) and default network functions (Mason et al., 2007). However, 
this area is not generally identified as a core component of the default mode network. 
Nevertheless, these data remain compatible with the idea that this area may be linked 
to reflective processes that give rise to the conscious feeling of free will (Goldberg et 
al., 2008). 
 
What is the value of relying on subjective experience? 
Unlike previous studies (e.g., van Eimeren et al., 2006) here it was not assumed that 
the subjective feelings of voluntariness would directly correlate with the number of 
available alternatives. Instead, participants were given a complex rule and were 
allowed to interpret it. In this way, the aim was to distil the bases of the feelings of 
voluntariness, independently from any preconceptions from the experimenter’s part.  
Subjective report provides unique access to phenomenal consciousness (Chalmers, 
1997), but is notoriously problematic as a guide to neural bases of experience. In this 
vein, a recent report by Guggisberg et al (Guggisberg, Dalal, Schnider, & Nagarajan, 
2011) has directly addressed the neural correlates of the subjective experience 
related to voluntary action. In an MEG study, the authors investigated the neural 
substrates of sensory events, of actual movements, and of intentions to move. In 
addition, they characterized the neural substrates of introspection about the timing of 
each of these events. They found that the spatial extent of the neural correlates of 
introspection of events did not match the neural loci of the first order events at which 
introspection was directed (but see Lau et al., 2004) for the opposite result). The 
present study mirrors that by Guggisberg et al (2011) in the sense that the brain areas 
that underlie introspection about a given process (here the feeling of free choice 
between action alternatives) do not appear to overlap with the brain areas that 
implement the the first order processes (i.e., choosing between action alternatives) to 
which that introspection refers. 
Several other studies have directly addressed the subjective experience of intending 
to act. These studies have revealed an involvement of both frontal and parietal areas 
in the phenomenology of intended action. For example, Fried et al (Fried et al., 
1991) found that direct electrical stimulation to medial frontal cortex led to 
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subjective “urges” to act. More recently, Kühn and Haggard (Simone Kühn, Brass, & 
Haggard, 2012) found that BOLD activity in a caudal portion of SMA correlated 
with the strength of the “temporal binding” effect, which has been suggested as an 
implicit marker of agency (Haggard et al., 2002). On the other hand, Desmurget et al 
(Desmurget et al., 2009) reported the conscious experience of intending to act 
following direct stimulation of the parietal cortex. These studies have associated 
medio-frontal and parietal areas to the feeling of intended action, but not the 
postcentral area reported here. One important difference between those studies and 
the present study should be pointed out. In those studies, the timing of action was not 
specified, but was left up to the participant. Consequently, the subjective experience 
of action intention may be related to the feeling of impending action. In the present 
experiment, in contrast, an action was to be made at a specific time. Actions could 
only differ in terms of their freedom of constraint by the external environment. 
Therefore, the subjective experience reported here was not related to the feeling of 
being about to act, but rather with the feeling of internal generation of response 
alternatives.  To use the terminology of Brass and Haggard’s what, when, whether 
model (Brass & Haggard, 2008) the feeling corresponded to the “what” component 
of volition, not to the “when” component.  
Importantly, these results do not undermine the validity of classical operational 
distinctions between free and instructed choice, nor do they rule out some relation 
between the classical operational distinction of free action and the experience of free 
choice. However, they do suggest that the experience of free choice of action is not 
simply a consequence of the same brain processes involved in free action selection.  
According to some theories, consciousness of a stimulus is simply a result of neural 
activity in particular brain areas that process information about the stimulus 
(Blankenburg et al., 2003; Libet, Alberts, Wright, & Feinstein, 1967).  The present 
results suggest that the conscious experience of choosing what to do does not work 
in this way. Where then, does the experience of free choice arise? There are at least 
two possibilities. First, the feeling of freely choosing might be closer to a 
confabulation than to a perception.  It might not be a bona fide experience at all 
(Wegner, 2002). Some support for this view comes from evidence on the perception 
of conscious intention.  When people freely choose between alternative manual 
responses, the experience of volition appears to be generated by processes occurring 
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after action selection, rather than before (Haggard & Eimer, 1999). On this view, the 
process of selection itself might not produce any direct phenomenal consequences. 
Second, the feeling of voluntary choice might indeed be a genuine experience, but it 
would be generated by a pathway parallel to the (unconscious) pathway that 
generates action itself (Cleeremans, 2011; Wegner, 2002).  
 
 
 
8. 5      Conclusion 
This experiment relates to the traditional philosophical question of “free will”. 
People generally feel that they choose their own actions (Nichols, 2011). Here, the 
aim was not to contribute to the debate over whether free will exists, or how it might 
be compatible with the neurobiological determinism. Rather, this study attempted to 
investigate the feeling of free will scientifically. Choosing between alternative 
actions in the absence of any external instruction generates a phenomenal experience 
that people can report (N. Block, 1996). These results suggest that this experience 
may not directly derive from brain circuits involved in intentional action selection, 
but from other brain areas. fMRI is a correlational method, so these results cannot 
reveal whether these other brain areas generate a subjective experience of free action 
choice by confabulation, or by some form of internal monitoring of action selection 
processes. The present results do suggest, however, that the feeling of free action 
choice is not straightforwardly generated by action choice itself. 
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Chapter 9 General discussion 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This general discussion provides a brief integrative overview of the general common 
findings of the experiments described in this thesis. Finally, it comments on the 
implications of the research presented for the development of individual and social 
moral responsibility.   
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9. 1      Conclusions  
Human intentional behaviour is widely recognized to have 'freedom from 
immediacy' (Shadlen & Gold, 2004), meaning that intentional decisions to act and 
inhibit action depend on the wide integration of information beyond any single 
current stimulus. These other factors may include, for example, memory for previous 
experience and predictions of future outcomes and more abstract entities such as 
values, moral rules, etc. However, what exactly makes intentional action intentional 
is still an unresolved question in the literature (See section 1.2.4).  
This thesis took a critical position relative to what intentional behaviour is, and in 
what ways it can be distinguished from instructed behaviour. Importantly, this thesis 
explored how intentional behaviour is best operationally defined for its empirical 
study, and to what extent the classical distinction between instructed and intentional 
processes can be generalized from action to other aspects of behaviour, such as 
inhibition.  
Taking this critical perspective, this approach has generated four main findings that 
contribute to the understanding of the mechanisms supporting intentional behaviour.  
 
1. Intentional behaviour differs from instructed behaviour 
Several previous empirical studies had compared the neural correlates of intentional 
and instructed actions. Chiefly on the basis of neuroimaging and lesion studies, a 
distinction between intentional and instructed action has been proposed, but has also 
been heavily criticized. Useful distinctions can be generalized beyond the domain for 
which they were originally developed. Therefore, and given the importance of 
inhibition of action in voluntary control, this thesis has attempted to generalize the 
instructed/intentional distinction from action to inhibition of action. 
A review of the existing evidence for intentional inhibition (chapter 1) was provided, 
and three experimental chapters (chapters 2, 3 and 4) directly addressed potential 
differences between instructed and intentional inhibition. Together, the results 
reported here revealed that different processes occurring in the period before 
response execution differ between instructed and intentional behaviour, both in cases 
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of action and inhibition. Therefore, the results argue for a general and 
neurophysiologically meaningful division between two kinds of behaviour.  
 
2. Intentional behaviour is associated with weak commitment to action decisions 
Intentional decisions are allegedly the result of internal deliberation processes, and 
not just automatized responses to unpredictable changes in the external environment. 
Therefore, because intentional actions are associated with motivations for action, an 
intuitive account would predict that intentional behaviour will has stronger neural 
underpinnings than the corresponding instructed behaviour.  
Results from chapters 2, 3 and 5 suggest that this intuitive account may not hold. 
Presumably because the alternative course of behaviour is always in principle 
available, intentional decisions seem to represent situations in which the 
counterfactual response alternative remains more active, and active until a later point 
in the response generation process, than instructed decisions.  
A note of caution is important here. The experiments in this thesis presented 
participants with situations that were mostly inconsequential, and in which the 
outcome of their decisions would have little impact on the participants’ future 
circumstances. It is neither practical nor efficient to study life-changing action 
decisions in a laboratory experiment. The recourse to study these relatively minor 
decisions used here may explain the “intermediate” nature of intentional behaviour. 
In truly naturalistic situations, the relative strengths of the neural codes associated 
with intentional and instructed actions may not be consistent with what has been 
reported here. This point is well illustrated by the results from chapter 4. 
Electrophysiological measures taken before the time of conscious decisions about 
whether to act or delay a reaction transiently revealed that unconscious preceding 
neural activity may impact on conscious decisions. However, and importantly, these 
effects could be apparently overridden by external instructions. In everyday 
situations, other internal or external signals could presumably override any weak 
effects of the previous states of the brain, that were shown to bias decisions towards 
one or another response alternative.  
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3. Representations of intentional actions are persistent 
Chapter 6 of thesis revealed an interesting and unexpected corollary of the relative 
weakness of intentional decisions. If it is true that the representation of the chosen 
response alternative is weaker in cases of intentional decisions as compared to 
instructed decisions, this implies that the representation of the non-selected 
alternatives is also stronger in intentional decisions. Therefore, even after intentional 
response selection has taken place, the neural representation of the non-chosen 
alternatives is maintained, and can potentially affect behaviour. This may not be the 
case in situations of instructed decisions, where strong external signals provide clear 
and unambiguous drive for the suppression of the neural activity associated with the 
“incorrect” response alternatives.  
 
4. Introspective reports may enrich models of intentional behaviour  
Arguably, one of the most interesting aspects of intentional action is precisely what 
it feels like to act intentionally. In stark contrast, the traditional approach the 
experimental study of intentional action has favoured functional definitions of 
behaviour, disregarding the different experiences associated with these different 
behaviours. Implicit in the intentional action literature, there is the assumption that 
the objective definitions of intentional action faithfully capture the subjective 
experience of acting intentionally.  
However this important assumption had never been challenged. The neural processes 
responsible for the emergence of the subjective experience of “having free will” 
remain largely unexplored. In chapter 8 the neural correlates of this ubiquitous 
subjective experience was directly addressed. Two interesting results emerged. In the 
first place, participants were able to consistently introspect on their feelings of 
voluntariness. Second, the brain correlates of intentional action identified on the 
basis of subjective measures did not match those that are typically identified on the 
basis of objective measures. These results demonstrate that subjective experience can 
usefully be integrated into experimental paradigms, to provide novel insights into 
neurocognitive questions. They also challenge the recent view that experiences, such 
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as urge and intention, are a direct conscious correlate of neural activity in motor 
areas of the brain. Instead, they point to a distinction between the information 
processes underlying action control and the subjective experience of action control, 
at least for the action selection processes studied in chapter 8. 
 
9. 2      Social implications 
As a final note, the potential social significance of understanding the neural basis of 
intentional behaviour should be discussed. Humans are social animals with a 
sophisticated pattern of interactions, based on reciprocity. All human societies have a 
concept of moral responsibility for action, which in addition, presupposes the 
capacity for intentional inhibition: the individual could have refrained from an action 
that they made. This socially accepted concept of intentions leads to a praise of motu 
proprio. Doing -or refraining from doing- something as a consequence of an 
instruction does not have the same value as doing something out of personal 
convictions and intentions. Thus, the understanding of what makes an action 
intentional, and what allows the action to be intentionally suppressed, is crucial for a 
full understanding of the extent of moral responsibility.  
This thesis aimed to shed some light on the neurophysiological, cognitive, and 
subjective mechanisms involved in intentional behaviour. A better understanding of 
neurophysiological changes may eventually lead to changes in social concepts or 
morality and responsibility. However, much care should be taken to avoid direct 
transitions from “neural ‘is’ to moral ‘ought’” (Greene, 2003). Other foundations are 
required to draw any conclusions about issues on morality and social responsibility.  
 
One point not explored here is the development of intentional behaviour across the 
lifespan. Newborns act only guided instructed by the external environment and their 
own internal states. These internal states may be initially precarious, and related 
mainly to physiological needs. They become gradually more sophisticated over time. 
Children gradually learn to overcome prepotent behaviours e.g., (Snyder & 
Munakata, 2010). First, they learn to do as they are told, even if this involves going 
against obtaining immediate rewards. Then, children slowly start to regulate their 
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behaviour even in the absence of external cues, and therefore in an intentional 
manner. 
Interestingly, a child may be irritated when she is asked or told to do something that 
she was planning to do in any case. This suggests that the concept of intentionality, 
and its distinction from instructedness, appears early in development. The question 
of how both the capacity for intentional behaviour and the concept of intentional 
behaviour may develop remains largely unexplored. Moreover, the relationship and 
interdependence between behavioural capacity and conceptual understanding of 
intention is unknown.  Further, the relationship to both with the concept of self has 
not been explored. These questions may be difficult to address experimentally, from 
a neuroscientific standpoint. At the same time, they are part of what makes us 
human. This thesis has illustrated one way in which introspection and subjective 
report can be incorporated into neurophysiological paradigms, suggesting promising 
and innovative future research directions.  
	  
References	  	  
277	  	  
References 	  Aron,	  A.	  R.	  (2010).	  From	  Reactive	  to	  Proactive	  and	  Selective	  Control:	  Developing	  a	  Richer	  Model	  for	  Stopping	  Inappropriate	  Responses.	  Biological	  Psychiatry,	  
69(12),	  e55–e68.	  doi:10.1016/j.biopsych.2010.07.024	  Aron,	  A.	  R.,	  Behrens,	  T.	  E.,	  Smith,	  S.,	  Frank,	  M.	  J.,	  &	  Poldrack,	  R.	  A.	  (2007).	  Triangulating	  a	  cognitive	  control	  network	  using	  diffusion-­‐weighted	  magnetic	  resonance	  imaging	  (MRI)	  and	  functional	  MRI.	  Journal	  of	  Neuroscience,	  27(14),	  3743.	  Aron,	  A.	  R.,	  &	  Poldrack,	  R.	  A.	  (2006).	  Cortical	  and	  subcortical	  contributions	  to	  stop	  signal	  response	  inhibition:	  role	  of	  the	  subthalamic	  nucleus.	  Journal	  of	  
Neuroscience,	  26(9),	  2424–2433.	  Averbeck,	  B.	  B.,	  Chafee,	  M.	  V.,	  Crowe,	  D.	  A.,	  &	  Georgopoulos,	  A.	  P.	  (2002).	  Parallel	  processing	  of	  serial	  movements	  in	  prefrontal	  cortex.	  Proceedings	  of	  the	  National	  
Academy	  of	  Sciences,	  99(20),	  13172–13177.	  doi:10.1073/pnas.162485599	  Baker,	  K.	  S.,	  Piriyapunyaporn,	  T.,	  &	  Cunnington,	  R.	  (2012).	  Neural	  activity	  in	  readiness	  for	  incidental	  and	  explicitly	  timed	  actions.	  Neuropsychologia.	  doi:10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2011.12.026	  Bancaud,	  J.,	  Talairach,	  J.,	  Geier,	  S.,	  Bonis,	  A.,	  Trottier,	  S.,	  &	  Manrique,	  M.	  (1976).	  Behavioral	  manifestations	  induced	  by	  electric	  stimulation	  of	  the	  anterior	  cingulate	  gyrus	  in	  man.	  Revue	  neurologique,	  132(10),	  705.	  Banks,	  W.	  P.,	  &	  Isham,	  E.	  A.	  (2009).	  We	  Infer	  Rather	  Than	  Perceive	  the	  Moment	  We	  Decided	  to	  Act.	  Psychological	  Science,	  20(1),	  17	  –21.	  Barch,	  D.	  M.,	  Braver,	  T.	  S.,	  Nystrom,	  L.	  E.,	  Forman,	  S.	  D.,	  Noll,	  D.	  C.,	  &	  Cohen,	  J.	  D.	  (1997).	  Dissociating	  working	  memory	  from	  task	  difficulty	  in	  human	  prefrontal	  cortex.	  
Neuropsychologia,	  35(10),	  1373–1380.	  doi:10.1016/S0028-­‐3932(97)00072-­‐9	  
References	  	  
278	  	  
Baumeister,	  R.	  F.,	  Schmeichel,	  B.	  J.,	  &	  Vohs,	  K.	  D.	  (2007).	  Self-­‐regulation	  and	  the	  executive	  function:	  The	  self	  as	  controlling	  agent.	  Social	  psychology:	  Handbook	  of	  
basic	  principles,	  516–539.	  Beckmann,	  M.,	  Johansen-­‐Berg,	  H.,	  &	  Rushworth,	  M.	  F.	  S.	  (2009).	  Connectivity-­‐Based	  Parcellation	  of	  Human	  Cingulate	  Cortex	  and	  Its	  Relation	  to	  Functional	  Specialization.	  The	  Journal	  of	  Neuroscience,	  29(4),	  1175–1190.	  doi:10.1523/JNEUROSCI.3328-­‐08.2009	  Beisteiner,	  R.,	  Windischberger,	  C.,	  Lanzenberger,	  R.,	  Edward,	  V.,	  Cunnington,	  R.,	  Erdler,	  M.,	  …	  Deecke,	  L.	  (2001).	  Finger	  Somatotopy	  in	  Human	  Motor	  Cortex.	  
NeuroImage,	  13(6),	  1016–1026.	  doi:10.1006/nimg.2000.0737	  Bekker,	  E.	  M.,	  Kenemans,	  J.	  L.,	  Hoeksma,	  M.	  R.,	  Talsma,	  D.,	  &	  Verbaten,	  M.	  N.	  (2005).	  The	  pure	  electrophysiology	  of	  stopping.	  International	  Journal	  of	  Psychophysiology,	  
55(2),	  191–198.	  doi:10.1016/j.ijpsycho.2004.07.005	  Berkes,	  P.,	  Orbán,	  G.,	  Lengyel,	  M.,	  &	  Fiser,	  J.	  (2011).	  Spontaneous	  cortical	  activity	  reveals	  hallmarks	  of	  an	  optimal	  internal	  model	  of	  the	  environment.	  Science,	  
331(6013),	  83.	  Bhushan,	  N.,	  &	  Shadmehr,	  R.	  (1999).	  Computational	  nature	  of	  human	  adaptive	  control	  during	  learning	  of	  reaching	  movements	  in	  force	  fields.	  Biological	  Cybernetics,	  
81(1),	  39–60.	  doi:10.1007/s004220050543	  Blankenburg,	  F.,	  Taskin,	  B.,	  Ruben,	  J.,	  Moosmann,	  M.,	  Ritter,	  P.,	  Curio,	  G.,	  &	  Villringer,	  A.	  (2003).	  Imperceptible	  Stimuli	  and	  Sensory	  Processing	  Impediment.	  Science,	  
299(5614),	  1864–1864.	  doi:10.1126/science.1080806	  Bledowski,	  C.,	  Prvulovic,	  D.,	  Hoechstetter,	  K.,	  Scherg,	  M.,	  Wibral,	  M.,	  Goebel,	  R.,	  &	  Linden,	  D.	  E.	  J.	  (2004).	  Localizing	  P300	  Generators	  in	  Visual	  Target	  and	  Distractor	  Processing:	  A	  Combined	  Event-­‐Related	  Potential	  and	  Functional	  Magnetic	  Resonance	  Imaging	  Study.	  The	  Journal	  of	  Neuroscience,	  24(42),	  9353–9360.	  doi:10.1523/JNEUROSCI.1897-­‐04.2004	  
References	  	  
279	  	  
Block,	  N.	  (1996).	  On	  A	  Confusion	  About	  a	  Function	  of	  Consciousness.	  Block,	  R.	  A.,	  Hancock,	  P.	  A.,	  &	  Zakay,	  D.	  (2010).	  How	  cognitive	  load	  affects	  duration	  judgments:	  A	  meta-­‐analytic	  review.	  Acta	  Psychologica,	  134(3),	  330–343.	  doi:10.1016/j.actpsy.2010.03.006	  Boorman,	  E.	  D.,	  Behrens,	  T.	  E.	  J.,	  Woolrich,	  M.	  W.,	  &	  Rushworth,	  M.	  F.	  S.	  (2009).	  How	  Green	  Is	  the	  Grass	  on	  the	  Other	  Side?	  Frontopolar	  Cortex	  and	  the	  Evidence	  in	  Favor	  of	  Alternative	  Courses	  of	  Action.	  Neuron,	  62(5),	  733–743.	  doi:10.1016/j.neuron.2009.05.014	  Boulinguez,	  P.,	  Ballanger,	  B.,	  Granjon,	  L.,	  &	  Benraiss,	  A.	  (2009).	  The	  paradoxical	  effect	  of	  warning	  on	  reaction	  time:	  Demonstrating	  proactive	  response	  inhibition	  with	  event-­‐related	  potentials.	  Clin	  Neurophysiol,	  120(4),	  730–737.	  Boulinguez,	  P.,	  Jaffard,	  M.,	  Granjon,	  L.,	  &	  Benraiss,	  A.	  (2008).	  Warning	  signals	  induce	  automatic	  EMG	  activations	  and	  proactive	  volitional	  inhibition:	  evidence	  from	  analysis	  of	  error	  distribution	  in	  simple	  RT.	  Journal	  of	  Neurophysiology,	  99(3),	  1572–1578.	  doi:10.1152/jn.01198.2007	  Bradshaw,	  J.	  L.	  (2001).	  Asymmetries	  in	  preparation	  for	  action.	  Trends	  in	  Cognitive	  
Sciences,	  5(5),	  184–185.	  Bramhall,	  J.	  (1655).	  A	  Defence	  of	  True	  Liberty	  from	  Ante-­‐cedent	  and	  Extrinsecall	  Necessity,	  being	  an	  answer	  to	  a	  late	  book	  of	  Mr.	  Thomas	  Hobbes	  of	  Malmsbury,	  
intituled,	  A	  Treatise	  of	  Liberty	  and	  Necessity.	  Brass,	  M.,	  &	  Haggard,	  P.	  (2007).	  To	  do	  or	  not	  to	  do:	  the	  neural	  signature	  of	  self-­‐control.	  
Journal	  of	  Neuroscience,	  27(34),	  9141.	  Brass,	  M.,	  &	  Haggard,	  P.	  (2008).	  The	  what,	  when,	  whether	  model	  of	  intentional	  action.	  
The	  Neuroscientist:	  A	  Review	  Journal	  Bringing	  Neurobiology,	  Neurology	  and	  
Psychiatry,	  14(4),	  319–325.	  
References	  	  
280	  	  
Britz,	  J.,	  &	  Michel,	  C.	  M.	  (2010).	  Errors	  can	  be	  related	  to	  pre-­‐stimulus	  differences	  in	  ERP	  topography	  and	  their	  concomitant	  sources.	  NeuroImage,	  49(3),	  2774–2782.	  doi:10.1016/j.neuroimage.2009.10.033	  Busch,	  N.	  A.,	  Dubois,	  J.,	  &	  VanRullen,	  R.	  (2009).	  The	  Phase	  of	  Ongoing	  EEG	  Oscillations	  Predicts	  Visual	  Perception.	  The	  Journal	  of	  Neuroscience,	  29(24),	  7869–7876.	  doi:10.1523/JNEUROSCI.0113-­‐09.2009	  Busch,	  N.	  A.,	  &	  VanRullen,	  R.	  (2010).	  Spontaneous	  EEG	  oscillations	  reveal	  periodic	  sampling	  of	  visual	  attention.	  Proceedings	  of	  the	  National	  Academy	  of	  Sciences,	  
107(37),	  16048–16053.	  doi:10.1073/pnas.1004801107	  Cauda,	  F.,	  Geminiani,	  G.,	  D’Agata,	  F.,	  Duca,	  S.,	  &	  Katiuscia,	  S.	  (2011).	  Discovering	  the	  somatotopic	  organization	  of	  the	  motor	  areas	  of	  the	  medial	  wall	  using	  low-­‐frequency	  bold	  fluctuations.	  Human	  Brain	  Mapping,	  32(10),	  1566–1579.	  doi:10.1002/hbm.21132	  Cavanna,	  A.	  E.,	  &	  Trimble,	  M.	  R.	  (2006).	  The	  Precuneus:	  A	  Review	  of	  Its	  Functional	  Anatomy	  and	  Behavioural	  Correlates.	  Brain,	  129(3),	  564–583.	  Chalmers,	  D.	  J.	  (1997).	  Facing	  up	  to	  the	  problem	  of	  consciousness.	  Explaining	  
Consciousness:	  The	  Hard	  Problem,	  9–32.	  Chambers,	  C.	  D.,	  Garavan,	  H.,	  &	  Bellgrove,	  M.	  A.	  (2009).	  Insights	  into	  the	  neural	  basis	  of	  response	  inhibition	  from	  cognitive	  and	  clinical	  neuroscience.	  Neuroscience	  &	  
Biobehavioral	  Reviews,	  33(5),	  631–646.	  doi:10.1016/j.neubiorev.2008.08.016	  Chauvel,	  P.	  Y.,	  Rey,	  M.,	  Buser,	  P.,	  &	  Bancaud,	  J.	  (1996).	  What	  stimulation	  of	  the	  supplementary	  motor	  area	  in	  humans	  tells	  about	  its	  functional	  organization.	  
Advances	  in	  neurology,	  70,	  199–209.	  Cheyne,	  J.,	  Solman,	  G.	  J.	  F.,	  Carriere,	  J.	  S.	  A.,	  &	  Smilek,	  D.	  (2009).	  Anatomy	  of	  an	  error:	  A	  bidirectional	  state	  model	  of	  task	  engagement/disengagement	  and	  attention-­‐related	  errors.	  Cognition,	  111(1),	  98–113.	  doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2008.12.009	  
References	  	  
281	  	  
Chikazoe,	  J.	  (2010).	  Localizing	  performance	  of	  go/no-­‐go	  tasks	  to	  prefrontal	  cortical	  subregions.	  Current	  Opinion	  in	  Psychiatry,	  23(3),	  267.	  Cisek,	  P.	  (2007).	  Cortical	  mechanisms	  of	  action	  selection:	  the	  affordance	  competition	  hypothesis.	  Philosophical	  Transactions	  of	  the	  Royal	  Society	  B:	  Biological	  Sciences,	  
362(1485),	  1585–1599.	  doi:10.1098/rstb.2007.2054	  Cisek,	  P.,	  &	  Kalaska,	  J.	  F.	  (2005).	  Neural	  Correlates	  of	  Reaching	  Decisions	  in	  Dorsal	  Premotor	  Cortex:	  Specification	  of	  Multiple	  Direction	  Choices	  and	  Final	  Selection	  of	  Action.	  Neuron,	  45(5),	  801–814.	  doi:10.1016/j.neuron.2005.01.027	  Cleeremans,	  A.	  (2011).	  The	  Radical	  Plasticity	  Thesis:	  How	  the	  Brain	  Learns	  to	  be	  Conscious.	  Frontiers	  in	  Psychology,	  2.	  doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2011.00086	  Cothran,	  D.	  L.,	  &	  Larsen,	  R.	  (2008).	  Comparison	  of	  inhibition	  in	  two	  timed	  reaction	  tasks:	  the	  color	  and	  emotion	  Stroop	  tasks.	  The	  Journal	  of	  Psychology:	  
Interdisciplinary	  and	  Applied,	  142(4),	  373–385.	  Cox,	  R.	  W.	  (1996).	  AFNI:	  Software	  for	  Analysis	  and	  Visualization	  of	  Functional	  Magnetic	  Resonance	  Neuroimages.	  Computers	  and	  Biomedical	  Research,	  29(3),	  162–173.	  Crowne,	  D.	  P.,	  &	  Marlowe,	  D.	  (1960).	  A	  new	  scale	  of	  social	  desirability	  independent	  of	  psychopathology.	  Journal	  of	  consulting	  psychology,	  24(4),	  349.	  Cunnington,	  R.,	  Windischberger,	  C.,	  Deecke,	  L.,	  &	  Moser,	  E.	  (2002).	  The	  preparation	  and	  execution	  of	  self-­‐initiated	  and	  externally-­‐triggered	  movement:	  a	  study	  of	  event-­‐related	  fMRI.	  Neuroimage,	  15(2),	  373–385.	  Cunnington,	  R.,	  Windischberger,	  C.,	  &	  Moser,	  E.	  (2005).	  Premovement	  activity	  of	  the	  pre-­‐supplementary	  motor	  area	  and	  the	  readiness	  for	  action:	  Studies	  of	  time-­‐resolved	  event-­‐related	  functional	  MRI.	  Human	  Movement	  Science,	  24(5-­‐6),	  644–656.	  doi:10.1016/j.humov.2005.10.001	  Cunnington,	  R.,	  Windischberger,	  C.,	  Robinson,	  S.,	  &	  Moser,	  E.	  (2006).	  The	  selection	  of	  intended	  actions	  and	  the	  observation	  of	  others’	  actions:	  a	  time-­‐resolved	  fMRI	  study.	  NeuroImage,	  29(4),	  1294–1302.	  
References	  	  
282	  	  
Daniels,	  C.,	  Witt,	  K.,	  Wolff,	  S.,	  Jansen,	  O.,	  &	  Deuschl,	  G.	  (2003).	  Rate	  dependency	  of	  the	  human	  cortical	  network	  subserving	  executive	  functions	  during	  generation	  of	  random	  number	  series	  –	  a	  functional	  magnetic	  resonance	  imaging	  study.	  
Neuroscience	  Letters,	  345(1),	  25–28.	  De	  Jong,	  R.,	  Coles,	  M.	  G.,	  Logan,	  G.	  D.,	  &	  Gratton,	  G.	  (1990).	  In	  search	  of	  the	  point	  of	  no	  return:	  The	  control	  of	  response	  processes.	  Journal	  of	  Experimental	  Psychology:	  
Human	  Perception	  and	  Performance,	  16(1),	  164–182.	  doi:10.1037/0096-­‐1523.16.1.164	  De	  Jong,	  R.,	  Gladwin,	  T.	  E.,	  &	  Hart,	  B.	  M.	  (2006).	  Movement-­‐related	  EEG	  indices	  of	  preparation	  in	  task	  switching	  and	  motor	  control.	  Brain	  research,	  1105(1),	  73–82.	  doi:10.1016/j.brainres.2006.03.030	  Debaere,	  F.,	  Wenderoth,	  N.,	  Sunaert,	  S.,	  Van	  Hecke,	  P.,	  &	  Swinnen,	  S.	  P.	  (2003).	  Internal	  vs	  external	  generation	  of	  movements:	  differential	  neural	  pathways	  involved	  in	  bimanual	  coordination	  performed	  in	  the	  presence	  or	  absence	  of	  augmented	  visual	  feedback.	  Neuroimage,	  19(3),	  764–776.	  Dehaene,	  S.,	  Artiges,	  E.,	  Naccache,	  L.,	  Martelli,	  C.,	  Viard,	  A.,	  Schürhoff,	  F.,	  …	  Martinot,	  J.	  L.	  (2003).	  Conscious	  and	  subliminal	  conflicts	  in	  normal	  subjects	  and	  patients	  with	  schizophrenia:	  the	  role	  of	  the	  anterior	  cingulate.	  Proceedings	  of	  the	  National	  
Academy	  of	  Sciences	  of	  the	  United	  States	  of	  America,	  100(23),	  13722.	  Deiber,	  M.	  P.,	  Passingham,	  R.	  E.,	  Colebatch,	  J.,	  Friston,	  K.,	  Nixon,	  P.,	  &	  Frackowiak,	  R.	  (1991).	  Cortical	  areas	  and	  the	  selection	  of	  movement:	  a	  study	  with	  positron	  emission	  tomography.	  Experimental	  Brain	  Research,	  84(2),	  393–402.	  Della	  Sala,	  S.,	  &	  Marchetti,	  C.	  (2005).	  Anarchic	  hand.	  Higher-­‐order	  Motor	  Disorders:	  
From	  Neuroanatomy	  and	  Neurobiology	  to	  Clinical	  Neurology,	  291.	  Demiralp,	  T.,	  Ademoglu,	  A.,	  Comerchero,	  M.,	  &	  Polich,	  J.	  (2001).	  Wavelet	  Analysis	  of	  P3a	  and	  P3b.	  Brain	  Topography,	  13(4),	  251–267.	  doi:10.1023/A:1011102628306	  
References	  	  
283	  	  
Demiralp,	  T.,	  Ademoglu,	  A.,	  Schürmann,	  M.,	  Basar-­‐Eroglu,	  C.,	  &	  Basar,	  E.	  (1999).	  Detection	  of	  P300	  Waves	  in	  Single	  Trials	  by	  the	  Wavelet	  Transform	  (WT).	  Brain	  
and	  Language,	  66(1),	  108–128.	  doi:10.1006/brln.1998.2027	  Desmet,	  C.,	  Fias,	  W.,	  Hartstra,	  E.,	  &	  Brass,	  M.	  (2011).	  Errors	  and	  Conflict	  at	  the	  Task	  Level	  and	  the	  Response	  Level.	  The	  Journal	  of	  Neuroscience,	  31(4),	  1366–1374.	  Desmond,	  J.	  E.,	  Gabrieli,	  J.	  D.	  E.,	  &	  Glover,	  G.	  H.	  (1998).	  Dissociation	  of	  Frontal	  and	  Cerebellar	  Activity	  in	  a	  Cognitive	  Task:	  Evidence	  for	  a	  Distinction	  between	  Selection	  and	  Search*	  1.	  Neuroimage,	  7(4),	  368–376.	  Desmurget,	  M.,	  Reilly,	  K.	  T.,	  Richard,	  N.,	  Szathmari,	  A.,	  Mottolese,	  C.,	  &	  Sirigu,	  A.	  (2009).	  Movement	  Intention	  After	  Parietal	  Cortex	  Stimulation	  in	  Humans.	  Science,	  
324(5928),	  811.	  Dettmers,	  C.,	  Fink,	  G.	  R.,	  Lemon,	  R.	  N.,	  Stephan,	  K.	  M.,	  Passingham,	  R.	  E.,	  Silbersweig,	  D.,	  …	  Frackowiak,	  R.	  S.	  (1995).	  Relation	  Between	  Cerebral	  Activity	  and	  Force	  in	  the	  Motor	  Areas	  of	  the	  Human	  Brain.	  Journal	  of	  Neurophysiology,	  74(2),	  802–815.	  Dimoska,	  A.,	  Johnstone,	  S.	  J.,	  &	  Barry,	  R.	  J.	  (2006).	  The	  auditory-­‐evoked	  N2	  and	  P3	  components	  in	  the	  stop-­‐signal	  task:	  Indices	  of	  inhibition,	  response-­‐conflict	  or	  error-­‐detection?	  Brain	  and	  Cognition,	  62(2),	  98–112.	  doi:10.1016/j.bandc.2006.03.011	  Dirnberger,	  G.,	  Duregger,	  C.,	  Lindinger,	  G.,	  &	  Lang,	  W.	  (2011).	  On	  the	  regularity	  of	  preparatory	  activity	  preceding	  movements	  with	  the	  dominant	  and	  non-­‐dominant	  hand:	  a	  readiness	  potential	  study.	  International	  journal	  of	  
psychophysiology:	  official	  journal	  of	  the	  International	  Organization	  of	  
Psychophysiology,	  81(2),	  127–131.	  doi:10.1016/j.ijpsycho.2011.04.008	  Dirnberger,	  G.,	  Fickel,	  U.,	  Lindinger,	  G.,	  Lang,	  W.,	  &	  Jahanshahi,	  M.	  (1998).	  The	  mode	  of	  movement	  selection	  Movement-­‐related	  cortical	  potentials	  prior	  to	  freely	  selected	  and	  repetitive	  movements.	  Experimental	  Brain	  Research,	  120(2),	  263–272.	  
References	  	  
284	  	  
Donchin,	  E.,	  &	  Coles,	  M.	  G.	  (1988).	  Is	  the	  P300	  component	  a	  manifestation	  of	  context	  updating?	  Retrieved	  from	  http://psycnet.apa.org/psycinfo/1989-­‐21502-­‐001	  Donkers,	  F.	  C.	  L.,	  &	  Van	  Boxtel,	  G.	  J.	  M.	  (2004).	  The	  N2	  in	  go/no-­‐go	  tasks	  reflects	  conflict	  monitoring	  not	  response	  inhibition.	  Brain	  and	  Cognition,	  56(2),	  165–176.	  doi:10.1016/j.bandc.2004.04.005	  Duann,	  J.-­‐R.,	  Ide,	  J.	  S.,	  Luo,	  X.,	  &	  Li,	  C.	  R.	  (2009).	  Functional	  connectivity	  delineates	  distinct	  roles	  of	  the	  inferior	  frontal	  cortex	  and	  presupplementary	  motor	  area	  in	  stop	  signal	  inhibition.	  The	  Journal	  of	  Neuroscience:	  The	  Official	  Journal	  of	  the	  
Society	  for	  Neuroscience,	  29(32),	  10171–10179.	  doi:10.1523/JNEUROSCI.1300-­‐09.2009	  Dum,	  R.,	  &	  Strick,	  P.	  (1991).	  The	  origin	  of	  corticospinal	  projections	  from	  the	  premotor	  areas	  in	  the	  frontal	  lobe.	  The	  Journal	  of	  neuroscience,	  11(3),	  667.	  Duncan-­‐Johnson,	  C.	  C.,	  &	  Donchin,	  E.	  (1982).	  The	  P300	  component	  of	  the	  event-­‐related	  brain	  potential	  as	  an	  index	  of	  information	  processing.	  Biological	  Psychology,	  
14(1–2),	  1–52.	  doi:10.1016/0301-­‐0511(82)90016-­‐3	  Duvernoy,	  H.	  M.	  (1991).	  The	  human	  brain:	  Structure,	  three-­‐dimensional	  sectional	  anatomy	  and	  MRI.	  Wien:	  Springer-­‐Verlag.	  Eagleman,	  D.	  M.	  (2008).	  Human	  time	  perception	  and	  its	  illusions.	  Current	  Opinion	  in	  
Neurobiology,	  18(2),	  131–136.	  Ebert,	  J.	  P.,	  &	  Wegner,	  D.	  (2011).	  Mistaking	  randomness	  for	  free	  will.	  Consciousness	  and	  
Cognition,	  20,	  965–971.	  Eimer,	  M.	  (1993).	  Effects	  of	  attention	  and	  stimulus	  probability	  on	  ERPs	  in	  a	  Go/Nogo	  task.	  Biological	  Psychology,	  35(2),	  123–138.	  Elsner,	  B.,	  &	  Hommel,	  B.	  (2001).	  Effect	  anticipation	  and	  action	  control.	  Journal	  of	  
Experimental	  Psychology:	  Human	  Perception	  and	  Performance,	  27(1),	  229–240.	  doi:10.1037/0096-­‐1523.27.1.229	  
References	  	  
285	  	  
Falkenstein,	  M.,	  Hoormann,	  J.,	  &	  Hohnsbein,	  J.	  (1999).	  ERP	  components	  in	  Go/Nogo	  tasks	  and	  their	  relation	  to	  inhibition.	  Acta	  Psychologica,	  101(2-­‐3),	  267–291.	  doi:16/S0001-­‐6918(99)00008-­‐6	  Filevich,	  E.,	  &	  Haggard,	  P.	  (2012).	  Grin	  and	  bear	  it!	  Neural	  consequences	  of	  a	  voluntary	  decision	  to	  act	  or	  inhibit	  action.	  Experimental	  brain	  research.	  Experimentelle	  
Hirnforschung.	  Expérimentation	  cérébrale,	  223(3),	  341–351.	  doi:10.1007/s00221-­‐012-­‐3263-­‐9	  Filevich,	  E.,	  Kühn,	  	  s,	  &	  Haggard,	  P.	  (2012a).	  Intentional	  inhibition	  in	  human	  action:	  The	  power	  of	  “no”.	  Neuroscience	  and	  Biobehavioral	  Reviews,	  36(4),	  1107–1118.	  Filevich,	  E.,	  Kühn,	  S.,	  &	  Haggard,	  P.	  (2012b).	  Negative	  motor	  Phenomena	  in	  cortical	  stimulation:	  implications	  for	  inhibitory	  control	  of	  human	  action.	  Cortex.	  Retrieved	  from	  http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0010945212001414	  Flash,	  T.,	  &	  Hogan,	  N.	  (1985).	  The	  coordination	  of	  arm	  movements:	  an	  experimentally	  confirmed	  mathematical	  model.	  The	  Journal	  of	  Neuroscience,	  5(7),	  1688–1703.	  Fleming,	  S.	  M.,	  Mars,	  R.	  B.,	  Gladwin,	  T.	  E.,	  &	  Haggard,	  P.	  (2009).	  When	  the	  Brain	  Changes	  Its	  Mind:	  Flexibility	  of	  Action	  Selection	  in	  Instructed	  and	  Free	  Choices.	  Cerebral	  
Cortex,	  19(10),	  2352	  –2360.	  doi:10.1093/cercor/bhn252	  Fletcher,	  P.	  C.,	  Shallice,	  T.,	  &	  Dolan,	  R.	  J.	  (2000).	  “Sculpting	  the	  Response	  Space”—An	  Account	  of	  Left	  Prefrontal	  Activation	  at	  Encoding.	  NeuroImage,	  12(4),	  404–417.	  doi:10.1006/nimg.2000.0633	  Forstmann,	  B.	  U.,	  Brass,	  M.,	  Koch,	  I.,	  &	  Von	  Cramon,	  D.	  Y.	  (2006).	  Voluntary	  Selection	  of	  Task	  Sets	  Revealed	  by	  Functional	  Magnetic	  Resonance	  Imaging.	  Journal	  of	  
Cognitive	  Neuroscience,	  18(3),	  388–398.	  doi:10.1162/jocn.2006.18.3.388	  Fox,	  M.	  D.,	  Snyder,	  A.	  Z.,	  Vincent,	  J.	  L.,	  &	  Raichle,	  M.	  E.	  (2007).	  Intrinsic	  Fluctuations	  within	  Cortical	  Systems	  Account	  for	  Intertrial	  Variability	  in	  Human	  Behavior.	  
Neuron,	  56(1),	  171–184.	  doi:10.1016/j.neuron.2007.08.023	  
References	  	  
286	  	  
Fried,	  I.,	  Katz,	  A.,	  McCarthy,	  G.,	  Sass,	  K.,	  Williamson,	  P.,	  Spencer,	  S.,	  &	  Spencer,	  D.	  (1991).	  Functional	  organization	  of	  human	  supplementary	  motor	  cortex	  studied	  by	  electrical	  stimulation.	  J.	  Neurosci.,	  11(11),	  3656–3666.	  Frith,	  C.	  D.,	  Friston,	  K.,	  Liddle,	  P.	  F.,	  &	  Frackowiak,	  R.	  S.	  (1991).	  Willed	  action	  and	  the	  prefrontal	  cortex	  in	  man:	  a	  study	  with	  PET.	  Proceedings.	  Biological	  Sciences	  /	  
The	  Royal	  Society,	  244(1311),	  241–246.	  Frith,	  C.,	  Gallagher,	  H.,	  &	  Maguire,	  E.	  (2004).	  Mechanisms	  of	  control.	  Retrieved	  from	  http://eprints.ucl.ac.uk/128459/	  Fulton,	  J.,	  &	  Jacobsen,	  C.	  (1935).	  The	  functions	  of	  the	  frontal	  lobes:	  A	  comparative	  study	  in	  monkeys,	  chimpanzees	  and	  man.	  Abstracts	  of	  the	  Second	  International	  
Neurological	  Congress,	  4,	  70–71.	  Ginsburg,	  N.,	  &	  Karpiuk,	  P.	  (1994).	  Random	  generation:	  Analysis	  of	  the	  responses.	  
Perceptual	  and	  Motor	  Skills,	  79(3	  Pt	  1),	  1059–1067.	  Gladwin,	  T.	  E.,	  Lindsen,	  J.	  P.,	  &	  De	  Jong,	  R.	  (2006).	  Pre-­‐stimulus	  EEG	  effects	  related	  to	  response	  speed,	  task	  switching	  and	  upcoming	  response	  hand.	  Biological	  
psychology,	  72(1),	  15–34.	  Gold,	  J.	  I.,	  &	  Shadlen,	  M.	  N.	  (2001).	  Neural	  computations	  that	  underlie	  decisions	  about	  sensory	  stimuli.	  Trends	  in	  cognitive	  sciences,	  5(1),	  10–16.	  Goldberg,	  G.	  (1985).	  Supplementary	  motor	  area	  structure	  and	  function:	  review	  and	  hypotheses.	  Behavioral	  and	  Brain	  Sciences,	  8(04),	  567–588.	  Goldberg,	  I.,	  Ullman,	  S.,	  &	  Malach,	  R.	  (2008).	  Neuronal	  correlates	  of	  “free	  will”	  are	  associated	  with	  regional	  specialization	  in	  the	  human	  intrinsic/default	  network.	  
Consciousness	  and	  Cognition,	  17(3),	  587–601.	  Goldman,	  P.	  S.,	  &	  Rosvold,	  H.	  E.	  (1970).	  Localization	  of	  function	  within	  the	  dorsolateral	  prefrontal	  cortex	  of	  the	  rhesus	  monkey.	  Experimental	  Neurology,	  27(2),	  291–304.	  
References	  	  
287	  	  
Goldman-­‐Rakic,	  P.	  s.	  (2007).	  Motor	  Control	  Function	  of	  the	  Prefrontal	  Cortex.	  In	  G.	  B.	  Organizer,	  	  eve	  O’Connor,	  &	  Joanrsh	  (Eds.),	  Ciba	  Foundation	  Symposium	  132	  -­‐	  
Motor	  Areas	  of	  the	  Cerebral	  Cortex	  (pp.	  187–200).	  John	  Wiley	  &	  Sons,	  Ltd.	  Retrieved	  from	  http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/9780470513545.ch12/summary	  Goldstein,	  A.,	  Spencer,	  K.	  M.,	  &	  Donchin,	  E.	  (2002).	  The	  influence	  of	  stimulus	  deviance	  and	  novelty	  on	  the	  P300	  and	  novelty	  P3.	  Psychophysiology,	  39(6),	  781–790.	  Gomes,	  G.	  (2002).	  Problems	  in	  the	  timing	  of	  conscious	  experience.	  Consciousness	  and	  
Cognition,	  11(2),	  191–197.	  Gratton,	  G.,	  Bosco,	  C.	  M.,	  Kramer,	  A.	  F.,	  Coles,	  M.	  G.	  H.,	  Wickens,	  C.	  D.,	  &	  Donchin,	  E.	  (1990).	  Event-­‐related	  brain	  potentials	  as	  indices	  of	  information	  extraction	  and	  response	  priming.	  Electroencephalography	  and	  Clinical	  Neurophysiology,	  75(5),	  419–432.	  doi:10.1016/0013-­‐4694(90)90087-­‐Z	  Greene,	  J.	  (2003).	  From	  neural	  “is”	  to	  moral	  “ought”:	  what	  are	  the	  moral	  implications	  of	  neuroscientific	  moral	  psychology?	  Nature,	  4,	  847–850.	  Gruber,	  M.	  J.,	  &	  Otten,	  L.	  J.	  (2010).	  Voluntary	  control	  over	  prestimulus	  activity	  related	  to	  encoding.	  The	  Journal	  of	  Neuroscience,	  30(29),	  9793.	  Guggisberg,	  A.	  G.,	  Dalal,	  S.	  S.,	  Schnider,	  A.,	  &	  Nagarajan,	  S.	  S.	  (2011).	  The	  neural	  basis	  of	  event-­‐time	  introspection.	  Consciousness	  and	  Cognition,	  20(4),	  1899–1915.	  Gumenyuk,	  V.,	  Korzyukov,	  O.,	  Alho,	  K.,	  Escera,	  C.,	  Schröger,	  E.,	  Ilmoniemi,	  R.	  J.,	  &	  Näätänen,	  R.	  (2001).	  Brain	  activity	  index	  of	  distractibility	  in	  normal	  school-­‐age	  children.	  Neuroscience	  Letters,	  314(3),	  147–150.	  doi:10.1016/S0304-­‐3940(01)02308-­‐4	  Guye,	  M.,	  Parker,	  G.	  J.	  .,	  Symms,	  M.,	  Boulby,	  P.,	  Wheeler-­‐Kingshott,	  C.	  A.	  .,	  Salek-­‐Haddadi,	  A.,	  …	  Duncan,	  J.	  S.	  (2003).	  Combined	  functional	  MRI	  and	  tractography	  to	  demonstrate	  the	  connectivity	  of	  the	  human	  primary	  motor	  cortex	  in	  vivo.	  
NeuroImage,	  19(4),	  1349–1360.	  doi:10.1016/S1053-­‐8119(03)00165-­‐4	  
References	  	  
288	  	  
Habas,	  C.	  (2010).	  Functional	  connectivity	  of	  the	  human	  rostral	  and	  caudal	  cingulate	  motor	  areas	  in	  the	  brain	  resting	  state	  at	  3T.	  Neuroradiology,	  52(1),	  47–59.	  doi:10.1007/s00234-­‐009-­‐0572-­‐1	  Hadland,	  K.	  A.,	  Rushworth,	  M.	  F.	  S.,	  Passingham,	  R.	  E.,	  Jahanshahi,	  M.,	  &	  Rothwell,	  J.	  C.	  (2001).	  Interference	  with	  Performance	  of	  a	  Response	  Selection	  Task	  that	  has	  no	  Working	  Memory	  Component:	  An	  rTMS	  Comparison	  of	  the	  Dorsolateral	  Prefrontal	  and	  Medial	  Frontal	  Cortex.	  Journal	  of	  Cognitive	  Neuroscience,	  13(8),	  1097–1108.	  Haggard,	  P.	  (2008).	  Human	  volition:	  towards	  a	  neuroscience	  of	  will.	  Nature	  Reviews	  
Neuroscience,	  9(12),	  934–946.	  Haggard,	  P.,	  Cartledge,	  P.,	  Dafydd,	  M.,	  &	  Oakley,	  D.	  A.	  (2004).	  Anomalous	  control:	  when	  “free-­‐will”is	  not	  conscious.	  Consciousness	  and	  Cognition,	  13(3),	  646–654.	  Haggard,	  P.,	  Clark,	  S.,	  &	  Kalogeras,	  J.	  (2002).	  Voluntary	  action	  and	  conscious	  awareness.	  
Nature	  Neuroscience,	  5(4),	  382–385.	  Haggard,	  P.,	  &	  Eimer,	  M.	  (1999).	  On	  the	  relation	  between	  brain	  potentials	  and	  the	  awareness	  of	  voluntary	  movements.	  Experimental	  Brain	  Research,	  126(1),	  128–133.	  Hagura,	  N.,	  Kanai,	  R.,	  Orgs,	  G.,	  &	  Haggard,	  P.	  (2012).	  Ready	  steady	  slow:	  action	  preparation	  slows	  the	  subjective	  passage	  of	  time.	  Proceedings	  of	  the	  Royal	  
Society	  B:	  Biological	  Sciences.	  doi:10.1098/rspb.2012.1339	  Handwerker,	  H.	  O.	  (2010).	  Microneurography	  of	  pruritus.	  Neuroscience	  Letters,	  470(3),	  193–196.	  doi:10.1016/j.neulet.2009.06.092	  He,	  B.,	  Lian,	  J.,	  Spencer,	  K.	  M.,	  Dien,	  J.,	  &	  Donchin,	  E.	  (2001).	  A	  cortical	  potential	  imaging	  analysis	  of	  the	  P300	  and	  novelty	  P3	  components.	  Human	  brain	  mapping,	  12(2),	  120–130.	  Hick,	  W.	  E.	  (1952).	  On	  the	  rate	  of	  gain	  of	  information.	  Quarterly	  Journal	  of	  Experimental	  
Psychology,	  4(1),	  11–26.	  
References	  	  
289	  	  
Hikosaka,	  O.,	  Nakamura,	  K.,	  Sakai,	  K.,	  &	  Nakahara,	  H.	  (2002).	  Central	  mechanisms	  of	  motor	  skill	  learning.	  Current	  Opinion	  in	  Neurobiology,	  12(2),	  217–222.	  doi:10.1016/S0959-­‐4388(02)00307-­‐0	  Hillyard,	  S.	  A.	  (1969).	  Relationships	  between	  the	  contingent	  negative	  variation	  (CNV)	  and	  reaction	  time.	  Physiology	  &	  Behavior,	  4(3),	  351–357.	  Hluštík,	  P.,	  Solodkin,	  A.,	  Gullapalli,	  R.	  P.,	  Noll,	  D.	  C.,	  &	  Small,	  S.	  L.	  (2001).	  Somatotopy	  in	  Human	  Primary	  Motor	  and	  Somatosensory	  Hand	  Representations	  Revisited.	  
Cerebral	  Cortex,	  11(4),	  312–321.	  doi:10.1093/cercor/11.4.312	  Hobbes,	  T.	  (1937).	  Leviathan.	  Retrieved	  from	  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=7M1ltciLaU8C&oi=fnd&pg=PT762&dq=hobbes+leviathan&ots=r8Qzo4MFCw&sig=9QXMLSc8GXoVkkQa0WCrH8lq2Ns	  Hobbes,	  T.,	  &	  Bramhall,	  J.	  (1999).	  Hobbes	  and	  Bramhall	  on	  Liberty	  and	  Necessity.	  Cambridge	  University	  Press.	  Hoffstaedter,	  F.,	  Grefkes,	  C.,	  Zilles,	  K.,	  &	  Eickhoff,	  S.	  B.	  (2012).	  The	  “What”	  and	  “When”	  of	  Self-­‐Initiated	  Movements.	  Cerebral	  Cortex.	  doi:10.1093/cercor/bhr391	  Hoshi,	  E.,	  &	  Tanji,	  J.	  (2007).	  Distinctions	  between	  dorsal	  and	  ventral	  premotor	  areas:	  anatomical	  connectivity	  and	  functional	  properties.	  Current	  Opinion	  in	  
Neurobiology,	  17(2),	  234–242.	  doi:10.1016/j.conb.2007.02.003	  Hughes,	  G.,	  Schütz-­‐Bosbach,	  S.,	  &	  Waszak,	  F.	  (2011).	  One	  Action	  System	  or	  Two?	  Evidence	  for	  Common	  Central	  Preparatory	  Mechanisms	  in	  Voluntary	  and	  Stimulus-­‐Driven	  Actions.	  The	  Journal	  of	  Neuroscience,	  31(46),	  16692	  –16699.	  doi:10.1523/JNEUROSCI.2256-­‐11.2011	  Hughes,	  G.,	  Velmans,	  M.,	  &	  Fockert,	  J.	  D.	  (2009).	  Unconscious	  priming	  of	  a	  no-­‐go	  response.	  Psychophysiology,	  46(6),	  1258–69.	  Ikeda,	  A.,	  Hirasawa,	  K.,	  Kinoshita,	  M.,	  Hitomi,	  T.,	  Matsumoto,	  R.,	  Mitsueda,	  T.,	  …	  Takahashi,	  R.	  (2009).	  Negative	  motor	  seizure	  arising	  from	  the	  negative	  motor	  
References	  	  
290	  	  
area:	  Is	  it	  ictal	  apraxia?	  Epilepsia,	  50(9),	  2072–2084.	  doi:10.1111/j.1528-­‐1167.2009.02097.x	  Ivry,	  R.	  B.,	  &	  Schlerf,	  J.	  E.	  (2008).	  Dedicated	  and	  intrinsic	  models	  of	  time	  perception.	  
Trends	  in	  Cognitive	  Sciences,	  12(7),	  273–280.	  doi:10.1016/j.tics.2008.04.002	  Jacoby,	  L.	  L.,	  Toth,	  J.	  P.,	  &	  Yonelinas,	  A.	  P.	  (1993).	  Separating	  conscious	  and	  unconscious	  influences	  of	  memory:	  Measuring	  recollection.	  Journal	  of	  Experimental	  
Psychology:	  General,	  122(2),	  139.	  Jahanshahi,	  M.,	  Dirnberger,	  G.,	  Fuller,	  R.,	  &	  Frith,	  C.	  (2000).	  The	  role	  of	  the	  dorsolateral	  prefrontal	  cortex	  in	  random	  number	  generation:	  a	  study	  with	  positron	  emission	  tomography.	  Neuroimage,	  12(6),	  713–725.	  Jahanshahi,	  M.,	  Jenkins,	  I.	  H.,	  Brown,	  R.	  G.,	  Marsden,	  C.	  D.,	  Passingham,	  R.	  E.,	  &	  Brooks,	  D.	  J.	  (1995).	  Self-­‐initiated	  versus	  externally	  triggered	  movements:	  I.	  An	  investigation	  using	  measurement	  of	  regional	  cerebral	  blood	  flow	  with	  PET	  and	  movement-­‐related	  potentials	  in	  normal	  and	  Parkinson’s	  disease	  subjects.	  Brain,	  
118(4),	  913–933.	  James,	  W.	  (1890).	  The	  principles	  of	  psychology,	  Vol	  I.	  Janssen,	  P.,	  &	  Shadlen,	  M.	  N.	  (2005).	  A	  representation	  of	  the	  hazard	  rate	  of	  elapsed	  time	  in	  macaque	  area	  LIP.	  Nature	  neuroscience,	  8(2),	  234–241.	  Jenkins,	  I.	  H.,	  Jahanshahi,	  M.,	  Jueptner,	  M.,	  Passingham,	  R.	  E.,	  &	  Brooks,	  D.	  J.	  (2000).	  Self-­‐initiated	  versus	  externally	  triggered	  movements.	  Brain,	  123(6),	  1216	  –1228.	  doi:10.1093/brain/123.6.1216	  Jodo,	  E.,	  &	  Kayama,	  Y.	  (1992).	  Relation	  of	  a	  negative	  ERP	  component	  to	  response	  inhibition	  in	  a	  Go/No-­‐go	  task.	  Electroencephalography	  and	  Clinical	  
Neurophysiology,	  82(6),	  477–482.	  doi:10.1016/0013-­‐4694(92)90054-­‐L	  Johansen-­‐Berg,	  H.,	  Behrens,	  T.	  E.	  J.,	  Robson,	  M.	  D.,	  Drobnjak,	  I.,	  Rushworth,	  M.	  F.	  S.,	  Brady,	  J.	  M.,	  …	  Matthews,	  P.	  M.	  (2004).	  Changes	  in	  Connectivity	  Profiles	  Define	  Functionally	  Distinct	  Regions	  in	  Human	  Medial	  Frontal	  Cortex.	  Proceedings	  of	  
References	  	  
291	  	  
the	  National	  Academy	  of	  Sciences	  of	  the	  United	  States	  of	  America,	  101(36),	  13335–13340.	  doi:10.1073/pnas.0403743101	  Joordens,	  S.,	  Van	  Duijn,	  M.,	  &	  Spalek,	  T.	  M.	  (2002).	  When	  timing	  the	  mind	  one	  should	  also	  mind	  the	  timing:	  biases	  in	  the	  measurement	  of	  voluntary	  actions.	  
Consciousness	  and	  Cognition,	  11(2),	  231–240;	  discussion	  308–313.	  Jueptner,	  M.,	  Frith,	  C.	  D.,	  Brooks,	  D.	  J.,	  Frackowiak,	  R.	  s.	  j.,	  &	  Passingham,	  R.	  E.	  (1997).	  Anatomy	  of	  Motor	  Learning.	  II.	  Subcortical	  Structures	  and	  Learning	  by	  Trial	  and	  Error.	  Journal	  of	  Neurophysiology,	  77(3),	  1325–1337.	  Kakei,	  S.,	  Hoffman,	  D.	  S.,	  &	  Strick,	  P.	  L.	  (1999).	  Muscle	  and	  Movement	  Representations	  in	  the	  Primary	  Motor	  Cortex.	  Science,	  285(5436),	  2136–2139.	  doi:10.1126/science.285.5436.2136	  Kane,	  R.	  (2005).	  A	  Contemporary	  Introduction	  to	  Free	  Will.	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  USA.	  Karch,	  S.,	  Mulert,	  C.,	  Thalmeier,	  T.,	  Lutz,	  J.,	  Leicht,	  G.,	  Meindl,	  T.,	  …	  Pogarell,	  O.	  (2009).	  The	  free	  choice	  whether	  or	  not	  to	  respond	  after	  stimulus	  presentation.	  Human	  
Brain	  Mapping,	  30(9),	  2971–2985.	  doi:10.1002/hbm.20722	  Kennerley,	  S.	  W.,	  Sakai,	  K.,	  &	  Rushworth,	  M.	  f.	  s.	  (2004).	  Organization	  of	  Action	  Sequences	  and	  the	  Role	  of	  the	  Pre-­‐SMA.	  Journal	  of	  Neurophysiology,	  91(2),	  978–993.	  doi:10.1152/jn.00651.2003	  Kitamura,	  J.,	  Shibasaki,	  H.,	  &	  Kondo,	  T.	  (1993).	  A	  cortical	  slow	  potential	  is	  larger	  before	  an	  isolated	  movement	  of	  a	  single	  finger	  than	  simultaneous	  movement	  of	  two	  fingers.	  Electroencephalography	  and	  clinical	  Neurophysiology,	  86(4),	  252–258.	  Kitamura,	  J.,	  Shibasaki,	  H.,	  Takagi,	  A.,	  Nabeshima,	  H.,	  &	  Yamaguchi,	  A.	  (1993).	  Enhanced	  negative	  slope	  of	  cortical	  potentials	  before	  sequential	  as	  compared	  with	  simultaneous	  extensions	  of	  two	  fingers.	  Electroencephalography	  and	  clinical	  
neurophysiology,	  86(3),	  176–182.	  
References	  	  
292	  	  
Klein-­‐Flügge,	  M.	  C.,	  &	  Bestmann,	  S.	  (2012).	  Time-­‐Dependent	  Changes	  in	  Human	  Corticospinal	  Excitability	  Reveal	  Value-­‐Based	  Competition	  for	  Action	  during	  Decision	  Processing.	  The	  Journal	  of	  Neuroscience,	  32(24),	  8373–8382.	  doi:10.1523/JNEUROSCI.0270-­‐12.2012	  Koechlin,	  E.,	  Corrado,	  G.,	  Pietrini,	  P.,	  &	  Grafman,	  J.	  (2000).	  Dissociating	  the	  role	  of	  the	  medial	  and	  lateral	  anterior	  prefrontal	  cortex	  in	  human	  planning.	  Proceedings	  of	  
the	  National	  Academy	  of	  Sciences,	  97(13),	  7651	  –7656.	  doi:10.1073/pnas.130177397	  Koechlin,	  E.,	  Ody,	  C.,	  &	  Kouneiher,	  F.	  (2003).	  The	  Architecture	  of	  Cognitive	  Control	  in	  the	  Human	  Prefrontal	  Cortex.	  Science,	  302(5648),	  1181–1185.	  doi:10.1126/science.1088545	  Koechlin,	  E.,	  &	  Summerfield,	  C.	  (2007).	  An	  information	  theoretical	  approach	  to	  prefrontal	  executive	  function.	  Trends	  in	  Cognitive	  Sciences,	  11(6),	  229–235.	  doi:10.1016/j.tics.2007.04.005	  Kok,	  A.,	  Ramautar,	  J.	  R.,	  De	  Ruiter,	  M.	  B.,	  Band,	  G.	  P.	  .,	  &	  Ridderinkhof,	  K.	  R.	  (2004).	  ERP	  components	  associated	  with	  successful	  and	  unsuccessful	  stopping	  in	  a	  stop-­‐signal	  task.	  Psychophysiology,	  41(1),	  9–20.	  Kornhuber,	  H.	  H.,	  &	  Deecke,	  L.	  (1965).	  Hirnpotential\änderungen	  bei	  Willk\ürbewegungen	  und	  passiven	  Bewegungen	  des	  Menschen:	  Bereitschaftspotential	  und	  reafferente	  Potentiale.	  Pfl\ügers	  Archiv	  European	  
Journal	  of	  Physiology,	  284(1),	  1–17.	  Krieghoff,	  V.,	  Brass,	  M.,	  Prinz,	  W.,	  &	  Waszak,	  F.	  (2009).	  Dissociating	  what	  and	  when	  of	  intentional	  actions.	  Frontiers	  in	  Human	  Neuroscience,	  3,	  3.	  Krieghoff,	  V.,	  Waszak,	  F.,	  Prinz,	  W.,	  &	  Brass,	  M.	  (2011).	  Neural	  and	  behavioral	  correlates	  of	  intentional	  actions.	  Neuropsychologia,	  49(5),	  767–776.	  
References	  	  
293	  	  
Kühn,	  S,	  &	  Brass,	  M.	  (2010).	  The	  cognitive	  representation	  of	  intending	  not	  to	  act:	  Evidence	  for	  specific	  non-­‐action-­‐effect	  binding.	  Cognition,	  117(1),	  9–16.	  doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2010.06.006	  Kühn,	  S,	  Elsner,	  B.,	  Prinz,	  W.,	  &	  Brass,	  M.	  (2009).	  Busy	  doing	  nothing:	  Evidence	  for	  nonaction—effect	  binding.	  Psychonomic	  Bulletin	  &	  Review,	  16(3),	  542.	  Kühn,	  S,	  Haggard,	  P.,	  &	  Brass,	  M.	  (2009).	  Intentional	  inhibition:	  How	  the	  “veto-­‐area”	  exerts	  control.	  Human	  Brain	  Mapping,	  30(9),	  2834–2843.	  doi:10.1002/hbm.20711	  Kühn,	  S.,	  &	  Brass,	  M.	  (2009).	  When	  doing	  nothing	  is	  an	  option:	  the	  neural	  correlates	  of	  deciding	  whether	  to	  act	  or	  not.	  Neuroimage,	  46(4),	  1187–1193.	  Kühn,	  S.,	  Gevers,	  W.,	  &	  Brass,	  M.	  (2009).	  The	  neural	  correlates	  of	  intending	  not	  to	  do	  something.	  Journal	  of	  Neurophysiology,	  101(4),	  1913.	  Kühn,	  Simone,	  Bodammer,	  N.	  C.,	  &	  Brass,	  M.	  (2010).	  Dissociating	  mental	  states	  related	  to	  doing	  nothing	  by	  means	  of	  fMRI	  pattern	  classification.	  NeuroImage,	  53(4),	  1294–1300.	  doi:10.1016/j.neuroimage.2010.07.006	  Kühn,	  Simone,	  Brass,	  M.,	  &	  Haggard,	  P.	  (2012).	  Feeling	  in	  control:	  Neural	  correlates	  of	  experience	  of	  agency.	  Cortex;	  a	  journal	  devoted	  to	  the	  study	  of	  the	  nervous	  
system	  and	  behavior.	  doi:10.1016/j.cortex.2012.09.002	  Lang,	  W.	  (2003).	  Surface	  recordings	  of	  the	  Bereitschaftspotential	  in	  normals.	  The	  
Bereitschaftspotential:	  Movement-­‐Related	  Cortical	  Potentials.	  New	  York,	  NY:	  
Kluwer	  Academics/Plenum	  Publishers,	  19–34.	  Lau,	  H.	  C.,	  Rogers,	  R.	  D.,	  Haggard,	  P.,	  &	  Passingham,	  R.	  E.	  (2004).	  Attention	  to	  intention	  (Vol.	  303).	  American	  Association	  for	  the	  Advancement	  of	  Science.	  Lau,	  H.,	  Rogers,	  R.	  .,	  Ramnani,	  N.,	  &	  Passingham,	  R.	  .	  (2004).	  Willed	  action	  and	  attention	  to	  the	  selection	  of	  action.	  NeuroImage,	  21(4),	  1407–1415.	  doi:10.1016/j.neuroimage.2003.10.034	  
References	  	  
294	  	  
Lau,	  H.,	  Rogers,	  R.	  D.,	  Haggard,	  P.,	  &	  Passingham,	  R.	  E.	  (2004).	  Attention	  to	  intention.	  
Science,	  303(5661),	  1208–1210.	  Lau,	  H.,	  Rogers,	  R.	  D.,	  &	  Passingham,	  R.	  E.	  (2006a).	  Dissociating	  response	  selection	  and	  conflict	  in	  the	  medial	  frontal	  surface.	  Neuroimage,	  29(2),	  446–451.	  Lau,	  H.,	  Rogers,	  R.	  D.,	  &	  Passingham,	  R.	  E.	  (2006b).	  On	  Measuring	  the	  Perceived	  Onsets	  of	  Spontaneous	  Actions.	  The	  Journal	  of	  Neuroscience,	  26(27),	  7265–7271.	  doi:10.1523/JNEUROSCI.1138-­‐06.2006	  Leon,	  M.	  I.,	  &	  Shadlen,	  M.	  N.	  (2003).	  Representation	  of	  time	  by	  neurons	  in	  the	  posterior	  parietal	  cortex	  of	  the	  macaque.	  Neuron,	  38(2),	  317–327.	  Levy,	  B.	  J.,	  &	  Wagner,	  A.	  D.	  (2011).	  Cognitive	  control	  and	  right	  ventrolateral	  prefrontal	  cortex:	  reflexive	  reorienting,	  motor	  inhibition,	  and	  action	  updating.	  Annals	  of	  
the	  New	  York	  Academy	  of	  Sciences,	  1224(1),	  40–62.	  doi:10.1111/j.1749-­‐6632.2011.05958.x	  Lewis,	  P.	  A.,	  &	  Miall,	  R.	  C.	  (2003).	  Brain	  activation	  patterns	  during	  measurement	  of	  sub-­‐and	  supra-­‐second	  intervals.	  Neuropsychologia,	  41(12),	  1583–1592.	  Libet,	  B.	  (1985).	  Unconscious	  Cerebral	  Initiative	  and	  the	  Role	  of	  Conscious	  Will	  in	  Voluntary	  Action.	  Behavioral	  and	  Brain	  Sciences,	  8(04),	  529–539.	  Libet,	  B.	  (1999).	  Do	  we	  have	  free	  will.	  Journal	  of	  Consciousness	  Studies,	  6,	  47–57.	  Libet,	  B.	  (2000).	  Time	  Factors	  in	  Conscious	  Processes:	  Reply	  to	  Gilberto	  Gomes.	  
Consciousness	  and	  Cognition,	  9(1),	  1–12.	  doi:10.1006/ccog.1999.0408	  Libet,	  B.,	  Alberts,	  W.	  W.,	  Wright,	  E.	  W.,	  &	  Feinstein,	  B.	  (1967).	  Responses	  of	  Human	  Somatosensory	  Cortex	  to	  Stimuli	  below	  Threshold	  for	  Conscious	  Sensation.	  
Science,	  158(3808),	  1597–1600.	  Libet,	  B.,	  Gleason,	  C.	  A.,	  Wright,	  E.	  W.,	  &	  Pearl,	  D.	  K.	  (1983).	  Time	  of	  conscious	  intention	  to	  act	  in	  relation	  to	  onset	  of	  cerebral	  activity	  (readiness-­‐potential).	  The	  unconscious	  initiation	  of	  a	  freely	  voluntary	  act.	  Brain:	  A	  Journal	  of	  Neurology,	  
106	  (Pt	  3),	  623–642.	  
References	  	  
295	  	  
Libet,	  B.,	  Wright	  Jr.,	  E.	  .,	  &	  Gleason,	  C.	  .	  (1982).	  Readiness-­‐potentials	  preceding	  unrestricted	  “spontaneous”	  vs.	  pre-­‐planned	  voluntary	  acts.	  
Electroencephalography	  and	  Clinical	  Neurophysiology,	  54(3),	  322–335.	  Logan,	  G.	  D.	  (1994).	  On	  the	  ability	  to	  inhibit	  thought	  and	  action:	  A	  users’	  guide	  to	  the	  stop	  signal	  paradigm.	  Inhibitory	  processes	  in	  attention,	  memory	  and	  language,	  189–239.	  Logan,	  G.	  D.,	  &	  Cowan,	  W.	  B.	  (1984).	  On	  the	  ability	  to	  inhibit	  thought	  and	  action:	  A	  theory	  of	  an	  act	  of	  control.	  Psychological	  Review,	  91(3),	  295–327.	  Logan,	  G.	  D.,	  Cowan,	  W.	  B.,	  &	  Davis,	  K.	  A.	  (1984).	  On	  the	  ability	  to	  inhibit	  simple	  and	  choice	  reaction	  time	  responses:	  a	  model	  and	  a	  method.	  Journal	  of	  Experimental	  
Psychology,	  10(2),	  276–291.	  Luck,	  S.	  J.	  (2005).	  An	  introduction	  to	  the	  event-­‐related	  potential	  technique.	  MIT	  Press.	  Lüders,	  H.	  O.,	  Dinner,	  D.	  S.,	  Morris,	  H.	  H.,	  Wyllie,	  E.,	  &	  Comair,	  Y.	  G.	  (1995).	  Cortical	  electrical	  stimulation	  in	  humans.	  The	  negative	  motor	  areas.	  Advances	  in	  
neurology,	  67,	  115.	  Masaki,	  H.,	  Takasawa,	  N.,	  &	  Yamazaki,	  K.	  (1998).	  Enhanced	  negative	  slope	  of	  the	  readiness	  potential	  preceding	  a	  target	  force	  production	  task.	  
Electroencephalography	  and	  Clinical	  Neurophysiology/Evoked	  Potentials	  Section,	  
108(4),	  390–397.	  Mason,	  M.	  F.,	  Norton,	  M.	  I.,	  Horn,	  J.	  D.	  V.,	  Wegner,	  D.	  M.,	  Grafton,	  S.	  T.,	  &	  Macrae,	  C.	  N.	  (2007).	  Wandering	  Minds:	  The	  Default	  Network	  and	  Stimulus-­‐Independent	  Thought.	  Science,	  315(5810),	  393–395.	  doi:10.1126/science.1131295	  Matsuhashi,	  M.,	  &	  Hallett,	  M.	  (2008).	  The	  timing	  of	  the	  conscious	  intention	  to	  move.	  
European	  Journal	  of	  Neuroscience,	  28(11),	  2344.	  Mayka,	  M.	  A.,	  Corcos,	  D.	  M.,	  Leurgans,	  S.	  E.,	  &	  Vaillancourt,	  D.	  E.	  (2006).	  Three-­‐dimensional	  locations	  and	  boundaries	  of	  motor	  and	  premotor	  cortices	  as	  
References	  	  
296	  	  
defined	  by	  functional	  brain	  imaging:	  a	  meta-­‐analysis.	  Neuroimage,	  31(4),	  1453–1474.	  Mayr,	  U.	  (2004).	  Conflict,	  consciousness,	  and	  control.	  Trends	  in	  Cognitive	  Sciences,	  8(4),	  145–148.	  doi:10.1016/j.tics.2004.02.006	  Mazaheri,	  A.,	  DiQuattro,	  N.	  E.,	  Bengson,	  J.,	  &	  Geng,	  J.	  J.	  (2011).	  Pre-­‐Stimulus	  Activity	  Predicts	  the	  Winner	  of	  Top-­‐Down	  vs.	  Bottom-­‐Up	  Attentional	  Selection.	  PLoS	  
ONE,	  6(2),	  e16243.	  doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0016243	  Mazoyer,	  B.,	  Zago,	  L.,	  Mellet,	  E.,	  Bricogne,	  S.,	  Etard,	  O.,	  Houdé,	  O.,	  …	  Tzourio-­‐Mazoyer,	  N.	  (2001).	  Cortical	  networks	  for	  working	  memory	  and	  executive	  functions	  sustain	  the	  conscious	  resting	  state	  in	  man.	  Brain	  Research	  Bulletin,	  54(3),	  287–298.	  doi:10.1016/S0361-­‐9230(00)00437-­‐8	  McGraw,	  K.	  O.,	  &	  Wong,	  S.	  P.	  (1996).	  Forming	  inferences	  about	  some	  intraclass	  correlation	  coefficients.	  Psychological	  methods,	  1(1),	  30.	  Mellers,	  B.	  A.	  (2000).	  Choice	  and	  the	  relative	  pleasure	  of	  consequences.	  Psychological	  
bulletin,	  126(6),	  910.	  Michotte,	  A.,	  Thines,	  G.,	  &	  Crabbe,	  G.	  (1991).	  Amodal	  completion	  of	  perceptual	  structures.	  Michotte’s	  experimental	  phenomenology	  of	  perception,	  140–167.	  Mikuni,	  N.,	  Ohara,	  S.,	  Ikeda,	  A.,	  Hayashi,	  N.,	  Nishida,	  N.,	  Taki,	  J.,	  …	  Hashimoto,	  N.	  (2006).	  Evidence	  for	  a	  wide	  distribution	  of	  negative	  motor	  areas	  in	  the	  perirolandic	  cortex.	  Clinical	  Neurophysiology,	  117(1),	  33–40.	  Miller,	  E.	  K.,	  &	  Cohen,	  J.	  D.	  (2001).	  An	  Integrative	  Theory	  of	  Prefrontal	  Cortex	  Function.	  
Annual	  Review	  of	  Neuroscience,	  24(1),	  167–202.	  doi:10.1146/annurev.neuro.24.1.167	  Morrone,	  M.	  C.,	  Ross,	  J.,	  &	  Burr,	  D.	  (2005).	  Saccadic	  eye	  movements	  cause	  compression	  of	  time	  as	  well	  as	  space.	  Nature	  neuroscience,	  8(7),	  950–954.	  
References	  	  
297	  	  
Mostofsky,	  S.	  H.,	  &	  Simmonds,	  D.	  J.	  (2008).	  Response	  Inhibition	  and	  Response	  Selection:	  Two	  Sides	  of	  the	  Same	  Coin.	  Journal	  of	  Cognitive	  Neuroscience,	  20(5),	  751–761.	  doi:10.1162/jocn.2008.20500	  Mueller,	  V.	  A.,	  Brass,	  M.,	  Waszak,	  F.,	  &	  Prinz,	  W.	  (2007).	  The	  role	  of	  the	  preSMA	  and	  the	  rostral	  cingulate	  zone	  in	  internally	  selected	  actions.	  NeuroImage,	  37(4),	  1354–1361.	  Munoz,	  D.	  P.,	  &	  Everling,	  S.	  (2004).	  Look	  away:	  the	  anti-­‐saccade	  task	  and	  the	  voluntary	  control	  of	  eye	  movement.	  Nat	  Rev	  Neurosci,	  5(3),	  218–228.	  doi:10.1038/nrn1345	  Nachev,	  P.	  (2010).	  Free	  choice	  and	  voluntary	  action.	  Phsyche,	  16(1),	  87–98.	  Nachev,	  P.,	  &	  Husain,	  M.	  (2010).	  Action	  and	  the	  fallacy	  of	  the’internal’:	  Comment	  on	  Passingham	  et	  al.	  Trends	  in	  cognitive	  sciences,	  14(5),	  192.	  Nachev,	  P.,	  Kennard,	  C.,	  &	  Husain,	  M.	  (2008).	  Functional	  role	  of	  the	  supplementary	  and	  pre-­‐supplementary	  motor	  areas.	  Nat	  Rev	  Neurosci,	  advanced	  online	  publication.	  doi:10.1038/nrn2478	  Nachev,	  P.,	  Rees,	  G.,	  Parton,	  A.,	  Kennard,	  C.,	  &	  Husain,	  M.	  (2005).	  Volition	  and	  conflict	  in	  human	  medial	  frontal	  cortex.	  Current	  Biology,	  15(2),	  122–128.	  Nagai,	  Y.,	  Critchley,	  H.	  D.,	  Featherstone,	  E.,	  Fenwick,	  P.	  B.	  C.,	  Trimble,	  M.	  R.,	  &	  Dolan,	  R.	  J.	  (2004).	  Brain	  activity	  relating	  to	  the	  contingent	  negative	  variation:	  an	  fMRI	  investigation.	  Neuroimage,	  21(4),	  1232–1241.	  Nahmias,	  E.,	  Morris,	  S.,	  &	  Nadelhoffer,	  T.	  (2004).	  The	  Phenomenology	  of	  Free	  Will.	  
Journal	  of	  Consciousness	  Studies,	  11(7-­‐8),	  162–179.	  Nathaniel-­‐James,	  D.,	  &	  Frith,	  C.	  (2002).	  The	  role	  of	  the	  dorsolateral	  prefrontal	  cortex:	  evidence	  from	  the	  effects	  of	  contextual	  constraint	  in	  a	  sentence	  completion	  task.	  Neuroimage,	  16(4),	  1094–1102.	  Nichols,	  S.	  (2011).	  Experimental	  Philosophy	  and	  the	  Problem	  of	  Free	  Will.	  Science,	  
331(6023),	  1401.	  
References	  	  
298	  	  
Nickerson,	  R.	  S.	  (2002).	  The	  production	  and	  perception	  of	  randomness.	  Psychological	  
Review,	  109(2),	  330–357.	  Nickerson,	  R.	  S.,	  &	  Butler,	  S.	  F.	  (2009).	  On	  producing	  random	  binary	  sequences.	  The	  
American	  Journal	  of	  Psychology,	  122(2),	  141–151.	  Nieuwenhuis,	  S.,	  Forstmann,	  B.	  U.,	  &	  Wagenmakers,	  E.-­‐J.	  (2011).	  Erroneous	  analyses	  of	  interactions	  in	  neuroscience:	  a	  problem	  of	  significance.	  Nature	  Neuroscience,	  
14(9),	  1105–1107.	  doi:10.1038/nn.2886	  Obhi,	  S.	  S.,	  &	  Haggard,	  P.	  (2004).	  Internally	  generated	  and	  externally	  triggered	  actions	  are	  physically	  distinct	  and	  independently	  controlled.	  Experimental	  Brain	  
Research,	  156(4),	  518–523.	  Otten,	  L.	  J.,	  Quayle,	  A.	  H.,	  Akram,	  S.,	  Ditewig,	  T.	  A.,	  &	  Rugg,	  M.	  D.	  (2006).	  Brain	  activity	  before	  an	  event	  predicts	  later	  recollection.	  Nature	  neuroscience,	  9(4),	  489–491.	  Pariyadath,	  V.,	  &	  Eagleman,	  D.	  (2007).	  The	  Effect	  of	  Predictability	  on	  Subjective	  Duration.	  PLoS	  ONE,	  2(11),	  e1264.	  doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0001264	  Park,	  J.,	  Schlag-­‐Rey,	  M.,	  &	  Schlag,	  J.	  (2003).	  Voluntary	  action	  expands	  perceived	  duration	  of	  its	  sensory	  consequence.	  Experimental	  Brain	  Research,	  149(4),	  527–529.	  doi:10.1007/s00221-­‐003-­‐1376-­‐x	  Parkinson,	  J.,	  Springer,	  A.,	  &	  Prinz,	  W.	  (2011).	  Can	  you	  see	  me	  in	  the	  snow?	  Action	  simulation	  aids	  the	  detection	  of	  visually	  degraded	  human	  motion.	  The	  Quarterly	  
Journal	  of	  Experimental	  Psychology,	  64(8),	  1463–1472.	  doi:10.1080/17470218.2011.594895	  Parzen,	  E.	  (1962).	  On	  Estimation	  of	  a	  Probability	  Density	  Function	  and	  Mode.	  The	  
Annals	  of	  Mathematical	  Statistics,	  33(3),	  1065–1076.	  Passingham,	  R	  E.	  (1985).	  Premotor	  cortex:	  sensory	  cues	  and	  movement.	  Behavioural	  
Brain	  Research,	  18(2),	  175–185.	  Passingham,	  R.	  E.	  (1987).	  Two	  cortical	  systems	  for	  directing	  movement.	  Motor	  areas	  of	  
the	  cerebral	  cortex,	  132.	  Retrieved	  from	  
References	  	  
299	  	  
http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=LZjQjtUfo7UC&oi=fnd&pg=PA151&dq=passingham+ciba+foundation&ots=cedFALqapL&sig=lyFjP2R6uvPb3cPTndtc08FIqrE	  Passingham,	  R.	  E.,	  Bengtsson,	  S.	  L.,	  &	  Lau,	  H.	  (2009).	  Medial	  frontal	  cortex:	  from	  self-­‐generated	  action	  to	  reflection	  on	  one’s	  own	  performance.	  Trends	  in	  cognitive	  
sciences.	  Passingham,	  R.	  E.,	  Bengtsson,	  S.	  L.,	  &	  Lau,	  H.	  (2010).	  Is	  it	  fallacious	  to	  talk	  of	  self-­‐generated	  action?:	  Response	  to	  Nachev	  and	  Husain.	  Trends	  in	  Cognitive	  
Sciences,	  14(5),	  193–194.	  doi:10.1016/j.tics.2010.03.004	  Passingham,	  Richard	  E,	  Bengtsson,	  S.	  L.,	  &	  Lau,	  H.	  (2010).	  Medial	  frontal	  cortex:	  from	  self-­‐generated	  action	  to	  reflection	  on	  one’s	  own	  performance.	  Trends	  in	  
cognitive	  sciences,	  14(1),	  16–21.	  doi:10.1016/j.tics.2009.11.001	  Penfield,	  W.,	  &	  Boldrey,	  E.	  (1937).	  Somatic	  motor	  and	  sensory	  representation	  in	  the	  cerebral	  cortex	  of	  man	  as	  studied	  by	  electrical	  stimulation.	  Brain,	  60(4),	  389–443.	  Penfield,	  W.,	  &	  Welch,	  K.	  (1951).	  The	  supplementary	  motor	  area	  of	  the	  cerebral	  cortex:	  a	  clinical	  and	  experimental	  study.	  Arch.	  Neural.	  Psychiatry,	  66,	  289–317.	  Pfefferbaum,	  A.,	  Ford,	  J.	  M.,	  Weller,	  B.	  J.,	  &	  Kopell,	  B.	  S.	  (1985).	  ERPs	  to	  response	  production	  and	  inhibition.	  Electroencephalography	  and	  Clinical	  
Neurophysiology,	  60(5),	  423–434.	  doi:16/0013-­‐4694(85)91017-­‐X	  Picard,	  N.,	  &	  Strick,	  P.	  L.	  (1996).	  Motor	  Areas	  of	  the	  Medial	  Wall:	  A	  Review	  of	  Their	  Location	  and	  Functional	  Activation.	  Cerebral	  Cortex,	  6(3),	  342–353.	  doi:10.1093/cercor/6.3.342	  Picard,	  N.,	  &	  Strick,	  P.	  L.	  (2001).	  Imaging	  the	  premotor	  areas.	  Current	  Opinion	  in	  
Neurobiology,	  11(6),	  663–672.	  doi:10.1016/S0959-­‐4388(01)00266-­‐5	  
References	  	  
300	  	  
Polich,	  J.,	  &	  Ochoa,	  C.	  J.	  (2004).	  Alcoholism	  risk,	  tobacco	  smoking,	  and	  P300	  event-­‐related	  potential.	  Clinical	  Neurophysiology,	  115(6),	  1374–1383.	  doi:10.1016/j.clinph.2004.01.026	  Posner,	  M.	  I.	  (2005).	  Timing	  the	  Brain:	  Mental	  Chronometry	  as	  a	  Tool	  in	  Neuroscience.	  
PLoS	  Biol,	  3(2),	  e51.	  Praamstra,	  P.,	  Stegeman,	  D.	  F.,	  Horstink,	  M.,	  Brunia,	  C.	  H.	  M.,	  &	  Cools,	  A.	  R.	  (1995).	  Movement-­‐related	  potentials	  preceding	  voluntary	  movement	  are	  modulated	  by	  the	  mode	  of	  movement	  selection.	  Experimental	  brain	  research,	  103(3),	  429–439.	  Purcell,	  B.	  A.,	  Schall,	  J.	  D.,	  Logan,	  G.	  D.,	  &	  Palmeri,	  T.	  J.	  (2012).	  From	  Salience	  to	  Saccades:	  Multiple-­‐Alternative	  Gated	  Stochastic	  Accumulator	  Model	  of	  Visual	  Search.	  The	  Journal	  of	  Neuroscience,	  32(10),	  3433–3446.	  doi:10.1523/JNEUROSCI.4622-­‐11.2012	  Rakos,	  R.	  F.,	  Laurene,	  K.	  R.,	  Skala,	  S.,	  &	  Slane,	  S.	  (2008).	  Belief	  in	  free	  will:	  Measurement	  and	  conceptualization	  innovations.	  Behavior	  and	  Social	  Issues,	  17(1),	  20–39.	  Ramautar,	  J.	  R.,	  Kok,	  A.,	  &	  Ridderinkhof,	  K.	  R.	  (2004).	  Effects	  of	  stop-­‐signal	  probability	  in	  the	  stop-­‐signal	  paradigm:	  The	  N2/P3	  complex	  further	  validated.	  Brain	  and	  
Cognition,	  56(2),	  234–252.	  doi:10.1016/j.bandc.2004.07.002	  Richard	  Clark,	  C.,	  McFarlane,	  A.	  C.,	  Weber,	  D.	  L.,	  &	  Battersby,	  M.	  (1996).	  Enlarged	  frontal	  P300	  to	  stimulus	  change	  in	  panic	  disorder.	  Biological	  Psychiatry,	  39(10),	  845–856.	  doi:10.1016/0006-­‐3223(95)00288-­‐X	  Rigoni,	  D.,	  Kühn,	  S.,	  Sartori,	  G.,	  &	  Brass,	  M.	  (2011).	  Inducing	  Disbelief	  in	  Free	  Will	  Alters	  Brain	  Correlates	  of	  Preconscious	  Motor	  Preparation:	  The	  Brain	  Minds	  Whether	  We	  Believe	  in	  Free	  Will	  or	  Not.	  Psychological	  Science:	  A	  Journal	  of	  the	  American	  
Psychological	  Society	  /	  APS.	  Ringkamp,	  M.,	  Schepers,	  R.	  J.,	  Shimada,	  S.	  G.,	  Johanek,	  L.	  M.,	  Hartke,	  T.	  V.,	  Borzan,	  J.,	  …	  Meyer,	  R.	  A.	  (2011).	  A	  Role	  for	  Nociceptive,	  Myelinated	  Nerve	  Fibers	  in	  Itch	  
References	  	  
301	  	  
Sensation.	  The	  Journal	  of	  Neuroscience,	  31(42),	  14841–14849.	  doi:10.1523/JNEUROSCI.3005-­‐11.2011	  Robertson,	  I.	  H.,	  Manly,	  T.,	  Andrade,	  J.,	  Baddeley,	  B.	  T.,	  &	  Yiend,	  J.	  (1997).	  `Oops!’:	  Performance	  correlates	  of	  everyday	  attentional	  failures	  in	  traumatic	  brain	  injured	  and	  normal	  subjects.	  Neuropsychologia,	  35(6),	  747–758.	  Roepstorff,	  A.,	  &	  Frith,	  C.	  (2004).	  What’s	  at	  the	  top	  in	  the	  top-­‐down	  control	  of	  action?	  Script-­‐sharing	  and	  “top-­‐top”control	  of	  action	  in	  cognitive	  experiments.	  
Psychological	  Research,	  68(2),	  189–198.	  Rosenbaum,	  M.	  (1980).	  A	  schedule	  for	  assessing	  self-­‐control	  behaviors:	  Preliminary	  findings.	  Behavior	  Therapy,	  11(1),	  109–121.	  Rosenberg-­‐Katz,	  K.,	  Singer,	  N.,	  Podlipsky,	  I.,	  Intrator,	  N.,	  Fried,	  I.,	  &	  Hendler,	  T.	  (2012).	  Enhanced	  functional	  synchronization	  of	  medial	  and	  lateral	  PFC	  underlies	  internally-­‐guided	  action	  planning.	  Frontiers	  in	  Human	  Neuroscience,	  6,	  79.	  doi:10.3389/fnhum.2012.00079	  Rosenblatt,	  M.	  (1956).	  Remarks	  on	  Some	  Nonparametric	  Estimates	  of	  a	  Density	  Function.	  The	  Annals	  of	  Mathematical	  Statistics,	  27(3),	  832–837.	  Rotter,	  J.	  B.	  (1967).	  A	  new	  scale	  for	  the	  measurement	  of	  interpersonal	  trust1.	  Journal	  of	  
personality,	  35(4),	  651–665.	  Roux,	  S.,	  Coulmance,	  M.,	  &	  Riehle,	  A.	  (2003).	  Context-­‐related	  representation	  of	  timing	  processes	  in	  monkey	  motor	  cortex.	  European	  Journal	  of	  Neuroscience,	  18(4),	  1011–1016.	  doi:10.1046/j.1460-­‐9568.2003.02792.x	  Rowe,	  J.	  B.,	  Toni,	  I.,	  Josephs,	  O.,	  Frackowiak,	  R.	  S.	  J.,	  &	  Passingham,	  R.	  E.	  (2000).	  The	  Prefrontal	  Cortex:	  Response	  Selection	  or	  Maintenance	  Within	  Working	  Memory?	  Science,	  288(5471),	  1656	  –1660.	  Rubia,	  K.,	  Russell,	  T.,	  Overmeyer,	  S.,	  Brammer,	  M.	  J.,	  Bullmore,	  E.	  T.,	  Sharma,	  T.,	  …	  Taylor,	  E.	  (2001).	  Mapping	  motor	  inhibition:	  conjunctive	  brain	  activations	  
References	  	  
302	  	  
across	  different	  versions	  of	  go/no-­‐go	  and	  stop	  tasks.	  NeuroImage,	  13(2),	  250–261.	  doi:10.1006/nimg.2000.0685	  S.	  A.	  S.	  Institute.	  (1999).	  SAS/STAT	  User’s	  guide:	  Version	  8	  (Vol.	  1).	  SAS	  institute.	  Sakai,	  K.,	  Hikosaka,	  O.,	  Miyauchi,	  S.,	  Sasaki,	  Y.,	  Fujimaki,	  N.,	  &	  Pütz,	  B.	  (1999).	  Presupplementary	  motor	  area	  activation	  during	  sequence	  learning	  reflects	  visuo-­‐motor	  association.	  The	  Journal	  of	  neuroscience:	  the	  official	  journal	  of	  the	  
Society	  for	  Neuroscience,	  19(10),	  RC1.	  Sarkissian,	  H.,	  Chatterjee,	  A.,	  De	  Brigard,	  F.,	  Knobe,	  J.,	  Nichols,	  S.,	  &	  Sirker,	  S.	  (2010).	  Is	  Belief	  in	  Free	  Will	  a	  Cultural	  Universal?	  Mind	  &	  Language,	  25(3),	  346–358.	  Schepers,	  R.	  J.,	  Johanek,	  L.	  M.,	  Hartke,	  T.	  V.,	  Shim,	  B.,	  Borzan,	  J.,	  Meyer,	  R.	  A.,	  &	  Ringkamp,	  M.	  (2008).	  A	  subpopulation	  of	  A-­‐delta	  nociceptors	  in	  monkey	  is	  vigorously	  activated	  by	  cowhage	  spicules.	  In	  Soc	  Neurosci	  Abstr	  (Vol.	  34).	  Schieber,	  M.	  H.,	  &	  Hibbard,	  L.	  S.	  (1993).	  How	  somatotopic	  is	  the	  motor	  cortex	  hand	  area?	  Science,	  261(5120),	  489–492.	  doi:10.1126/science.8332915	  Schlaghecken,	  F.,	  &	  Eimer,	  M.	  (2004).	  Masked	  prime	  stimuli	  can	  bias“	  free”	  choices	  between	  response	  alternatives.	  Psychonomic	  Bulletin	  and	  Review,	  11,	  463–468.	  Schubotz,	  R.	  I.,	  Friederici,	  A.	  D.,	  &	  Yves	  von	  Cramon,	  D.	  (2000).	  Time	  Perception	  and	  Motor	  Timing:	  A	  Common	  Cortical	  and	  Subcortical	  Basis	  Revealed	  by	  fMRI.	  
NeuroImage,	  11(1),	  1–12.	  doi:10.1006/nimg.1999.0514	  Schütz,	  A.	  C.,	  &	  Morrone,	  M.	  C.	  (2010).	  Compression	  of	  time	  during	  smooth	  pursuit	  eye	  movements.	  Vision	  research,	  50(24),	  2702–2713.	  Schüür,	  F.,	  &	  Haggard,	  P.	  (2011).	  What	  are	  self-­‐generated	  actions?	  Consciousness	  and	  
Cognition,	  20(4),	  1697–1704.	  Sebanz,	  N.,	  Bekkering,	  H.,	  &	  Knoblich,	  G.	  (2006).	  Joint	  action:	  bodies	  and	  minds	  moving	  together.	  Trends	  in	  Cognitive	  Sciences,	  10(2),	  70–76.	  Shackman,	  A.	  J.,	  Salomons,	  T.	  V.,	  Slagter,	  H.	  A.,	  Fox,	  A.	  S.,	  Winter,	  J.	  J.,	  &	  Davidson,	  R.	  J.	  (2011).	  The	  integration	  of	  negative	  affect,	  pain	  and	  cognitive	  control	  in	  the	  
References	  	  
303	  	  
cingulate	  cortex.	  Nature	  Reviews	  Neuroscience,	  12(3),	  154–167.	  doi:10.1038/nrn2994	  Shadlen,	  M.	  N.,	  &	  Gold,	  J.	  I.	  (2004).	  The	  neurophysiology	  of	  decision-­‐making	  as	  a	  window	  on	  cognition.	  The	  Cognitive	  Neurosciences,	  1229–1241.	  Shadlen,	  M.	  N.,	  &	  Newsome,	  W.	  T.	  (1996).	  Motion	  perception:	  seeing	  and	  deciding.	  
Proceedings	  of	  the	  National	  Academy	  of	  Sciences,	  93(2),	  628	  –633.	  Sheather,	  S.	  (2004).	  Density	  Estimation.	  Statistical	  Science,	  19(4),	  588–597.	  Sherrington,	  C.	  S.	  (1906).	  The	  integrative	  action	  of	  the	  nervous	  system.	  Scribner.	  Shibasaki,	  H.,	  &	  Hallett,	  M.	  (2006).	  What	  is	  the	  Bereitschaftspotential?	  Clinical	  
Neurophysiology,	  117(11),	  2341–2356.	  doi:10.1016/j.clinph.2006.04.025	  Shima,	  K.,	  Mushiake,	  H.,	  Saito,	  N.,	  &	  Tanji,	  J.	  (1996).	  Role	  for	  Cells	  in	  the	  Presupplementary	  Motor	  Area	  in	  Updating	  Motor	  Plans.	  Proceedings	  of	  the	  
National	  Academy	  of	  Sciences,	  93(16),	  8694–8698.	  Shimazaki,	  H.,	  &	  Shinomoto,	  S.	  (2010).	  Kernel	  bandwidth	  optimization	  in	  spike	  rate	  estimation.	  Journal	  of	  computational	  neuroscience,	  29(1),	  171–182.	  Simon,	  J.	  R.	  (1969).	  Reactions	  toward	  the	  source	  of	  stimulation.	  Journal	  of	  Experimental	  
Psychology,	  81(1),	  174.	  Sirigu,	  A.,	  Daprati,	  E.,	  Ciancia,	  S.,	  Giraux,	  P.,	  Nighoghossian,	  N.,	  Posada,	  A.,	  &	  Haggard,	  P.	  (2004).	  Altered	  awareness	  of	  voluntary	  action	  after	  damage	  to	  the	  parietal	  cortex.	  Nat	  Neurosci,	  7(1),	  80–84.	  doi:10.1038/nn1160	  Skinner,	  B.	  F.	  (1938).	  The	  behavior	  of	  organisms:	  An	  experimental	  analysis.	  Retrieved	  from	  http://psycnet.apa.org/psycinfo/1939-­‐00056-­‐000	  Smallwood,	  J.,	  &	  Schooler,	  J.	  W.	  (2006).	  The	  restless	  mind.	  Psychological	  Bulletin,	  
132(6),	  946.	  Smith,	  J.	  L.,	  Johnstone,	  S.	  J.,	  &	  Barry,	  R.	  J.	  (2008).	  Movement-­‐related	  potentials	  in	  the	  Go/NoGo	  task:	  The	  P3	  reflects	  both	  cognitive	  and	  motor	  inhibition.	  Clinical	  
Neurophysiology,	  119(3),	  704–714.	  doi:10.1016/j.clinph.2007.11.042	  
References	  	  
304	  	  
Smith,	  P.	  L.,	  &	  Ratcliff,	  R.	  (2004).	  Psychology	  and	  neurobiology	  of	  simple	  decisions.	  
Trends	  in	  Neurosciences,	  27(3),	  161–168.	  doi:10.1016/j.tins.2004.01.006	  Snyder,	  H.	  R.,	  &	  Munakata,	  Y.	  (2010).	  Becoming	  self-­‐directed:	  Abstract	  representations	  support	  endogenous	  flexibility	  in	  children.	  Cognition,	  116(2),	  155–167.	  doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2010.04.007	  Soon,	  C.	  S.,	  Brass,	  M.,	  Heinze,	  H.	  J.,	  &	  Haynes,	  J.	  D.	  (2008).	  Unconscious	  determinants	  of	  free	  decisions	  in	  the	  human	  brain.	  Nature	  neuroscience,	  11(5),	  543–545.	  Spence,	  S.	  (2009).	  The	  actor’s	  brain:	  Exploring	  the	  cognitive	  neuroscience	  of	  free	  will.	  Oxford	  University	  Press.	  Stadler,	  W.,	  Schubotz,	  R.	  I.,	  Von	  Cramon,	  D.	  Y.,	  Springer,	  A.,	  Graf,	  M.,	  &	  Prinz,	  W.	  (2011).	  Predicting	  and	  memorizing	  observed	  action:	  Differential	  premotor	  cortex	  involvement.	  Human	  Brain	  Mapping,	  32(5),	  677–687.	  doi:10.1002/hbm.20949	  Staub,	  E.,	  Tursky,	  B.,	  &	  Schwartz,	  G.	  E.	  (1971).	  Self-­‐control	  and	  predictability:	  Their	  effects	  on	  reactions	  to	  aversive	  stimulation.	  Journal	  of	  Personality	  and	  Social	  
Psychology,	  18(2),	  157.	  Stroop,	  J.	  R.	  (1935).	  Studies	  of	  interference	  in	  verbal	  reactions.	  Journal	  of	  Experimental	  
Psychology,	  18(6),	  3–662.	  Swann,	  N.	  C.,	  Cai,	  W.,	  Conner,	  C.	  R.,	  Pieters,	  T.	  A.,	  Claffey,	  M.	  P.,	  George,	  J.	  S.,	  …	  Tandon,	  N.	  (2011).	  Roles	  for	  the	  pre-­‐supplementary	  motor	  area	  and	  the	  right	  inferior	  frontal	  gyrus	  in	  stopping	  action:	  Electrophysiological	  responses	  and	  functional	  and	  structural	  connectivity.	  Neuroimage.	  Swick,	  D.,	  Ashley,	  V.,	  &	  Turken,	  U.	  (2011).	  Are	  the	  neural	  correlates	  of	  stopping	  and	  not	  going	  identical?	  Quantitative	  meta-­‐analysis	  of	  two	  response	  inhibition	  tasks.	  
NeuroImage,	  56(3),	  1655–1665.	  doi:10.1016/j.neuroimage.2011.02.070	  Tangney,	  J.	  P.,	  Baumeister,	  R.	  F.,	  &	  Boone,	  A.	  L.	  (2004).	  High	  self-­‐control	  predicts	  good	  adjustment,	  less	  pathology,	  better	  grades,	  and	  interpersonal	  success.	  Journal	  of	  
Personality,	  72(2),	  271–324.	  
References	  	  
305	  	  
Tanji,	  J.,	  &	  Hoshi,	  E.	  (2001).	  Behavioral	  planning	  in	  the	  prefrontal	  cortex.	  Current	  
Opinion	  in	  Neurobiology,	  11(2),	  164–170.	  doi:10.1016/S0959-­‐4388(00)00192-­‐6	  Tanji,	  J.,	  &	  Hoshi,	  E.	  (2008).	  Role	  of	  the	  Lateral	  Prefrontal	  Cortex	  in	  Executive	  Behavioral	  Control.	  Physiological	  Reviews,	  88(1),	  37	  –57.	  doi:10.1152/physrev.00014.2007	  Tecce,	  J.	  J.	  (1972).	  Contingent	  negative	  variation	  (CNV)	  and	  psychological	  processes	  in	  man.	  Psychological	  Bulletin,	  77(2),	  73–108.	  Thaler,	  D.,	  Chen,	  Y.	  C.,	  Nixon,	  P.	  D.,	  Stern,	  C.	  E.,	  &	  Passingham,	  R.	  E.	  (1995).	  The	  functions	  of	  the	  medial	  premotor	  cortex.	  I.	  Simple	  learned	  movements.	  Experimental	  
Brain	  Research.	  Experimentelle	  Hirnforschung.	  Expérimentation	  Cérébrale,	  
102(3),	  445–460.	  Thomas,	  E.,	  &	  Brown,	  I.	  (1974).	  Time	  perception	  and	  the	  filled-­‐duration	  illusion.	  
Attention,	  Perception,	  &	  Psychophysics,	  16(3),	  449–458.	  doi:10.3758/BF03198571	  Thomas,	  S.	  (1894).	  Summa	  theologica	  (Vol.	  6).	  Typographia	  Forzani	  et	  S.	  Thut,	  G.,	  Hauert,	  C.-­‐A.,	  Viviani,	  P.,	  Morand,	  S.,	  Spinelli,	  L.,	  Blanke,	  O.,	  …	  Michel,	  C.	  (2000).	  Internally	  driven	  vs.	  externally	  cued	  movement	  selection:	  a	  study	  on	  the	  timing	  of	  brain	  activity.	  Cognitive	  Brain	  Research,	  9(3),	  261–269.	  doi:10.1016/S0926-­‐6410(00)00004-­‐5	  Tolkien,	  J.	  R.	  R.	  (1954).	  The	  Lord	  of	  the	  Rings.	  3	  vols.	  London:	  George	  Allen	  &	  Unwin,	  
55(1),	  8.	  Tomassini,	  V.,	  Jbabdi,	  S.,	  Klein,	  J.	  C.,	  Behrens,	  T.	  E.	  J.,	  Pozzilli,	  C.,	  Matthews,	  P.	  M.,	  …	  Johansen-­‐Berg,	  H.	  (2007).	  Diffusion-­‐Weighted	  Imaging	  Tractography-­‐Based	  Parcellation	  of	  the	  Human	  Lateral	  Premotor	  Cortex	  Identifies	  Dorsal	  and	  Ventral	  Subregions	  with	  Anatomical	  and	  Functional	  Specializations.	  The	  Journal	  
of	  Neuroscience,	  27(38),	  10259–10269.	  doi:10.1523/JNEUROSCI.2144-­‐07.2007	  
References	  	  
306	  	  
Treleaven-­‐Hassard,	  S.,	  Gold,	  J.,	  Bellman,	  S.,	  Schweda,	  A.,	  Ciorciari,	  J.,	  Critchley,	  C.,	  &	  Varan,	  D.	  (2010).	  Using	  the	  P3a	  to	  gauge	  automatic	  attention	  to	  interactive	  television	  advertising.	  Journal	  of	  Economic	  Psychology,	  31(5),	  777–784.	  doi:10.1016/j.joep.2010.03.007	  Trevena,	  J.,	  &	  Miller,	  J.	  (2009).	  Brain	  preparation	  before	  a	  voluntary	  action:	  Evidence	  against	  unconscious	  movement	  initiation.	  Consciousness	  and	  Cognition.	  Uematsu,	  S.,	  Lesser,	  R.,	  Fisher,	  R.	  S.,	  Gordon,	  B.,	  Hara,	  K.,	  Krauss,	  G.	  L.,	  …	  Webber,	  R.	  W.	  (1992).	  Motor	  and	  sensory	  cortex	  in	  humans:	  topography	  studied	  with	  chronic	  subdural	  stimulation.	  Neurosurgery,	  31(1),	  59.	  Vallesi,	  A.,	  &	  Stuss,	  D.	  T.	  (2010).	  Excessive	  sub-­‐threshold	  motor	  preparation	  for	  non-­‐target	  stimuli	  in	  normal	  aging.	  NeuroImage,	  50(3),	  1251–1257.	  doi:10.1016/j.neuroimage.2010.01.022	  Van	  Eimeren,	  T.,	  Wolbers,	  T.,	  Münchau,	  A.,	  Büchel,	  C.,	  Weiller,	  C.,	  &	  Siebner,	  H.	  R.	  (2006).	  Implementation	  of	  visuospatial	  cues	  in	  response	  selection.	  NeuroImage,	  
29(1),	  286–294.	  Van	  Gaal,	  S.,	  Ridderinkhof,	  K.	  R.,	  Van	  den	  Wildenberg,	  W.	  P.	  M.,	  &	  Lamme,	  V.	  A.	  F.	  (2009).	  Dissociating	  consciousness	  from	  inhibitory	  control:	  Evidence	  for	  unconsciously	  triggered	  response	  inhibition	  in	  the	  stop-­‐signal	  task.	  Journal	  of	  
Experimental	  Psychology:	  Human	  Perception	  and	  Performance,	  35(4),	  1129–1139.	  doi:10.1037/a0013551	  Velmans,	  M.	  (2002).	  How	  could	  conscious	  experiences	  affect	  brains?	  Journal	  of	  
Consciousness	  Studies,	  9(11),	  3–29.	  Verbruggen,	  F.,	  &	  Logan,	  G.	  D.	  (2008a).	  Response	  inhibition	  in	  the	  stop-­‐signal	  paradigm.	  
Trends	  in	  Cognitive	  Sciences,	  12(11),	  418–424.	  doi:10.1016/j.tics.2008.07.005	  Verbruggen,	  F.,	  &	  Logan,	  G.	  D.	  (2008b).	  Automatic	  and	  controlled	  response	  inhibition:	  Associative	  learning	  in	  the	  go/no-­‐go	  and	  stop-­‐signal	  paradigms.	  Journal	  of	  
Experimental	  Psychology:	  General,	  137(4),	  649–672.	  doi:10.1037/a0013170	  
References	  	  
307	  	  
Vogt,	  B.	  A.,	  Nimchinsky,	  E.	  A.,	  Vogt,	  L.	  J.,	  &	  Hof,	  P.	  R.	  (1995).	  Human	  cingulate	  cortex:	  Surface	  features,	  flat	  maps,	  and	  cytoarchitecture.	  The	  Journal	  of	  Comparative	  
Neurology,	  359(3),	  490–506.	  doi:10.1002/cne.903590310	  Vohs,	  K.	  D.,	  &	  Schmeichel,	  B.	  J.	  (2003).	  Self-­‐regulation	  and	  the	  extended	  now:	  Controlling	  the	  self	  alters	  the	  subjective	  experience	  of	  time.	  Journal	  of	  
Personality	  and	  Social	  Psychology,	  85(2),	  217–230.	  Vohs,	  K.	  D.,	  &	  Schooler,	  J.	  W.	  (2008).	  The	  value	  of	  believing	  in	  free	  will.	  Psychological	  
Science,	  19(1),	  49.	  Wald,	  A.,	  &	  Wolfowitz,	  J.	  (1940).	  On	  a	  test	  whether	  two	  samples	  are	  from	  the	  same	  population.	  The	  Annals	  of	  Mathematical	  Statistics,	  11(2),	  147–162.	  Walsh,	  E.,	  Kühn,	  S.,	  Brass,	  M.,	  Wenke,	  D.,	  &	  Haggard,	  P.	  (2010).	  EEG	  activations	  during	  intentional	  inhibition	  of	  voluntary	  action:	  an	  electrophysiological	  correlate	  of	  self-­‐control?	  Neuropsychologia,	  48(2),	  619–626.	  Walter,	  W.	  G.,	  Cooper,	  R.,	  Aldrige,	  V.	  J.,	  McCallum,	  W.	  C.,	  &	  Winter,	  A.	  L.	  (1964).	  Contingent	  negative	  variation:	  an	  electric	  sign	  of	  sensorimotor	  association	  and	  expectancy	  in	  the	  human	  brain.	  Nature,	  203,	  380–384.	  Waszak,	  F.,	  Wascher,	  E.,	  Keller,	  P.,	  Koch,	  I.,	  Aschersleben,	  G.,	  Rosenbaum,	  D.	  A.,	  &	  Prinz,	  W.	  (2005).	  Intention-­‐based	  and	  stimulus-­‐based	  mechanisms	  in	  action	  selection.	  
Experimental	  brain	  research,	  162(3),	  346–356.	  Watanabe,	  K.,	  Igaki,	  S.,	  &	  Funahashi,	  S.	  (2006).	  Contributions	  of	  prefrontal	  cue-­‐,	  delay-­‐,	  and	  response-­‐period	  activity	  to	  the	  decision	  process	  of	  saccade	  direction	  in	  a	  free-­‐choice	  ODR	  task.	  Neural	  Networks,	  19(8),	  1203–1222.	  doi:10.1016/j.neunet.2006.05.033	  Watson,	  A.	  B.,	  &	  Pelli,	  D.	  G.	  (1983).	  QUEST:	  A	  Bayesian	  adaptive	  psychometric	  method.	  
Attention,	  Perception,	  &	  Psychophysics,	  33(2),	  113–120.	  Wegner,	  D.	  (2002).	  The	  Illusion	  of	  Conscious	  Will	  (Cambridge.	  MA.	  
References	  	  
308	  	  
Wegner,	  D.,	  &	  Wheatley,	  T.	  (1999).	  Apparent	  mental	  causation:	  Sources	  of	  the	  experience	  of	  will.	  American	  Psychologist,	  54(7),	  480–492.	  Wenke,	  D.,	  Waszak,	  F.,	  &	  Haggard,	  P.	  (2009).	  Action	  selection	  and	  action	  awareness.	  
Psychological	  Research,	  73(4),	  602–612.	  doi:10.1007/s00426-­‐009-­‐0240-­‐4	  Wittmann,	  M.,	  Von	  Steinbüchel,	  N.,	  &	  Szelag,	  E.	  (2001).	  Hemispheric	  specialisation	  for	  self-­‐paced	  motor	  sequences.	  Brain	  research.	  Cognitive	  brain	  research,	  10(3),	  341–344.	  Wundt,	  W.	  M.	  (1909).	  Über	  reine	  und	  angewandte	  Psychologie.	  Yantis,	  S.	  (1995).	  Perceived	  continuity	  of	  occluded	  visual	  objects.	  Psychological	  Science,	  182–186.	  Yarrow,	  K.,	  Haggard,	  P.,	  Heal,	  R.,	  Brown,	  P.,	  &	  Rothwell,	  J.	  C.	  (2001).	  Illusory	  perceptions	  of	  space	  and	  time	  preserve	  cross-­‐saccadic	  perceptual	  continuity.	  Nature,	  
414(6861),	  302–305.	  doi:10.1038/35104551	  Yarrow,	  K.,	  &	  Rothwell,	  J.	  C.	  (2003).	  Manual	  Chronostasis:	  Tactile	  Perception	  Precedes	  Physical	  Contact.	  Current	  Biology,	  13(13),	  1134–1139.	  doi:10.1016/S0960-­‐9822(03)00413-­‐5	  Yarrow,	  K.,	  Whiteley,	  L.,	  Rothwell,	  J.	  C.,	  &	  Haggard,	  P.	  (2006).	  Spatial	  consequences	  of	  bridging	  the	  saccadic	  gap.	  Vision	  Research,	  46(4),	  545–555.	  doi:10.1016/j.visres.2005.04.019	  Zhang,	  J.,	  Hughes,	  L.	  E.,	  &	  Rowe,	  J.	  B.	  (2012).	  Selection	  and	  inhibition	  mechanisms	  for	  human	  voluntary	  action	  decisions.	  NeuroImage,	  63(1),	  392–402.	  doi:10.1016/j.neuroimage.2012.06.058	  
 
